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Abstract 
The University of Manchester 
Jorge Manuel de Meneses Bateira 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), 2010 
Institutions, Markets and Economic Evolution 
Conceptual Basis for a Naturalist Institutionalism 
We might wonder, after two centuries of economic science and 
thousands of articles and books written by economists, if 
something new can still be said about ‘markets’. Today, what new 
contribution could still be given to a so fundamental concept in 
economics? This thesis builds on the main legacy of Veblen, Polanyi 
and Hayek’s Institutionalism: the distinction between the 
‘interactional’ level of human sociality and the ‘structural’ level of 
society that Veblen named ‘institutions’. The three authors 
tentatively formulated an original idea: the two levels of 
sociocultural reality are interdependent and mutually constitutive. 
This is a proto-emergentist ontology of institutions that makes the 
starting point of the thesis. Convergent results of different 
disciplines are explored in order to develop such ontology. It is 
argued that sociocultural systems have properties that make them 
specific, namely the human capacity to interact in multiple scales of 
time-space using human language. Sociocultural research cannot 
be guided by conceptual schemes abstracted from other levels of 
Nature. This is the bedrock of a Naturalist Institutionalism. To 
understand institutions we need to discuss meanings and culture; 
we need to enter the semiotic of Peirce, the founder of Pragmatism. 
The foregoing implies the distinction of three types of inter-
dependent processes in sociocultural systems: the cultural 
(‘norms’); the social (networks, organisations); the material reality. 
This analytical move enables a redefinition of ‘institution’: a 
sociocultural system emergent from inter-related organisations, 
networks, norms and material reality, which structure individuals 
and organisations and serves a societal function. In this sense, the 
‘economy’ is a macro-institution and markets are sub-systems of 
the ‘economy’, meso-institutions. Thus, a market is a self-
organizing, complex, and open system endowed with structural 
levels emergent from persons’ interactions-communications 
participating in the transformation processes of production, 
distribution, appropriation and consumption, using matter-energy 
and symbolic tools. Finally, it is argued that the evolutionary 
process of markets has a specific sociocultural nature that goes by 
the name of ‘history’. Their motion is discussed with recourse to a 
model that highlights the interactions of markets with science, 
state and culture to solve problems of uncertainty and coordination 
in the processes of competition, cooperation and valuation. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Research questions 
We might wonder, after two centuries of economic science and thousands of 
articles and books written by economists, if something new can still be said 
about ‘markets’. Today, what new contribution could still be given to a so 
fundamental concept in economics? 
However, in the recent Elgar Companion to Social Economics, Geoffrey 
Hodgson (2008: 251), a leading figure of contemporary Institutional 
economics, wrote in the entry “Markets”: “No fewer than three Nobel 
Laureates have noted the paradoxical omission of discussion of market 
institutions in the literature in economics.” Leaving aside institutions, 
perhaps a robust neoclassical theory of markets could be available; but even 
this hypothesis is discarded (Ibid, 251-252): 
Even in the 1980s Ronald Coase (1988, p. 7) could still observe that ‘in 
modern economic theory the market itself has an even more shadowy role 
than the firm’. Economists are interested only in ‘the determination of 
market prices’ whereas ‘discussion of the market place itself has entirely 
disappeared’. 
A quick look at the curricula of undergraduate courses in economics, and at 
the textbooks that support them, flagrantly confirms the diagnosis. Besides 
graphics about supply and demand, we do not find even a minimal 
elaboration about markets, much less a chapter dedicated to explain them to 
undergraduates. No wonder the financial crisis that began in 2007-2008, 
then the quasi-collapse of financial markets, took by surprise the mainstream 
of the profession, including the most accredited economists at the best 
ranked universities. 
This thesis takes as point of departure economics current poor 
understanding of markets and intends to advance scientific knowledge in this 
fundamental field. It will argue that markets are institutions. Thus, a central 
place will be given to the understanding of institutions. In doing so, the 
15 
 
thesis aims to give a contribution to the updating and consolidation of 
Institutional economics that could be useful to policy makers, particularly in 
a time of great challenges to contemporary societies. 
Years ago, Uskali Mäki (1993: 20) recalled the critique addressed to the so-
called ‘Old’ Institutionalism about the lack of a theory and an obsession with 
collection of empirical material. In that same passage Mäki quotes a 
statement by Robert Langlois: 
[Followers of Veblen] wanted an economics with institutions but without 
theory; the problem with many neoclassicists is that they want economic 
theory without institutions; what we should really want is both institutions 
and theory. 
What happened since then has been the consolidation of this programme; a 
theoretical and applied “economics with institutions”, precisely the title of 
Mäki’s text. As a consequence, a large part of its promoters – those of so-
called New Institutional Economics (NIE) – has been included in the 
mainstream of the discipline, which now spans from Neo and New Classics, 
New Keynesians, Game theoreticians and New Institutionalists. And for some 
time there are scholars also engaged in making bridges, if not promoting a 
convergence, between the Old and the ‘well behaved’ NIE stream (see 
Rutherford, 1995). 
This thesis is unabashedly non-mainstream; it is unequivocally theoretical, 
and nevertheless affiliated to Thorstein Veblen’s Institutional economics, 
which I prefer to label (instead of ‘Old’) Original Institutionalism. Rather than 
working to improve a stream of “economics with institutions”, the thesis 
argues for an “economics of the economy”, by which I mean that the object of 
economics is the ‘institution-economy’. Although highlighting that there is 
more to the economy than markets, the focus of the thesis is on markets; it 
aims to give a contribution to the understanding of markets’ nature and 
motion, qua institutions of society. 
More precisely, I argue that the ‘economy’ is a macro-institution of society; a 
self-organising, complex and open, sociocultural system. Ioannides and 
Nielsen (2007: 10) would find in this stance a trade-off: 
On the one hand, openness increases relevance but reduces possibilities for 
modelling. On the other hand, a closed system is more susceptible to 
modelling but is less relevant. 
16 
 
I totally disagree with such view, and in this thesis I intend to show 
(hopefully) that open systems can also be modelled, on the condition that we 
shake off the neoclassical frame of mind that equates theoretical modelling 
with mathematical formulas. Of course, any kind of modelling implies the 
acceptance of simplifications, but the crucial point resides in what we retain, 
what we let go, what assumptions we make. Unfortunately, in the vain hope 
of looking for recognition by the mainstream of the profession, some non-
mainstream economists accept to be constrained by such narrow view about 
research methods, and indeed about what science is about. 
This thesis embraces a systemic approach: markets are subsystems of the 
economy, which is itself a subsystem of society. I reserve for this kind of  
societal system – markets, economy, science, state and others – the term 
‘institution’. This is in strong contrast with the meaning of institutions that is 
usually adopted in Institutional economics literature, New and Old. As an 
illustration, consider the following statement (Samuels, 1995: 571): 
Although Institutionalists disagree as to how much and what precisely is 
important in the neoclassicists’ analysis of the operation of pure market 
mechanisms in allocating resources, they all agree that markets are 
organised by and give effect to the institutions which form them. 
This is the typical formulation “markets cum institutions”, which suggests 
that we have on one side “pure market mechanisms” and on another side 
“institutions”; to work, markets need these ‘impurities’. 
What actually are these “institutions” that organise markets? Some 
Institutionalists that have studied with the second generation of 
Institutionalist economists in the USA maintain that institutions are part of 
society’s culture (for instance Mayhew, 1987). Note that the above presented 
statement tells us that “markets … give effect to the institutions which form 
them.” So we have here an issue of ‘circular causation’, a causal recursivity, 
involving “market mechanisms” and “institutions”, the latter possibly of a 
cultural nature. 
If we take account that Veblen adopted the Darwinian idea of “cumulative 
causation”, perhaps it is pertinent to assume that “market mechanisms” and 
“institutions” mutually constitute themselves through processes of 
cumulative and recursive causation. This understanding is agnostic about 
what concerns the systemness of such overall process (a ‘unit’ that is not 
named) but at least it makes sense in light of the concept of ‘emergence’ 
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used in other sciences, though the term is seldom used in the Institutional 
economics literature. 
However, what seems a problem of clarity and choice of terms quickly turns 
into a complicated issue when the scope of “institutions” is suddenly 
augmented. Two pages after, Samuels (1995: 573) states: 
institutionalists insist that the ultimate determinant of allocation of 
resources is not some abstract market mechanism but the institutions, 
especially the power structures, which structure markets and to which 
markets give effect. 
In this passage we are told that “institutions” also comprise “power 
structures”, which certainly points to organisations, entities where we find 
layers of hierarchical relations through which power is exercised, especially 
firms that are leading actors of markets. Here we need to ask: if “institutions” 
(comprising both cultural entities and firms) structure “markets”, what do 
they really structure? What are exactly these “markets”? The answer might be 
looked for in John Commons, a disciple of Veblen: they structure “individuals’ 
transactions” (Kaufman, 2007). This augmented formulation could be 
acceptable if the above mentioned system-unit, as constituted by 
“individuals’ transactions”, the “institutions” that are given “effect” by them, 
and the relations between them (indeed, the higher-level encompassing 
system) were explicitly acknowledged. 
Actually, the problem is deeper. The relations between “individuals’ 
transactions” and the so-called “institutions” is seldom analysed. What is 
exactly involved in this articulation so that transactions “give effect to the 
institutions which form them”, while some “institutions” are of an ideational 
kind and others are organisations? Is it enough to range everything under the 
concepts of ‘habits’ and ‘rules’, as contemporary Veblenians do, in order to 
account for processes relating “the market” and two kinds of “institutions”? 
And what is the analytical usefulness of the “institution” as a concept when 
“language, money, law, systems of weights and measures, table manners, 
firms (and other organizations) are thus all institutions” (Hodgson, 2006b: 
2)? 
This thesis attempts to answer these questions and shed light on this 
problematic riddle that plagues the very name of this stream of heterodox 
economics. Namely, the lack of research about the processes that make “the 
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market” a systemic unit – a unit made by individuals’ interactions-
communications of a particular kind and the structures that emerge upon 
them and at the same time structure them. After all, what is the future of 
Original Institutionalism if the ideas of those who are affiliated to it are all 
but clear about the ‘corner stone’ of their theoretical edifice? Facing head on 
these obscurities, the research of this thesis aims to answer the following 
questions: 
- What is an institution? Is it a set of cultural and social structures 
coupled with individuals’ interactions? If so, do these sets make a 
sociocultural system? Could we say that any sort of sociocultural 
system is an institution, or should we reserve the term ‘institution’ to 
the upper-level structures of these systems? 
- Is the market an institution? How do we make an ontological 
distinction between the cultural components of markets and the 
organisational ones, namely firms? Do these two kinds of market 
structures relate in the same way to the lower-level interactions 
between individuals? What are precisely the processes that are at work 
in the emergence of these two kinds of structures? 
- Do markets evolve? What connects the evolution of markets and 
societies to the evolution of the other levels of reality? Can we admit 
that, at a high level of abstraction, all evolutionary processes have a 
similar structure? 
- Can we build a theory of capitalist markets that could be helpful in 
understanding their historical and geographical specificity as 
institutions of particular societies? 
To answer these questions I had to deal with the limitations of my own 
training as economist, and the limitations of the discipline itself. I quickly 
understood that not only the full accomplishment of the project is beyond 
the capacity of a single researcher but it also required the risk of crossing 
disciplinary boundaries. Without a strong methodological ‘glue’ the very 
preliminary outcomes of such ambitious journey would fall apart shortly after 
the first steps. I had to make methodological choices that could guide my 
endeavour in the building of what ultimately became a domain-specific 
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ontological theory (Davidsen, 2005). In the next section I present the 
methodological assumptions of this thesis. 
1.2 Methodological assumptions 
By methodological assumptions I mean the philosophical points of departure 
and general guiding principles of my journey towards building an ontology of 
markets. 
Mainstream economics rarely states at the outset the methodological 
assumptions of its research. I will behave precisely in the opposite way and 
accept the following statement (Jackson, 1995: 777): 
Academics working as social scientists, by the nature of their activities, 
have little choice but to make ontological presuppositions. The realist 
argument is that it is better for these presuppositions to be declared  from 
the outset and not left implicit in one’s epistemology or theory. 
Methodological choices that lay the ground for scientific research are 
researcher’s answers to questions about: Metaphysics – what is reality? 
Ontology – how is reality organised? Epistemology – how do we know reality?  
My answers are different from those we usually find in non-mainstream 
economics literature. In this introductory chapter I limit myself to a brief 
synthesis of my options and will not contrast them with those of leading 
authors in Institutional economics.1 The unfolding of the thesis will open up 
the opportunity to contrast my choices with others’ at the moment of 
discussing particular topics. 
1.2.1 Metaphysics of process 
As the Spanish philosopher Zubiri (2003 [1989]) has stated in the first lines 
of an interesting book, “things, in fact, “are” in a certain way but also 
“become”, have a becoming.” This gives us a clue of what is the meaning of a 
metaphysics of reality understood as a ‘process’ rather than ‘substance’. 
The advances in science in different domains of reality are confronting us 
with the need to let go the limited understanding of process as “mechanistic 
                                                 
1 For the sake of brevity, I will use the terms ‘Institutional economics’. Even heterodox 
economists more in tune with Schumpeter’s thinking, rather than Veblen’s, work with 
some version of the formula “markets cum institutions”. As the organisations of the so-
called Washington Consensus for some time also use the concept of ‘institutions’, one 
might even say that “now we are all Institutionalists”. 
20 
 
causal interactions among fixed objects”, simply because we no longer know 
what objects are. Physicists have decomposed physical reality into 
elementary parts the extreme but are still uncertain about what reality 
actually is.2 Observed from the perspective of quantum physics, reality 
appears veiled (D'Espagnat, 2006). To leave behind a metaphysics of 
substance means to abandon the following ideas: (1) fixity-stasis is the 
default situation and change calls for an explanation; (2) each substance is 
decomposable in elementary elements; (3) reality has a bottom-level made of 
elementary particles and the causal relations among them. 
As Bickhard puts it, metaphysics of substance introduces a “metaphysical 
split” between the realms of substance and intentionality (Ibid, 253): 
This makes it rather difficult to account for phenomena such as 
intentionality and normativity, and, correspondingly, the normativities of 
function (functional, dysfunctional) and representation (true, false) have 
become at the center of the difficulties in studies of mental phenomena. 
Choosing a metaphysics of process, leads us to embrace the following ideas: 
(1) “Change becomes default, and it is stability, should such occur, that 
requires explanation”; (2) “The world is constituted in organizations of 
processes, so there is no in-principle mystery that new organizations might 
yield emergently new properties”; (3) “If metaphysical emergence is no longer 
blocked, it makes sense to explore the possibility that normativity and 
intentionality might, after all, be emergent in the natural world. More 
generally, explorations of multiple realms of possible emergence are 
enabled” (Ibid, 254).3 
With a metaphysics of process I gain a new perspective about the evolution of 
reality; its mode of being is the on going process that so far gave from itself 
new ‘organisations of processes’, new levels of reality – the physical, the 
living, the human and the social (Emmeche et al., 1997). This understanding, 
I will argue, implies a reformulation of the concept of ‘cause’, the abandon of 
the idea of ‘laws of nature’, and the rejection of the modern synthesis 
between Darwinism and genetics (Ulanowicz, 2009). Therefore, in the study 
                                                 
2 As Campbell (2009: 459) states, “since the only coherent way to conceptualize quantum 
fields is as processes extended in space-time, it follows that any process, no matter how 
micro, consists of yet smaller processes, ad infinitum.”  
3 Note that, contrary to a metaphysics of substance, in organised processes “it is not 
always clear where the boundaries are, or if there are any boundaries” (Bickhard, 2008b: 
255). 
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of markets I will adopt a process metaphysics that sees reality, including 
sociocultural reality, as an evolutionary process that self-organises in clusters 
of emergent process systems (Campbell, 2009; Rescher, 2000), and I will 
name ‘Nature’ this evolutionary process launched by an event that macro-
physicists usually term the Big Bang (Nicolescu, 1996). 
1.2.2 Multi-level ontology 
I share with Tony Lawson the idea that methodological issues, namely the 
ontological ones, are central to the separation between the heterodox stream 
of Original Institutional economics and the mainstream of the discipline 
(Lawson, 2006). 
My ontology is explicitly grounded in the above presented metaphysics of 
process: basically, what exists in reality is ‘organisations of processes’4, 
mostly bearing a systemic nature.5 I will adopt four basic ontological levels of 
reality (physical, living, human, sociocultural) constituted by entities that vary 
according to the degree of two fundamental properties, organisation and 
complexity (see Collier and Hooker, 1999). 
Some of these entities, which I will label ‘self-organising complex systems’, 
have their cohesiveness built upon non-linear bonds between their 
components, which give them unique properties that are not present on the 
latter. As Campbell (2009: 463) explains, 
What is ontologically significant is that, in these cases of non-linear 
unification, the properties of the whole are somehow ‘more’ than the 
arithmetical sum of its partssuch system properties, and the causal 
powers of such a system, are emergent. Emergence should no longer be 
viewed as a dubious metaphysical mystery, but as explicable in terms of 
non-linear functions. … The result is the familiar picture of a multi-layered 
model of the world as stratified into different levels, in a micro-to-macro 
hierarchy. 
A sub-type of self-organising complex systems is constituted by self-
maintenant systems (e.g. flames). They are “stable far-from-equilibrium 
                                                 
4 Contrary to the metaphysics of substance that attributes to each individual a space and 
time location, process metaphysics enables to “replace the particularist conception of 
individuals with a view of individuality that focuses not on location but on ‘specificity-in-
functioning’ in the widest sense of ‘functioning’, i.e., focuses on the dynamic role of an 
entity (e.g., an activity) within a certain dynamic context” (Seibt, 2009: 484). 
5 To my knowledge, this is the best formulation consistent with a metaphysics of process. 
Besides other reasons pertaining to the specificity of sociocultural reality, the lack of a 
metaphysics of process leads me to set aside the typology of complex systems proposed 
by Foster (2005a). 
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process-systems” which display interactions with their environment 
indispensable to their existence. Some of these (e.g. biological systems) are 
recursively self-maintenant and I will name them autonomous systems; they 
are (Ibid, 467) 
necessarily open, organized action systems, in essential interactions with 
their environments. Unlike candle flames, through their internal control of 
such interactions they are able to maintain their own viability conditions 
and control their reproduction. The ontological consequence is that we 
cannot say what they are without taking those interactions into account. 
In social science research it is crucial to recognise that ‘persons’ are 
autonomous systems. Certainly they are open systems and they internally 
control their interactions with the environment in order to survive and 
reproduce. But they do much more and much better than that. Namely, the 
human mind not only thinks but also knows that it thinks. “Thinking that one 
is thinking, being aware of being aware, has to be a second-level operation. 
… We have to do here with reflection. Such a meta-level of experiencing has 
in fact evolved, it is a characteristic feature of humans” (Campbell, 2009: 
474). 
In the same evolutionary process human beings have developed a 
sophisticated language, which enormously enhanced their capacity to co-
operate, develop stable societies and control the bio-physical environment. 
Human beings are born and raised in a sociocultural environment pervaded 
by the symbolic code of language without which they are unable to think like 
persons; persons emerge as sociocultural human beings. 
Finally we have the level of sociocultural systems to which markets belong. 
The interesting aspect here is that without human beings there are no 
sociocultural systems and, at the same time, without a sociocultural 
environment no human being becomes a person. As Campbell (2009: 474-
475) puts it, 
the emergence of reflective persons and the emergence of social 
institutions and certain social groups are mutually dependent and 
interactive. … These institutions and groups manifest properties and 
powers which are novel and distinctive, and which the humans who 
constitute them do not individually manifest. 
This emergent nature of sociocultural systems is determinant for the 
rejection of economic theories that are supported by ‘methodological 
individualism’. However, I am not arguing for a methodological holism, 
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rather I am assuming the implications of the emergent nature of sociocultural 
systems. When persons act as members of sociocultural systems, that is, 
when they perform an institutional role, they do not act as individuals. What 
they do only makes sense as part of the structure and dynamics of the whole. 
The system, because of the non-linear bonds that bind its members, is much 
more than a population of individuals; it has causal powers of its own that 
are able not only to constrain but also to transform the persons that 
constitute it. 
The above presented ontological distinctions (what exists in reality) are no 
more than basic guidelines for my research about institutions and markets; 
they have to be completed. For instance, ‘organisations’ are systems much 
different from the ideas that make a ‘theory’ of organisations. We clearly 
need to make an ontological distinction between social and cultural systems, 
but at the right moment in Chapter 3 I will discuss the topic. 
1.2.3   Interactivist epistemology 
In the previous subsections I made statements about what reality is and how 
it is organised. Nevertheless, they are what ‘I think’, and this is too an 
important methodological subject. Even if we are not aware, we always have 
some theory about what is our ‘thinking’, what is human knowledge; how 
persons organise and develop knowledge about a reality out there. I also 
need to make an epistemological choice. 
To my knowledge, the best available epistemology, one that is consistent 
with a metaphysics of process and a multi-level ontology, is the ‘Interactivist’ 
epistemology developed by Bickhard (1999; 2009) and others (Campbell and 
Bickhard, 1986; Christensen and Hooker, 2000; Hooker, 2009). Here I limit 
myself to a brief note and reserve the details for Chapter 3 where I discuss 
how personal knowledge gives rise to ‘public knowledge’, that is, how 
cultural entities emerge and become part of institutions. 
How should we deal with the problem of human knowledge? Hooker (2009: 
515) answers: 
if we set aside supernatural intervention, it can only be resolved through 
the consequences of interacting with the world; this is why interaction is 
essential. 
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Rather than understanding our basic representations about the world as a 
mental ‘codification’ of sensorial data, the model starts with the rough idea 
that “representation emerges in the presuppositions of anticipatory 
interactive processes” (Bickhard, 2009: 86). Thus, the point of departure is a 
situated human body interacting with an environment (bio-physical and 
social) and, in the process, constructing anticipations about what particular 
aspects of this environment will appear. The learning process that the body 
goes through in interactive trials and errors gives rise to the human mind 
and a person, both understood as emergent ‘organised processes’. 
The novelty of such emergentist understanding of cognition and mind is well 
summarised by Hooker (2009: 522; emphasis mine):6 
mind is concerned primarily with the extraction of invariant trans-
contextual environmental patterns, conceived as, and formulated in terms 
of, autonomy-sustaining action guides; it is only derivatively and context-
specifically concerned with achieving action correlated to the environment.  
Again, this understanding of knowledge as invariant patterns will be revisited 
and explored in my discussion about the ontology of cultural entities in 
Chapter 3.  
One might be curious about the relation of this epistemology to the 
Variation-Selection-Retention (VSR) evolutionary scheme elaborated by 
Donald T. Campbell (1960) and widely cited in Institutional economics. 
Hooker (2009: 531) contrasts the Interactivist epistemology with Campbell’s 
epistemology, and with his words I conclude this section: 
By contrast, systems with more sophisticated regulatory capacities bring, to 
varying degrees, each of V, S and R under significant epigenetic regulation. 
In varying degrees, such organisms significantly regulate (i) their own 
development, both physiological and cognitive/behavioural, (ii) the 
structure of their environment, both natural and social, and through both, 
(iii) their behaviour, including their reproduction. This epigenetically 
regulated shaping of endogenous capacity and exogenous social and 
natural environment is a capacity to (partially) regulate the VSR process. 
1.3 Overview of the thesis 
The overview of the thesis aims to introduce the spirit of what will come 
next. I provide the main topics of the discussion that makes each chapter 
                                                 
6 “Bickhard also argues that the primary (and ultimately only coherent) conception of 
language is as a generative system of operations acting on the action states of recipients” 
(Hooker, 2009: 522; emphasis mine). 
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and highlight their rationale in relation to the research questions previously 
formulated. 
Before that, I make three preliminary remarks. Firstly, in order to make its 
contribution to a theory of markets the thesis borrows freely from different 
sub-disciplines of the social science and makes consistent connections with 
psychology, biology and physic science. In the sense that it trespasses onto 
long established disciplinary borders, and despite its economics roots, it 
might be considered a post-disciplinary thesis in social science. In saying this 
I have no pretence of great originality. I simply tried to “look beyond fences 
and make synthetic use of what we have got; that is, sufficiently original and 
difficult” (Sorge, 2007: 193). 
Secondly, the thesis provides a vision that goes beyond an ontology of 
markets. It questions established assumptions in economics, even within 
Institutional economics, and in doing so it aims to contribute to a renewal of 
Original Institutionalism; it provides the conceptual basis of what I name a 
Naturalist Institutionalism. I am aware that knowledge is fallible, and that this 
research is only a first step in a new direction that can only be fruitful as a 
collective endeavour. Even so, being aware that imperfections and errors are 
inevitable, I prefer “to be roughly right than precisely wrong”, to recall a 
famous phrase attributed to John Maynard Keynes. 
Finally, in order to make clear my argument I have frequently disagreed with 
prominent scholars that for a long time have worked and written about these 
topics. I am personally grateful to some of them for having opened up new 
horizons to my intellectual life some years ago. The fact that I have made my 
own intellectual journey, and thus made my own mind on the subjects under 
discussion, in nothing belittles their contribution. On this point I make mine 
the following statement: “To critique is to dignify, to acknowledge common 
ground from which to criticize, modify, and transcend” (Gregory, 2009: 142). 
Chapter 2 refers to the work of three great names of economics and for this 
reason a preliminary explanation is due. Original Institutional economics 
enjoyed the status of mainstream economics in the USA in the first three 
decades of the last century and, notwithstanding a few brilliant but isolated 
scholars such as Polanyi, Myrdal, Hirschman, Kapp or Galbraith, it suffered 
half a century of almost complete exclusion until it started a come back in 
the eighties. In this chapter I state the Institutionalist affiliation of my 
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research and, for that, I discuss the legacy of three great names of this 
stream of economics. Obviously I had to start with the founder, Thorstein 
Veblen. However, to avoid the family quarrels of the first generations, the 
second Institutionalist author chosen is Karl Polanyi taking account of his 
specific contribution to the understanding of capitalist markets and their 
articulations to the wider society. The third author could be another of the 
above mentioned names, but I made a less evident choice. Over many 
decades of the twentieth century, Hayek has been the figure of the Austrian 
school that provided the strongest arguments for the political advocacy of 
“free markets”. The interesting point is that his late work bears important 
connections with the Institutionalist thinking, even if this is largely 
unacknowledged. The choice of Hayek, with political options in radical 
opposition to Polanyi’s, brought into the analysis a source of variety that 
eventually enriched my discussion of the nature of markets. 
In the first half of Chapter 2 I summarise the legacies of these three authors 
mainly in terms of three questions: (1) the ontological nature of markets; (2) 
the epistemology underlying individuals’ agency; (3) how they understood 
the articulation between agency and markets’ structures. The second half 
connects these legacies to present day literatures in different disciplines; it 
provides up-dated answers to these questions and turns them into stepping 
stones for the work ahead. What begins to emerge in this chapter is a full 
fledged emergentist understanding of sociocultural reality. 
In Chapter 3 I present an in-depth discussion of the emergentist nature of 
sociocultural systems with a focus on the much debated ‘agency-structure 
problem’. The discussion acknowledges the crucial trait of human linguistic 
communication and from there proceeds with an ontology of cultural entities. 
In order to connect the material basis of culture to personal and ‘public’ 
knowledge, I recur to the semiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of 
the Pragmatist philosophy that inspired Veblen and other scholars in the first 
decades of the last century. I conclude with an extended answer to the main 
research question, What are institutions? The chapter also places the specific 
emergence of institutions within the broader context of society and in 
connection with the evolutionary process of Nature, hence the title 
‘Naturalising institutions’. 
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Chapter 4 answers the research question What are markets? The point of 
departure is the Polanyian vision of the economy as a subsystem of society 
that serves the provisioning function. The latter is guaranteed by the market 
system and the non-market sector of the economy. I then present a critique 
of the received concept of economic rationality and propose a more realist 
and encompassing understanding of human rationality that also applies to 
persons acting in markets. Contemporary Polanyian views of markets are 
then discussed, which is followed by the detailed presentation of my 
institutional and emergentist view of markets as meso-institutions in light of 
the definition of institutions previously given. Consistently, Polanyi’s 
fictitious commodities do not fulfil the conditions of my definition of a 
market. The chapter concludes with a critical discussion of other views of 
markets that have large currency in the heterodox literature. 
In Chapter 5 the thesis shifts from the discussion of the structures of 
markets to the discussion of markets’ motion. Of course, the reality studied 
is always the same, markets understood as organised processes of provision 
involving monetary exchanges. So, while in the previous chapter the 
‘structural’ aspect of markets has been highlighted, in Chapter 5 it is the 
‘flow’ aspect that is under analytical focus. It begins with a review of the 
meaning of ‘economic evolution’ in the debates that occurred in the last 
years within the non-mainstream Institutionalist camp. I will argue that it is 
not possible to abstract a general conceptual scheme of ‘evolution’ that 
could inform the study of all levels of Nature. Rather, I argue for a Naturalist 
pluralism that calls for an historical Institutionalist approach to sociocultural 
systems in order to respect their ontological specificity. This stance does not 
preclude the local use of a few multidisciplinary concepts that enable the 
analysis to account for properties common to all levels of reality. The chapter 
follows with a review of the theoretical legacies of Schumpeter and the 
Austrian school in order to take stock of their contribution to the 
understanding of markets’ motion. In the last section I present a brief 
discussion about the concept of ‘time’ and a review of the literature of path 
dependence models. The limitations of these models leads me to propose a 
new understanding of the sources of market change, neither from ‘within’ 
nor from ‘outside’: an Interactionist model that shows how markets’ change 
is fuelled by multiple interactions between internal and external processes 
and their forms of inter-organisation. 
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Chapter 2 
Veblen, Hayek and Karl Polanyi: 
Their legacies and beyond 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I want to consider the intellectual legacies of three great 
names of economic science of the twentieth century, Veblen, Hayek and Karl 
Polanyi. Bearing the specifics of their personality, research choices, and 
period of history they were given to live, each one left an intellectual legacy 
that should not be ignored at the moment of beginning an enquiry that 
addresses markets, firms and the economy. I am convinced that a warranted 
theoretical approach needs to take account of relevant past contributions in 
order to make a valid step forward. In each moment of our lives we always 
intertwine past, present and views about the future, and it seems that the 
same three dimensions are inevitably present in any scientific endeavour 
even if the researcher is not aware of that. Therefore, over the present 
chapter I intend to establish the affiliation of my current theoretical choices 
by establishing a connection to past enquiries in order to build a consistent 
conceptual framework that could be fruitful for the remainder of thesis. 
Veblen, Hayek and Karl Polanyi are representatives of a tradition in 
economics that has been excluded from current undergraduate courses, and 
a great number of postgraduate training in the second half of twentieth 
century. They made important ruptures with the dominant economics ideas 
of their time, which made them in different ways forerunners of new research 
in the social sciences of the twenty first century. In what concerns my 
research interest, both Veblen and Polanyi distanced themselves from 
classical economics and its ideas of markets as a ‘gift of nature’, and 
economic behaviour as determined by self-interested calculatory rationality. 
Choosing different paths, Veblen and Polanyi converged on the 
understanding of markets as institutions, which they based on a complex 
and dynamic vision of human nature much different from the ‘homo 
œconomicus’. Measured against this two-fold criteria t
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places in the history of Institutional economics: at the entry of twentieth 
century, Veblen is the founder of the frequently named ‘Old Institutionalism’ 
(although I prefer ‘Original’ instead of ‘Old’), while Polanyi’s Institutionalism 
at the middle of the century is credited with an innovative understanding of 
markets’ nature, and a vision of capitalism motion that some see as 
alternative to Marx’s fight of classes. In contrast with those two eminent 
figures of Institutionalism, Hayek never made a break with Adam Smith’s 
vision of markets and left all over his work important elements of ambiguity. 
Nevertheless, Hayek is the twentieth century’s strongest intellectual advocate 
of a society organised by “free markets”, which is frequently (but wrongly) 
associated to an idea of “markets without institutional norms”. Most 
importantly, despite Hayek’s struggle for policy orientations at the opposite 
extreme of Veblen and Polanyi’s, Hayek also upheld a stance about human 
knowledge that was not far from the Original Institutionalist action-based 
epistemology. Further, and at least after 1960, his dynamic non-Walrasian 
economics actually turns into a specific kind of evolutionary and quasi-
Original Institutional economics when viewed in light of the above-mentioned 
criteria. Therefore, the inclusion of Hayek’s late work in a discussion focused 
on ‘markets as institutions’ actually enriches the analysis by adding variety to 
the intellectual sources of the enquiry. 
In order to organise the discussion that follows, I will try to find the answers 
of Veblen, Hayek and Polanyi to three questions that are crucial for the 
development of my theoretical framework: (1) What is the deep (ontological) 
nature of markets and firms? (2) What kind of epistemology underlies 
individuals’ agency? (3) How individuals’ agency links to markets and firms? 
In attempting to find the answers of each author, difficulties are expected 
due not only to the extent of the work under analysis but also to tensions, or 
even inconsistencies, that are natural in the development of an intellectual 
lifelong work. In principle, I will use two hermeneutic criteria: the late 
formulations are considered more mature, and thus more representative of 
the author’s thinking; ambiguities should be discussed because this enables 
to better see the underlying assumptions of different formulations, most 
frequently of an ontological nature. It is expected that this overview will lead 
to an identification of common traits in Veblen, Hayek, and Karl Polanyi’s 
legacies, which in a closing section will be related to recent interdisciplinary 
30 
 
research in order to provide key elements of the theoretical framework 
developed in the following chapters. 
2.2 Veblen’s evolutionary Institutionalism 
The work of Veblen is voluminous, rich, and also uneven. It would be pointless 
to present here his ideas, even in a brief summary, as this has already been 
done in the last two decades by Hodgson (1988; 1993a; 1998; 2001; 2004b). 
Instead, I will follow a focused approach targeting the specific aspects of 
Veblen’s work that are of direct relevance to the development of the present 
research.7 
The first question to be approached asks about the ontological nature of 
markets and firms in Veblen’s thinking. The answer is all but easy not only 
because Veblen did not address these issues directly but also because even the 
‘institution’, the core concept of his work, presents different and more or less 
ambiguous formulations (Lawson, 2003a). Consider for instance the following 
passage (Veblen, 1899c: 190; emphasis mine): 
The institutions are, in substance, prevalent habits of thought with respect 
to particular relations and particular functions of the individual and of the 
community. 
In the above quote Veblen takes institutions as psychological phenomena (“habits 
of thought”), which are generalised at a point of being prevalent in the community. 
Now consider the following passage in a later text (Veblen, 1909: 243; emphasis 
mine): 
The growth and mutations of the institutional fabric are an outcome of the 
conduct of the individual members of the group, since it is out of the 
experience of the individuals, through the habituation of individuals, that 
institutions arise; and it is in this same experience that these institutions act 
to direct and define the aims and end of the conduct. 
Here we have a more elaborated formulation that suggests the autonomy of a 
new level of sociocultural reality (“institutions arise”) endowed with causal 
properties over the individual.8 At the same time, the formulation avoids the 
reification of institutions as it clearly emphasises that they are an outcome of 
individual behaviour. According to Veblen, without a widely accepted habitual 
                                                 
7 For this, Hodgson (2004b) has been a rich and stimulating guide. 
8 As acknowledged by Lawson (2003b: 204), and despite the ambiguities, Veblen “was in 
effect edging towards a special case of the realist transformational model of social 
activity”. 
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behaviour of individuals there is no institution. This passage, and similar ones 
in Veblen’s methodological works, provides convincing evidence that Veblen 
attained a dynamic and recursive understanding of institutions, and thus 
rejected both the idea that institutions are merely shared ideas and 
behaviours, and the idea that institutions are floating structures, independent 
of human beings, which determine habits and the overall human conduct. This 
is an important theoretical advancement, even if Veblen has always been vague 
about the ontological nature of institutions. In the examples he gives, most are 
of strictly cultural nature (‘ideational’) while a few others are hybrid, 
sociocultural systems (e.g. markets, firms). This is a subject to probe in the 
last section of the present chapter. 
On this point additional elaboration is needed because Veblen’s approach is 
complex. He draws heavily on the Pragmatist philosophy of Charles Sanders 
Peirce and the psychology of William James (1890) in order to place habits at 
the core of his analysis (Twomey, 1998). For Veblen, on the one hand 
individuals’ “habits of life” reproduce cultural norms and social roles within 
which individuals are socialised, therefore creating social stability and 
(sometimes hard) resistance to change at the ‘institutional’ and the individual 
level;9 on the other hand, and besides the facilitation of daily routines, habits 
are also an indispensable support to knowledge development, thereby 
enabling innovative behaviour and social change. This tension between 
stability and (endogenously-driven) change, both in individuals and in Veblen’s 
‘institutions’, coupled with his formulations sometimes close to determinism, 
led to important misunderstandings by his disciples, and eventually gave rise 
to what became known as the Veblenian Dichotomy (Brette, 2003; Rutherford, 
1984).10 
Attempting to answer my first question, I will retain the more elaborate version 
of Veblen’s concept of institution built on the pivotal role of habits. Within this 
conceptual framework markets and firms should be classified as two kinds of 
institutions. Not that Veblen gave any explicit definition of those entities, even 
                                                 
9 In Veblen’s (1899: 191) words: “These institutions which have so been handed down, 
these habits of thought, … are therefore themselves a conservative factor. This is the 
factor of social inertia, psychological inertia, conservatism.” 
10 It is recognised that Ayres misunderstood the recursive dynamics of Veblen’s concept of 
institution (Lawson, 2003a). Moreover, Ayres and other Institutionalists diffused the 
problematic idea of a ‘Veblenian dichotomy’: institutions were responsible for social 
stability whereas technologies were the main source of social change (Rutherford, 1984). 
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in The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904). But we can confidently deduce 
that, for Veblen, markets and firms are elements of modern society’s 
institutional fabric and are not reducible to the economic agency of 
individuals. At least in implicit terms, the institutional nature of markets and 
firms is approached in the following passage (Veblen, 1899b: 193; emphasis 
mine): 
Any community may be viewed as an industrial or economic mechanism, the 
structure of which is made up of what is called its economic institutions. 
These institutions are habitual methods of carrying on the life process of the 
community in contact with the material environment in which it lives. 
Markets and firms are not mentioned here, but it is reasonable to infer that 
Veblen has them in mind. Note that in this passage institutions are “habitual 
methods of carrying on the life process”, instead of “habits of thought” 
referred to three pages earlier. However, this is not a much different 
formulation, and it should be understood in the light of the Pragmatist 
philosophy that influenced Veblen, and for which knowledge is always rooted 
in human action. 
However, in a later work Veblen (1904: 26, 68-69) stated: 
The channel by which disturbances are transmitted from member to member 
of the comprehensive industrial system is the business relations between the 
several members of the system; and, under the modern conditions of 
ownership, disturbances, favourable or unfavourable, in the field of industry 
are transmitted by nothing but these business relations. 
It is among these transmitted institutional habits of thought that the 
ownership of property belongs. It rests on the like general basis of use and 
wont. The binding relation of property to its owner is of a conventional, 
putative character. 
The first quote addresses the crucial role of the “business man” seeking profit 
and producing disturbances in the (“industrial”) system of interlocked markets; 
it emphasises the social nature of markets. The second one clearly states that 
a crucial character of the industrial firm, its ownership, bears an institutional 
nature. On the whole, it is evident that Veblen integrates both markets and 
firms in the above-mentioned concept of “economic institutions”, although it is 
also true that Veblen almost reduced them to the stripped concept of 
“institutions as habits of thought” and almost ignored their teleological 
components (e.g. laws, contracts). 
In brief, I find in Veblen two core ideas, albeit not always clearly developed: (1) 
markets and firms are economic institutions integrated in the institutional 
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fabric of society; (2) the specific nature of institutions involves inter-
dependencies between a  structural level of “habits of thought” and individuals’ 
actions.11 These two propositions are assumed to be Veblen’s answer to my 
first question, even if I totally agree with Lawson’s (2003a: 199) argument that 
Veblen was not directly concerned with an ontological elaboration of his 
concept of institution. Indeed, what really interested Veblen was an 
evolutionary explanation of societies and, specifically, of “economic 
institutions”. 
Veblen strongly criticised classical economics because its interpretation of 
causal relations in the economic realm always presupposed the existence of a 
“natural law” (Veblen, 1898: 378): 
This natural law is felt to exercise some sort of a coercive surveillance over 
the sequence of events, and to give a spiritual stability and consistence to 
the causal relation at any given juncture. 
In brief, classical economics was more concerned with deductive methods and 
their empirical confirmation, than with real “processes of cumulative 
causation”, open-ended causal sequences in line with the scientific method 
used by Darwin. 
Therefore, Veblen argued for an evolutionary economics that theorises “the 
economic life process … the sequence of change in the methods of doing 
things,— the methods of dealing with the material means of life” (Veblen, 
1898: 387). The crucial point is that Veblen assumes social reality as a 
process, which means a continuous and simultaneous interplay between 
individuals and ‘institutions’ – “the scheme of life” – both of economic and 
non-economic kind. Rutherford (1984: 343-344) acknowledges the following 
stages in Veblen’s institutional dynamics, which corresponds to a kind of 
‘transformational model’: 
(i) habits of livelihood giving rise to institutions and conventions which are 
then refined, crossed, and grafted onto all areas of life, embodied in law, and 
extended over time [forming the institutional base]; (ii) the logic of the 
prevailing scheme affecting the rate and direction of technical change; (iii) 
adjustments within the existing institutional logic to any new technological 
means introduced; and (iv) the possibility of changes of institutional base as 
a result of the new habits of life which emerge as technological change 
overcomes the resistance of established institutions and interests. 
                                                 
11 Hodgson (2004b: 180) remarks that the distinction between these two levels appears in 
passages where Veblen insists on the precedence of ‘institutions’ over the individual and 
refers that ‘habits of thought’ are received from the past. 
34 
 
This sequence corresponds to a “developmental process”, as Veblen (1898: 
387) called it, which is fuelled by human action: “Changes in the material facts 
breed further change only through the human factor” (Ibid, 388). At this point 
we are led to ask: how does this developmental process relates to Veblen’s 
evolutionary thinking? The answer is usually referred by Institutionalist authors 
to the following passages of Veblen (1899b: 188, 189): 
The evolution of social structure has been a process of natural selection of 
institutions. The progress which has been and is being made in human 
institutions and in human character may be set down, broadly, to a natural 
selection of the fittest habits of thought and to a process of enforced 
adaptation of individuals to an environment … there is no doubt 
simultaneously going on a process of selective adaptation of habits of 
thought within the general range of aptitudes which is characteristic of the 
dominant ethnic type or types. 
Here we are presented with a scheme of variation and selection of ‘institutions’ 
that presupposes a long-run process. In these passages Veblen does not 
explain the nexus between the previously mentioned “developmental process” 
and this “evolutionary process” inspired by Darwin. However, we could easily 
see that the former is the ongoing short-run process that maintains existing 
institutions, and also generates new ones, which are differentially adapted to 
“the exigencies of life” that make up the “changing environment” (Ibid, 188). 
About the selection mechanism, Veblen (1899b: 190; emphasis mine) also 
states: 
whether it is chiefly a selection between stable types of temperament and 
character [genetically transmitted between individuals], or chiefly an 
adaptation of men’s habits of thought to changing circumstances [handed 
down by learning] — is of less importance than the fact that, by one method 
or another, institutions change and develop.  
In fact, Veblen repeats the argument some paragraphs later (Ibid, 192). From 
the structure of the argument we see that Veblen was not able to make a 
choice between a Darwinian and a Lamarckian explanation of how institutions 
become adapted in the long run, and we are left with an important lacuna in 
his evolutionary argument. But, despite his agnosticism about the issue, 
Veblen concludes the passage stating that what counts is that “institutions” 
“change and develop”, which is an ambiguous expression reinforced by the 
fact that further references to any kind of phylogenetic process are absent in 
the pages that follow the quotation. Moreover, in a passage of the same work 
(1899b: 207), Veblen uses the word “evolutionary” in a discussion about how 
35 
 
the leisure class addresses maladjustments of her “conspicuous consumption”, 
which is a ‘developmental’ context.12 
Hodgson (2004b: 188-192) forcefully argues that Veblen was trying to apply 
Darwinian principles of variation-selection-retention to the analysis of social 
evolution by taking institutions as the unit of selection and assuming 
differences in the details of mechanisms. However, combining my above-given 
interpretation of the ‘classical quotes’ with the relevant passages in Veblen’s 
(1919) methodological works, I tend to agree with Rutherford’s (1998: 467) 
interpretation that “in Veblen’s later work …  institutional change comes 
increasingly to be represented exclusively in terms of the adaptation of habits 
of thought to new circumstances”, which points to a developmental-
transformational model. This view is also argued by Lawson (2003b: 210-212) 
for whom “Veblen’s limited use of the phrase ‘natural selection’” and “no 
mention at all of Darwinian mechanisms of ‘natural selection’” is due to the 
fact that Veblen did not see it necessary; “it was enough that Veblen identified 
non-teleological processes of cumulative causation. The precise mechanisms in 
play in any given context are a matter of detailed concrete, empirical analysis” 
(Ibid, 212). Thus, confronting this interpretation of Veblen’s Darwinism with an 
updated understanding of evolutionary processes in natural sciences (Weber 
and Depew, 2001), I am led to suggest that Veblen’s hesitations actually 
reflected a forerunning intuition of the need to take distance (at least) from an 
adaptationist idea of natural selection.13 
For Veblen, institutions can only exist through individuals’ habitual interaction, 
which begs fundamental questions about human nature. Veblen shared 
Darwin’s explanations of the evolutionary origin of man and, like the American 
pragmatists, saw human knowledge rooted in the individual’s action. Twomey 
(1998: 437; emphasis mine) summarised this influence: 
For Peirce, knowledge is bound up with action in the world—and this action 
can be, and often is, of a habitual nature. This theory of knowledge was 
                                                 
12 Referring to the Darwinian passages above quoted, Jennings and Waller (1998: 212) 
state that “there are no similar passages elsewhere in Veblen’s work”. They argue that, 
despite multiple references to Darwin, Veblen’s Darwinism was above all a commitment to 
explanations in terms of “processes of cumulative causation”. 
13 Veblen (1899b: 192; emphasis mine) also understood ‘selection’ in terms of co-
evolution: “[Social advance] consists in a continued progressive approach to an 
approximately exact “adjustment of inner relations to outer relations”; but this adjustment 
is never definitively established, since the “outer relations” are subject to constant change 
as a consequence of the progressive change going on in the “inner relations.”  
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clearly influenced by Darwin’s theory of evolution, with Peirce’s 
understanding that knowledge is an adaptation to the environment. 
Thus, Veblen’s philosophical inspiration pointed to a naturalist understanding 
of knowledge inspired by the most recent scientific perspectives of his time. 
Accordingly, he argued vehemently against ‘rational choice’ assumptions of 
classical economics and claimed that human behaviour should also be 
understood in evolutionary terms. Behind Veblen’s critique it is easy to see the 
ideas of Dewey who strongly opposed the classical separation between ‘ends’ 
and ‘means’ in human action, as recalled by Joas (1996: 154): 
Dewey speaks of a reciprocal relationship between an action’s end and the 
means involved. … he does not presuppose that the actor generally has a 
clear goal , and that it only remains to make the appropriate choice of 
means. On the contrary, the goals of actions are usually relatively 
unspecified, and only become more specific as a consequence of the 
decision to use particular means. … The dimension of means in relation to 
the dimension of goals is in no way neutral. 
Therefore, human knowledge emerges in the embodied mind through 
forward-looking adaptive interactions with the world, which includes the 
natural and the social environment. Referring to the latter, Veblen also stated 
that any community has acquired “a body of technological knowledge” (Veblen, 
1908b: 325-326):14 
Such a stock of knowledge and practice is perhaps held loosely and 
informally; but it is held as a common stock, pervasively, by the group as a 
body, in its corporate capacity, as one might say; and it is transmitted by the 
group, … not by individuals and in single lines of inheritance.  
In this passage there is a striking similarity between Veblen’s systemic view of 
knowledge production and current management literature about ‘collective 
knowledge’. Yet, Veblen never lost the view that “every further detail of 
workmanlike innovation, is of course made by individuals and comes out of 
individual experience and initiative, since the generations of mankind live only 
in individuals” (Veblen, 1914: 103).  In fact, Veblen has a process view of 
knowledge development that occurs in the interplay between individual’s inner 
life and the relevant sociocultural structures. Against classical economics’ view 
of man (“a bundle of desires”), Veblen (1898: 390) argued that human nature 
is 
                                                 
14 In this “body of technological knowledge” Veblen includes the language (Ibid, 325), 
which is symptomatic of his cultural understanding of institutions. 
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a coherent structure of propensities [instincts] and [personal] habits which 
seeks realization and expression in an unfolding activity. … The activity is 
itself the substantial fact of the process, and the desires under whose 
guidance the action takes place are circumstances of temperament which 
determine the specific direction in which the activity will unfold itself in the 
given case. … [they are] the outcome of his antecedents and his life up to the 
point at which he stands. 
This passage presents a naturalist view of human nature and suggests that 
each individual is different and path-dependent; human beings are the 
outcome of their present actions but strongly influenced by inherited traits. 
However, despite this idea of a joint outcome of ‘nature and nurture’, Veblen 
did not go so far as to explicitly discuss how human knowledge-action is in 
itself a source of change, which would require more attention to individuals’ 
self-reflectivity. 
Taking account of this background, I assume that Veblen’s answer to my 
second question is an action-based epistemology, which interactively arises in 
the socialised process of human development.15 
Coming back to those “circumstances of temperament”, Veblen (1898: 390) 
wrote: 
They are the products of his hereditary traits and his past experience, 
cumulatively wrought out under a given body of traditions, conventionalities, 
and material circumstances; and they afford the point of departure for the 
next step in the process. 
Linking this passage to a later work, we can see that, besides habits, “instincts” 
also played an important role in Veblen’s (1914: 2-3) analysis. Veblen 
elaborated a particular understanding of instincts that draw partially on the 
work of William James, and on discussions with the biologist Jacques Loeb, his 
colleague at Chicago. Opposed to neurological explanations (Veblen, 1914: 
28), Veblen argued that the instinct should be viewed as a innate propensity of 
psychological nature “that sets up a characteristic purpose, aim, or object to be 
attained” (Ibid, 3). Accordingly, Veblen identified three major instincts: 
“parental bent”, “idle curiosity”, and “workmanship”. Most relevant to our 
discussion, the latter was supposed to be responsible for human’s continuous 
                                                 
15 Veblen’s pragmatist epistemology escapes both positivism and idealism. Against 
positivism, Veblen (1908a: 33) argued that scientific knowledge always needs a point of 
view (“The concept of causation is recognized to be a metaphysical postulate, a matter of 
imputation, not of observation”). Yet, against idealism, Veblen strongly argued for 
experimental science guided by “imputed” causal sequences, which he illustrated with the 
advances in physics of his time (Ibid, 35). 
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search for productive efficiency and technological improvement, while the 
second explains human drive for knowledge acquisition and the endeavour of 
science. This means that Veblen used a particular understanding of instincts 
“to place human beings within the ambit of material causation” (Jennings and 
Waller, 1998: 206). Recurring to the psychology of McDougall, Veblen 
acknowledges the largely common physiological grounding of the different 
instincts, and states that “each engage the individual as a whole”, so that 
the habituation that touches the functioning of any given instinct must, in a 
less degree but pervasively, affect the habitual conduct of the same agent 
when driven by any other instinct (Veblen, 1914: 12-13; emphasis mine). 
By now it is clear that for Veblen human intelligent action is sustained by 
habits, which bear on instincts, and instincts are the evolutionary link to nature 
(Hodgson, 2004b: 162-175). His theory of instincts also gave him a basis to 
formulate a negative view about the “pecuniary motives” of businessman and 
industrial competition, which he depicted as a destabilising rivalry that 
produces waste. On the other hand, he praised the “machine process” and the 
“industrial system”, both driven by the “instinct of workmanship” and seen as a 
source of institutional change. In fact, Veblen envisaged a society where 
technological change could be liberated from the negative command of 
pecuniary gain (Knoedler and Mayhew, 1999). 
In brief, I take Veblen’s answer to the third question as follows: “economic 
institutions” are maintained and changed by individuals’ interactions, which in 
the relevant cases are determined by human habits, both directly and indirectly 
through the support of habits to explicit deliberation. In any case, for Veblen, 
instincts play an important role as expression of our primitive origins. 
My reading of Veblen’s work takes account of an impressive legacy that 
centres around two crucial contributions. Firstly, the defence of an 
evolutionary Institutionalist economics: economic ‘institutions’ (Veblen’s 
meaning), in necessary interplay with the economic activities of individuals, 
should be the object of economic science. Secondly, according to Veblen’s 
Darwinian perspective, the adequate methodological approach should 
respect the deep nature of reality, both natural and sociocultural, which is 
best captured by an understanding in terms of ‘process’. Albeit marked by 
inconsistencies, and a lack of elaboration about the specific processes that 
originate markets and firms, Veblen is credited with a new understanding of 
human societies as structured by evolving, and inter-connected, ‘institutions’ 
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of different nature that depend upon, and partially constitute, the individuals. 
In this sense, Veblen’s work is a radical rupture with classical economy and 
other schools of thought of his time. A century after, a strand of non-
mainstream economists is attempting to revitalise his unfinished research 
programme strongly arguing that in multiple aspects it remains of actuality 
(Brown, 1999; Hodgson, 2004b; O'Hara, 2002). 
2.3 Hayek’s evolutionary orders 
The work of Hayek is immense in quantity and variety, spreading over six 
decades. It is widely recognised that his work before 1936 was conducted 
under the philosophical framework of the emerging neoclassical school, even 
if Hayek already had some doubts about it. While immersed in a neoclassical 
environment at the London School of Economics, Hayek wrote Economics and 
Knowledge (Hayek, 1936), a work that marks the beginning of his rupture 
with mainstream economics.16 This second stage in Hayek’s work (Hayek II) 
led him to explore both the limitations of neoclassical assumptions (e.g. 
knowledge, equilibrium, human agency) and the potential of a subjectivist 
view of knowledge. 
However, the rupture with the concept of equilibrium begs the question of 
what to put in its place. For years this problem remained unsolved and in the 
background of other research subjects, mostly because of Hayek’s idealistic 
philosophy, as discussed below. According to Fleetwood (1995: 5), The 
Constitution of Liberty (1960) is Hayek’s first presentation of his mature 
understanding of “social structures”: 
After 1960, however, Hayek successfully integrates the notion of social 
structures into his analysis, thereby allowing the development of a notion 
whereby human agents navigate their way in the socio-economic world by 
following social rules of conduct. This development appears to be a turning 
point in his work. 
This third period leads Hayek to a shift in his ontology of social reality, which 
is complemented by the adoption of an evolutionary explanation for what he 
terms “social orders” (Hayek, 1960: 58-59): 
                                                 
16 As Caldwell (2001: 542) recalls, “Hayek’s interest in psychology dates to the early 
1920s, when as a student he wrote a paper that would later form the basis for his book 
The Sensory Order [1952].” 
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in the relations among men, complex and orderly and, in a very definite 
sense, purposive institutions might grow up which owed little to design, 
which were not invented but arose from the separate actions of many men 
who did not know what they were doing. … For the first time it was shown 
that an evident order which was not the product of a designing human 
intelligence need not therefore be ascribed to the design of a higher 
supernatural intelligence, but that there was a third possibility—the 
emergence of order as the result of adaptive evolution. 
In this passage Hayek applies to the social realm the concept of ‘emergence’ 
taken from the complexity approach in natural sciences, which accounts for 
an autonomous, emergent level of reality arising from the complex 
interactions of  its constituent elements. Moreover, in alternative to the 
mechanics of equilibrium in neo-classical economics, Hayek III combined a 
realist view of social orders with a naturalist understanding of knowledge, 
thereby arriving to an evolutionary dynamics that I will discuss later.17  
This understanding of social orders is much different from the approach 
adopted by Hayek II, for whom social phenomena does not exist beyond 
individuals’ shared conceptions. In that period Hayek (1943: 43; emphasis 
mine) stated: 
the specific subjectivist approach of the social sciences starts … from our 
knowledge of the inside of these social complexes, the knowledge of the 
individual attitudes which form the elements of their structure. 
This methodological stance reveals that Hayek aims to explain social 
phenomena by the study of individual’s conceptions, which would be 
subsequently aggregated and classified in order to build models able to 
predict at least loose patterns of behaviour (Hayek, 1952). In fact, Hayek II 
combined a subjectivist understanding of knowledge with a positivist 
philosophy that takes prediction as explanation, although he recognised the 
epistemic limits of the endeavour because of the higher complexity of social 
phenomena. Such methodological individualism is a direct consequence of 
Hayek’s ontological assumption that social structures have no real existence 
outside individual’s ideas (at best, they are viewed as epiphenomenal), which 
contrasts with his mature understanding of “orders” and “social rules of 
conduct”. The ontological shift detected circa 1960 reveals that Hayek 
combines a subjectivist epistemology with an ontology that still sees social 
                                                 
17 The fact that some authors fail to recognise Hayek III, and combine quotations from 
works of distinct periods (see Boettke and Subrick, 2002), originates serious 
misunderstandings about Hayek’s thinking. Nevertheless, there are important ambiguities 
in the texts of the mature Hayek. 
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reality as concept-dependent in its understanding, but is no longer reduced 
to conceptual constructs in the minds of the agents. In this sense, Hayek III 
can only be understood within a theoretical framework whereby the 
‘structural’ level is constituted, maintained, and transformed by (but also 
acting on) human interactions.  
Hayek was aware of the emergentist model developed in natural sciences. 
Fifteen years after having written about ‘complex phenomena’ (Hayek, 1967: 
Chap. 2), Hayek not only was enthusiastic about the physics research of 
Prigogine, and the evolutionary psychology of D. T. Campbell, but also 
explicitly accepted the idea of ‘downward causation’ of the social level over 
the individuals (Hayek, 1979: 158). In fact, Hayek III rejected the view that 
social reality is merely epiphenomenal to persons’ activities. 
Acknowledging this intellectual background, it is time to address Hayek’s 
answer to my first question. Recurring to his mature work, a short answer 
could be: markets and firms are social structures that bear the nature of 
‘orders’. By order Hayek means the “matching of the intentions and 
expectations that determine the actions of different individuals” (Hayek, 
1973: 36) as living members of a society.18 Rather than an atomistic account 
of economic processes, Hayek III takes from the sciences of nature a 
‘complex systems’ theoretical framework, which provides the analogy for his 
analysis of markets and organisations.19 
At this stage, Hayek makes a central distinction between spontaneous 
(‘kosmos’) and purposeful (‘taxis’) orders. Referring to the former, Hayek 
(1973: 37) states: 
It would be no exaggeration to say that social theory begins with—and has 
an object only because of—the discovery that there exist orderly structures 
which are the product of the action of many men but are not the result of 
human design. 
Here Hayek refers to actions guided by (‘tacit’) rules learned by experience, 
“rules which we know how to follow but are unable to state” (Ibid, 19) and 
that are part of our cultural heritage. Therefore, a spontaneous order results 
(emerges) from the multiplicity of interacting individuals, which adapt to their 
                                                 
18 Referring to the market order, Hayek used the Greek-derived word ‘catallaxy’. 
19 “Only recently has there arisen within the physical sciences under the name of 
cybernetics a special discipline which is also concerned with what are called self-
organizing or self-generating systems” (Hayek, 1973: 37).  
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environment by following what Hayek terms “abstract rules”, and in many 
cases we could identify with customary rules.20 However, Hayek makes it clear 
that spontaneous orders also build on other types of rules. Besides natural 
and customary rules, there are enforceable rules of law that “we can 
deliberately alter” (Hayek, 1973: 45): 
They may have to be made to obey, since, although it would be in the 
interest of each to disregard them, the overall order on which the success 
of their actions depend will arise only if these rules are generally followed. 
This idea is also stated in a later discussion of “stratification of rules of 
conduct” where he distinguishes between “the remains of traditions” of past 
social structures and “the thin layer of rules, deliberately adopted or modified 
to serve known purposes” (Hayek, 1979: 160).21 
Hayek defines “purposeful” orders (e.g. organisations), which are understood 
as powerful instruments of co-ordination of individuals’ behaviour. 
Purposeful orders need specific commands and rules addressing the 
performance of tasks, the latter aiming at “filling the gaps left by the 
commands” (Hayek, 1973: 49). What critically distinguishes organisations 
from spontaneous orders is both their teleological origin (they are “created 
by an outside agency”) and their smaller degree of complexity (Hayek, 1973: 
38): 
Such orders are relatively simple or at least necessarily confined to such 
moderate degrees of complexity as the maker can still survey; they are 
usually concrete in the sense just mentioned that their existence can be 
intuitively perceived by inspection; and, finally, having been made 
deliberately, they invariably do (or at one time did) serve a purpose of the 
maker. 
In the last line of this passage Hayek admits that a concrete order may no 
longer serve the purpose of his maker. A possible meaning could be that a 
concrete order may change into an abstract order after an important growth 
in complexity. However, acknowledging Hayek’s strict separation between 
spontaneous orders and organisations, Ioannides (2003: 538) suggests that 
“as a man-made order develops in complexity, the purpose that it serves, or 
                                                 
20 Hayek (1973: 44) stated: “Society can thus exist only if by a process of selection rules 
have evolved which lead individuals to behave in a manner which makes social life 
possible.” 
21 In fact, the “spontaneous” nature of the order does not depend on its origin but on the 
high level of complexity of the overall interdependencies, which each individual cannot 
capture, “the concrete circumstances known only to the individuals who obey the rules 
and apply them to facts known only to them” (Hayek, 1973: 46).   
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the original agency behind the original purpose, may change.” Thus, 
Ioannides turns to Hayek’s ‘complexity criteria’ and argues that (over time) 
organisational growth in complexity eventually leads to the emergence of 
some sort of abstract rules, typical of spontaneous orders, in which 
commands and concrete rules become embedded. In this sense, and still 
within the Hayekian spirit, it is reasonable to suggest that firms may also 
integrate abstract rules of functioning, which we may identify with the 
culture of the organisation. 
Hayek referred to the “catallaxy” as a particular case of spontaneous order 
created “by the mutual adjustment of many individual economies in a market 
… through people acting within the rules of the law of property, tort and 
contract” (Hayek, 1976: 109). In order to preserve the mechanisms that give 
rise to the emergence of the order, those market rules should be 
“independent of purpose” and address all the agents, or at least “whole 
classes of members not individually designated by name” (Hayek, 1973: 50). 
In brief, Hayek states that the emergent market order makes “peaceful 
reconciliation of the divergent purposes possible—and possible by a process 
which redounds to the benefit of all ” (Hayek, 1976: 110).22 This extreme 
optimism did not impede Hayek from recognising that spontaneous orders 
need to be preserved, and sometimes improved, but the process should be 
only indirect by acting on the rules; any direct intervention would only 
disturb the “part of a system of interdependent actions determined by 
information and guided by purposes known only to the several acting 
persons but not to the directing authority” (Hayek, 1973: 51). 
Therefore, Hayek’s rejection of purposive rules to ‘organise markets’ is 
justified on the grounds that they may disrupt or even destroy the 
‘spontaneous’ order. On this point Murphy (1994) highlights that Hayek 
certainly knew Aristotle’s trichotomy of ‘nature-habit-reason’, which we 
recognise as core order-concepts behind his three types of ‘natural-
spontaneous-purposive’ orders, as he named them. Unfortunately, and 
contrary to Aristotle, Hayek treated those three types of orders as mutually 
exclusive. While “Aristotle treats his concepts as complementary and mutually 
inclusive … Hayek tends to see a given institution as the exemplar of only 
                                                 
22 Hayek (1976: 113; emphasis mine) went further to assume that “the economist is 
therefore entitled to insist that conduciveness to that order be accepted as a standard by 
which all particular institutions are judged.” 
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one kind of order” (Murphy, 1994: 538-539). However, in different passages 
of his work Hayek was not consistent with a strict distinction between social 
and natural orders (Hayek, 1973: 39-40, 1979: 158-159). For instance, 
following Adam Smith, Hayek assumes that the division of labour is based on 
a natural psychological propensity to truck, barter, and exchange, and that 
the internal causal mechanisms of the complex system (the ‘invisible hand’) 
inevitably gives rise (if not disturbed) to an order that is analogous to the bio-
physical order of nature.23  
Because Hayek lacked a clear understanding of a hierarchical emergence in 
natural systems he could not see the mutual interdependency of the three 
nuclear orders; that purposeful rules always build on nature and custom, 
even when they attempt to modify both (Murphy, 1994). Moreover, conflict 
between customs is inevitable in the functioning of ‘spontaneous orders’, 
which frequently lead to new (and concrete) legislation. Note that Hayek 
acknowledged the need to review previous legislation. However, he did not 
make the next step; he failed to integrate downward causation from 
purposeful rules over individuals through habituation, which might lead to 
the emergence of a new custom. But to go down this road would represent 
the acceptance of a Veblenian scheme, which was far beyond his ideological 
stance. 
At this point I have enough material to frame Hayek’s answer to my first 
question. Markets are spontaneous orders that emerge by individuals’ 
economic behaviour according to informal and formal rules of conduct, 
which by accumulation of traditions currently form multiple ‘institutional’ 
layers. They are evolving complex systems, and hence emerge out of 
individuals’ interactions but do not reduce to these interactions.24 For Hayek 
firms are organisations, that is, concrete social orders infused by purpose 
and structured by commands and concrete rules. 
Approaching now the second question, it is clear that Hayek III maintains the 
Kantian inspired epistemology of Hayek II, but now combined with the 
                                                 
23 In fact, Hayek’s concept of ‘spontaneous orders’ seems unable to accommodate 
important features of social systems such as disruptive tensions between groups, 
institutional crises and periods of accelerated changes, which may be seen to have 
analogous counterparts in bio-physical self-organising systems (Prasch, 2000). 
24 Hayek (1973: 39) specifies his understanding of ‘emergence’: “The significance of the 
abstract character of such orders rests on the fact that they may persist while all the 
particular elements they comprise, and even the number of such elements, change.” 
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adoption of a realist ontology that encompasses social phenomena. For 
Hayek, sensory stimulation always needs to be organised under previously 
acquired categories in order to provide understanding of the situation. In his 
major work about psychology Hayek (1952) assumes that those previous 
meanings are themselves learned, possibly since the first post-birth 
experiences. In fact, Hayek’s theory of the mind builds on a particular 
understanding of neural networking and its relationship with human 
experience, which has been sketched in his youth. He stated (Hayek, 1960: 
23): “Man did not simply impose upon the world a pattern created by his 
mind. His mind is itself a system that constantly changes as a result of his 
endeavour to adapt himself to his surroundings”. In other passages of the 
same work Hayek’s psychology takes a pragmatist flavour (Hayek, 1960: 24, 
35; emphasis mine): 
an erroneous intellectualism that regards human reason as something 
standing outside nature and possessed of knowledge and reasoning 
capacity independent of experience. 
[abstract thought] would no long continue and develop without the 
constant challenges that arise from the ability of people to act in a new 
manner, to try new ways of doing things … And the flow of new ideas, to a 
great extent, springs from the sphere of action, often non-rational action, 
and material events impinge upon each other. 
In these formulations there is a clear emphasis on the idea that knowledge, 
which is also an ‘order’, emerges from action, instead of being made of 
passive impressions of outside reality into the mind. This is an understanding 
similar to the American pragmatists’ view, even if the inspiration is not 
recognised. Such a view of knowledge emerging from the particular experience 
of the individual led Hayek to stress that knowledge is a subjective reality. Each 
economic actor has a specific and partial knowledge about the catallaxy and of 
society in general. However, because each individual “moves within a coherent 
structure most of whose determinants are unknown to him” he can access to 
much more knowledge than he possesses (Hayek, 1973: 14). In this sense, 
scientific advances come from “the utilization of knowledge which is and 
remains widely dispersed among individuals” (Ibid, 15). Thus, Hayek sees 
catallaxy as a field of opportunities for individuals, not only to find information 
about (and through) prices but also to find and use relevant knowledge about 
their business (Butos and McQuade, 2002).  In brief, Hayek’s answer to my 
second question is an action-based understanding of knowledge supported by 
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a connectionist perspective about mind-brain relations of which he was a 
forerunner (Steele, 2002).  
Hayek linked individual agency to social rules of conduct within an 
evolutionary framework whose more elaborated formulation he attributes to 
“the eighteenth-century moral philosophers and the historical schools of law 
and language” long before Darwin.25 Like Veblen, Hayek takes ‘institutions’ as 
units of selection and accepts a “basic conception” of evolution common to 
the biological field. However, Hayek does not spend much time to discuss the 
differences between biological and cultural evolution (a “similar but much 
faster process”; Hayek, 1979: 154). Rather, he systematically emphasises 
what he sees as a crucial similarity, the complex nature of spontaneous 
orders (Ibid, 158): 
all enduring structures above the level of the simplest atoms, and up to the 
brain and society, are the results of, and can be explained only in terms of 
processes of selective evolution, and that the more complex ones maintain 
themselves by constant adaptation of the internal states to changes in the 
environment. 
Therefore, Hayek combines in his evolutionary scheme two processes: the 
dynamics of spontaneous order (self-organising complex systems) and the 
basic evolutionary scheme (“variation with selective retention” in D. T. 
Campbell’s formula). About the latter, and pace Hodgson’s (1993a) critique, 
Hayek provides meaningful statements in line with Lamarckism: albeit 
implicitly, he recognises the “law breakers, who were to be path breakers” as 
a source of variation of institutions (Hayek, 1979: 161); he accepts the 
(group) selection mechanism by which “some practices enhanced prosperity 
of certain groups and led to their expansion” (Ibid, 159), thereby conducting 
to the “prevalence of the more effective institutions in a process of 
competition” (Ibid, 155); he also referred to the retention mechanism that 
maintains successful institutions (“learnt habits are transmitted by imitation”; 
Ibid, 155). This line of evolutionary explanation based on group selection 
certainly raises difficult questions, which Witt (1994: 184-185) sees as a 
weakness in Hayek’s work. 
                                                 
25 Whether the evolutionary explanation corresponds to a late discovery in Hayek’s work, 
and in what sense it is a Darwinian one, is a controversial issue discussed by Caldwell 
(2001; 2004) and Hodgson (2004c). 
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Drawing on this cursory review of Hayek’s approach to the motion and 
evolution of orders, I am able to answer my third question: for Hayek, human 
knowledge and behaviour is a source of endogenous variation, which 
becomes enmeshed in the complexity of sociocultural interdependencies and 
leads to differential outcomes among firms, markets, or societies. In the long 
run differential fitness selects for the prevailing rules, while human 
experience is the built-in source of new rules in the on going motion of 
spontaneous orders. 
Despite having forcefully argued for the crucial role of human (action-based) 
knowledge in social processes, Hayek mostly focused on the virtues of 
tradition and customary laws as guides of human behaviour in slowly 
evolving spontaneous orders. This bias also led Witt (1994: 186) to 
acknowledge the inconsistency: 
The members can invent new rules or modify old ones. Of course this may 
be the result of reasoning about current rules and their efficiency, 
deliberate action, and even consciously planned modifications. … what 
matters is only whether or not the modifications lead to superior 
adaptation to the current state of the environment. Hence, deliberate 
change founded on reason and reflection cannot be rejected per se.  
Inconsistencies in the work of Hayek should not surprise. Hayek had a 
peculiar understanding of what science should be: “Fruitful social science 
must be very largely a study of what is not: a construction of hypothetical 
models of possible worlds which might exist if some of the alterable 
conditions were made different” (Hayek, 1973: 17). Indeed, rather than 
explaining the social orders we actually have, Hayek’s work is about 
providing policy-makers with an Utopia, a “guiding conception of the overall 
order to be aimed at” with the ultimate aim of “radically redesigning society” 
(Hayek, 1973: 65). This politico-ideological agenda underlies his 
condemnation of ‘targeted policies’. Hayek gives two main reasons for this: 
policy-makers have limited knowledge about the internal mechanisms of a 
complex social order; policy-makers lack ‘field knowledge’ that is only 
available to those involved in the issues object of the policy. But, at the same 
time, Hayek seems to have no doubts about the overall beneficial effects of 
“rational policies” aiming at the realisation of the Utopia, if necessary by 
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“radically redesigning society”. The complexity of the system, and policy-
makers’ limitations seem no longer hold in the latter case.26 
The normative motivation that ultimately conducted Hayek’s work helps to 
explain why he put aside important aspects of complex systems, namely 
their organisation on the basis of (equally complex) interdependent sub-
systems. This structured complexity (otherwise consistent with Hayek’s 
‘stratified’ view of ‘institutions’) strongly contradicts Hayek’s passages about 
an unstructured catallaxy, which only comprises individuals, either humans 
or organisations (“it is necessarily vain to try to discover by observation 
regularities in any of its parts”; Hayek (1973: 64). This unrealistic assumption 
about the ontology of social orders also contributes to damage Hayek’s 
argument for non-targeted policies aiming “to increase equally the chances 
for any unknown member of society of pursuing with success his equally 
unknown purposes”; Hayek (1976: 114). A vision of an unstructured society 
actually means that no social classes are acknowledged, which is largely 
contradicted by other social sciences, namely sociology and anthropology.27  
There are other problematic points in the work of Hayek such as a formalist 
conception of economics or a sociobiological explanation of resistance to a 
Great Society submitted to (and organised by), the standards of the market 
order. Yet, Hayek’s legacy also includes important contributions to the 
advancement of our understanding of the social realm: rupture with 
equilibrium assumptions and the exploration of commonalities between 
sociocultural and bio-physical systems; concept of market rules emerging 
from individuals’ interactions; connection between self-organising systems 
and the evolutionary process, which prefigure modern advances in 
evolutionary biology beyond Darwinian Modern Synthesis (Depew, 1998). 
 
 
                                                 
26 Witt (1994: 186) recognises the problem in a sympathetic style: “Thus there is a problem 
in determining the boundary between constructivist presumptiousness on the one hand 
and reflection on existing rules and suggestions for improving them that can usefully 
inform policy action on the other.” 
27 Indeed, social classes exist and are reproduced. There is now abundant evidence that 
meritocracy-designed policies aiming to enhance the chances of children belonging to 
lower classes fail to compensate for the physical, psychological, and socialising effects of 
poverty in the early stages of childhood (Esping-Andersen, 2004). 
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2.4 Karl Polanyi’s instituted economy 
Karl Polanyi was born in 1886 in Vienna. Until his death in 1964 he has been 
contemporary of dramatic events and radical changes both in Western 
societies and in the world economy. His most important work, The Great 
Transformation (Polanyi, 1944; hereafter GT), addresses the rise of the liberal 
order of the 19th century and attempts to explain how the consequences of 
such “utopian project” eventually gave origin to the social and political turmoil 
that ended in two Great Wars. 
As Mayhew (2000: 1) stated, 
The Great Transformation is a history of the SRM [Self-regulating market]: of 
its emergence from the fact that the Industrial Revolution of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries took place within a thoroughly 
commercial though not yet thoroughly market-organized economy; its 
nurture through the efforts of the liberal economists and statesmen of 
England in the first decades of the nineteenth century; and finally its demise 
as a consequence of the “protective reaction” to counteract the 
consequences that the SRM spawned. 
Central to Polanyi’s argument is the distinction between the ‘economic system’ 
and the different forms of its integration. Building on the anthropological 
research of Malinowski and Thurnwald, Karl Polanyi argues that classical 
economics was founded upon the “paradigm of the bartering savage”, which 
plainly connected the division of labour to the exchange of goods, and 
identified the latter with markets (GT: 44). Against the atomistic view of human 
nature pictured by classical economists, Polanyi stressed the social nature of 
the primitive man and stated that possession of material goods in primitive 
societies was always a means to obtain a social status (GT: 46): 
Neither the process of production nor that of distribution is linked to specific 
economic interests attached to the possession of goods; but every single 
step in that process is geared to a number of social interests which 
eventually ensure that the required step be taken. 
Having discredited the motive of gain in primitive societies, Polanyi also 
recurred to anthropological studies to put forward three principles of 
economic behaviour that have been present in, and contributed to the 
integration of, economic activities in all societies across time: reciprocity, 
redistribution and exchange. But, adopting an Institutionalist stance, Polanyi 
immediately emphasised that those principles of behaviour (more or less 
present in all societies) would not be possible “unless existing institutional 
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patterns lend themselves to their application” (GT: 48). Hence, he mentioned 
the institutional pattern of “symmetry”, which supports trade activities without 
profit, and the institutional pattern of “centricity”, which supports 
redistribution processes in different types of societies.28 Exchanges may be 
bartered or mediated by money; they also may involve vital provisioning for a 
society, or simply non-essential goods. On the institutional level, they depend 
on the ‘market pattern’, which is an organised way to operate economic 
exchanges. However, while the other two principles do not create separate 
institutions – or “institutions for one function only” (GT: 56) – exchanges give 
rise to a specific ‘institution’, the market, which brings a new and destabilising 
element into the societal organisation: the motivation to produce for gain. 
Polanyi (GT: 54-5) summarises his argument as follows: 
all economic systems known to us up to the end of feudalism in Western 
Europe were organized either on the principles of reciprocity or 
redistribution, or householding, or some combination of the three. … The 
Greco-Roman period, in spite of its highly developed trade, represented no 
break in this respect. … it formed no exception to the rule that up to the end 
of the Middle Ages, markets played no important part in the economic 
system; other institutional patterns prevailed. 
Polanyi’s idea that, previously to industrial capitalism, markets were 
“submerged in general social relations” is also expressed in the following 
statement: “the motives and circumstances of productive activities were 
embedded in the general organization of society” (GT: 70). Unfortunately, this 
idea has been reinterpreted by Granovetter (1985) and other authors in 
economic sociology.29 
This leads us to the core of Polanyi’s thesis: the nineteenth century produced 
in England a radically new type of organisation of economic processes never 
seen before in History, the “market economy” and its “self-regulating 
mechanisms”. This means an “economic system controlled, regulated, and 
directed by markets alone” (GT: 68), while “self-regulation implies that all 
production is for sale on the market and that all incomes derive from such 
sales” (GT: 69). 
                                                 
28 In GT Polanyi also refers to the principle of householding, “which consists in production 
for one’s own using” (p. 53). However, in a later work Polanyi (1957: 250) no longer refers 
to it, presumably because he reclassified it as a form of redistribution (Schaniel and Neale, 
2000). 
29 For Granovetter, ‘embeddedness’ means that economic behaviour always occurs within 
(individuals’) networks of social relations. About this concept see Barber (1995) and 
Krippner (2001). 
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At this point Polanyi introduces a critical element in his argument: the 
development of a fully integrated and self-regulating market economy implied 
that labour, land and money should be submitted to the pricing mechanisms 
prevailing in the trade of other commodities. However, these are “fictitious 
commodities”. Polanyi (GT: 71) argues: 
labor, and land are no other than the human beings themselves of which 
every society consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists. To 
include them in the market mechanism means to subordinate the substance 
of society itself to the laws of market. 
This (at least partial) subordination has been established in England in the first 
decades of the nineteenth century. Polanyi dedicated some chapters of GT to a 
detailed description of the great economic, social and political transformations 
occurred in England at that time leading to a social organisation in which 
“human society had become an accessory of the economic system” (GT: 75). 
Or, as stated later in a clear formulation (Polanyi, 1947: 63; emphasis mine): 
an “economic sphere” came into existence that was sharply delimited from 
other institutions in society. Since no human aggregation can survive without 
a functioning productive apparatus, its embodiment in a distinct and 
separate sphere had the effect of making the “rest” of society dependent 
upon that sphere. 
This “market society” had devastating consequences on human beings and the 
environment in the England of mid-nineteenth century. In a short period, a 
social and political counter-movement was underway calling for laws to 
enforce less unfavourable conditions to labour.30 According to Polanyi, society 
was trying to “safeguard the human character of the alleged commodity, labor” 
(GT: 177) by reducing the power of the self-regulating market. New legislation 
to improve sanitary conditions in factories and cities, and to protect natural 
resources, was approved. Even business interests had to be protected from 
market laws (GT: 132): “central banking and the management of the monetary 
system were needed to keep manufactures and other productive enterprises 
safe from the harm involved in the commodity fiction as applied to money.” 
Thus, Polanyi understands the dynamics of modern post-Industrial Revolution 
societies as a “double movement” conducted by two organising principles: the 
principle of economic liberalism, supported by trading classes calling for 
                                                 
30 In GT it is not clear if Polanyi accepted that the ‘self-regulating market’ existed for some 
decades in the nineteenth century England, or it was a liberal utopia that actually never 
fully existed because the social reaction against the initial damaging effects of the first 
transformations impeded its institutionalisation. 
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laissez-faire policies and free trade; the principle of social protection, 
supported by those immediately affected by the self-regulating market who 
call for protective legislation and restrictions to the market mechanisms. The 
outcome of this double movement is open, which means that it is contingent 
to the historical conditions of each society in a particular time, as Polanyi 
attempted to show with a detailed analysis of the differences between the 
British and the Continental industrialisation.31 In particular periods, the socio-
political conflict may lead to stalemate and create conditions for the rise of 
“unsuspected forces of charismatic leadership and autarchist isolationism” (GT: 
200) such as the fascist movements that spread in the aftermath of the Great 
Depression. 
Having surveyed the core of Karl Polanyi’s thought I turn now to the three 
questions put forward in the beginning of this section. Firstly, how did Polanyi 
see the deep nature of markets and firms? In the following I only refer to 
markets because Polanyi did not discuss the nature of firms, which is an 
important shortcoming of his approach to the market economy. 
The critique addressed to the classical economists by Polanyi centred on their 
atomistic and naturalistic understanding of human nature, which was less 
evident in Adam Smith but eventually became the basis of Malthus and Ricardo 
economics. According to Polanyi, the fathers of political economy ignored 
‘society’ as an autonomous reality. Because they did not recognise the 
autonomy of social phenomena, they recurred to naturalistic explanations such 
as “the iron law of wages”. Opposing classical economics, Polanyi adopts an 
Institutionalist view and develops in GT (Chapter 4) a crucial distinction 
between “principles of behavior” and “institutional patterns”. He also accepts 
the existence of causal mechanisms affecting those two levels in a 
bidirectional way: “institutional patterns and principles of behavior are 
mutually adjusted” (GT: 49). 
In a later work, Polanyi (1957: 248; emphasis mine) states his Institutionalist 
lineage in these terms: 
                                                 
31 According to Block (2003), over the writing of GT Polanyi made a shift from an initial 
view of social dynamics in line with the Marxist conception of dialectical interplay between 
‘material productive forces’ and ‘social relations of production’ into his own concepts of 
‘self-regulating market’, ‘fictitious commodities’, and the dynamics of ‘double movement’. 
Because he wanted to publish the book before the end of WW II he had no time to revise 
the text, which thus bears the traces of two organising frameworks. 
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The fount of the substantive concept [of economics] is the empirical 
economy. It can be briefly (if not engagingly) defined as an instituted process 
of interaction between man and his environment. … The economy, then, is 
an instituted process. 
And, Polanyi specifies (Ibid, 250): 
A study of how empirical economies are instituted should start from the way 
in which the economy acquires unity and stability, that is the 
interdependence and recurrence of its parts. This is achieved through a 
combination of a very few patterns which may be called forms of integration. 
Here Polanyi refers to the already mentioned patterns of reciprocity, 
redistribution, and exchange, which are observed in personal interrelations. 
And the argument goes (Ibid, 251; emphasis mine): 
Superficially then it might seem as if the forms of integration merely 
reflected aggregates of the respective forms of individual behaviour … The 
significant fact is that mere aggregates of the personal behaviors in question 
do not by themselves produce such structures. … Acts of exchange on the 
personal level produce prices only if they occur under a system of price-
making markets, an institutional setup which is nowhere created by mere 
random acts of exchange. 
Adopting a formulation close to contemporary critical realism, he insists that 
“societal effects of individual behavior depend on the presence of definite 
institutional conditions, these conditions do not for that reason result from the 
personal behavior in question” (Ibid, 251). This means that institutions are 
necessary for individuals’ socialisation and precede their behaviours. 
Therefore, Polanyi makes an ontological distinction between individuals’ 
patterns of exchange and market institutions, both levels being at the same 
time autonomous (“relative independence”) and interdependent. Ultimately, 
Polanyi’s answer to my first question is not far from Veblen’s view of 
‘institutions’, but excludes the evolutionary dimension. In fact, despite having 
studied human societies at different stages of their development, Polanyi was 
mostly interested in the ‘embeddedness’ of the economic process and not in 
the causal mechanisms of the evolution of institutions. His aim was the motion 
of capitalism propelled by the action of individuals and their struggles around 
political projects, a dynamics far from the Darwinian meaning of evolution but 
perhaps not so far from a ‘developmental’ one. 
Individual behaviour and epistemological issues are not directly addressed in 
Polanyi’s work. However, some passages reveal Polanyi’s views of human 
nature, which carry an implicit formulation of his ideas about those topics. The 
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following passage is an example of his rather subliminal way of addressing the 
issue (Polanyi, 1957: 249): 
In the absence of any indication of societal conditions from which the 
motives of the individuals spring, there would be little, if anything, to sustain 
the interdependence of the movements and their recurrence on which the 
unity and the stability of the process depends. 
Here Polanyi stresses that individual’s interactions always need institutional 
support to be effective. Or, in other words, “only in the presence of a system of 
price-making markets will exchange acts of individuals result in fluctuating 
prices that integrate the economy” (Ibid, 252). Thus, individual’s behaviour is 
only meaningful if sustained by an institutional framework. In brief, human 
beings acquire their knowledge through socialisation (‘instituted’) processes, a 
view that strongly contrasts with the view of classical economics to which 
prices carry information to be processed by solipsistic individuals. 
Moreover, Polanyi sees human activity commanded by a complex of 
motivations. Hence, he strongly criticises all dichotomies (material versus 
ideal, rational versus non-rational, economic versus non-economic) that 
misread the ontological nature of both human action and society’s institutions 
(“Yet it would be truer to say that the basic human institutions abhor unmixed 
motives”; Polanyi (1947: 71). Indeed, Polanyi’s work and life has been a “plead 
for the restoration of that unity of motives which should inform man in his 
everyday activity” (Ibid, 72). Therefore, his intellectual work builds on a 
Personalist understanding of man, which bears a unitary view of human beings 
as persons to be respected in the way societies institute economic processes 
(Özel, 2001). Acknowledging this Personalist anthropology, I conclude that 
Polanyi’s answer to my second question is certainly very close to the integrative 
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, which he (implicitly) combined with the above-
mentioned recursive understanding of individual-social structures relations. 
This leads to my third question about how Polanyi related human action to 
(maintenance and change of) markets’ institutions. Again, Polanyi did not work 
out his views on this ‘micro-macro’ linkage but it is not difficult to see that he 
subscribed (albeit not always in clear statements) Veblen’s habits-based 
explanation of how institutions mould individuals’ behaviour. An example is 
his critique of mainstream economics ‘habits of thought’ concerning the 
selfish nature of man (Polanyi, 1947: 69): 
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For once society expects a definite behavior on the part of its members, and 
prevailing institutions become roughly capable of enforcing that behavior, 
opinions on human nature will tend to mirror the ideal whether it resembles 
actuality or not.  
Here the importance of habits is implicit in the statement that opinions on 
human nature tend to conform to instituted roles and ideas, a mechanism that 
helps to explain the inertia of institutions. At the same time, Polanyi perceived 
that, in parallel to the ‘reification’ of man’s labour activity, market society 
provided some “freedoms” to individuals and the awareness of the “reality of (a 
complex) society”. In fact, despite the acknowledgement of an institutional 
moulding of individuals’ through habits, and of the need of state power to 
organise society, Polanyi strongly rejected the idea of an over-socialised man: 
“In truth, we will have just as much freedom as we will desire to create and to 
safeguard” (Polanyi, 1947: 76). 
Therefore, Polanyi’s understanding of the ‘agency-structure problem’ is 
different from both the liberal occultation-negation of society by market 
relations, and the orthodox Marxism’s deterministic view of the economic 
sphere. Because, as persons, we preserve the ultimate freedom to not fully 
adapt to (and even fight against) ‘institutions’, Polanyi upheld that “the 
transformation of society was not only shaped by the functional logic of the 
market system but also by social counter movements” (Thomasberger, 2001: 
7). This means that in the passages about the political and moral implications 
of his analysis Polanyi is still consistent with an ontological view of 
“interdependence with relative independence” of agency and social 
structures.32 
Polanyi’s thinking remains an illuminating contribution, not only to a deeper 
understanding of the role of the state in relation to markets and market 
societies (Hodgson, 2002a), but also to a better consideration of the role of 
economic ideas in the dynamical interplay of state, economy, polity and social 
movements (Blyth, 2002). 
 
 
                                                 
32 For an overview of the moral implications of Polanyi’s thinking see Baum (1996). 
56 
 
2.5 Building on the legacies 
The above-presented theoretical legacies are idiosyncratic understandings of 
society, economic processes, and what economics is about. We can find in the 
three authors important and still valuable contributions, as well as weaknesses 
and unfinished legacies. But what strikes most in the overview of their work is 
that all of them had the courage to create and build upon a theoretical 
perspective of society that in crucial points was in strong dissonance with 
prevailing ideas of their time. Their contributions stand as landmark legacies 
of the twentieth century that cannot but inspire the different strands of 
economics that currently labour for a new paradigm able to meet the 
challenges of the new century. 
In the following I recall foundational legacies of Veblen, Hayek and Polanyi and 
attempt to explore its connections with recent research about issues that are 
relevant for the work ahead: conceptual frameworks about social reality; 
visions of human nature; the linkage between agency and social structures. 
2.5.1 Social reality: emergence or practices?  
One of the core legacies reviewed above is the institutional nature of markets. 
Both Veblen and Polanyi explicitly use the word “institution” to qualify markets, 
while Hayek most frequently refers to “catallaxy” to stress the self-organising 
complexity of the market ‘order’.33 Beyond the differences, what is relevant is 
the (more or less elaborated) acceptance by the three authors of an emergent 
level of sociocultural organisation that comes up from economic and non-
economic interactions between individuals, which in turn enables and 
constrains these same interactions. In their own specific way of dealing with 
the problem of sociocultural emergence, each author assumed that between 
the level of “human interactions” and the level of (what they named) 
“institutions” there are causal processes operating both ways. However, none 
of them assumed that both levels form a unity, an outcome of the whole 
process of emergence. This is a crucial step that I make in this thesis when, in 
the next chapter, the concept of institution will be redefined. 
                                                 
33 Rutherford (1996: 93) gives a good insight on how Polanyi’s perspective could be 
reinterpreted in emergentist terms: “although the process [the political bargain] as a 
whole aims (to some extent) to produce some deliberately implemented and enforced 
institutional rule, the exact specification of the design that emerges at the end of the day 
may not correspond with the original intentions of all (or any) of the parts involved.” 
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While Hayek stressed the negative effects of purposeful action aiming the 
change of social norms and gave more importance to self-organising, 
customary orders/institutions, Veblen and Polanyi also admitted purposeful 
action as a source of institutional change, thus building a framework that 
provides a better understanding of state and public policy-making, which 
strongly contrasts with mainstream economics. As Mayhew (2001) argued, an 
Institutionalist view of the interplay between agency and structure enables to 
see how mainstream rational choice theories “reduced people involved in 
governments to rent seekers or to pawns of history” (Ibid, 244), and why ,little 
recognition has been given to “learning by state agents, no room for 
inheritance of ideas of good government, and, as a consequence, no way to 
incorporate the idea of “public purpose” into the motives of our agents” (Ibid, 
245). Instead of a vision of the state taken by bureaucracy and opportunism, 
an Institutionalist approach based on a pluralist view of human motivations 
and a recursive interdependence between agency and structure suggests a 
richer, nuanced understanding of state intervention, which is able to explain 
both state capture by vested interests and developmental policies. To this we 
should add Hayek’s insistence on the complex nature of sociocultural systems 
and the always-present unintended effects of public policies, which suggests 
precaution and, whenever possible, experimental stages in policy-making. 
Another point of convergence is given by the fact that the three authors linked 
markets to the broader society. In Veblen this societal integration is best 
illustrated by his analysis of the developmental path linking changes in 
technologies to changes in the institutional fabric of society, a dynamics that is 
understood as a “cumulative causation” process. Either discussing the adaptive 
selection of rules, or arguing against what he labelled ‘rationalist’ policies, 
Hayek also acknowledged the interdependence between catallaxy and other 
social orders within his Great Society. Without explicit elaboration, Polanyi 
formulated the concept of ‘embeddedness’ referring to the uneven 
interdependence between markets and society. The concept has been central 
to the literature of New Economic Sociology (Guillén et al., 2002), and 
influential in the analysis of markets (Callon, 1998) since Granovetter’s (1985) 
particular appropriation of the concept. Granovetter wanted to emphasise that 
market relations are not cut from other kinds of relations. His argument 
developed along two lines of reasoning: “the first is that economic activity is 
embedded in networks of social relations; the second is that economic 
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institutions are socially constructed” (Lewis, 2004: 169). Granovetter 
developed a critique of mainstream economics (including Transaction Cost 
Economics), and for that he placed his analysis at the level of personal 
relations and networks thereby ignoring higher level, cultural and social 
structures. 
However, in line with the legacy of the three authors, another stream of 
research labelled ‘critical realism’ (Archer et al., 1998; Lawson, 1997) insists 
that social structures are ontologically distinct from person’s activities in that 
they “are composed of a nexus of (in many cases internally related) positions, 
the relations between which are relatively impersonal in the sense that they 
typically exist independently of the particular individuals who occupy them at a 
particular moment in time” (Lewis, 2004: 175). Usually, critical realists argue 
that social structures correspond to a particular distribution of vested 
interests, and have an historical dimension based on material and discursive 
resources, which in the overall are not reducible to current agency and inter-
personal relations.34 This entails an emergentist perspective of social reality 
that differs from Individualism, Holism and what Archer (1995) labels 
“Elisionism” or “Central conflationism” implicit in Giddens’ sociology. 
Critical realists highlight the temporal priority, relative autonomy and causal 
efficacy of sociocultural structures. Such realist perspective should be seen as 
consistent with a multi-level ontology, which calls for analytical distinctions 
between individuals’ interactions and emergent sociocultural systems. 
According to Archer (2000b: 465), “analytical dualism” is different from 
“ontological dualism” because “(1) structures are only held to emerge from the 
activities of people, and because (2) structures only exert any effect when 
mediated through the activities of people.”35  Therefore, critical realists have 
rejected not only the network approach to the ‘agency-structure problem’ but 
also other theoretical variants mostly inspired by the works of Bourdieu and 
Giddens. They argue that these approaches are based on a narrow, flattened 
vision of social reality when proposing a mid-level, a ‘central conflation’ of 
levels, between individuals and social reality. Referring to such theoretical 
                                                 
34 Most critical realist literature does not make a distinction between social and cultural 
structures. An outstanding exception is (Archer, 1988, 1995). 
35 Given the ontological load of the term ‘dualism’ in the discussions of the so called 
‘mind-brain problem’, I prefer the expression ‘analytical distinction’ in order to keep apart 
from the ‘dualism vs. monism’ debate, which I think is overcome by a multi-level ontology. 
Further discussion of sociocultural emergence is postponed to the next chapter. 
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option, Layder (1998: 99) recognises that “although some examples of this 
kind of approach are more likely to formally acknowledge the existence of 
different social domains their practical effect is to compact, dissolve or 
conflate them and thus to fail to account for their distinct and partially 
autonomous effects.” 
Therefore, markets cannot exist without: (1) interpersonal relations 
(interactional level); (2) settled ‘ways of doing business’ governing the different 
stages of the market process (intermediate level); (3) general laws, rules, 
standards and a variety of higher-order systems of social and cultural nature 
(high structural level). Therefore, whatever the level of analysis considered, I 
will treat a market as the systemic totality of these three levels of processes, a 
particular kind of emergent sociocultural system. 
At this point it should be clear that an Institutionalist, emergentist 
understanding of markets makes a contribution to the methodology of 
economic theory. This emergentist perspective—neither independence nor 
conflation of levels and causal relations—pictures the interplay between 
human agency and the structural levels of society as a complex process, which 
calls for a deeper elaboration that goes largely beyond the bare scheme used 
by the three Institutionalist authors reviewed. In fact, none of them was able to 
use the concept of ‘emergence’ in their multi-level understanding of 
institutions, even if the concept was already discussed in biology since 
Veblen’s time (Hodgson, 2004b). Therefore, references in their formulations to 
mutual interdependence between agency and sociocultural structures mostly 
rest on a rather vague discourse involving habits, imitation and some 
(unspecified) collective action. 
Fortunately, in the last two decades a more elaborate ontology of social reality 
has been developed by social scientists of different backgrounds inspired by 
the critical realist philosophy of Roy Bhaskar (1989 [1979]) and his proposal of 
a Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) (see Fig. 1). The latter has 
been improved by Archer’s (1995) morphogenesis-morphostasis model 
making explicit both the temporal dimension of social phenomena and the 
importance of the interface between agency and structures (see Fig. 2). 
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Fig. 1 - Bhaskar’s TMSA (source: Archer, 1995: 156) 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 – TMSA - Morphogenetic/static cycle (source: Archer, 1995: 158) 
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The critical realist approach of social reality is still an ongoing research 
programme engaged in important debates; it still needs to settle some 
epistemological and ontological issues (Cruickshank, 2004; Nellhaus, 1998),36 
and clarify in what sense the invoked causal efficacy of sociocultural structures 
is compatible with individuals’ autonomy (Lewis, 2000; Wight, 2004). 
Nevertheless, taken in a broad scope, it provides what I find the more 
adequate conceptual framework available at this moment for those who want 
to theorize economic phenomena and build on the Institutionalist legacy. 
Therefore, in order to proceed, I need to come to terms with underdeveloped 
aspects of the critical realist ontology, and with the problems of applying it to 
specific sociocultural entities such as markets. The task is even more 
demanding because the widespread adoption of biological metaphors in 
heterodox economics has diverted some non-mainstream economics 
researchers from the most important task of exploring the specific 
sociocultural nature of markets and firms (Niman, 1994), notwithstanding the 
acknowledgement at a high level of abstraction of some commonalities. 
2.5.2 Homo œconomicus or persons? 
As noticed, Veblen and Hayek emphasised the enduring nature of ‘institutions’ 
on grounds of human propensity for habitual behaviour. On the contrary, 
Polanyi stressed the transformative power of human agency to explain why 
and how the institution of a “market society” has been a rupture in human 
history. The question that arises is how these two facets of human behaviour 
(routine versus innovation) have been integrated by subsequent non-
mainstream literature, and if so under what kind of coherent and plausible 
understanding of human agency? 
But first it is convenient to explain why this discussion does not concern 
mainstream economics, either in its neoclassical school or in the revised 
versions of game theories (Davis, 2003). In fact, neoclassical economics 
appeared as a result of a long theoretical struggle of classical economists with 
the difficulties to integrate human subjectivity in their analysis. In its 
                                                 
36 Critical realism has been criticised by Hodgson (2002b) because it neglects the 
“reconstitutive downward causation” of institutions over individuals’ motivations namely 
through change in habits. However, a careful reading of Archer (1995: Chap. 8) shows that 
her concept of “double morphogenesis” of structure and agency accommodates this type 
of effect, but certainly without any preponderance of habits as I will discuss below in this 
section. 
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beginnings, economics adopted Locke’s version of the individual as an 
isolated, conscious and self-reflexive being that privately builds knowledge out 
of simple ideas that he gets through sense experience. Either in cardinal utility 
theory, or later with preferences in the ordinal utility theory, the Lockean view 
of individual consciousness, private and unchanged along time, remains the 
fundamental inspiration. But, assuming the existence of two worlds, the inner 
(subjective) and the external (objective) world, the classics had to face the 
difficult question about their relations. While Adam Smith recurred to the 
rather vague concept of ‘order’ (the metaphor of the “invisible hand”) to link 
the subjective world of individuals and the economic outcomes of the market, 
this stance has been considered far from satisfactory. By the end of the 
nineteenth century the disputed problem of how to scientifically integrate in 
economics the subjectivity of the individual received a neo-classical solution, 
that is, the belief that psychological states are the direct causes of individual 
behaviour, which expresses rational choices of the mind based on the 
marginalist principles. 
However, the debates around utility and individual’s psychology led to the 
belief that rational maximisation of utility was only one instance of the general 
principle of rational choice procedure, which is instrumental about means and 
agnostic about ends.37 Therefore, after the contribution of Samuelson, Arrow 
and others, “the theory of choice was progressively emptied of any and all 
reference to individuals’ subjective ends, to the point that current mainstream 
choice theory refers to individuals’ ends entirely formally in terms of objective 
functions” (Davis, 2003: 27). At the end of this process what has become 
mainstream economics treats preferences as “given” or as “exogenous” to 
economic relations. The self-reflective individual and his subjectivity finally 
disappeared from the economic realm as it has been reconverted into abstract 
choices determined by algorithmic computations in the brain.38 In fact, the 
failure of the microfoundations project of New Classical Economics, and the 
deep ambiguities of the “hybrid atomist-holist” game theory explanations 
                                                 
37 For a critique of rational choice theory see, among others, (Archer, 2000a), (Dupré, 
2001b) and (Joas, 1996). 
38 According to Davis (2003), the adoption of game theory in the analysis of strategic 
decisions of individuals is what mostly distinguishes modern mainstream economics from 
neoclassical economics. However, this new application of ‘rational choice theory’ does not 
reintroduce the subjectivity of the individual in the analysis. 
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(Davis, 2003: 35-44), are only symptoms of a more fundamental reality: indeed 
mainstream’s homo œconomicus is not about real human beings in the world. 
In contrast to the atomist view of the economic agent, most heterodox views 
recur to what is usually called the ‘embeddedness’ of individuals. This term no 
longer corresponds to Polanyi’s meaning, and rather points to the idea that in 
their decisions individuals are influenced by their social environment, which is 
usually understood (wrongly, but see below) as a limitation to human 
rationality within a view of man as a ‘rule follower’ (Rutherford, 1996). 
Nevertheless, in the Original Institutionalist perspective launched by Veblen 
‘embeddedness’ still preserves individuals’ autonomy to learn and change, 
both themselves and the social structures around them. 
Other authors (Hodgson, 2004b; Vromen, 2001), replying to sceptical critiques 
about how to account for human purposeful action within a Darwinian 
evolutionary understanding of institutions, recur to Evolutionary Psychology.39 
However, Davis (2003) argues that evolutionary economics, as well as other 
non-mainstream approaches that attempt to deal with this ‘embedded man’ 
without making it disappear in a holist view of social reality, have been unable 
to fill-in the details of the framework of agency-structure interaction. To 
provide an alternative, Davis builds on the idea of an ‘embedded man’ that is 
self-reflective and endowed with causal powers, and makes a step forward by 
adopting a particular theory of the individual that he thinks is able to provide 
the quested articulation between self-reflectivity and social behaviour. The 
individual is the starting point: “the specific account of socially embedded 
individuals I employ—shared or collective intentionality analysis—is not an 
account of individuals outside social relationships, but one that instead sees 
social relationships as embedded in individuals” (Davis, 2003: 130). Actually, 
the author adopts the theory of social relations proposed by Tuomela (2002), 
which also influenced John Searle’s philosophy of institutions. A crucial idea in 
this theoretical framework is that individuals behave in accordance with two 
interconnected kinds of intentionality: first-person singular, which is the 
domain of instrumental rationality; first-person plural, which is the domain of 
voluntarily accepted social obligations. The approach amounts to an 
‘individualisation’ of social phenomena, and thus proposes a solution to the 
‘agency-structure problem’ that has received strong and convincing critiques 
                                                 
39 I disagree with this stream of research but reserve the discussion for Chapter 5. 
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(Meijers, 2003; Viskovatoff, 2003). Had Davis made a careful enquiry into 
contemporary research within psychology and sociology he certainly would 
find other contributions that fully assume the individual, and yet picture a 
more convincing nexus between agency and structure. The pointers to an 
alternative to homo œconomicus may be found both in the Pragmatist legacies 
of Veblen and Hayek-III, and in the Personalist vision of human nature 
underlying Polanyi’s work. Both streams connect with a plurality of recent 
contributions of which I will present a cursory synthesis in the following 
paragraphs. 
I begin with a comment on the growing literature that reviews and updates our 
knowledge of American Pragmatists’ understanding of both human nature and 
social structures (Barbalet, 2004; Joas, 1996, 1998; Manicas, 2002). Firstly, the 
philosophy and psychology of William James are usually associated with 
Veblen’s emphasis on the role of habits and instincts as linkages between 
agency and institutions (Hodgson, 2004b: 162-175). However, James’s study 
of instincts should be put in the scientific and cultural context of his epoch. 
Actually, it was a refined understanding that broadly corresponds to what is 
now referred under the formula of “embodied knowledge” in opposition to the 
classical cognitivist, computational theory of the mind. When we take account 
of James’s ambiguous formulations, namely about the autonomy of the mind, 
then instinct and emotion appear to be very close in kind if not the same; the 
former is understood as a evolved, “pre-organised mechanism” of bodily 
changes triggered by some external (or memory) event, which is experienced 
at the mental level by the human being as ‘emotion’.40 However, Bird (1986: 
139-140) notes that “James is not claiming that emotions are instinctive rather 
than acquired, and he could allow that we may acquire or develop certain 
emotions. (…) The idea is rather that whatever the provenance of the emotion 
it will have to be associated with those established physiological mechanisms”. 
This relative autonomy of ‘emotions’, linked to what James perceived as 
complex, obscure causation of neurophysiological processes, should be 
framed within James’s dualist metaphysics, which leaks into his psychology the 
struggle of the philosopher trying to reconcile scientific explanations with the 
idea of a survival of the ‘soul’ and a religious meaning for life (Flanagan, 
                                                 
40 Actually, William James’s concept of emotion seems to be what Damasio (1999) names 
‘feelings’, the conscious awareness of emotions: “bodily changes follow directly from the 
perception of an exciting fact, and that our feelings of [these] changes as they occur is the 
emotion” (Quoted by Barbalet, 2004: 341-342). 
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1997). In my view, because James has not a concept for emergent phenomena, 
his formulations ultimately reveal the relentless pursuit of a science-based 
non-eliminativist, and yet non-dualist understanding of human nature, which 
only recently is receiving wider acceptance in psychology (Martin, 2003).41 
Taking this background, “reference to the future is crucial for an 
understanding of James’s thought, because the apprehension of the future and 
the basis of action that achieves or creates one possible future against others 
are necessarily emotional” (Barbalet, 2004: 338; emphasis mine). This forward-
looking attitude is also basic to James’s understanding of human rationality. 
The future carries with it uncertainty or ambiguities that can only be dissipated 
by a decision prompted by emotionally driven expectations about the 
consequences. “In this affective or emotional displacement of uncertainty 
concerning the future James locates rationality, or at least the ‘sentiment of 
rationality’, … the particular emotional configuration that enables actors to 
engage unknowable futures” (Barbalet, 2004: 343). In brief, William James sees 
emotions (‘feelings’ in Damasio’s terms) as mental, general-purpose guides of 
adapting human behaviour.42 In a more up-dated formulation, but still 
preserving the essential of James’s intuitions, Clark (2002: 157) states: “In 
place of rigid patterns found in most species, the inherited “drives” of primates 
and humans might better be described as broad propensities that guide an 
overall behavior pattern that is learned mainly from experience and from social 
culture.” In this sense, it would be a reductionist mistake to use James’s 
problematic discussion of instincts both to establish a gene-based direct link 
to human propensities and, further, to privilege a particular propensity (e.g., 
habits, creativity) in order to account for actual behaviour. 
A naturalist view of mind is also present in the particular Pragmatism of John 
Dewey, mostly in his late work where he clearly anticipated the connectionist 
understanding of the brain and thus rejected the idea of a problem-solving 
                                                 
41 For a deep discussion of emergent processes in natural systems, see Emmeche et al. 
(1997). For process metaphysics supporting an emergentist and evolutionary view of 
reality, yet opened to the religious concerns of William James, see Entralgo (1999). 
42 According to Clark (2002: 58), “there are but three basic drives or needs that specifically 
constitute human nature … I label these needs  “propensities” rather than “instincts” or 
“drives” (the more common terms for genetically programmed emotions) because while 
propensity still implies a powerful innate tendency, it suggests far more flexibility in the 
behavioral responses by which it can be satisfied. The three propensities are for bonding, 
for autonomy, and for meaning.” Clark specifies that the latter subordinates the other two, 
and that the particular meaning system we need for bonding and preserving autonomy is 
a “human construct” (Ibid, 59). 
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mind governed by symbols and rules (Manicas, 2002). Further, he had an 
ecological understanding of the mind as he saw knowledge arising at the 
crossroads of brain and body acting within a specific situation. “That is, there 
is no way to disconnect sensing and acting nor to disconnect these from the 
situation which is changing as the consequence of acting” (Manicas, 2002: 
286). With this ecological understanding Dewey rejects the Cartesian dualism 
of mind and matter in two fundamental aspects. First, rather than accepting 
that we make a movement as a consequence of a perception, Dewey argues 
that perception and movement are only analytical stages of an ongoing, 
coordinated act and each of them gains a meaning as part of that action. 
“From the standpoint of the actor, the action, the goal, the actor and the object 
usually remain undifferentiated or fused within the act” (Gillespie, 2005: 23). 
Second, Dewey sees the mind as arising within a process of managing 
conflicting responses within the act. Consciousness arises out of unexpected 
difficulties in the course of action that forces the subject to a mental 
“reconstruction” of the situation. Gillespie (2005: 23-24) states: “the basic 
movement can be schematised as a movement from a rupture of ongoing 
action, to reconstructive effort (experienced as consciousness), which resolves 
in the continuation of action.” 
From the above presented cursory notes we can see that an important legacy 
of American Pragmatism consists in a complex understanding of human 
nature, at the same time biological, psychological, and constitutively opened to 
the world (see Fig. 3). This has been an inspiration for a number of 
contemporary researchers in developmental psychology whose current work 
builds on the concept of ‘person’ (Bickhard, 2004b; Martin, 2003; Overton, 
2004).  
 
 
 
Fig. 3 - The human being as emergent ‘person’ 
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Looking for an alternative both to “modernity man”, which has been 
impoverished until only left with an algorithmic-abstract rationality, and to 
“society’s being”, the post-modern human individual turned into “gift of 
society” (Archer, 2000a), the above-mentioned authors argue for a third stance 
that builds on the concept of emergence. The framework adopted endorses 
important critiques formulated by post-modernism against modernity 
understanding of human nature, but also assumes different ontological and 
epistemological assumptions that prevent both idealism and relativism. Rather 
than a ‘self’ ‘socially constructed’, it argues for the emergence of self as 
person “through relational discursive construction [and material interactions] 
deployed in the context of systemic processes of social constitution, both 
societal-level and local, in a temporally extended unfolding” (Falmagne, 2004: 
838). In a convergent account that accepts the post-modern critique of a 
entirely unified view of the self, Martin (2005: 212) argues:  
A very considerable degree of multiplicity and diversity in any individual 
person is readily accommodated in most of our sociocultural practices of 
personhood, without necessitating a denial that the embodied individual in 
question is a single self. 
The importance of this ‘emergent person’ perspective for the theoretical 
framework I aim to build merits a sketch of its main ideas.43 Firstly, because 
persons “emerge and develop contingently within real sociocultural, physical, 
and biological contexts” (Martin et al., 2003: 110), they are not reducible 
either to biological kinds or to sociocultural contexts and practices. “A person 
is an identifiable, embodied individual human with being, self-understanding 
(self), agentic capability, and personal identity” (Ibid, 111). Besides the 
biological body (not only the brain), this definition highlights the contingent 
existence of the individual in the life-world (being) and his relational 
development, which “is dependent on, but very different from the 
developmentally more primitive, prelinguistic sense of self that equates with 
one’s recognition of one’s physical body as distinct from other objects and 
people” (Ibid, 111). Further, the definition points to a personal ‘identity’, the 
“particular concerns, cares, and commitments to which self-reflective agents 
direct their actions and efforts” (Ibid, 112). Finally, the authors make it clear 
that persons have a deliberative, reflective activity for “selecting, framing, 
                                                 
43 See also the meaning of ‘emergent person’ in Bickhard (2004b: 126; emphasis mine): “It 
is emergent in the biological and psychological development of an individual who, 
however massively social, is not entirely social in his or her being.” 
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choosing, and executing” their actions in a way that is not fully determined by 
other factors than their own understanding and reasoning (Ibid, 112).44 One 
important aspect of the developmental view is the pre-reflective, body 
sensations experienced by the infant unfolding in progressive maturation. This 
occurs at the biophysical level and at the psychological level, the latter mostly 
in the capability to make sense of the socio-cultural practices, of which the 
relational-conversational are crucial for learning to use symbolic tools (Martin 
and Sugarman, 2000: 400).45 Such developmental, on going acquisition of 
conscious self-reflection does not imply the disappearance of pre-reflective 
activity; on the contrary, the latter is always present and plays a crucial role in 
everyday life routines.46 The development of the infant is nested in biological, 
social and psychological interdependencies and involves learning processes of 
different kind: ‘acquisitional’ learning (elaborating meanings from relations 
with the environment), and ‘revisionist’ learning coming from the conscious 
interpretation of a new situation when previous understanding is insufficient 
(Martin and Sugarman, 2000: 402). 
Therefore, above and beyond the traditional separation between routinised 
and purposeful action, we should accept that (in more or less degree) a 
creative dimension is present in human action, even when we perform an 
institutional role or act routinely.47 This is an important contribution of the 
Personalist understanding of human nature that merits detailed discussion of 
its implications in the following subsection. 
2.5.3 Agency: tangled up in personality and society 
I begin with a reference to Hans Joas’s (1996; 1998) sociology of action, the 
most discussed work of the last decade addressing the present topic, which is 
also inspired by the American Pragmatist thinking of the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Joas’s (1996) work is consistent with the above-mentioned 
                                                 
44 In a similar vein, see Ingold (2002: 744): “in truth, no more than other animals do 
human beings come biologically ready-made, to be ‘topped-up’ by culture.” 
45 Donald (2001) extensively discusses the emergence and use of symbolic technologies. 
46 This does not mean that human routines are not conscious as some evolutionary 
economists assume. About this see (Donald, 2001: 57). 
47 See this illuminating passage by Archer (2000c: 53; emphasis mine): “norms cannot be 
scripted for every contingency. Therefore the successful role-player cannot sink into the 
passive follower of normative instructions whose only reasons for action are located in the 
role itself, or because satisfactory performance gives access to further roles. … Yet, if we 
truly personify roles, then we bring to them something other than the normative stuff out 
of which roles are made. What we bring is judgement …” 
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developmental view of human nature and presents an elaborated critique of 
action theory’s assumptions as assumed either in neoclassical economics or in 
normative theories of classical sociology. In brief terms: rather than the rigid 
and sequential scheme of given ends/goals commanding optimal choice of 
means, ends/goals and means/actions are constituted (defined, revised) within 
an interactive situation; rather than taking for granted (and almost ignoring) 
the body, we need to recognise that the body has an influence on action that is 
not completely anticipated, and be opened to other forms of action that imply 
passivity, receptivity and the release of the body; rather than the conventional 
individualistic, fully autonomous view of action, we need to emphasise the 
natural, social and historical shaping of both individuals and their inter-
actions. 
Building on the above-mentioned critique, Joas (1996) goes further to 
elaborate a theory of action, which brings human creativity to the foreground 
within a multi-stage model: 
According to this model, all perception of the world and all action in the 
world is anchored in an unreflected belief in self-evident given facts and 
successful habits. However, this belief, and the routines of action based 
upon it, are repeatedly shattered. (…) Our perception must come to terms 
with new or different aspects of reality; action must be applied to different 
points of the world, or must restructure itself. This reconstruction is a 
creative achievement on the part of the actor. If he succeeds in reorienting 
the action on the basis of this changed perception and thus continuing with 
it, then something new enters the world: a new mode of action, which can 
gradually take root and thus itself become an unreflected routine (Joas, 
1996: 128-129). 
Some reviewers of Joas (1996) have noticed that this model presents a dual, 
sequential view of habitual and creative action that is not consistent with its 
foundations. As Kilpinen (1998) recalls, Pragmatists had a reflective 
understanding of habit, which they did not equate with routine. In Peirce’s 
words, “consciousness of habit is a consciousness at once of the substance of 
the habit, the special case of application, and the union of the two” (quoted in 
Kilpinen, 1998: 178). Acknowledging Peirce’s intertwining of habit and 
reflexivity, Camic (1998: 289) also asks “why single out one half of this pair 
and propose a theory of creativity, rather than of the habit-creativity nexus?” 
These observations point to a weakness in Joas’s (1996) model and reveal the 
need of its re-elaboration in order not only to do justice to Peirce’s thinking 
but also to move beyond and fully acknowledge a creative dimension in human 
action, which is different from a formulation in terms of ‘habits-cum-creativity’. 
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Actually, this is the line of argument proposed by Dalton (2004) who firstly 
recalls Bourdieu and his concept of ‘habitus’, which is based on individual’s 
habitual behaviour acquired within a particular social class setting. The 
conceptual framework of ‘habitus’ is important for the present discussion 
because, despite being central to the explanation of social reproduction, it also 
assumes that creativity is always present in human action although in a largely 
constrained manner. As Dalton (2004: 614) states, “the primary lesson 
Bourdieu’s perspective holds lies in the possibility of uniting habitual and 
creative elements in a theory of action that neither depends on ascribing a 
separate origin and operation to a creative “tendency” nor on toggling between 
habitual and creative moments in the unfolding course of practical challenges.” 
A creative dimension in habitual behaviour is better seen with three examples 
that cannot be framed within Joas’s model: (1) creativity arises in the impulsive 
behaviour that emerges within a routine, not because there is a problem to 
solve but as a result of boredom and the need to vary, or even is motivated by 
a desire to subvert normal activities; (2) in artistic activities sometimes the 
work becomes routinised in specific styles or genres, “and when routinised, 
the concrete realization of specific forms of artistry may be creative 
achievements because of small deviations from artistic ideals or paradigmatic 
works” (Dalton, 2004: 609); (3) rather than a reaction to the failure of a 
routine, creativity may also be at work in the efforts to improve a routine even 
if it is already successful. In this case, creativity does not suspend routine but 
rather operates within the routine. In brief, these examples show that we need 
to look for a more sophisticated understanding of human action than the 
sequential stages proposed by Joas (1996). 
In order to overcome the above-mentioned limitations I turn now to the less 
discussed work of Emirbayer and Mische (1998), which is also inspired by the 
Pragmatist thinking. The crucial insight of their contribution lays in the 
consideration of the temporal dimension of agency (Emirbayer and Mische, 
1998: 963): 
while routine, purpose, and judgement all constitute important [temporal] 
dimensions of agency, none by itself captures its full complexity. Moreover, 
when one or another is conflated with agency itself, we lose a sense of the 
dynamic interplay among these dimensions and of how this interplay varies 
within different structural contexts of action. 
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Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 971) distinguish in human agency three 
analytical dimensions related to time-positioning: iterational (“selective 
reactivation of past patterns of thought and action”), projective (“imaginative 
generation of possible future trajectories of action”) and practical-evaluative 
(“capacity to make now practical and normative judgements among alternative 
possible trajectories of action”). The authors argue that the three dimensions 
are present in any kind of action in varying degrees, but they also recognise 
that iteration is crucial because the other two dimensions “are deeply 
grounded in habitual, unreflected, and mostly unproblematic patterns of 
action by means of which we orient our efforts in the greater part of our daily 
lives” (Ibid, 975). Even so, Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 979) underline that 
iteration always involves the (secondary) presence of some form of projective 
and evaluative dimensions. To explain this, they refer to the presence of an 
expectation that past patterns will repeat and succeed in the situation at hand, 
and that we still need in the moment some ‘manoeuvring’ to adequate agency 
to the details of the situation. In brief, Emirbayer and Mische (1998) provide an 
insightful analysis that not only preserves the iterational aspect of human 
behaviour but also goes beyond Veblen’s habit-based psychology by fully 
integrating creativity as a uniquely human capacity (Donald, 2001). 
At this point a question is in order: is it possible to build on the 
multidimensional analysis of agency proposed by Emirbayer and Mische (1998) 
and establish a theoretically adequate (and methodologically useful) linkage to 
the ontology of sociocultural reality? To achieve an answer to this question I 
need to provide the analytical detail that renders this articulation possible, and 
the qualifications that should preserve both a developmental stance about 
human nature and the critical realist approach previously endorsed. 
My point of departure takes person as an emergent source of causal powers in 
line with developmental arguments already presented. Despite basic 
theoretical convergence with Archer (1995) on what concerns her emergentist 
stance about sociocultural structures, and her defence of “analytical dualism” 
to preserve ontological distinctions between human and social realms, I do not 
fully subscribe to her recent work (Archer, 2000a; 2003), which sees the self as 
primarily constituted in the infant’s practice—his relationships with nature or 
with objects—only then being able to socially interact. Archer’s ideas that from 
birth infants create a proto-self by drawing on their emotions in order to filter 
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sensorial experiences and organise meanings is certainly consensual, although 
it seems to be only a part of the story mainly because it neglects affective, 
language-based interactions with caregivers.48  To consider the emergence of 
the self as previous to social interaction is only a first step in Archer’s 
theoretical struggle against oversocialised views of the individual, which she 
links to the seminal influence of Mead’s psycho-sociological thinking.49 
In a second step, Archer defends that the process of identity formation is 
solitary and takes the form of an internal conversation.50 Arguing for a 
nuanced position, Meyers (2003) convincingly shows that this process of 
identity building begins early with the acquisition of language and strongly 
depends on the learning of a range of skills with helpful adults. Developing an 
extensive argument against Archer’s (2000a) views, Meyers (2003: 280) states: 
“I believe that there is no need to espouse such unrealistic conception of 
human life. (…) it is possible to make good on the claim that people’s 
distinctive desires, interests, values, and goals are not simply products of their 
environment without denying the indispensability of interpersonal 
relationships or the profundity of society’s influence.” 
Another critique of Archer’s stance is given by Mutch (2004: 432) who agrees 
with her broad critical realist formulation of agency-structure relations 
“provided that they include an adequate response to the broader literature on 
the situated nature of cognition.” As a complement, the author proposes the 
work of the sociologist of education Basil Bernstein and argues that his 
conceptual framework enables us to account for the influence of structural 
factors, specifically linguistic codes typical of certain social classes, on 
children’s identity construction, which occurs through the limitations those 
codes introduce in conversations, ways of thinking and life projects. And 
Mutch (2004: 440; emphasis mine) concludes: 
                                                 
48 Benton (2001b: 37) addresses a pertinent question: “what of the non-linguistic 
dimensions of embodied human interaction – including those between infants and carers, 
but continuing through life?”. In fact, the question contains a pertinent critique of Archer’s 
narrow views of how a sense of self emerges, and of her predominantly linguistic 
understanding of social interaction. 
49 According to Vandenberghe (2005: 233), in Archer’s recent work “Mead is assailed as an 
‘uncompromising externalist’ and a ‘downwards conflationist’ who got it all wrong.” 
50 About this point Benton (2001b: 38) also asks: “Why does it matter whether we arrive at 
a modus vivendi between our different emotional dispositions and commitments by way 
of an inner conversation with ourselves, or by way of an outer conversation with friends, 
members of the family or other acquaintances?”   
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there seems to be at least some evidence to suggest that such modes of 
thought are powerfully shaped by structural factors in a way which perhaps 
needs to be taken into consideration when we consider conversations and 
reflexivity. 
Even so, we must bear in mind that structural factors at work in social 
interactions are always actively received; they are filtered and reconstructed, 
for “the achievements of the creative imagination are constitutive for the 
person’s ability to communicate with reality, other people, and him or herself” 
(Joas, 1998: 13).51 
With the above-presented critical reviews of Archer’s recent work my aim is 
to give a hint of the complex background that should be acknowledged when 
we discuss the tangled connections between socio-cultural structures and 
human action. As McGowan put it, “both [are] deeply embedded in cultural 
codings that carry experiences of the past and motivational-normative 
orientations toward a desired future.” Certainly, as Archer (1995) discussed 
at length, today’s human beings have grown up under the influence of social 
realities that pre-existed them, and each of us plays social roles that give 
access to specific resources used to maintain and/or change present social 
structures, or to create new ones for the future. However, notwithstanding 
Archer’s (2003) most recent contribution, critical realism still needs to 
develop in depth analysis about the agency-structure linkage, both from the 
side of human action (but see Layder, 2004b) and from the side of 
sociocultural structures to the extent that semiotic processes are usually 
absent from the analysis (Fairclough et al., 2002). 
Critical realists emphatically reject social reification and argue that social 
entities exist as relations between roles/positions and only have an influence 
through people’s actions. This means that causal powers of more or less 
distant social layers-systems are always mediated by persons,52 which also 
exert their own causal powers. Hence the importance of Goffman’s focus on 
the bottom level of person’s inter-actions. Layder (1994: 218-219) comments 
on this basic level in the following terms: 
                                                 
51 In this sense we should not refer to “internalisation” when talking about learning 
processes because it is not “an automatic copying or transmission operation, but one 
involving coordination of the new with the old and restructuring of both” (Carpendale and 
Müller, 2004: 11; emphasis mine). 
52 In Archer’s (1995: 184) words, “any form of socio-cultural conditioning only exerts its 
effects on people and is only efficacious through people.” 
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Without doubt Goffman was aware of the intimate tie between interaction 
and [higher-level] institutional orders (…) he never lost sight of the 
complicated and delicate mediations that the interaction order interposes 
between human agency and the wider social fabric. It is only by making 
such distinctions between social orders that we can depict the ‘layering’ of 
social reality. 
In line with such a view of a social reality composed of different but closely 
interdependent layers, Layder (1997; 2004a) proposed a typology of ‘social 
domains’: psychobiography (“lifelong personal development and 
individuation”), situated activity (“relationships between at least two 
individuals enclosed by the situational focus of their mutual involvement”), 
social settings (“the socially organized conditions (reproduced relations) 
under which different kinds of situated activity take place”), contextual 
resources (“person’s most general social [and cultural] influences”, namely 
his/her position in networks giving access and control in different kind and 
degree to cultural, material and authoritative resources within society). 
Layder’s contribution opens a new perspective about the social realm but I 
cannot accept ‘psychobiography’ as a social level; rather, what Layder 
describes is a ‘hybrid’ domain that impedes a clear ontological distinction 
between individual and society. Even so, the framework is useful for my 
discussion in that it assumes “the individual as intrinsically involved with 
others in both face-to-face situations and in terms of more remote networks 
of social relationships” (Layder, 1994: 3). In a convergent stance, Falmagne 
(2004: 823) argues: 
a ‘person’’s subjectivity and ‘mind’ are constituted over time through 
her/his social location in a gendered, ‘raced’ and class-stratified world, the 
attendant formative societal discourses, the local discursive processes in 
which s/he has participated and that have been configured by those larger 
discourses-structures, and her/his agency in appropriating, rejecting or 
modulating various societal discourses and in constructing the subject 
positions s/he inhabits in local discursive exchanges. At the same time, 
social subjects affect local and macro-level social processes by their actions 
and their positionings. 
From the above-presented stances I take that at a local level, within more or 
less organised ‘social settings’, persons establish interactions between one 
another and with nature, thereby creating, maintaining and transforming 
social relations, the units that make up social structures, some of which give 
rise to systems endowed with strong emergent properties. Emphasising that 
‘social domains’ are not only analytic distinctions but also emergent realities, 
Layder (1998: 89) further states that “while distinct in their own right, the 
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domains overlap, interpenetrate and diffusely influence each other.” 
According to this view, the bottom-level53 of the social realm is constituted by 
myriad of social relations that emerge in virtue of patterned human inter-
actions and practices that persons entertain in given contexts (see Fig. 4).54  
 
 
  
 (1) Emergent social relations 
 (2) Social structures: emergent, organised roles-positions 
 (3) Causal interactions between social layers-systems 
 
Fig. 4 - Interpenetration between agency and social structures 
                                                 
53 Here, and in other passages or diagrams, I adopt a spatial metaphor to benefit from its 
semiotic potential, although this is not fully appropriate in the case of social reality as I 
will discuss in the next chapter. 
54 Analogously to the emergence of concepts, which are seen as ‘invariants’ from 
patterned, meaningful experiences across different contexts (Hooker, 1995; Pankow, 
1976), here I see social relations as ‘social invariants’ emerging across time and space 
from patterned human interactions. 
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Consider, for example, parent-offspring relationships (Layder, 1997: 83; 
emphasis mine) 
that are socially defined in terms of formal expectations and obligations, 
patterns of deference and so on. However, actual contact and the quality of 
relations [inter-actions] between parent and offspring will depend on the 
“state” of the relationship. Typically though, the two will come together in 
specific episodes of face-to-face interaction, and each instance will have a 
small life and history of its own in which the social relationship is 
reproduced in various ways. 
This means that, although mutually constituting, human ‘interactions’ and 
‘social relations’ should be analytically distinguished. Interactions belong to 
situated activity, the lived-experience of human beings involving cognitive 
processes enmeshed with emotional engagements, which generate normative 
bonds for those who interact (Baerveldt and Voestermans, 2005); social 
relations are emergent invariants of those bonds, some of which are 
internally and necessarily related and thus constitute social roles-positions 
independently of the persons that enact them. In Layder’s (1997: 83; 
emphasis mine) words, “social relations are about the trans-situational ties 
that join together particular episodes of situated activity.” 
Although within a very different research programme, Niklas Luhmann (1995: 
Chap. 6) followed  a similar path. Setting aside the discussion bout the 
nature of the elementary unit of social systems—should we consider human 
action or human communication? (Stichweh, 2000)—Luhmann was right when 
he argued that the severing of human beings from social systems does not 
occur when one sees that the human realm interpenetrates the social realm 
at the interactional level: “interpenetration exists (…) when both systems 
enable each other by introducing their own already-constituted complexity 
into each other. (…) This is strikingly true in the relationship of human 
beings to social systems” (Luhmann, 1995: 213). 
With the foregoing discussion I am ultimately arguing for an understanding 
of the sociocultural realm that rejects the ‘intersubjectivity’ approach to 
social reality adopted by some non-mainstream authors (see Fullbrook, 
2002).55 To clarify this point I can also recur to the idea that human action is 
                                                 
55 Despite wide use of the concept of ‘intersubjectivity’ to address the interactional level of 
social reality—including critical realists such as (Lewis and Runde, 2002) and (Layder, 
1998: 92)—I reject it because it presupposes that the subjectivity of individuals is 
externalised, which is an idea based on the problematic codificationist understanding of 
language. I have discussed at length this topic in (Bateira, 2006). 
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a “bipolar” concept: it has both a subjective experience aspect, which relates 
to the motion of human beings’ personality, and a transformative aspect that 
is public and source of experiences for other human beings (Overton, 2004: 
39).56 Therefore, in my view, human inter-actions are the locus of 
‘interpenetration’ of two ontologically distinct levels of reality, the personal 
and the sociocultural. Such understanding presupposes that the person 
maintains its autonomy, that is, a relative control of self development within 
which “the actions, attitudes and perspectives of others gradually are 
appropriated and transformed into psychological processes” (Martin, 2005: 
221).57  
This ontological separation carries with it an important implication that I 
have suggested before: the units that constitute systems’ structures are not 
the individuals themselves, not even their agency, but the social relations 
that are created between them (see Fig. 4). With time, interactions become 
patterned and give rise to bonds between persons and to their invariants, 
‘social relations’. This emergentist understanding of social relations builds 
on the previously argued emergentist understanding of persons, and also 
bears a connection to the philosophy of Martin Buber to whom Chiari and 
Nuzzo (2006: 258; emphasis mine) refer emphasising a structural 
perspective: 
We are more accustomed to thinking that social processes take place 
whenever an individual meets another individual. In this case, we see two 
separate individuals interacting with each other. However, we can assume a 
different perspective and take the relation as primary: it is from the 
relation that persons and their realities emerge. In this case, the two terms 
of the relation are no longer separately interacting; they complement each 
other. 
Therefore, instead of the individual, I take “the relation as primary” for my 
ontology of the ‘social’ domain in sociocultural systems. I assume social 
relations as units that emerge from person’s interactions.58 In their multiple 
interconnections, social relations form roles and positions in order to 
specialise and pattern individuals’ interactions; roles and positions in turn 
                                                 
56 See also (Baerveldt and Voestermans, 2005: 467). 
57 In a similar vein see (Harvey, 2002a: 193).  
58 While I take social relations as emergent invariants of bonds between persons, most 
evolutionary literature takes social rules as the elementary unit of social realty, which 
places connections between individuals and society under the perspective of analytic 
philosophy about mind-world relationship. For a critique of analytic philosophy see (Lakoff 
and Johnson, 1999). 
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are organised into networks (themselves elementary ‘systems’) that form 
layers of social structures. Some of those networks have highly dense non-
linear relations with multiple feedback and feedforward links. These 
connections originate a complex self-organising structure that emerges as a 
unity, a social system displaying properties of its own.59 In the next chapter I 
intend to show how the foregoing perspective, and the resulting 
reformulation of the ‘agency-structure problem’, will be helpful for the 
discussion of a renewed understanding of institutions, and thus of markets. 
Although in a rather implicit manner, this linkage between human action and 
social reality also underlies Dalton’s (2004) analysis of creativity, which he 
thinks should be framed by “an interaction between the individual’s attempts 
to operate successfully in the world and the social judgements that permeate 
any such attempts” (Dalton, 2004: 617). This means that the outcomes of 
creative agency (“creative products” in Dalton’s words) fall immediately into 
the social realm when they enter into the domain of human inter-actions. 
Being subject to “social judgements”, they may be adopted as such, modified, 
rejected, or even object of “a variety of contradictory responses that reveal 
ambivalence linked to conflicting social pressures or positions” (Dalton, 
2004: 618). That is, creative products enter an open-ended process that 
eventually turns some of them into socially validated innovations.60 Further, 
this social selection of creative products occurs under the up and downward 
causal influence of different types of structural layers, which are more or less 
close to the interactional level. Therefore, innovation is not simply dependent 
on the interactional level where individuals appear to be creative; it also 
depends on higher-level “patterns of creative authority [socio-cultural 
systems] that influence social response” (Dalton, 2004: 619). Indeed, socio-
                                                 
59 In a second stage of his thinking Bhaskar uses the concept of “rhythmic” to account for 
interactions’ dimensions of space, time and causality, which give social relations the 
dynamics typical of self-organising systems. According to Harvey (2002a: 175-176)“the 
concept of “rhythmic” points to a complexly layered totality whose elements interact to 
form a reality greater than their sum. … With the incorporation of spatio-temporal 
rhytmics into TMSA, the reciprocal reproduction of structure and agency takes on an 
irreversible temporal character. This irreversibility, in turn, allows us to expand its analytic 
so that the possibility of path-dependent social development can take center stage.” 
60 In this context I think useful to make a distinction between three interlinked concepts: 
imagination, which is a precognitive phenomenological dimension of individuals that 
intertwines with perception to sustain our sense of reality; creativity, which corresponds 
to particular outcomes of agency most visible when its projective dimension takes a 
leading role; innovation, which emerges as a socially validated outcome of multiple 
interactions involving material and social reconfigurations in different domains. 
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cultural systems interpenetrate and mutually influence each other thereby 
making the societal realm dynamic and structured. 
Returning to Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) contribution it is important to 
acknowledge that in the concluding section they explicitly reject both dualist 
and flattened understandings of the ‘agency-structure’ problem, and assume 
that individual agency and social structures are continuously engaged in a 
contingent interplay (Ibid, 1003). However, their analysis of agency is still one 
sided, individual-based. The internal structure of agency (the “chordal triad”) is 
viewed from the side of an individual who plays with the undifferentiated 
“temporal-relational context”.61 For this reason, the lines of empirical research 
that the authors propose mainly focus on changes at the individual level, and 
either take contexts as ‘made of a piece’ or reduce contexts to the social 
setting. Clearly Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) analysis of agency’s internal 
structure is a very useful contribution, but on the condition to be placed into 
an analytical framework that could integrate a process understanding of 
sociocultural reality. 
Summing up my emergentist approach (see Fig. 5), human action is the way a 
person lives in the world and thereby manifests his/her more or less conscious 
arbitration of the different social influences to which it is subject (Archer’s 
modus vivendi). At the same time, human inter-actions continuously give rise 
to/maintain/transform social relations thereby organising myriad of dynamic 
networks of roles/positions, which make up social structures and the systems 
they form.62 
 
 
                                                 
61 Contrastingly, a psychologist as Falmagne (2004) clearly acknowledges the need to 
adopt a systemic level to account for the interdependencies between local settings, 
societal levels and persons’ interactions. 
62 Such a relational perspective calls attention to different access to the resources 
available, and therefore “allows one to situate the possibility of different (and 
antagonistic) interests, of conflicts within society, and hence of interest-motivated 
transformations in social structure” (Bhaskar 1979/1989, reprinted in Archer et al., 1998: 
221). 
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(a) Interactions: at the same time iterative, projective and evaluative 
(b) Social relations between roles-positions: internal and necessary 
(c) Other social relations: external and contingent 
(d) Causal processes: upwards, downwards, horizontal 
              
               Fig. 5 - Emergentist understanding of sociocultural reality 
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Using the spatial metaphor, while the latter feed-downwards to the persons 
that occupy such positions-roles, the dynamics of their relations also feed-
upwards to the social settings where human interactions occur, and also to 
higher-level structures to which both ‘interactional’ and ‘social setting’ levels 
are (internally and necessarily) related.63 
In the past, social relations have given rise to social systems (“the activities of 
the long dead” to use Archer’s (1995: 143) words), and thus to the properties 
they currently exhibit. This means two things: firstly, social relations that are 
relevant to the system are not reducible to the people involved now;64 
secondly, persons acting in different social settings (family, workplace, 
professional, leisure, political, religious, etc.) currently maintain-transform 
‘inherited’ roles-positions constituting different kinds of networks and 
organisations, which have more or less defined borders, multiple connections-
overlaps, and variable complexity. Such perspective enables us to see that 
social systems not only exert downward causation over social settings, and the 
relations that individuals therein mutually entertain, but also causally interact 
among themselves as sub-systems of the societal system, thereby generating 
diverse forms of macro-social relations going from hierarchical dependence, 
equal footing inter-dependence or only loose connections. On the overall, this 
process enables the emergence of society’s autonomy (Luhmann, 1995).65 In 
turn, such autonomy raises the question of the conditions of possibility for a 
meta-regulatory role for the state (Jessop, 2004). 
About a layered understanding of social reality, Habermas (1987) introduced a 
much invoked distinction between the ‘lifeworld’ and ‘systemworld’ in order to 
account for what he saw as a basic duality of modern societies (see right side 
of Fig. 5). “The lifeworld refers primarily (although not exclusively) to aspects 
of social life that have to do with lived experience of human beings. … System 
elements have to do with the reproduced, institutionalised features of society” 
                                                 
63 This stance relates Layder’s ‘social domains’ approach to Georg Simmel’s sociology, 
which was also based on the guiding concept of ‘human interaction’. For an appraisal of 
Simmel’s thinking, see Nedelmann (2001).  
64 This foundational idea is at the core of the philosophy of Martin Buber in his “ontology 
of the between” (See Friedman, 1999: 411). 
65 I agree with this view of Luhmann (1995: Chap. 6), although I do not follow his 
understanding of social systems, both on the exclusive choice of communications as 
bottom-level units and on the autopoiesis of the cell as the analogy for modelling social 
systems. For critiques of Luhmann’s perspective that I (to a point) subscribe see (Collier, 
2000; Goldstein, 2003; Mingers, 2002; Viskovatoff, 1999). 
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(Layder, 1997: 78).  Therefore, Habermas splits the level of ‘social settings’ 
between the systemworld (e.g. organisations, state and other formal 
‘institutions’) and the lifeworld (e.g. informal situations). Although disagreeing 
with the purity of these two levels, and their low interconnectedness much 
emphasised by Habermas, it is worth to acknowledge the distinction because it 
refers to a real and much neglected issue in social analysis. In fact, interactions 
in a particular setting may not have the same degree of institutionalisation (in 
the sense of normative patterning and duration) as in other kinds of settings. 
For example, friendship relations are not so structured as workplace relations, 
and behaviour in streets is not so constrained as behaviour in courtrooms. All 
this means that there are some higher-level social structures that have gained 
macro-properties of a systemic kind. They have much greater stability and 
exert strong downward causation, while other social structures are constituted 
by less complex systems and networks, and still others may simply have a 
dyadic nature. A modern reading of the sociology of Georg Simmel helps to 
illuminate this point (Nedelmann, 2001: 71): 
Applying Simmel’s dynamic perspective, the three types of institutions 
[“patterned everyday mundane interactions”, “interactions within 
institutionalised structures”, “generic forms of society itself”] can be 
understood as a continuum of increasing institutionalization (or de-
institutionalization), in which the costs of individual freedom (in the sense of 
deviations from institutionalised criteria of social action) are gradually 
increasing (or decreasing). 
Such variability is caused by two types of factors: first, human inter-actions 
bear a dual nature (private and public) and thus “play a significant role in 
“carrying” the respective influences of the lifeworld and systems elements into 
social practices and activities and into the personal lives of particular people”; 
second, there are differences between “types of power and control relations 
and their consequences for practice as they relate to the social domains” 
(Layder, 1997: 80). 
With the foregoing I began to unveil crucial mechanisms at the interface 
between personal and sociocultural systems, and hope to have shown the 
variable complexity of the structures of these systems, which sheds more light 
on the nature and motion of agency-structure linkages, thereby enriching the 
“transformational model” proposed by critical realists (Fig. 1 and 2). On the 
overall, this section points to a research path that could combine a multi-level 
approach to institutions, already implicit in Veblen and Polanyi’s legacies, with 
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a self-organising complex systems approach inspired by Hayek’s idea of 
emergent social orders. Such is the challenge I will address in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Naturalising institutions 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The third chapter of this thesis aims to develop the emergentist intuition 
explored in the work of Veblen, Polanyi and Hayek, which constitutes an 
important legacy of Original Institutionalism. Previously I provided evidence 
of its implicit use by those authors in what amounts to a ‘proto-
emergentism’. I recognise that the concept of emergence has never been 
widely used in this literature, although it has been the subject of a vigorous 
debate for over thirty years between two Institutionalist scholars; Clarence 
Ayres, a disciple of Veblen and David Miller, a disciple of Mead (see Hill, 
1989). 
The stance that I argue in this chapter, and constitutes a corner stone for the 
whole thesis, takes the side of David Miller and has been well summarised by 
Hill (1989: 469): 
Emergence is present in all levels of evolutionary change from the physical 
universe of inanimate objects, through the biological universe of living 
beings, to the cultural universe of human kind. The human species is 
differentiated from other species by the emergence of the ability to use 
symbols in thought and in communication.  
In the philosophy of science, the concept of emergence has been used with a 
variety of meanings that I will not discuss. I only make clear that my concept 
of emergence is a ‘strong version’, labelled “nomological emergence” by 
Silberstein (2002: 91) in the following terms: 
there are no bridge laws whatsoever linking fundamental physical 
phenomena with higher-level phenomena. In such cases, fundamental 
physical facts and laws would only provide a necessary condition for 
higher-level facts and laws. … in all cases of nomological emergence, it is 
in principle impossible to derive or predict the higher-level phenomena on 
the basis of the lower-level phenomena. 
With this specification it becomes clear that my understanding of Nature is 
supported by a version of ‘emergence’ that goes beyond the concept of 
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‘supervenience’ referred by Hands (2001). Therefore, in the present chapter I 
make an attempt to ‘Naturalise’ institutions in the sense that I assume their 
specific emergence upon the evolutionary previous levels of Nature, and 
attribute to institutions ‘genuine’ causal powers beyond those of persons, 
still much beyond the causal powers of their bodies. My stance is not 
physicalist naturalisation (see Hands, 2001: Chapter 4). 
The second section of this chapter discusses my understanding of 
emergentism in the context of social reality, and points to linguistic 
communication as a most distinctive trait of human and sociocultural reality 
in relation to previous levels of Nature. Section three is a large one as it faces 
head on the specification of an ontology of culture. I cannot see how 
economists could understand their domain of reality – the institution 
‘economy’ – without clear ideas about what is specific about human nature 
and sociocultural systems. I argue that the use of explanatory schemes 
borrowed from other sciences will not account for the specific of 
sociocultural emergence, and this is why I engage in the unravelling of what 
happens in the emergence of institutional norms, whose ontology is cultural. 
However, human culture is strongly related to material objects because, 
besides the body (voice, gestures), we also use tools for symbolic 
communication. I think that the semiotic of Peirce provides the best way to 
articulate what is the specific of sociocultural systemsand institutions are 
systems of this kindto the mind of humans, to their biology and to the 
inanimate world. Following this path I prepare the ground for a true 
sociocultural study of ‘markets as institutions’ and, at the same time, I keep 
persons and sociocultural systems in deep connection with the rest of 
Nature. Section three concludes with a detailed answer to the question: What 
are institutions? Ultimately, this chapter is a bold exercise of 
“transdisciplinarity” (Nicolescu, 1996). 
3.2 Specifics of social emergence 
To clear the ground for the discussion that follows, I answer in the present 
section the following questions: (1) What is the precise meaning of emergence? 
(2) What is specific to ‘social’ emergence as an autonomous domain of 
sociocultural reality? In order to address these complex issues, I discuss and 
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present a personal synthesis of relevant contributions in different disciplines 
that converge, or are consistent, with my methodological 
choicesmetaphysics of process, multi-level ontology and interactivist 
epistemology. 
3.2.1 In defence of strong emergence 
Firstly, I assume social reality as a new, emergent level ‘above’ persons and 
their social life, in the sense that it has causal powers of its own that affect the 
latter; otherwise social reality would be only ‘epiphenomenal’ to persons’ 
interactions, which is a ‘soft’ version of reductionism that I reject with my 
choice of a multi-level ontology. Soft reductionism corresponds to the idea that 
social reality exists as an aspect of individuals’ interactions whose properties 
fully determine those of that ‘supervening’ reality. As Humphreys (1997: S337; 
emphasis mine) put it, 
reduction is still not an option, but supervenience is no good either. It is a 
notion that is empty of any scientific content, and what antireductionists 
need in its place is emergence. The latter idea can properly capture the 
picture of distinctively different layers of the world in which antireductionists 
believe. 
Therefore, rejecting supervenience, I side with those who acknowledge the 
possibility of different levels of emergence within Nature’s evolutionary 
process, which include animals minds, the human mind, persons and human 
societies.66 This means that human social phenomena have emerged upon 
human interactions according to evolutionary developmental processes,67 
which gave rise to an ontological level endowed with specific causal properties 
(Emmeche et al., 1997).68 In line with my discussion of the dynamical 
interpenetration between the personal and the social realm (Fig. 4), social 
entities may be defined as “systems of human relationships among social 
positions” (Porpora, 1998: 343; emphasis mine), a critical realist formulation 
                                                 
66 The evolutionary process is Naturalist in the sense that the ontological diversity of 
reality is the actuality of an originary and unitary process, which I name Nature (Bateira, 
2006: 233). See also the “unified” ontology of Smith (1999: 96; emphasis mine) for whom 
“physical objects and events, mental activities, persons, societies, and cultural institutions 
all occur in this one world of nature.” 
67 The discussion of ‘evolution’ in its biological and sociocultural meanings will be held in 
Chapter 5. 
68 Analogously to other levels of nature, the social level is an organisation of processes. 
Thus my reference to entities (including ‘social entities’) should be understood in the 
context of metaphysics of process, instead of metaphysics of substance (Bickhard, 2000a). 
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that suggests the emergence of a social system.69 In fact, as Hooker and 
Christensen (1998: 103-104; emphasis mine) have stated 
in metaphysics of complex non-linear systems, being an entity isn’t the only 
legitimate kind of natural status. In these kinds of systems we need (at 
minimum) to distinguish between entities, immediate (or narrow) properties 
of entities, and wide—complex interactive—properties which arise through 
the interactions of entities. 
In social reality, these system-wide properties are emergent upon structured 
and patterned interactions between persons; indeed, because persons can only 
exist in society, ‘between’ them there are social relations. In general terms, 
Wight states (2004: 294; emphasis mine), “binding them all together and 
providing the structure within which the different ontological forms exist are 
the “relations”. Social relations are not a fiction imagined in our heads; they 
are real.70 Social relations organise in particular ways the different roles or 
positions occupied by individuals in the social structure, which is causally 
relevant because “much of their “capacity to do” (their causal power) is derived 
from their social positioning” (Ibid, 292). 
‘Causal powers’ of social entities are a controversial issue among sociologists 
and Institutional economists. In my understanding, research in different 
sciences has settled that sociocultural phenomena display features that are 
formally analogous to those of self-organising complex systems in all other 
domains of reality (Urry, 2005); they emerge upon non-linear relations 
established between individuals (Abbott, 1988). These relations organise into 
spatio-temporal, meaningful structures thereby giving rise to social systems, 
which (among other effects) exert downward causation over individuals and 
their interactions.71 
                                                 
69 See an encompassing definition by Lawson (1997: 165): “the building blocks of society 
are positions, involving, depending upon, or constituted according to, social rules and 
associated tasks, obligations, and prerogatives, along with the practices they govern, 
where such positions are both defined in relation to other positions and are immediately 
occupied by individuals.” 
70 Note that philosophical ‘realism’ may be emergentist, and if so it is incompatible with 
philosophical ‘materialism’ of which there are ‘hard’ (physicalism) and ‘soft’ 
(epiphenomenal emergence) versions.  
71 Humphreys (1997: S342) discusses criteria for ‘emergence’ that are not necessarily 
cumulative “for there is a wide variety of ways in which emergence can occur”: new 
properties that are “qualitatively different from the properties from which they emerge”, 
“that could not be possessed at a lower level”, that “result from an essential interaction 
between their constituent properties”, and “are holistic in the sense of being properties of 
the entire system rather than local properties of its constituents.” 
88 
 
Emmeche et al. (2000) describe three ways in which such downward causation 
could be understood. According to a strong version, “a given level may 
causally inflict changes or effects on entities or processes on a lower level” 
(Emmeche et al., 2000: 18). The authors do not support such version because, 
for them, emergent phenomena are always inclusive in the sense that “they can 
never change the laws of the lower level” (Ibid, 93). Yet, their rejection of 
strong downward causation is not consensual, even in natural sciences, and 
there are philosophers of physics who argue we should change our traditional 
understanding of relations between systems’ components: “Emergent wholes 
have contemporaneous parts, but these parts cannot be characterized 
independently from their respective wholes. … it does not make sense to talk 
about reducing an emergent whole to its parts, since the parts are in some 
sense constructs of our characterization of the whole” (Kronz and Tiehen, 
2002: 345; emphasis mine). Recurring to a problematic, but widely used 
vocabulary, the ‘laws’ of the parts and the ‘laws’ of the whole are co-
constitutive. Recognising the possibility of a weak version,72 Emmeche et al. 
(2000) adopt a medium version of ‘downward causation’; it acts through 
boundary conditions (‘initial’ and ‘constraining’ conditions of the system), 
“which select and delimit various types of the system’s several possible 
developments” that are originated at a lower level (Ibid, 25). 
Acknowledging different degrees of downward causation, Bickhard (2000a: 
343) argues that downward causation may involve “[a] constraints internal to a 
system that are non-linear consequences of the organization of the system”; 
[b] “constraints internal to the constituents of a system”; [c] [strong version] 
“constraints on the generative processes—sources of constructive variation—
as well as the activities per se, of lower levels.” 
The acceptance of the latter understanding of emergence certainly implies a 
revision of our traditional views about causality, and this is also supported by 
Emmeche et al. (1997: 94): 
the two [macro and micro levels] are parts of one and the same process, and 
the scientific idea of cause is rather to be interpreted as the regularity of this 
process. … What we use to call “efficient cause”, close to the common sense 
                                                 
72 Weak downward causation is identified with the existence of an attractor, a set of 
system’s states in its phase space as a result of alternative lower level dynamics based on 
different initial conditions. This is a framework that sees the attractor as “the centre of a 
basin of attraction, that is, even if it is very rare on the global level, it is locally generic; 
stable and insensitive to perturbations. This insensibility might be the reason for the 
assumption of downward causation” (Emmeche et al., 2000: 28). 
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of the word, is only the subjective focusing on one element in the causal 
process, an element being made solely responsible for the process. 
In other words, self-organising systems bear an emergent structured unity 
built upon interactive constraint formation (Collier and Hooker, 1999), which 
calls for an epistemic approach somewhat different from Darwin’s “cumulative 
causal explanation” (Hodgson, 2004a: 190).73 
Therefore, if we adopt the concept of self-organising complex systems it lacks 
sense to relate specific causes to specific effects, as suggested by the idea of 
“cumulative causal explanation”, and “what should be meant by ‘causation’, 
either upwards or downwards, may thus ultimately have more in common with 
notions such as material and formal cause than with the classical notion of 
efficient causation” (Lemke, 2000a: 211). 
3.2.2 From efficient-cause to understanding 
Following the deductive-nomological model (Hempel, 1965), mainstream 
economics usually equates scientific understanding with the formulation of 
‘covering law’ explanations supported by empirical regularities. The 
widespread use of econometrics intended by most of the users to support (if 
not to provide) ‘causal’ explanations is testimony of this (Lawson, 1997).74 
Disagreeing with the ‘covering law’ model of explanation, social science 
‘realists’ (Bunge, 2004; Hedström and Swedberg, 1998) argue that in order to 
scientifically explain, that is, to say how reality works, we need to go beyond 
surface co-variations and identify and describe sequences of causes, 
unobservable ‘mechanisms’ that underlie co-variations. In social sciences some 
realists adopt methodological ‘individualism’ (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998) 
while Bunge (1997) argues for ‘systemism’, a stance that aims to overcome 
both individualism and holism, although Bunge does not openly admit that 
emergent properties have causal autonomy, and thus (when addressed) 
require non-reductive research strategies. 
                                                 
73 Hodgson (2004a: 190) accepts an emergent levels ontology, the “emergentist 
materialism” proposed by Bunge (1980). However, this stance actually amounts to what 
Silberstein (2001: 68) labels “nomological supervenience”: “fundamental laws determine 
everything that happens (in conjunction with initial or boundary conditions).” 
74 Lawson’s (1997; 2003b) critique of the use of econometrics to look for concomitant 
variations proposed as ‘causal’ relations are particularly acute, but may be Lawson has 
gone too far in a nearly absolute condemnation of the ceteris paribus clause. See Chick 
and Dow (2005: 377) for a discussion of this topic. 
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An emergentist stance challenges directly the assumption of “causal 
completeness” (Dupré, 2001b), which presupposes that any phenomenon has 
to be explained in terms of mechanisms occurring at the physical level.75 
Against this assumption Dupré recalls that indeterminism is everywhere in the 
world, a kind of indeterminism more radical than the probabilistic version of 
quantum mechanics, which is “still conceived as evolving according to causal 
laws, just laws of a somewhat different kind [from those of classical 
determinism]” (Dupré, 2001b: 157). In fact, rather than an outcome of absence 
of causes, indeterminism is the outcome of contingent clusters of causes of 
which some may countervail others. Indeed, what usually happens in the world 
is an outcome of many mechanisms concurrently active at different levels of 
reality, either in non-human nature, in human beings, or in social systems. 
Adopting an emergentist perspective, Dupré (2001b: 162) argues: 
objects at many, probably all, levels of the structural hierarchy have causal 
powers. One of the reasons why these causal powers are never displayed in 
universal laws (deterministic or probabilistic) is that objects at other levels 
often interfere with the characteristic exercise of these powers.76 
This understanding of causality is also adopted by Wilson (2003: 532) who 
finds problematic the current consensus among biologists about evolutionary 
selection at separate levels because the “various levels of selection are often 
entwined or fused, not just in the sense that they co-occur, or operate in the 
same direction, but in that they are reliably coinstantiated and do not make 
isolatable, distinct contributions to the ultimate evolutionary currency, fitness.” 
Therefore, if there is no causal completeness at any level of reality, even at the 
quantum physics level, social scientists should understand ‘causal powers’ as 
“joint determination of capacities by internal structure and external context” 
(Dupré, 2001a: 319; emphasis mine).77 Note that this openness to an external 
reality is a property of far-from-equilibrium processes operating in living 
                                                 
75 Besides analytical reduction to the physical level, where are supposed to reside the 
“genuine” causes, Dupré (2001b: 157) states that “causal completeness requires that there 
be some quantitatively precise law governing the development of every situation.” 
76 This stance seems to converge with the critical realist understanding of causality as 
presented by Danermark et al. (2002: 54-55). 
77 This emergentist understanding of social systems conflicts with some critical realist 
formulations such as “Realism is a ‘thing-centred’ ontology” (Potter, 2000: 204). Actually, 
explanations in terms of entities and their properties or laws refer to “an Aristotelian 
metaphysics [metaphysics of things-substance], which is an inadequate metaphysics for 
relationships and process, most specially open process” (Bickhard, 2000a: 334; emphasis 
mine). 
91 
 
systems, and in cognitive and social systems as well (Collier and Hooker, 1999: 
246). 
From the foregoing discussion of the meaning of emergence and causality we 
can see that ontological and epistemological matters are interdependent 
(Praetorius, 2003), and this calls for a more detailed look to the epistemic side 
of the issue. As Berger (1998: 329) puts it, “saying that science looks for 
mechanisms, especially causal ones, seems correct. However, this tells us very 
little about which mechanisms scientists consider explanatory or how the 
methods and theories of science generate explanations.” ‘Explanation’ is an 
epistemological category; it has different meanings according to different 
philosophical stances about the nature and source of knowledge (Faye, 1999). 
As already mentioned, the predominant meaning of ‘causal explanation’ is 
given by the ‘covering law’ model that most social scientists think to be typical 
of natural sciences, although it is well established that it is only a kind of 
explanation among others, which even does not correspond to the research 
practice in laboratories (Giere, 1999; Pickering, 1995). In fact, research in 
micro-physics and molecular biology is about looking for specific causal 
mechanisms under experimentally controlled conditions (Cartwright, 1983; 
Soto and Sonnenschein, 2006). However, despite acknowledging the 
impossible experimental insulation of social mechanisms, most realists in 
social science implicitly take natural sciences’ experimental methods as the 
paradigm of scientific explanation. This motivates them to consider ‘why’ 
questions as the relevant type of research question, and causal answers as the 
adequate type of scientific explanation.78  Accordingly, Runde (1998: 169; 
emphasis mine) concludes 
The virtue of the causal approach to economic explanation is that provides a 
coherent means of acquiring knowledge about the world that does not 
presuppose the existence of such [deductive-nomological] economic laws, 
even if the knowledge so acquired will generally be of a qualitative, 
comparative, and often contingent kind. 
                                                 
78 See Lawson’s (2003b: 85; emphasis mine) statement: “we all very often advance our 
knowledge of aspects of the world … by way of first questioning why something is not 
quite as we expected it to be”, which is followed by a paragraph of illustrative ‘why’ 
questions. 
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Similarly, Byrne (2005: 97; emphasis mine) emphasises that in social sciences 
“explanation is possible, but only explanation that is local in time and place.”79. 
Bhaskar (1989 [1979]), the founder of critical realism, argued for a naturalist 
ontology for social systems because, similarly to other levels of Nature, social 
reality is also open and emergent. The problem is that critical realists have 
attached to this ontology what appears to be a ‘prescriptive’ methodology. 
Thus, social sciences should also research and explain in terms of 
mechanisms; that is, in terms of “causal powers” and “tendencies”. This 
methodological orientation reveals that critical realist methodology (at least as 
initially proposed) maintains some continuity with the Modernist paradigm of 
science to which Darwin subscribed,80 which leads most critical realists to 
equate ‘scientific explanation’ with the identification of ‘efficient’ cause-effect 
sequences.81 
However, both history and philosophy of sciences have for some time shown 
that ‘mechanismic’ explanations are not always useful for every type of 
science, every type of sub-discipline, and every type of problem (Berger, 1998; 
Calhoun, 1998). Notwithstanding the particular importance of causal 
explanations, the way scientific research actually works shows that 
“explanatory information is not always information about causes, and causal 
information is not always explanatory” (Berger, 1998: 312). I think there is 
enough methodological reflection to support the adoption of a broad meaning 
for ‘scientific understanding’, one that is not confined to efficient-cause 
explanations, the processes of “cumulative causation” referred by Darwin. 
Another difficult point in critical realism relates to the validation of 
mechanismic explanations and the choice between competing theories. In 
order to go deeper than ‘empirical’ and ‘actual’ levels of reality, critical realists 
make use of abstraction (“retroduction”) in a first moment aiming “to identify 
connections and relations essential to the existence and efficacy of some 
                                                 
79 See Bhaskar and Lawson (1998: 12; emphasis mine): “Contrastive explanation, clearly, is 
concerned not so much with such questions as ‘why is the average crop yield x?’ but ‘why 
is the average crop yield in that end of this field significantly higher than that achieved 
elsewhere?’” 
80 This is partly recognised by Potter (2000: 207) who states: “Realism keeps some of the 
positivist understanding of law, explanation, confirmation, falsification and so on. It just 
restricts them, transforms them and changes the emphasis.” 
81 This incomplete rupture underlies two interesting debates about critical realism in 
economics with particular incidence on Lawson’s formulations. See (Fleetwood, 2005) and 
(Mearman, 2006).  
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structure of interest” (Lawson, 1989: 71). In a second moment, the abstracted 
mechanisms and the non-essential elements of reality are “synthesised into a 
unity that re-constitutes the concrete, although at this point more clearly and 
essentially understood” (Ibid, 69). According to Sayer (2004a: 1787), this 
methodology provides a “theoretically informed explanation of concrete 
objects”. Although I recognise the vagueness of Lawson’s formulations, I think 
Baert (1996: 518) may be wrong in claiming that there is a contradiction in the 
particular way critical realism deals with empirical reality. However, he is partly 
right on the hermeneutic side of his critique. A balanced reading of Kuhn’s 
philosophy of science should lead critical realists to admit that the proof of a 
theory is problematic in natural sciences, and even more so in social sciences 
where absence of experimental practice combined with human liberty 
enhances indeterminacy to the highest levels (Calhoun, 1998: 867). 
Moreover, critical realists are vague about how to choose among different 
theories that seem to fit empirical data, sometimes invoking the criterion of 
‘explanatory power’ (Fleetwood, 2005; Lawson, 1997).82 In critical realist 
literature it is seldom recognised (at least explicitly) that the explanatory 
power of a theory is not independent of scientists’ cognitive interests, 
background knowledge and unexamined assumptions, individually and as a 
community of inquirers.83 Because critical realism has in its roots an ambiguity 
toward the hermeneutic dimension of science, a number of critical realists has 
difficulties to accept that scientific progress cannot be measured in terms of 
theories’ qualities (consistency, explanatory power, unifying power, etc.) by 
lack of a ‘neutral’ algorithm (Baert, 2005),84 which undermines the very idea of 
dispassionate choice between theories according to some criteria (Peacock, 
2000).  
                                                 
82 I do not want to wholly dismiss the critical realist method; only acknowledge that in 
some cases empirical regularity may be close to deep reality and a useful reference for 
research, mostly in local explanations where “a linear approximation is appropriate” 
(Wagner, 1999: 98). What I do want to say is that it is not always clear in critical realists’ 
discourse that social sciences cannot test theories and that research strategies may 
require non-causal explanations, which is a rupture with mainstream views of good 
scientific research (Somers, 1998). 
83 A notable exception is Runde (1998) who explicitly discusses the role of “a priori and 
framework principles” in the assessment of scientific explanations, and refers to 
disagreements between different ‘schools of thought’ within the research community. 
84 In fact, the same applies to the ontology of social reality proposed by Bhaskar (see 
Cruickshank, 2004). 
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Does this means that science is no more than a continuous ‘conversation’ 
within a very particular community? In economics, the “rhetoric versus realism 
debate” led Peter (2001: 586) to acknowledge the need “to reconsider the 
question of what framework is necessary to ensure the validity of arguments.” I 
accept that we need a meta-theoretical framework that goes beyond the 
modernist and the post-modernist ones and, for that, I think the Classical 
Pragmatism of Charles S. Peirce is a good source of inspiration. Against the 
post-modernist version, which argues we should let go the idea of ‘truth’ (see 
Baert, 2005), Peirce stressed the importance of confrontation with reality 
(Haack, 2004; Rescher, 2005). In post-Kuhnian times this means a continuous 
attempt to “avoid more and deeper errors than previous positive knowledge” 
(Bickhard, 2002: 26).85 On the other hand, differently from most critical 
realists’ modernist idea that science progresses toward ‘truth’, namely through 
theories with greater explanatory power, Peirce related ‘truth’ to the settled 
opinion of a community of inquirers in a given moment. This attention to the 
sociocultural nature of science (indeed, its ‘institutional’ nature) points to the 
interactive process that gives rise to that “settled opinion”, which largely 
depends on the existence of intelligible theories, those that respond to the 
interests of researchers and fit their skills (De-Regt and Dieks, 2005).86 
3.2.3 Without language no social reality  
From the above-presented meta-theoretical discussion I will take the following 
three ideas: (1) underlying empirical reality (biological, physical and social), 
which sometimes presents regularities, there are contingent configurations of 
causal processes criss-crossing different structural levels; (2) biological, 
physical and social systems have irreducible emergent properties, and thus 
take part in causal processes involving both their components and other 
systems, at the same or other levels; (3) science addresses different levels of 
reality, and different systems at each level, and for that task scientists recur to 
intelligible theories providing explanations of different kind (nomic, causal, 
                                                 
85 Pragmatists escape from both ‘epistemic fallacy’ and ‘ontological fallacy’ through 
practical confrontation with reality: “applicative praxis—not theoretical merit but practical 
capability—is the best available standard for assessing scientific progress” (Rescher, 2000: 
89). 
86 “Intelligibility is a context-dependent value related to properties of the theory but also to 
scientists’ skills. … In this pragmatic conception, understanding goes beyond merely 
having an accurate theory: it requires that this theory is intelligible to the scientists who 
use it. Scientists need intelligible theories because they have to be able to use theories in 
order to construct models and explanations” (De-Regt, 2004: 103, 108). 
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functional, intentional, interpretative) according to their research interests and 
skills. 
The foregoing enables to better frame debates in social science about “causal 
powers of social structures” of which (Harré and Varela, 1996) and (Lewis, 
2000) provide an illustration. Harré and Varela (1996) support an 
understanding of social systems that could be labelled non-reductive 
physicalism (Van-Gulick, 2001), or ‘supervenience’ (Humphreys, 1997). For 
fear of reification, they mostly emphasise that macro-social phenomena cannot 
be causally efficacious on its own right because causality is only activated by 
individuals as ‘genuinely’ real entities. Recognising some pertinence to this 
stance, but still attempting to salvage a causal role for social phenomena (qua 
social) that could be consistent with free-will, Lewis (2000: 258; emphasis 
mine) argues that although “social structure lacks the capacity to initiate 
activity and to make things happen of its own accord”, it is no less true that it 
concurs to the causal complex supported by human agency because 
“depending on their location in the social hierarchy, then, people are endowed 
with an historically given array of resources, which in turn constitutes an 
ontologically irreducible influence on their ability to further their interests in 
the future” (Ibid, 259). 
In my view, it is the attachment to metaphysics of things-substance that leads 
Lewis to emphasise the role of resources as evidence for “causal powers” of 
social structures. Because the latter are non-observable, their causal effects 
(the differential access to, and use of, resources) are supposed to be the only 
way to postulate their existence. Lewis’s formulation attributes primacy to 
human agency because it is endowed with efficient causation, while social 
structures are given an instrumental role as they can only be a passive, 
material cause (Ibid, 264). However, if we substitute metaphysics of 
processboth individuals and social structures are organised processes, 
multi-level ontology, and causal indeterminacy, for a deterministic world of 
‘things’ endowed with efficient-cause powers and isolatable effects, Lewis’ 
understanding of social causality becomes inadequate.87 
                                                 
87 Lewis’s (2000: 264) argument draws on Mackie’s (1974) “inus” condition: “The latter 
states that a cause is an insufficient but necessary part of a set of conditions which are 
collectively unnecessary but sufficient for the production of some outcome (a social event, 
say)”. Despite the right intuition about ‘causal complexes’ at work in social reality, Lewis 
fails to see that both the restrictive concept of ‘efficient cause’ and the deterministic 
assumption of ‘universal regularity’ still underlie his argument. For a critique of naturalist 
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Despite recognising that social reality is best seen as “concept-dependent” 
processes, which calls for research strategies adequate to such specificity, 
critical realists still try to preserve the problematic idea of structures endowed 
with efficient-cause powers, perhaps to maintain methodological commonality 
between natural and social sciences. However, and contrary to this view, I have 
previously argued that social systems make up an ontological category on 
their own right, different from individuals that give rise and sustain them. 
Because social systems are real entities emergent upon organised social 
relations, it amounts to reductionism to recur to individuals’ actions in order 
to acknowledge that macro-social phenomena participate in causal processes. 
We only need to consider that social relations constitute myriad of internal, 
non-linearly related roles and positions that individuals occupy in society, 
thereby giving rise to social systems. 
In this sense there is no mystery in social systems’ autonomous participation 
in causal processes.88 It is the inherent non-linearity, and spatio-rhythmic 
heterogeneity of meaningful social relations, and their networks, that generate 
an emergent, system-wide causality. Further, as previously acknowledged, 
causal processes are at action in myriad of criss-crossing, non-linear ways, at 
different levels of reality.89 Thus, when using the ‘efficient-cause’ concept we 
should bear in mind that most of the times it implies a strong simplification; it 
refers to the epistemic focus on a fragment of the causal complex, rather than 
to the property of a “particular”, be it physical, biological, personal or social.90 
Therefore, if we admit that everything in the world is organisation of relational 
processes (Silberstein and McGeever, 1999), it is expected that social systems 
(qua emergent level of Nature) also participate in the causal connections that 
sustain and move the world. Besides, there is no risk of ‘holism’ in this stance 
                                                                                                                                     
determinism (classical and probabilistic) and the “inus” condition, see (Dupré, 2001b: 166-
170). 
88 Lewis (2000: 267; emphasis mine) shows that in a early work Roy Bhaskar referred to 
two different paradigms of the “non-actual real, viz. the powers of a particular or kind, and 
the relations between the elements of a system” [Lewis’s quote], the latter being the 
adequate paradigm for social structures. However, Bhaskar did not develop this insight 
and maintained the language of the ‘causal powers theory’. For a friendly critique of the 
rhetoric of ‘causal powers’ in critical realism see (Nash, 1999).   
89 As Byrne (2005: 105; emphasis mine) put it, complex systems “are nested in, have 
nested within them, and intersect with other complex systems. … Nesting is not hierarchy. 
Determination runs in all possible directions, not just top down. All these levels have 
implications for all other levels.” 
90 Because of simultaneous interactions, in some domains of research in biology “it is 
practically impossible to sort out causes and effects” (Soto and Sonnenschein, 2006: 372). 
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because individuals and social systems constitute each other and both lack 
causal completeness. In my view, the burden of proof is on those who stick to 
metaphysics of substance and thereby reject the idea of an equal footing, joint 
participation of social systems and individuals in causal processes. 
At this point it should be noted that evolutionary economics literature 
traditionally assumes a two-level scheme in order to discuss emergence in 
complex systems and the micro-macro relations therein. However, such dual 
scheme that so far I have taken for granted sets aside important aspects of the 
process that a model with more levels of reality is able to reveal. Recalling the 
work of Salthe (1985; 1993), Lemke (2000b: 101-102) summarises: “units on 
level N are constituted by interactions at level (N-1) among the units at that 
lower level, but that of all the possible configurations that such interactions 
might produce at level N, only those that are allowed by boundary 
[constraining] conditions set at level (N+1) actually occur.” In dynamic terms 
this means that, “new levels of organization always emerge between previously 
existing levels. … the new level N reorganizes the relationships between level 
(N-1) and level (N+1).” For Lemke, the structural stability of a system is based 
on the filtering by level N of variations at level (N-1) and (at the same time) by 
the buffering of level (N+1) against variations at level (N-1): “what matters is 
the information and communicational coherence of a level (and its relations to 
adjacent levels)” (Ibid, 103; emphasis mine). 
Acknowledging this multi-level interdependence of variations leads us to 
accept that, at least since the emergence of life on earth (Emmeche, 2000; 
Weber, 2000), the evolutionary development of complex systems (including 
social systems) depends on relations that involve semiotic processes 
supporting such “information and communicational coherence”. 
Overlooking that social systems’ are made of interconnected structures, most 
Institutional economists assume that social processes “operate at a single 
characteristic scale of space and time. [However] when relations of meaning as 
well as of material interaction co-determine the dynamics of a system, we must 
take into account scale heterogeneity or scale-mixing as well” (Lemke, 2000a: 
181). Typically, human interactions self-organise under a diversity of 
(meaningful) roles over a lifetime according to different scales. Thus, the multi-
meaningfulness of semiotic processes intertwines with the multiplicity of 
scales (in time-space) of social relations, on the overall leading to the highest 
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levels of self-organising complexity. This particular configuration makes social 
reality a specific emergence in Nature. Indeed, it is socio-cultural reality. 
Therefore, “the dynamics and development of ecosystems which contain 
humans who act according to cultural meaning criteria cannot be adequately 
described without a description of the meaning-systems in use” (Ibid, 183, 
emphasis mine). Illustrating the semiotic dimension of social life and its 
networked topology, Lemke (2000a: 186) states: 
when I speak or act in any way, not only my internal constituency and my 
present surroundings, but my biographical history as a member of many 
communities or social networks plays a part. More than this, the tools with 
which and through which I so often act … ensure that the history of my 
community, and the history of the tools themselves, are also essential for 
accounts of the full ecological and semiotic significance of my moment-to-
moment actions.91  
Therefore, the socio-cultural realm is structured by myriad of processes 
building-maintaining-changing meaningful social and cultural processes at 
different scales, which are organised upon roles, positions and meanings that 
interactively give rise to sociocultural systems with fuzzy boundaries (Bickhard, 
2000a: 335).92 
About the specificity of the sociocultural level, Wight (2004: 296) recalls that 
“the concepts possessed by agents “matter”; they make a difference”, which 
means that social and cultural entities are specific because they (mostly) 
emerge upon language-based interactions. The latter constitute a locus of 
complex and dynamic interpenetration between self-organising social systems, 
cultural entities and (autonomous) human beings. Assuming such co-
constitutive interpenetration also enables a Naturalist understanding of human 
freedom different from traditional ‘free-will’ formulations. Opposing the idea 
that institutions work against freedom, I claim that the exercise of human 
autonomy gives rise to institutional norms, which in turn enable the exercise 
of genuine freedom. As Dupré (2001b: 181) states, “the causal capacities most 
characteristically and uniquely human are capacities that derive not solely 
                                                 
91 The heterogeneity of scales in human sociality here acknowledged also brings a new 
horizon of complexity into the discussion about human nature and agency presented in 
Chapter 2 (2.5.3). 
92 In a similar vein, see Hooker (2000) who argues that sociocultural systems have multi-
level, multi-dimensional, multi-plexed, multi-producted, and multi-phasic, properties, 
which on the whole create an extreme complexity. 
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from the internal structure of humans, or human brains, but that depend 
essentially on the relationship between an individual and society.”  
In brief, the specific nature of sociocultural systems necessarily requires the 
integration of semiotic processes. This specific nature renders risky the 
borrowing by social science of explanatory frameworks used by biologists and 
physicists. In fact, sociocultural systems form a new ontological level of Nature, 
which calls for 
a radical extension not only of the range but of the dynamics of co-evolution 
… the communicative creativity taking place at this interface must be placed 
at the center of theory (Hoffmeyer, 1998: 289).  
Hence, the explanatory work of the social scientist cannot rest on finding the 
right analogy with another level of Nature. Notwithstanding the careful and 
‘local’ use of metaphors and analogies, social scientists are obliged to 
integrate language-based semiotic processes in their conceptual framework 
because they refer to what is specific in this level of Nature.93 
3.3 Understanding institutions 
In the present section I will elaborate on the distinction between the social and 
the cultural domains of sociocultural systems. This enables me to explain what 
constitutes culture and how it emerges. With such distinction of two emergent 
domains, and the discussion of their interdependence and mutual constitution, 
I am able to provide an original vision of society and its institutions, the 
economy being one of them. However, before that, I need to discard Searle’s 
philosophy of institutions despite its welcoming reception in some Institutional 
economics literature. 
3.3.1 Institutionalism and the soft-reductionism trap 
3.3.1.1 Social systems or rules? 
I begin by agreeing with Lawson (1997: 159) that “human life is highly 
routinised”, which leads him to presuppose “the existence of widely known or 
                                                 
93 I acknowledge that semiosis is an emergent property of life (Hoffmeyer, 1997), perhaps 
also present in a specific form at the physic-chemical level. Human semiosis is 
qualitatively different from semiosis at other levels of Nature in that it is language-based 
and makes use of material reality to produce symbols that support human communication 
(Donald, 2001). 
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shared generalised procedures of action, procedures that can be referred to 
here as social rules … something irreducible to human agency and action” 
(Ibid, 160-162). So, according to Lawson, social life is structured in social 
systems, which are understood as “ensembles of networked, internally related, 
positions with their associated rules and practices” (Ibid, 165). But here 
Lawson makes a distinction: “while a social system is best conceived of as a 
structured process of interaction … an institution is most usefully viewed as a 
social system that has been found to be (relatively) enduring … and identified 
as such” (Lawson, 1997: 165, 318; emphasis mine). In a later work, Lawson 
acknowledges that the concept of institution is “a nested concept” because 
“there can be institutions within institutions within institutions”, which he 
views as emergent social structures that give a sense of continuity to social life 
as they are “reproduced (through change) over wide swathes of space and 
(perhaps more interestingly) time” (Lawson, 2003b: 43). 
The social acceptance of institutions that seems to underlie Lawson’s 
definition (“enduring … and identified as such”) could be related to Hodgson’s 
(Hodgson, 2006b: 2) qualification of social rules as “established and 
prevalent”. Unfortunately, Lawson does not unpack his formulation; he is 
mostly interested in ontological issues, namely that institutions, like any social 
system, are not reducible to individuals’ behaviour. On the contrary, Hodgson 
wants to articulate a Veblen-inspired Institutional economics, and for that he 
adopts a definition of institution that includes “language, money, law, systems 
of weights and measures, table manners, and firms (and other organizations)” 
(Ibid, 2). 
Taking account of the large (and confusing) variety of meanings attributed to 
the concept of institution, and the diverse criteria that could be used to 
classify institutional phenomena in the absence of ontological guidance (see 
Parto, 2005), Hodgson’s definition is a useful point of departure. In fact, 
Hodgson’s work not only takes institutions as emergent social structures, but 
also aims to go beyond (Hodgson, 2002b). However, Hodgson’s and Lawson’s 
use of the concept of “social rules” is problematic; it is unhelpful for the 
understanding of the linkage between individuals and institutions. In the 
following I will discuss this central topic. 
Pointing to the limitations of Archer’s (1995) understanding of social 
emergence, Hodgson (2002b) accepts (wrongly) that demographic structures 
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have ‘causal powers’94 but notes that institutions are “more than constraints … 
the downward causation of [an institutional] structure upon agent would result 
in a reconstitution of purposes and preferences, as well as behaviour” 
(Hodgson, 2002b: 168; emphasis mine). Such ‘strong’ understanding of 
emergence has been reaffirmed: “[institutions] depend upon the thoughts and 
activities of individuals but are not reducible to them” (Hodgson, 2006b: 2). 
Accordingly, we should expect Hodgson to place rules (seen as ‘the stuff’ of 
institutions) unambiguously at a supra-individual level. Surprisingly, Hodgson 
recurs to the philosopher John Searle (1995; 2005) and states (Hodgson, 
2006b: 4; emphasis mine): 
the mental representations of an institution or its rules are partly constitutive 
of that institution, since an institution can only exist if people have particular 
and related beliefs and mental attitudes. Hence, an institution is a special 
type of social structure that involves potentially codifiable and (evidently or 
immanently) normative rules of interpretation and behaviour. 
In line with Veblen, Hodgson also argues that habits ground institutions: “For a 
habit to acquire the status of a rule, it has to acquire some inherent normative 
content, to be potentially codifiable, and to be prevalent among a group” 
(Hodgson, 2006b: 6).95 Thus, according to Hodgson, rules could be at the 
same time phenomenological (qua “mental representations”) and social entities 
(Ibid, 8). Further, the existence of a rule depends on the spreading of those 
“mental representations” to a large number of individuals so that it could be 
considered “prevalent”. This is a formulation that I find inconsistent with a 
social systems ontology, and it is telling that Hodgson does not use the 
concept of emergence in his definition of ‘rules’. In fact, rather than a 
‘systems’ perspective, Hodgson assumes a ‘population’ perspective where 
relations between the elements are of no analytical interest. 
Further, if we assume (as Hodgson does) that an institution (qua social entity) 
is ontologically distinct from a psychological entity, how can we make sense of 
statements about a ‘double nature’?96 A possible explanation for such 
                                                 
94 See also (Hodgson, 2006b: 21). Both Archer and Hodgson fail to see that a 
‘demographic structure’ is not a social system. ‘Demographic structure’ is a concept that 
does not account for (internal and necessary) relations between individuals. They are 
aggregations established by the contiguity of individuals according to a demographic 
criterion. For an ontological discussion of ‘aggregates’, see (Weissman, 2000: 56-57). 
95 (Hodgson, 2010) provides a recent systematic elaboration of his views of ‘habits’ and 
‘instincts’ as foundations of human choices and action. 
96 “Institutions are in this respect like Klein bottles: the subjective “inside” is 
simultaneously the objective “outside” (Hodgson, 2006b: 8). 
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ambiguities resides in the intellectual influence of Searle’s philosophy of 
institutions, which is welcome in some Institutional economics literature.97 In 
my view, Searle’s understanding of institutions is a soft reductionism trap for 
those who want to update Original Institutionalism. The importance of what is 
at stake calls for an extended discussion of Searle’s thinking. 
3.3.1.2 Searle’s soft-reductionism 
Searle (2005: 6) defines “a social fact as any fact involving the collective 
intentionality of two or more agents.” By collective intentionality Searle means 
specific purposes, beliefs and desires that individuals hold and make them 
able to engage in cooperative action. Searle also makes a distinction between 
social facts and institutional facts. For Searle, what is specific of humans is that 
they have the very special capacity to create institutions by “the assignment of 
status functions with their accompanying deontologies [rights, obligations, 
empowerments, requirements, certifications] according to constitutive rules” 
(Ibid, 9), and the general form of this procedure is “X counts as Y in context C”. 
In order for this assignment to be effective there must be a general 
acceptance, recognition or acknowledgement of the status of X and its 
associated deontic powers, which is largely based on the use of language.98 
The crucial point is that “the acceptance of desire-independent reasons for 
action” (Ibid, 11) depends on Searle’s assumption of a ‘collective 
intentionality’, which among other aspects of his philosophy is indeed 
problematic, as I will explain below. 
To clarify this point we need to recall Searle’s previous work of which (Searle, 
2005) is only a concise presentation. For Searle there are two conditions of 
adequacy that an account of intentionality (individual or collective) must fulfil: 
“society consists of nothing but individuals”; “the structure of any individual’s 
intentionality has to be independent of the fact whether or not he is getting 
things right” (Searle, 1990: 407). The first one corresponds to ontological 
reductionism and is nothing more than the consistent application to the social 
realm of Searle’s epiphenomenalism about the mind (Viskovatoff, 2002). His 
                                                 
97 See the choice of Searle (2005) for the inaugurating article of the recent Journal of 
Institutional Economics. 
98 About this connection Searle (2005: 13) states: “the cognitive capacity to see these 
things [at both physical and institutional levels] requires a linguistic or symbolic capacity. 
To put it very crudely: no language, no status functions. No status functions, no 
institutional deontology.” 
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rhetoric about levels of reality should not be confused with an ontology of 
emergent levels, which does not admit the reductionism underlying the 
statement that “the universe consists entirely of entities we find it convenient 
to call particles (even though, of course, the word ‘particle’ is not quite right)” 
(Searle, 2005: 5).99 With this it is clear that Searle wants to argue against the 
collectivist concept of “group mind or consciousness”. However, we have not to 
choose between individualism and collectivism because, as argued before, 
there is a third way: social structures make a specific ontological category; 
they emerge by self-organising, complex processes that build upon social 
relations. In brief, Searle has an individualist understanding of institutions 
(and social reality in general), which he sees as “ontologically subjective” 
(Searle, 2005: 4). In this sense Searle’s occasional use of the term ‘emergence’ 
should be understood as referring to ‘supervenience’ (Humphreys, 1997), and 
thus is not consistent with the Veblenian kind of Institutionalism that is closer 
to ‘strong’ emergentism.100 
The second condition of adequacy proposed by Searle reveals a kind of 
solipsistic thinking about the mind, also known in the philosophical literature 
by the thought experiment of “a brain in a vat”. According to this condition, all 
intentionality has a structure independent of what the world is. The point is 
strictly conceptual; Searle certainly acknowledges that we are interactively 
connected to the world. However, in order to account for radical mistakes, he 
sustains that we could (logically) have intentions without any support of the 
world. Clearly, this way of dealing with ‘wrong representations’ of the world 
testimonies the absence in Searle’s theory of intentionality of a ‘normative 
function’, a mechanism to contrast our representations of reality against 
reality ‘itself’ and produce feedback with learning effects. Thus, for Searle we 
cannot have representations with a wrong content; learning (and learning how 
to learn) has no place in Searle’s conceptual framework about mind-world 
relations (Bickhard, 2004a). 
                                                 
99 The latter part of this statement, if taken seriously, would lead Searle to assume that 
quantum physics calls for an ontology consistent with metaphysics of process, which he 
does not. According to Turner (1999: 212) this kind of inconsistency also occurs in other 
passages of (Searle, 1995). 
100 About the individualism of Searle see Hund (1998: 129-130; emphasis in the original): 
“Searle’s model introduces the idea of social and institutional concepts and facts. But 
these phenomena are not possible outside of interaction. Interaction is a logical condition 
of collective intentionality. And interaction cannot be located ‘in the head’ of any one 
individual. That is an impossibility. So there is really nothing to distinguish Searle’s model 
from individualism.”  
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Combining the two above-mentioned conditions, Searle assumes an original 
claim: collective intentionality is a specific kind of intentionality (“We” 
purposes-beliefs-desires) that supports human cooperative behaviour and 
coexists in the mind of individuals side by side with individual (“I”) 
intentionality. According to Searle, it is collective intentionality that supports a 
representative of a group of people in his assignment of an institutional 
function, either to a particular object (X counts as Y in C) 101 (e. g. a piece of 
paper counts as money in a certain kind of society) or, as acknowledged more 
recently, to a set of power relationships (S has power (S does A)) (Searle, 2005: 
16-17), and for the latter case the debit card or the corporation are 
paradigmatic examples. 
The problem with this view is that it requires someone’s explicit enactment 
(Searle, 2005: 12)102 supported by generalised acceptance in a group,103 which 
is given by collective intention in the minds of individuals. Here we have an 
atomistic vision of human nature that fails to see social facts such as rights, 
obligations or commitments as intrinsically relational. As Kaufman (2005: 
462) states, “obligations and commitments indeed cannot be cut off from the 
outside world without losing what they structurally are.”104 Further, because for 
Searle we-acceptance is a mental fact, it is far from clear how acceptance 
becomes generalised in the moment of an institutional enactment. 
Nevertheless, even if Searle subscribed to any kind of ‘shared intentions’ 
explanation the scheme would still be flawed because, as Meijers (2003: 176; 
emphasis mine) argues, “cognitive attitudes are not sufficient to explain the 
sharing of intentionality. Normative attitudes have to be part of the 
analysis.”105 In fact, the normative dimension of social life must reside outside 
                                                 
101 As Turner (1999: 219-220) notes, Searle’s view of the creation of an institution is 
similar to a legal enactment, which largely restricts the range of possible sources for 
institutions. 
102 “Searle believes that we can create desire-independent reasons for action. The way he 
believes we do this is by making commitments by the very fact of making certain kinds of 
speech acts” (Viskovatoff, 2003: 9; emphasis mine). 
103 In Searle’s (2005: 11) words, “without the recognition, acknowledgement, and 
acceptance of the deontic relationships, your power is not worth a damn.” 
104 In a convergent view Viskovatoff (2003: 27; emphasis mine) argues that the creation of 
institutions “can be accounted for in terms of individual intentionality and communication, 
and that, contra Searle, there is no reason why we should not include the concept of 
communication  in the ontology of our social theory. This suggests that the notion of 
collective intentionality is superfluous.” 
105 Meijers (2003: 179) is very clear on this point: “agreements cannot be analysed solely in 
terms of individual intentions, beliefs, and desires. Joint acceptance of a view … gives 
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the individual and relate to the experience of compellingness, which is an 
emotional outcome of one’s embodied socio-cultural life (Baerveldt and 
Voestermans, 2005). Therefore, the idea that institutions appear by contagion 
of habits and associated mental representations is based on problematic 
choices about the basic elements that structure social and cultural entities 
(relations and communications, not individuals or agency), the source of 
institutional normativity (culture, not habits) and its normative linkage to 
persons (emotions, not simply cognition). Finally, an explicit enactment is a 
particular form of creating legal institutions, and thus cannot account for all 
situations of social life including important ones such as language and money. 
As Turner (1999: 229) acutely observes, Searle’s “vision of an Adamic moment 
in the history of each social institution in which functions are assigned is 
utterly implausible.” 
To sum up, I suggest that current efforts to revitalise Institutional economics 
should avoid Searle’s philosophy because: (1) his views of institutions are not 
congruent with the emergentist understanding of sociocultural reality that is in 
tune with Classical Pragmatism; (2) Searle’s thinking about human and social 
reality is deeply individualist and based on an algorithmic view of the human 
mind that lacks scientific basis; (3) to mix Searle’s ideas with the proto-
emergentism of Veblen amounts to theoretical eclecticism. 
3.3.2 Opening the black-box of sociocultural reality 
The above referred work of Donald (2001) invites me to look inside the ‘black 
box’ of what so far I have labelled sociocultural reality. It is the moment to 
expand on the analytical distinction between the ‘cultural’ and the ‘social’ 
domains, which makes me enter the crucial (though difficult) discussion about 
the ontological nature of ‘culture’ and how it articulates with the previously 
argued ontology of the ‘social’ domain. 
3.3.2.1 Culture and institutions: too much fog 
The absence of such distinction between cultural and social realities is at the 
core of Veblen’s definition of institutions (“prevalent habits of thought”), which 
is a culture-based definition maintained by some of his contemporary 
followers, albeit in different formulations, such as Ann Mayhew (2009) in the 
                                                                                                                                     
certain rights to members of the group to correct each other. They may claim, for 
example, that other members stick to this view.” 
106 
 
USA and Hodgson (2006b) in the UK. For Mayhew, the Institutionalism of 
Veblen and Commons “has been most clearly defined by its emphasis upon the 
importance of culturally determined behaviour” (1987: 596; emphasis mine). 
Notwithstanding the excessive word “determined”, Mayhew’s view provides a 
blend of social and cultural dimensions that I think useful to distinguish. An 
amalgamated understanding is also present in the words of a leading figure of 
American Institutionalism (Hamilton, 1932: 236): 
Any simple thing we observe – a coin, a time table, a cancelled check, a 
baseball score, a phonograph record – has little significance in itself; the 
meaning it imparts comes from ideas, values and habits established about it. 
… Our culture is a synthesis – or at least an aggregation – of institutions. 
In order to clarify the subject, Hodgson (2001: 297) has argued that there are 
key differences between the social and cultural realms although “both 
institutions and culture have a common foundational basis in habits.” For 
Hodgson (2001: 297-298)  culture refers to “durable beliefs, customs and 
routines”, which “is not a specific entity, but a set of traits that may be found 
in several institutions” while institutions are “codifiable social rules and 
conventions that structure social interactions.” From these distinctions 
Hodgson concludes: “institutions refer to the underlying structures and culture 
to prevalent common characteristics of different institutions” (Ibid, 299; 
emphasis mine). Therefore, Hodgson holds that institutions should be given 
analytical priority and culture treated as “a secondary criterion of classification 
and explanation” (Ibid, 304). 
The distinctions proposed by Hodgson make a progress in relation to two 
kinds of approaches: those that extend rational-choice analysis to culture, the 
latter treated as a new field of enquire disconnected from economic processes; 
those that treat cultural phenomena as a context of economic processes 
(Zelizer, 2002). Moreover, Hodgson rejects the analytical conflation between 
personal interactions and sociocultural structures that underlies some New 
Economic sociology in statements like this one: “shared understandings and 
their representations in objects and practices as part and parcel of economic 
activity” (Zelizer, 2002: 117; emphasis mine). 
Notwithstanding the merits of Hodgson’s contribution, including the 
acknowledgement of the mutual influence between institutions and culture, I 
still disagree with his attribution of a “subsidiary” place to culture. The latter 
would only differentiate institutions in time and place through people’s 
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“interpretation and implementation of the same legal rules” (Hodgson, 2001: 
304). What most strikes in Hodgson’s formulations is the lack of an ontology 
to support his proposed distinction between institutions and culture.106 In fact, 
ontological confusion is a common hindrance in contemporary Institutionalist 
literature (Lawson, 2001) of which the following psychologist definition is an 
illustration: “institutions are regarded not as objective phenomena but as 
mental constructions produced by human beings” (Sjöstrand, 1995: 23; 
emphasis mine). 
However, this context of vague (and sometimes contradictory) definitions of 
institutions, and a nebulous view of how they relate to culture, is not seen by 
Mayhew as necessarily bad (Mayhew, 2009: 282, note 281). On the contrary, 
and although agreeing with the Pragmatist view that this is an ongoing process 
of open deliberation within a community of researchers, I see the effort of 
clarifying these concepts as part of the very nature of science. Consequently, I 
will propose an ontology of culture and institutions. 
3.3.2.2 For an ontology of culture 
To understand cultural reality we need to make at the outset an ontological 
distinction that is inspired by Bhaskar’s “levels of reality”. Consequently, I state 
that sociocultural reality is better understood if we analytically distinguish the 
following levels and domains: a) daily human sociality (“the empirical”) where 
we see the intertwinement of interests, needs, powers, with personal 
meanings, public meanings, emotional and cognitive resources, and material 
reality; b) the interactional-communicational (“the actual”) that goes beyond 
the empirical to encompass events that are not perceived, and which I 
analytically separate in two types: inter-actions (social domain) and 
communications (cultural domain); c) the structural (“the real”) part of reality 
that is made of relations, and networks of relations, plus the social and cultural 
structures to which they give rise. Note that this higher-level, and partially the 
intermediate (what is ‘actual’ but not ‘empirical’), are epistemic outcomes of 
the analysis (Archer, 1995; Lawson, 1997). In this scheme I assume that: (1) 
the (broadly considered) structural level emerges upon the interactional; (2) at 
both the bottom and the structural levels there are two kinds of entities: those 
of the social domain and those of the cultural domain (see Table 1). 
                                                 
106 It is surprising that Hodgson does not refer to the work of Archer (1988; 2000a), the 
first of Bhaskar’s disciples to study culture and its relations to social structures. 
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Table 1 – Analytical distinctions about sociocultural reality 
 
 
 
 
In section 2.5 of this thesis I have already provided theoretical support for a 
multi-layered understanding of social structures but at that moment I had to 
delay the distinctions made above. Now my focus is on the cultural domain 
(right side of Table 1), and thus I emphasise the distinction between the 
emergent cultural entities and the actual level at which occur communicational 
processes that give rise to the former (Archer, 1988: 504). More precisely, the 
‘culture’ of a community is a multi-layered structural domain encompassing a 
huge variety of entities such as meanings, ideas, values, norms, concepts, 
theories, worldviews, etc., that is, socially regulated outcomes of a cultural 
nature that emerge upon individuals’ communications. For the moment I keep 
indistinct the ‘ideational’ and the ‘material’ dimensions of these processes and 
assume that ‘culture’ (in the singular, and in a wide sense) “refers to the 
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totality of human products that produce humans” (Vandenberghe, 2003: 462). 
Obviously, these processes take specific spatio-temporal forms; they 
differentiate societies and thus force us to use the plural form, ‘cultures’. From 
the structural level point of view, culture can also be understood as a particular 
system “internally differentiated into several fields and subfields of cultural 
production” (Ibid, 462) nested within the societal system.107 Below this chapter 
I will return to these ontological distinctions in order to enrich it with a 
semiotic understanding of culture to which I turn now. 
3.3.2.3 Culture is semiotic by nature 
I proceed with an in-depth discussion of the processes at work in the 
emergence of the cultural domain of society. I will bring into the analysis the 
semiotic linkage between individuals and emergent cultural entities, which has 
been absent from most contemporary social theory despite the established 
uniqueness of human intelligence and symbolising capacities (Donald, 
2001).108 
I adopt the Interactivist model already referred in this thesis (see subsection 
1.2.3). Ontogenetically, this approach takes human knowledge as a structured, 
evolutionary developmental process that emerges from individuals’ 
interactions with a socially organised environment (Christensen and Hooker, 
1999). Within this process, individuals’ mental representations about the 
environment arise and organise in different levels of complexity (elementary 
meanings, mental schemes, reflexive consciousness). This means that human 
beings have acquired a regulatory process at the cognitive level that serves 
human adaptiveness (Christensen and Bickhard, 2002). Such regulatory 
mechanism involves (positive and negative) feedback and feedforward 
processes, which by sending signals of differences enable the interactive 
construction of a representation-reference, a cognitive pattern or invariant. 
This is the way we construct personal meanings about the world. In the words 
of Hooker (1995: 75): 
We may understand this cognitive achievement as the representation in the 
brain of an invariant three-dimensional spatial reference framework that 
                                                 
107 See (Dupré, 2001b: 107-108; emphasis mine): “cultures are at least partially integrated 
wholes … and the persistence of a cultural item will always owe something to its role in 
that integrated context over and above any benefits it may be seen to provide in 
isolation.” 
108 An exception is Sayer (1999; 2000). 
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transcends any momentary egocentric point of view, and in which all of those 
points of view are represented as so many varying two-dimensional 
perspective projections. In this way the young child is able to organize and 
unify experiences.109 
Cognitive normativity has two points of entry in this model of human 
epistemology: externally, through communications that ultimately settle 
objective meanings for a community (‘what means’); internally, through 
individuals’ cognitive regulatory process that settles personal meanings (‘I 
mean’). Obviously, such theoretical framework is not compatible with the 
algorithmic psychology adopted by those who take mental schemes as pre-
formed ‘rules’ that provide guiding information underlying the invariants of 
human behaviour. Opposing such codificationist perspective, Lemke (1996: 
354) states: 
The invariants are emergent; they neither have nor require such sources or 
executives. The proposed cognitive schema executives are simply the 
observed invariants restated as causes, when in fact they are themselves 
rather the products of what is going on in each performance. 
On the other hand, the approach I adopt enables to see that the emergence of 
human order, both in cognition and behaviour, is based on interactions that 
are ignored by individualist approaches. It needs a socially organised 
environment where signs play a crucial role, namely the complex system of 
signs we call language. Within this framework language is treated as an 
evolved ‘sign tool’ that enhances inter-actions, helps to manage uncertainty 
inherent in situations where persons meet, and ultimately has enormous 
effects in the development of child’s mind.110 Again, Lemke (1996: 356) is 
helpful with his developmental psychology formulation: 
The order in language-using behaviour should emerge from 
interdependencies within a larger complex of perceptual-motor and 
embodied cognitive-semiotic processes of the child’s participation in the 
community (as culture and as material ecology). … Surely in all this, taken 
together, as it is lived, there is more than enough informational redundancy 
to account for the self-organization of the developing organism into all the 
semiotic orders of the community, simultaneously and in concert. 
                                                 
109 “The appropriate criterion for what is fundamentally real will then be what is invariant 
across all points of view. Thus we regard three-dimensional physical objects as real” 
(Hooker, 1995: 75; emphasis mine). Thus, personal knowledge is also an ‘object’, in the 
sense of an ‘invariant’ of different subjective perspectives about something in the world. 
110 This explains the strong embodied effects of socialisation, which give rise to very 
different mechanisms of cognition in Eastern and Western societies (Nisbett et al., 2001; 
Norenzayan and Nisbett, 2000). 
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Now I introduce the distinction between psychological and material 
dimensions of semiotic processes. A first approach has been proposed by 
Twardowski in 1912 and is summarised in (Bobryk, 2002: 489): 
According to Twardowski’s theory, three ontological categories of actions 
and [inseparable] products may be distinguished: Physical actions and 
products (walking – a walk), mental or psychological, actions and products 
(thinking – a thought), and psychophysical actions and products (speaking – 
a speech, painting – a picture). 
The latter case is particularly relevant for the understanding of ‘signs’ (of 
which language is a particular case) because it involves an epistemic, 
interactive-constructive process linking the mind to a material product, hence 
the term ‘psychophysical’ referring to signs (speech, picture).  
Using this semiotic insight, we are able to see how human communities settle 
the cognitive invariants across individuals (‘public knowledge) they need to 
live in common. The emergence of public knowledge is always a triadic 
process for each person involved in a communication (see Fig. 6); its elements 
are public meaning, symbolic material (mostly linguistic), the person who 
interprets the symbols. Therefore, our relation to symbols is at the same time 
‘private’ (personal knowledge, an emergent first level invariant) and ‘public’ 
(public knowledge, an emergent second level invariant). This view is consistent 
with the interactivist-constructivist approach in psychology and relates to the 
‘semiotic’111 of Charles Sanders Peirce who’s philosophy contributed to the 
sociology of George Mead, the psychology of William James and John Dewey, 
and to the economics of Veblen (Kilpinen, 2003; Liebhafsky, 1993). 
For Peirce, semiotic processes involve three poles: the representamen,112 a sign 
that mediates between the person’s internal processes and some object, 
material or ideational; that sign relates both to the interpretant and to the 
object in some respect, the latter comprising not only material objects but also 
cultural objects (concepts, theories, etc.) (Nellhaus, 1998: 4). 
                                                 
111 The term ‘semiotic’ refers to the specific kind of sign theory developed by Peirce. 
112 It is Peirce’s word for one of the components of the process: “something 
[representamen] which stands for somebody [interpretant] for something [object] in some 
respect or capacity” (Peirce quoted by Nellhaus, 1998: 3). In a late and not published 
paper entitled ‘Pragmatism’ this formulation is expanded to encompass a wider and more 
complex understanding of the interpretant (Bergman, 2003).   
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Fig. 6 – Emergence of public knowledge (“what means”) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 - Peircean understanding of institutional ‘norms’ 
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The semiotic triad could be illustrated by the following example: written 
characters such as ‘red’ make a representamen; the meaning of ‘red’ that 
arises in the person reading the word is the interpretant;113 the object is ‘red 
colour’, public knowledge seen as a second level invariant of different persons’ 
knowledge, to which both representamen and interpretant refer (the ‘referent’) 
(see Fig. 7).114 In fact, Peirce’s triad is more sophisticated; in a late formulation, 
the ‘interpretant’ is not reduced to a personal meaning, “the semiotic effect 
that a sign determines in an interpreter. … Indeed Peirce explicitly states that 
there are interpretants that are emotions or actions, as opposed to 
interpretants that are conceptual signs” (Bergman, 2003: 12).  
I take Peirce’s triad as an important tool that links my present discussion of 
cultural emergence to the other levels of Nature, as aptly summarised by Brier 
(2006: 263-264; emphasis mine): 
Peircean (bio)-semiotics is special to other semiotic paradigms in that it not 
only deals with intentional signs of communication but also encompasses 
non-intentional signs such as symptoms of the body and patterns of 
inanimate nature. It then encompasses both nature and culture. 
Because Peirce’s semiotic is consistent with the ontological levels proposed by 
critical realists (Nellhaus, 1998), it is convenient to make the following 
clarifications about sign processes: a) the actual, composed by what exists and 
what happens in the world, independently of being experienced or not by an 
observer; b) the real, which goes beyond the ‘actual’, comprises two domains: 
b1) what remains possible; b2) the general character of what will occur, “the 
mode of being of a law, or concept” (Peirce, 1903: Lowell Lectures; CP 
1.536.537).115 
                                                 
113 Here ‘meaning’ is an outcome of a complex process: the reading of ‘red’ produces a 
mental image that is linked to the memory of personal experience of socialising with 
coloured materials at the age at which children learn colours.  
114 The triadic relation is irreducible to any of the three poles, or to a dyad as in mainstream, 
‘object-sign’ semiotics: in the example, it is at the same time ‘written characters-personal 
meaning-objective colour’, and neither dimension prevails over the other. Further, it is a 
process: “Although the sign may appear as a static entity in its definition and illustration, the 
intent of Peirce’s formulation is one of continuous change and development” (Smith, 2005: 
193). 
115 At this point it is important to acknowledge that Peirce’s logic categories were 
formulated early in his life for a pragmatist theory of cognition—“a continuous and infinite 
social semiotic process, in which Man is a sign” (Burks, 1996: 323)—and were later 
reformulated and expanded into an evolutionary developmental understanding of 
different domains of reality and the whole cosmos (Ibid, 371). Peirce named this expanded 
system of ideas ‘Pragmaticism’ and took distance from William James’ Pragmatism. 
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To close this cursory review of Peirce’s semiotic I recall that everything 
material is a sign—icon, index or symbol116—although some artefacts (e.g. 
human voice, books, films), due to their language-based constitution, have a 
richer semiotic potential than others (see Miller, 2002). 
3.3.2.4 Why Peirce’s semiotic is indispensable 
An evident implication of the use of Peirce’s semiotic is that language (spoken 
or written) cannot convey ‘explicit’ or ‘codified’ meanings. Certainly, language 
is the richest sign-tool that humans use for communication, but nevertheless it 
is nothing more than a symbolic tool. Social interaction is always needed for 
the emergence of the ‘public’ knowledge that language symbolises, and the 
latter always needs ‘interpretation’ as acknowledged by Peirce. 
In more general terms, Peirce’s semiotic enables us to gain a better grasp on 
human and social phenomena for different kinds of reasons. Firstly, a better 
grasp of human knowledge. Because the constructive nature of our epistemic 
relation to the world is powered by the high reflexivity of the human mind—it 
works with elementary representations of the world upon which it builds 
evermore abstract representations of representations—we can say that 
“knowledge consists solely of signs” (Nellhaus, 1998: 4). But, whatever the 
level of abstractness, cognitive processes can only occur interactively in the 
world. As Hutchins (1996) and others have shown, “the mind is frequently 
engaged in interaction with objects, symbols and other people, and these are 
inextricably tied to the thinking that occurs” (Gauvain, 2001: 130). 
Secondly, it provides a better grasp of human interactions either seen from a 
social or a cultural perspective, as I will substantiate below. In fact, Peirce 
provides the conceptual key to deepen our understanding of the interlocked 
levels (interactional-structural) and domains (social-cultural) that constitute 
social life. Today, researchers in different disciplines return to Peirce, and 
Wiley (2006: 36-37) acknowledges that Peirce’s thinking “was very close to, if 
not identical with, the concept of culture, and therefore influenced one of the 
                                                 
116 In Peirce’s semiotic artefacts have a representational role under different qualities: they 
conventionally represent a category of objects (symbols); they point to an object or are an 
effect of it (index); they have some sort of analogy with an object (icon) (Nellhaus, 1998: 5). 
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main ideas that would clarify or fill in the paradigm space of American 
sociology and anthropology” at the beginning of the twentieth century.117 
Thirdly, and no less important for a discussion of institutions, Peirce’s semiotic 
enables to grasp the foundations of social normativity by showing how 
semiosis plays a normative role for the self (Valsiner, 2001: 87): 
signs create relative stability within the field of experience – ‘capturing’ some 
(generalized) features [‘invariants’] of the irreversible flow of experience of a 
personal kind. Through that relative stability, human beings can bridge their 
past and present with the immediate next future-in-the-construction. 
Moreover, those signs have a material dimension that supports the connection 
between life’s normativity and the rhythmic of human and social life. Urban 
and rural landscapes, monuments, buildings, libraries, objects of art, jewels of 
family are examples of material reality that outlast persons and even 
generations. They are representamina (the plural form of ‘representamen’) of 
social and cultural systems that endure; they are part of semiotic processes 
underlying human relations in different institutional settings. If we consider 
shorter time scales, the materiality of the human body lasts exactly the time of 
human life, while a huge variety of artefacts (machines, consumption goods, 
books, road maps, cloth fashion, etc.) are transient. The latter mediate human 
interactions and bear variable affective value for their users or owners which 
means that their normative role varies considerably. Interestingly, Miller (2002: 
408) points out that “artefacts may be most effective in determining our 
perception when they express a sense of humility in which they avoid 
becoming the direct focus of our attention.” 
Finally, with Peirce’s semiotic we are also able to understand why language-
based cultural artefacts (books, films, machines, etc.) have not in themselves 
an ‘objective knowledge’, as Karl Popper (1972) argued;118 rather, those 
artefacts are only the material part of semiotic processes that have a triadic 
dimension (“Representamen-Object-Interpretant”) and occur within an 
institutionalised setting. Actually, this institutional dimension of knowledge 
                                                 
117 See also the following passage: “If we refer to the Chicago School’s position as 
‘symbolic interactionism’ [mostly associated to Mead], even though the term was invented 
by Herbert Blumer, this expression could also be used to refer to Peirce’s sociological 
ideas” (Wiley, 2006: 44). 
118 On this point Peirce’s semiotics takes me apart from Archer (1988), Layder (1997) and 
Willmott (1997) in their acceptance of Popper (1972) in equating signs with ‘encoded’ 
knowledge (“third world”), which he sees as more or less independent from the physical 
(first) and the mental (second) worlds. For a critique of Popper’s philosophy, see Hooker 
(1995: Chap. 3). 
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was present (but unacknowledged) in Popper’s argument, as we can see in the 
following passage: “People involved in a fruitful discussion of a problem often 
[in fact always] rely, if only unconsciously, upon … a considerable amount of 
common background knowledge” (Popper, 1972: 238). 
In fact, Popper’s “common background knowledge” is what I name ‘public 
knowledge’, ‘the stuff’ of institutional norms; “a set of social practices of the 
relevant community determining which components of this background 
knowledge are in fact accepted, as opposed to those that are not. … they are 
again the result of a socially negotiated consensus, proceeding according to 
the familiar patterns of social consensus formation” (Hooker, 1995: 164; 
emphasis mine).    
The evolutionary developmental process of human beings and their 
communities gave rise to language, worldviews, moral, political, scientific and 
aesthetical ideas, customary tastes, taken-for-granted assumptions, folk 
beliefs, etc.119 It is this vast array of sign-based cultural entities that makes up 
culture, Margaret Archer’s (1988) Cultural System.120 Archer has been inspired 
by Karl Popper’s (1972) logic-based philosophy of science, which led her to 
exclude from the Cultural System non-logical objects such as values, myths or 
widely accepted background assumptions. Although respecting Archer’s 
contribution, I prefer a larger understanding of culture (Adams and Markus, 
2001: 288):  
cultural influence is also mediated by implicit, unrecognised nameless or 
‘positionless’ patterns that are embedded in local meanings, institutions, 
practices and artefacts. A full account of the relationship between culture and 
self requires an appreciation for this shaping of self by patterns that are 
implicit in everyday life. 
The fact is that, although discussing some ideas of Peirce, Archer does not 
recur to his semiotic. I prefer to side with those who argue that culture is 
about human processes of meaning development-cum-signs. Through 
communications, individuals interactively elaborate and stabilise (give rise to) 
useful patterns of meanings and derivative elaborations of these, that is, new 
                                                 
119 A crucial outcome of this evolutionary developmental process is human intelligence, a 
highly complex kind of autonomy that is based on the capacities for: a) developing linked 
levels of progressively higher degrees of cognitive abstraction (Valsiner, 2001); b) 
improving learning processes (Christensen and Hooker, 2000). 
120 Archer (1988: 105) gives the following definition: “the Cultural System is composed of 
entia which stand in logical relations to one another – the most important of which are 
those of consistency or contradiction between items since both are vital elements in an 
adequate theory of cultural stability and change.” 
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and more complex cultural entities of varying degrees of abstraction 
supported by symbolic artefacts that are used across space and time. This is 
specific to human sociocultural emergence. In social science, any conceptual 
framework that ignores culture, or makes it accessory, fails to grasp the deep 
reality of its object of study.  
3.3.2.5 Ontological implications for sociocultural systems 
Now I need to connect the foregoing discussion of Peirce’s semiotic with my 
‘two levels’-‘two domains’ ontology of sociocultural reality (see 3.3.2.2). There, 
I made clear the need to analytically distinguish between two kinds of 
processes. At the ‘actual’ of sociocultural life we have: interactions, made of 
people’s practices and embodied relationships; communications, made of 
sequences of semiotic processes that also give meaning to those interactions. 
At the ‘structural’ level of sociocultural life we have: social organisations 
comprising both networks and systems; meanings-based cultural objects, 
discourses and systems. Supporting both kinds of processes, we have a huge 
diversity of material reality. Then I made a step forward by articulating Peirce’s 
semiotic to the interactivist-constructivist paradigm, which I used to shed light 
on everyday sociality seen as the interface that sustains the emergence of both 
organisations and culture. 
Now, instead of saying that social structures are concept-dependent as critical 
realists usually do,121 I state that social relations, and the structures they form, 
are sign-mediated; they emerge upon interactions supported by (sign-based) 
communications.122 In brief, despite ontologically different from culture, social 
systems depend on semiotic processes occurring at the level of daily sociality to 
emerge and change while enduring.  
Note that although a cultural entity belongs to the structural level, it is an 
element of Peirce’s triad (the ‘object’ to which a sign refers), and thus it takes 
part in sign processes involved in the communications through which 
individuals make sense of their relationships. Differently, social systems are 
                                                 
121 This is not a uniform stance in critical realist quarters as Sayer (2000: 28) 
acknowledges. See also Cruickshank’s (2004) critique of Archer’s ontological 
formulations. 
122 Recent work by critical realists (Fairclough et al., 2002; Lopez, 2003) aims to bring 
semiotics into their ontological reasoning. However, I see some problems in those 
contributions such as the lack of affiliation to Peirce’s triadic semiotic, codificationist 
understanding of knowledge and language, and acceptance of Neo-Darwinism. 
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contingent and external to semiotic processes;123 they depend on the latter 
through the meanings that individuals use to enact their roles, that is, to 
create, maintain and change social relations. Therefore, we need to keep in 
mind two things: 1) the social and the cultural domains are ontologically 
different; 2) the social and the cultural domains are asymmetrical in their 
relation to sign processes supported by material reality.124 
Archer (1988) opened a new path to Institutionalists by calling attention to the 
‘autonomy’, though not independence, of both domains: we can have a clash 
of ideologies without social disruption if the dynamic of current interests of 
individuals and social groups maintain the stability of social structures. 
Conversely, social conflict can happen, and actually is happening in modern 
developed societies, without giving rise (so far) to important changes in 
prevailing ideologies.  
The ongoing inter-dependence of both domains is easy to see when a set of 
beliefs and values (worldview, religion, ideology) becomes a powerful source of 
social transformation (Somers and Block, 2005), or when scientific theories 
originate ‘general purpose technologies’ carrying with them wide changes in 
societies (Lipsey et al., 2005). Conversely, society’s organisation, and the 
social tensions that inhere in it, have causal effects on how much resources are 
available for cultural activities, what groups have access to these activities and 
their outcomes, and thus which new ideas and values appear and are 
disseminated (Zeuner, 2001). A methodological implication of such an 
emergentist approach, which always requires bottom-up causation, is that it 
may be adequate to analyse social and cultural interactions at a macro-level 
without giving the details of what occurs at the micro-level.  
The foregoing discussion is illustrated in Table 2.125 This exercise obviously 
raises classificatory difficulties taking account that the same material object 
may have a hybrid nature and/or different semiotic dimensions.126 To better 
                                                 
123 Note that even when the ‘social system’ becomes an ‘object’ in a semiotic process, for 
instance as a scientific concept, the researcher that uses the concept works within an 
organisation that is contingent and external to that semiotic process.   
124 An illustrative case is given in Wiley (2006) who refers to the disputes within 
anthropology at the turn of 19th to 20th century. 
125 Material reality is placed in a continuum at the centre of Table 2 intending to suggest that 
it connects to both ‘levels’ and ‘domains’. 
126 According to Nellhaus (1998: 22), “Peirce left the question of the representamen’s 
materiality unexplored.” At least for this reason, the inclusion of material reality in Table 2 
leaves open the precise correspondence to levels and domains. 
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see those difficulties, consider for example the human body: it takes part in 
interactions that create-maintain social relations, and at the same time 
participates in communications that give rise to conceptual elaboration. 
Another example: an artefact like the car is both an icon of social relations of 
production, and a cultural index of the driver’s social status (Nellhaus, 1998: 
15). Nevertheless, Table 2 may be useful to highlight the central role of 
material reality in sociocultural life, and so to shed light on the semiotic 
interface between individuals’ social life and the self-organising complex 
entities of social and cultural kind they give rise. 
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Table 2 – Understanding sociocultural reality  
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3.3.3 Institutions: between society and persons 
3.3.3.1 Emerging from the rest of Nature 
Now it is time to make important distinctions within sociocultural reality. 
Consider the cases of ‘markets’, ‘state’, or ‘science’, which Veblen labelled 
‘institutions’ and, in a vague sense, treated as emergent phenomena (see 2.2). 
Supported by the above presented ontology of sociocultural reality, in this 
thesis I argue that such entities actually are sociocultural systems and, when 
we adopt a high level of abstraction, we may recognise that they have 
properties of self-organising complex systems belonging to other levels of 
Nature (Collier and Hooker, 1999: 246). Indeed, the properties of complexity 
and organisation appear in sociocultural systems in varying degree of scale 
and strength.127  
On the other hand, we know that markets, state, and science are made of 
lower-level systems such as networks and organisations. The latter have 
properties of autonomous systems by which I mean that, besides self-
organisation, they “exert a degree of influence on the conditions under which 
they exist” (Christensen and Bickhard, 2002: 17). In fact, just as human 
cognitive capacities comprise a normative function that enables us to make 
crucial distinctions between true and false (or incorrect) representations of the 
world, organisations also have a normative function that monitors their 
relationship to the environment and provides information with survival and 
flourishing value (Stacey et al., 2000).128 
This ‘normative function’ of sociocultural systems is analogous to what we find 
in autonomous systems at other levels of reality. As Bickhard (2004a: 130) 
puts it, 
all of mind and mental and social phenomena are fundamentally normative, 
and they all emerge in a hierarchy with biological functional normativity at its 
base. Some other locations and levels in the hierarchy include representation, 
perception, memory, learning, emotions, sociality, language, values, 
rationality, and ethics. 
Besides the self-organising nature that they share with the institutions to which 
they belong, organisations have normative functions that not only make them 
                                                 
127 Similarly to the properties of complexity and organisation, Collier (2000: 289; emphasis 
mine) argues that “autonomy is a matter of degree”.  
128 I recognise the difficulty of defining the content of ‘flourishing’. On this point see 
(Sayer, 2004b: 15). 
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adaptive to changes in their environment but also enable anticipative 
behaviour that improves their autonomy.129 We could also say that 
organisations are ‘relationship-maintaining’ systems. According to this view, 
rather than narrow ‘goal-seeking’ systems, organisations are best understood 
as systems that, in order to survive, attempt to maintain a complex web of 
(sometimes conflicting) relations (West, 2005). Because organisations define 
their own objectives, and manage their interaction with the environment, 
organisations are key components of institutions as much as the cultural 
entities that give institutions a normative character (‘norms’). 
Drawing on this Naturalist view, I immediately give a preliminary definition of 
‘institution’: it is an emergent sub-system of society that organises individuals 
and organisations interactions-communications according to a set of 
normative distinctions about what is adequate-inadequate (good-bad) for the 
function that the sub-system serves for society. 
Of course those ‘normative distinctions’ are of different kind depending on the 
function that is served (provisioning, education, scientific knowledge, public 
order, etc.). This is so whether or not current individuals have made (explicit or 
implicit) agreements about those distinctions, whether or not they (more or 
less) ignore them, even whether or not they have any idea about their 
usefulness.130 
While institutions are self-organising systems that serve societal functions, 
society is an autonomous system that, in order to survive and flourish in the 
world, depends on these institutions. As an autonomous system, society 
manages its openness and subsists by balancing positive and negative 
feedbacks stemming from its interactions with the rest of the world. At the 
same time, society as a whole maintains, constrains and changes its 
institutions (see Fig. 8). 
 
                                                 
129 Christensen and Bickhard (2002: 22) identify “three dimensions to increases in 
autonomy: (i) increasing collective benefit, (ii) increasing dependency of component 
processes on collective activity, (iii) collectively imposed constraints on membership of the 
system.” For these authors, “autonomy also has wider relevance since socio-cultural 
systems such as businesses, cities, geo-political regions, and nations can also be 
autonomous” (Ibid, 4). 
130 Humans are trained in the use of language without being aware of the critical role of 
this process to their development. 
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Fig. 8 – Society as an autonomous system (adapted from Taylor, 1976) 
 
The fact that in my definition of institutions and organisations I have recurred 
to a concept such as ‘self-organising complex systems’ does not mean that I 
have forgotten the specificity of social reality. It only means that social 
systems’ properties are consistent with, and perhaps in some sense analogous 
to, some properties of living systems and of self-organising physical systems 
such as flames, hurricanes and tsunamis (see Table 3; Collier and Hooker, 
1999: 246). I acknowledge the heuristic usefulness for social science of 
borrowing a few terms used in other disciplines to describe and classify 
systems, but I also bear in mind that they only allow to grasp in very abstract 
and loose terms (van-Uden, 2005) some analogies because they have emerged 
upon these ‘primary levels’ of reality. Beyond local analogies, I follow 
Emmeche et al. (1997: 113) who argue that emergence at each level of reality 
depends on mechanisms specific to each level and that 
it may not be possible to sketch a general theory of interlevel relations in the 
emergence of primary levels, because the genesis of four primary levels 
[physical, biological, psychological and social] are asymmetrical or 
nonhomomorphic. 
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Table 3 – Organisation and complexity in Nature 
                             (an interpretation of Collier and Hooker, 1999) 
 
 
Acknowledging the specificity of sociocultural reality, I only borrow a typology 
of systems that seems helpful in terms of analogy, and move on to consider 
fundamental issues about institutions. One of them is the debated question of 
how institutions articulate with human behaviour. 
According to Hodgson (2006b: 21): “Repeated, conditional, rule-like behaviour 
acquires normative weight as people accept the customary as morally virtuous 
and thus help stabilize the institutional equilibrium.” In my view, an 
explanation of institutional normativity that is based on individuals’ habits 
misses the identification of its source. Widespread behaviour may exist as an 
outcome of societal enforcement, but in itself does not provide the legitimacy 
that appears associated to the normativity of a social rule. Institutional 
normativity is exerted by cultural entities such as concepts, ideas and values 
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to which we have been socialised, and its strength depends on the emotional 
stress aroused in individuals by a deviant behaviour.131 
Let us see this point in more detail. When facing uncertainty resulting from a 
conduct (others’ and ours) inconsistent with social norms, individuals typically 
feel some degree of compellingness, which depends on what is at stake. This 
compellingness is caused by persons’ emotions, that is, the way human beings 
deal with their internal uncertainty (Bickhard, 2000b). Therefore, when 
emotions are socially expressed they constitute a powerful mechanism of 
control (von-Scheve and von-Luede, 2005), thereby leading to repeated 
behaviour, and the consequent habits. Moreover, current neurobiological 
studies highlight that emotion-based feelings depend upon, but are not 
reducible to, “rapid, automatic, and stereotyped emotional responses”, or 
vague “dispositions” triggered by rules’ incentives and constraints (Dolan, 
2002; Hardcastle and Stewart, 2002). 
Here lies a divergence with Hodgson’s treatment of habits. His persistent 
regress to biological and mental causes of human activity omits that these 
levels are subsumed in the higher-level system that the person is.132 In fact, the 
causal autonomy of the (emergent) person is source of ‘downward causation’ 
over the neurophysiological processes that underlie emotions and feelings, 
and over the interactions motivated by conflicting feelings and needs (e.g. 
personal insecurity and the need to manipulate and gain power, need to make 
different experiences stimulated by human creativity, need of rebalancing 
personal commitments in order to achieve a new meaning for life) (Bennett and 
Hacker, 2003; Bickhard, 2008a).133 In fact, Hodgson misses the concept of 
(emergent) ‘person’ and mistakes the consequences (habits) for the causes 
(emotions) of institutional normativity. Further, by sticking to the concept of 
‘habit’, Hodgson cannot capture the source of the diverse, and frequently 
                                                 
131 Underlying this point there are two important ideas that I will not detail: a) Georg 
Simmel’s idea of variable degree of ‘institutionalisation’ of human interactions 
(Nedelmann, 2001); b) the existence of a strong link between reason and emotion in both 
‘rational decisions’ and ‘expression of emotions’ (Robinson, 2004). 
132 See the following statement as an illustration (Hodgson, 2010: 2, note): “This leaves 
unanswered the vital question of what viable neural and psychological mechanisms 
actually underlie preferences or choice.”  
133 For a discussion of the so-called ‘social emotions’ see (Baerveldt and Voestermans, 
2005: 467): “Emotions are indeed embodied beliefs, but their body is not just my own, but 
that of my body and yours, acting in synchronized spontaneity, thus consensually 
enacting a world that has normative force for both of us.”  
126 
 
contradictory, motivations of daily human behaviour, even in the more 
routinised mode.134 
The foregoing discussion also relates to a different understanding of culture, 
which I see by itself normative, even for non-institutionalised behaviour. Note 
that sign processes are intrinsically normative, which stems from the realism 
of Peirce’s semiotic. Both ‘representamen’ and ‘interpretant’ refer to an 
‘object’, indeed to real objects in the world; for Peirce reality is the ultimate 
norm. Signs involving different degrees of abstraction enable humans to make 
distinctions of right-wrong or good-bad ways of speaking a language, eating at 
table, rearing children, making politics, or doing science. The referents for 
such normativity are cultural entities‘objects’ such as values, beliefs, 
models, norms, lawsassociated to different kinds and degrees of 
compellingness according to persons’ emotions such as esteem, empathy, 
shame, guilt and embarrassment. Therefore, cultural objects act upon 
individuals through sign processes, which elicit a normative assessment of the 
situation and the arousal of emotions (Barbalet, 2001).135 This macro-micro 
linkage enables us to understand culture “as an inherently normative order and 
emotions as the primary way in which we are tied to that order” (Baerveldt and 
Voestermans, 2005: 468). 
For those who do not share the algorithmic view of human nature, the 
knowledge of a situation, the emotion dealing with the uncertainty of the 
situation, and the motivation for action (which is a selection among 
possibilities of what to do next) are different but interlocked dimensions of the 
same process that maintains human beings alive in a instituted world 
(Bickhard, 2000b; Summers-Effler, 2002). It is through such dynamical 
mechanisms that normativity works in a process that is driven by persons’ 
autonomy, thus necessarily implying the ‘interpretation’ of roles and inherent 
on going (even if small) deviations from the ‘norm’.136 Therefore, habits-based 
                                                 
134 In a similar vein, see the concluding words in Layder (1997: 254): “In all I have 
attempted to develop a conception of individuals who experience contradictory impulses, 
are sometimes only partly aware and in control of their behaviour and reactions and who 
are both rational and irrational at various times.” 
135 von-Scheve and von-Luede (2005: 318) side with those who argue for the idea that 
“emotion regulation is part and parcel of emotion elicitation and that, in some way, 
emotions are always regulated.” 
136 Micro sociocultural changes are filtered across networks into higher-level structures of 
institutions by layers close to the interactional level (social settings), which makes the 
change of some norms, or overall change, typically slow and difficult to be perceived. And 
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explanations of institutions fail to acknowledge that: (1) the cultural nature of 
norms provides institutions with normativity; (2) emotions are the source of 
individuals’ feelings of compellingness; (3) emotion-fuelled motivations are the 
source of continuous social change, even in the midst of habitual behaviour. 
Therefore, through the biological basis of human cognition and emotions, and 
supported by the material reality of signs, institutions are deeply connected 
with, as they have emerged from, the rest of Nature.  
3.3.3.2 What are institutions?  
In a friendly debate with Douglass North, Hodgson (2006b: 10) argues for the 
treatment of organisations as ‘institutions’: 
Organizations involve structures or networks, and these cannot function 
without rules of communication, membership, or sovereignty. The 
unavoidable existence of rules within organizations means that, even by 
North’s own definition, organizations must be regarded as a type of 
institution. 
My stance is different from Hodgson’s.137 In the case of some organisations 
(e.g. large corporations, universities) I admit that specific departments 
endowed with particular norms (legal and non-legal) could constitute a micro-
institution because they too serve a function for the system to which they 
belong, the whole organisation.138 Such case does not preclude the existence 
of a corporate culture constituted by a diversity of norms, the ‘rules’ to which 
Hodgson refers. In brief, in my conceptual framework organisations are 
components of society’s (macro) institutions; organisations are not institutions, 
but some of them may contain (micro) institutions. Societies are autonomous 
systems that need institutions (sub-systems) to serve particular functions. 
The discussion between leading figures of New Institutionalism and 
contemporary Original Institutionalism has also extended to the theoretical 
status of non-legal ‘rules’, mostly non-written, which for Hodgson (2006b: 19-
21) are “informal institutions” while for North they are not institutions. North 
argues that, contrary to formal rules enforced by courts, non-legal ‘rules’ that 
he labels ‘norms’ “are enforced usually by your peers or others who will 
                                                                                                                                     
yet we know that there are periods of acceleration leading to large-scale changes. This 
topic is developed in Chapter 5. 
137 “Institutions are systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social 
interactions” (Hodgson, 2006a: 157). 
138 This parallels Lawson’s (2003b: 43) idea of institutions nested within institutions. 
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impose costs on you if you do not live up to them” (Ibid, 20-21). The dialogue 
turned around the ‘formal versus informal’ distinction about the entities 
covered by the term ‘institutions’, and the respective differences in mode of 
enforcement. 
In my view, the terms of the debate are problematic. Firstly, both authors 
understand normativity as enforcement, and this is a weakness. As I have 
argued, normativity is inherent to the nature of institutions and comes from its 
cultural components (values, beliefs, laws, theories, etc.), which define ‘the 
way things should be’. Enforcement is of a social nature; it is action-based, 
addresses deviant behaviour (sometimes also deviant thinking), and comes 
from different sources (police, courts, chiefs, peers, friends, neighbours) in 
different forms (judiciary, command, injunction, emotional expression). In my 
understanding, ‘norms’ are ‘necessary and internal’ (cultural) components of 
institutions; they account for the normativity that Hodgson fails to capture with 
the concept of ‘habit’. Enforcement is additional to normativity; it is an aspect 
of the functioning of institutions’ organisations that ultimately relies on the 
enforcement of last resort provided by the state. 
In combining cultural components (‘norms’), endowed with different kinds of 
normativity, with social components (networks, organisations) that functionally 
serve society and frequently provide a front-line enforcement, my definition of 
institution dissolves the distinctions made in the ‘Hodgson versus North’ 
debate. It places norms of different kind (legal and non-legal) at the core of 
institutions (sub-systems of society), thus preventing not only dichotomous 
thinking (formal versus informal) but also risky voluntarism in policy-making. 
In fact, change in legislation is only one move in the overall process of 
institutional change, which also depends on other norms such as ideologies 
and business models, and on the ‘social’ components of institutions where 
power and interests are of prime importance.139 Unfortunately, power and 
interests cannot be accounted for by the algorithmic concept of ‘rules’. 
Having clarified my stance in relation to other formulations of what are 
institutions, in the following I attempt to go deeper in my understanding of the 
latter. To repeat, I see institutions constituted by two domains, the ‘social’ and 
                                                 
139 Pelikan (2003: 241) acknowledges that pro-market reforms in Eastern countries “could 
be slower in coming than may have been naively expected” because “informal institutions” 
may constitute a constraint to the pace of formal-legal institutional change (Ibid, 240). 
Like Hodgson, Pelikan treats values and customs as “informal institutions”. 
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the ‘cultural’, both of them organised at an interactional-communicational and 
a structural level. Connecting both levels there are semiotic processes that 
relate persons, material reality and norms. In Fig. 9 I attempt to detail the 
processes that lead to the emergence of social systems and culture and are not 
visible in Table 1. Observed from the top (the macro-level), we see that the 
institution is made of an ecology of social systems constituted by networks 
and organisations that use a system of norms specific to that institution. As 
discussed about Table 1, they are ontologically different but closely inter-
dependent. Still, the institution is the overall self-organising complex system, 
which can be studied at other levels, that is, observed according to other 
perspectives. For the sake of simplicity, besides the macro-level it is only 
represented the bottom level (the micro-level) where persons interact and 
communicate. 
Building on the foregoing, I proceed with a second and more elaborated 
definition of ‘institution’: it is a sociocultural system emergent from inter-
related organisations, networks, norms and material reality, which structure 
individuals and organisations according to a set of normative distinctions, 
thereby serving with reliability a societal function. 
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Fig 9 - Institution as an emergent socio-cultural system 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10 – The economy as an institution of society (macro-perspective) 
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To a better understanding of the definition, I refer to Fig. 10 and add three 
notes: 
(1) social and cultural entities have distinct roles in institutions. The cultural 
components (norms) provide normativity while social systems (organisations, 
networks) provide functionality; 
(2) analytically, four levels are assumed (interactional-communicational, 
institutions, society, world), each relatively autonomous to the others; 
(3) different combinations between social and cultural elements account for a 
range of institutions and for the existence of tensions between social and 
cultural domains, and between institutions themselves (which in turn may form 
second order institutions) and the whole societal system.140 
The heterogeneity of institutions has inspired a huge literature, some involving 
the elaboration of a typology. I will not discuss this literature as my definition 
is general enough to account for typologies based on different criteria such as 
the level of complexity and organisation, level of autonomy, systemic function 
or spatial scale. I remind the reader that the generality of the definition is built 
upon a process metaphysics and a multi-level ontology, and therefore is not 
compatible with most of what appears in that literature, namely with 
institutions: seen as patterned behaviour; written rules taken as scripts for 
behaviour; cognitive rules ‘internalised’ by individuals; ‘social practices’ à la 
Giddens; whatever combination of these approaches (see Parto, 2005; Scott, 
2008). 
An implication of my definition is that institutions cannot exist without 
organisations; the latter are needed in order to provide some function for 
society, that is, in order to ‘organise’ particular processes that sustain society. 
Therefore, an institution comprises the interacting individuals and the 
structural levels of networks, organisations and norms that emerge from those 
interactions, the whole making a sociocultural system – an institution – that 
serves a function for society (Fig. 9).141 
                                                 
140 Not least, tensions and contradictions between particular institutions and the state. 
141 This interdependence between organisations and norms is acknowledged in a 
statement by Khalil (1995: 463): “It is organizations which, in the final analysis, embody 
and interpret the scheme of norms and rules according to their preferences.” However, 
differently from my understanding, Khalil fails to grasp the systemic nature of this whole 
and uses the term ‘institutions’ for what I name ‘norms’. 
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The heterogeneity of existing institutions should also be understood in terms 
of degree of institutionalisation, by which I suggest that the structuring of 
human interactions is variable and depends on the degree and kind of 
normativity involved, the type of enforcement at work, the exercise of 
individuals’ agency, and the material basis associated. Taking account that 
‘upward’ and ‘downward’ causal processes connecting the interactional and 
the structural levels are of a different nature, such multifaceted heterogeneity 
is also manifest in the fact that the pace of institutional change is highly 
contingent in space and time. 
Another implication of my definition is that it dispenses with the use of the 
‘embeddedness’ concept in the sense commonly used. In my understanding, it 
is an oxymoron to say that economic action is embedded “in networks of 
interpersonal relations” (Granovetter, 1985). Obviously, all economic activity is 
carried through interpersonal relations (the interactional-communicational 
level of the institution ‘economy’), which self-organise in networks that 
connect with other networks, sometimes non-economic. All these networks are 
sociocultural because the economy is a sub-system of society. Further, the 
concept of ‘social networks’ not only conflates structures with interactions but 
also does not account for the analytical distinction between the ‘social’ and the 
‘cultural’ domains; it is an obstacle to the understanding of the differences, 
and causally autonomous inter-dependencies, of these domains. Of course, 
such critique also extends to the concept of “cognitive embeddedness” (see 
Dequech, 2003), which ignores the ontological distinction between individuals’ 
meanings and the emergent ‘public knowledge’ involved in sign processes.142 
My definition of institutions has the advantage of providing a conceptual 
clarification in the legacy of Original Institutional economics that was for a 
long time needed. This literature gives us diverse definitions of institutions 
from “habits of thought” (Veblen) to “ways of thought or action” (Walton 
Hamilton) or “patterned behaviour and the ideas and values associated” 
(Neale). In all these meanings institutions are reduced to ‘personal’ habits, 
patterns of behaviour, or a mix of both.  
                                                 
142 Note that Hodgson accepts that ‘rules’ emerge from human interactions. However, how 
can we understand his use of the term ‘embeddedness’ and the omission of the term 
‘emergent’? (See Hodgson, 2004b: 424). 
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Contrastingly, I argue that institutions combine three interlocked components: 
social systems, cultural elements and the material basis of semiotic processes. 
An illustration of our different understanding is the case of ‘language’, which 
Hodgson assumes to be “the basic institution”.143 In my view, when seen as a 
‘system of signs’, language is a cultural system within the culture of society. 
However, according to my definition, I also consider language an ‘institution’: 
a sociocultural system that involves relations between a ‘system of signs’ 
(language as culture), professional organisations and state organisations, and 
material artefacts that support sign processes (e.g. dictionaries, grammar 
books, literary books, etc.). Consequently, the English language is a cultural 
tool used by educated people at a global level, whereas in the UK and in some 
other societies the English language is much more than a cultural tool that 
persons use; it is an institution that serves societal functions of coordination 
and integration. After all, it is for some reason that citizenship is only accorded 
to immigrants that are able to speak the national language. 
Similarly, I argue that the economy, state, marriage and science are best seen 
as self-organising complex (sociocultural) systems comprising social systems, 
cultural entities and material reality, each one with an history; they are 
institutions. 
Now consider ‘money’, unanimously classified in the literature as an 
institution. According to my definition, to define money as an institution we 
need to put in relation organisations (Central Bank, commercial banks, credit 
card firms, printing offices, etc.), cultural entities (laws, accounting 
regulations, ideas, theories, values), and material artefacts (cheques, cards, 
banknotes and coins). Further, the institution-money serves crucial functions 
for the macro-institution ‘economy’, among others as means of payment and 
storage of purchasing power. Similarly to other institutions, the enforcement 
of monetary laws and regulations is not completely guaranteed by the 
organisations of the institution; enforcement of last resort belongs to the 
state, the meta-institution of modern societies. In brief, money is best seen as 
a meso-institution, a sub-system of the macro-institution economy. 
Another example is the state. In my view, the state is a case that is 
inadequately treated with Hodgson’s (2006b: 13) rule-based definition. 
                                                 
143 Agreeing with Searle, Hodgson (2006b: 13) states that language is the basic social 
institution because “all institutions involve at least rudimentary interpretative rules.”    
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Hodgson puts under the conceptual umbrella of “systems of social rules” 
different realities such as public services and state bodies, which I treat as 
organisations,144 and laws, which I treat as cultural entities. Further, because 
for Hodgson culture is outside institutions, it is unclear how beliefs and values 
are put under the label of ‘informal’ institutions although they clearly are 
cultural entities. In my view, this tension stems from the lack of an ontology 
that could make the distinction between culture and social reality, and the 
absence of an emergentist theory of systems.145 
To conclude this chapter I want to acknowledge that my definition of 
institutions runs the risk of being criticised for its connection to Parson’s 
thinking. In fact I assume that the macro-institution ‘economy’ serves a 
provisioning function for society. This has been the object of a debate 
between Old Institutionalists and the sociologist Talcott Parsons concerning 
his systemic approach and attribution of ‘functions’ to sub-systems of 
society. I will not revisit the debate. However, I want to highlight that my 
theoretical standpoint differs from Parsons’, even if I also adopt a systemic 
framework and see a functional aspect in institutions. However, as Krippner 
(2001: 790) has stated, “Parsons endorsed a view of the economy as sharply 
separated from the social world [the rest of society]. This separation was for 
Parsons an analytical one and in no way reflected a claim about reality.”  
So, while for Parsons ‘systems’ and their ‘functions’ were analytical tools 
used to abstract aspects of the empirical reality of human social life, my 
systemic framework is suggested by a multi-level ontology that sees 
sociocultural systems as really existing. My analytical stance admits an 
interpenetration between the emergent structures of sociocultural systems 
and individuals’ interactions and communications. This is a central difference 
insofar Parsons lacked a clear ontology that could support a discussion of the 
so-called ‘agency-structure’ problem. Hence the critique of Parson’s 
‘structuralism’, which does not apply to my emergentist stance. 
                                                 
144 On this point Pelikan (2003: 241) has good reasons to say that Original Institutional 
economics is wrong when it treats organisations “especially large lasting ones, such as 
ministries, central banks, or universities” as ‘institutions’. Khalil (1995) also argues for a 
theoretical distinction between organisations and institutions. Both authors name 
‘institutions’ what I name (institutional) ‘norms’. 
145 Hodgson labels “informal institutions” the established customs, moral judgements, or 
religious beliefs, which is not helpful to make a distinction between culture and institutions. 
On this, Hodgson gives continuity to the ambiguities of Veblen’s Institutionalism. 
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However, I argue that we need a methodology that goes beyond the 
traditional reductionisms of the past in order to produce new insights about 
institutions. For this, I “study social processes from the point of view of the 
fundamental preconditions for the maintenance or survival requirements of 
the system [society]” (Mouzelis, 1974: 400). Insofar I have present a detailed 
description of how institutions (qua sociocultural systems) emerge, to 
acknowledge that markets serve a provisioning function for society has 
nothing to do with ‘functionalism’. Having provided this clarification, in the 
next chapter I turn to a detailed study of markets. 
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Chapter 4 
Markets as institutions 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I have presented an ontology of institutions, which 
are understood as sociocultural sub-systems of society. Their multi-layered 
emergent nature, and the ontological distinction between the social systems 
(networks, organisations) and the norms of the institution have been 
emphasised (see Fig. 9 and Fig. 10). 
I intend to use this ontology of institutions to answer the research question 
‘What are markets?’. The analysis maintains its abstract nature, though the 
analytical interest is now focused on a particular subset of contemporary 
societies. As sociocultural phenomena, markets are viewed as irreversible, 
historical processes. Markets ‘structures’ are the subject of the present 
chapter. But they are not seen as ‘things’; rather, they are treated as 
organised processes of a self-organising, complex and open system. The 
discussion of the ‘motion’ aspects of markets are dealt with in the next 
chapter.  
My point of departure is the contribution of Karl Polanyi who forcefully 
argued that markets are institutional forms that human societies have 
adopted in the course of their history in order to organise their 
provisioning.146 Perhaps due to the influence of Talcott Parsons thinking, the 
late work of Polanyi has a systemic tone that also surfaces in the texts of his 
collaborators. For instance, Hopkins (1957: 287; emphasis mine) states that: 
all societies, viewed as self-maintaining social systems, have certain 
fundamental requirements which must be met if they are to continue in 
                                                 
146  With the hegemony of economics’ neo-classical synthesis after the thirties of twentieth 
century the term ‘provisioning’ has been abandoned in economics. It belongs to the 
discourse of Polanyi’s “substantive economics” (Polanyi, 1968 [1947]). Veblen (1899a: 
136; emphasis mine) aptly summarised the basic difference: “the utilitarian economists 
make exchange value the central feature of their theories, rather than the conduciveness 
of industry to the community’s material welfare.”    
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operation. … Furthermore, all societies in fact have structures of social 
relations through which this supply is maintained, and in any given case 
that structure (or structures) is its economy.147 
I assume Polanyi’s late intuition: the economy is the institution that serves 
the provisioning function of society. In the next section (4.2) I expand on this 
view, while in the remainder of the chapter I provide details of the specific 
institutional nature of markets (4.3) and contrast my stance with other views 
in contemporary Institutional economics and other heterodox streams of the 
discipline (4.4). 
4.2 The macro-institution economy 
4.2.1 Economy and society 
It should be noted at the outset that my research builds on the relevant 
concepts and theories available whatever their disciplinary source, be it 
economics, sociology, political science or other. In fact, the present state of 
economics has made Heiskala (2007: 244) to state: “the centrality of the 
economy in the modern world could make us think that among the social 
sciences it is economics towards which one should turn for an illuminating 
account of the economy/society relationship. Curiously enough this is not the 
case, and it is sociology rather than economics that one will have to consult for 
an analysis of this relationship”. 
Therefore, my point of departure for the discussion of the economy as a sub-
system of society leads me to revisit the ‘embeddedness’ debate introduced in 
Chapter 3. There I referred to an unresolved ambiguity in the work of Karl 
Polanyi, which is related to the use of the term ‘embeddedness’. I concur with 
those who judge Polanyi’s claim – that since 19th century English markets 
became “disembedded” from society –  a very problematic one. The historically 
documented role of the state in the construction and maintenance of national 
markets through the use of general law, taxes and (more or less developed) 
                                                 
147 See also Pearson (1957: 308): “in principle the Parsons-Smelser book [Economy and 
Society] conceives the problem of economy and society in the same way as it is here 
conceived. … A functionally defined economy is seen as performing within the structural 
context of society.” 
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welfare systems, should suffice to drop that meaning of (dis)embeddedness 
(Harvey, 2007a).148 
On the other hand, it neither makes sense to argue that markets are “always 
embedded in society” (Barber, 1995), mostly if by this it is suggested that the 
nature of markets is non-social, but nevertheless they are surrounded and 
conditioned by, or linked to, the social environment. In fact, such 
understanding of “embeddedness” lacks an ontology of sociocultural reality: 
economic phenomena occur through interactions and communications 
between persons, which make them inherently sociocultural, as much as other 
phenomena of the human sociality. Here I recall my basic understanding of 
institutions (subsection 3.3.4), which applies to the present discussion of 
markets: human interactions give rise to (and are conformed by) emergent 
levels composed of a huge variety of norms (laws, regulations, technical 
standards, moral), organisations (most importantly firms) and networks 
(lobbying, innovation, etc.) of different levels of complexity and organisation. 
Therefore, whatever the level of analytical focus, be it interactional, medium-
structural or high-structural, the economy should be treated as a sub-system of 
society.149 
Such understanding accords with Gemici (2008: 24), who noticed a double 
meaning in Polanyi’s rare use of the term “embeddedness”: 
When he formulates embeddedness as a gradational variable, Polanyi’s 
analysis rests on a restrictive institutionalism which understands economic 
life as the exchange of goods and services. On the other hand, 
embeddedness as a methodological principle is derived from a holistic 
[systemic] view of society, from looking at the various ways economic life is 
structured and shaped by social institutions and relations. 
Notwithstanding Gemici’s alignment with Giddens’ sociology, which I do not 
follow, his exegesis of Polanyi’s texts shows that my understanding of the 
economy as a sub-system of society is consistent both with Polanyi’s 
methodological meaning of embeddedness and his substantive understanding 
of the economy.   
                                                 
148  See also (Fligstein, 2002: 71) about the co-evolution of state and markets. 
149  This understanding is assumed by someone very close to Polanyi’s late research 
(Hopkins, 1957: 295; emphasis mine) in the following statement: “To explain these 
variations in men’s economic activities, then, one must turn to the wider system of social 
actions, the society, of which the economy as a social process is a part.” 
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Moreover, we should not forget what ultimately motivated Polanyi’s intellectual 
endeavour: the fundamental idea that, in order to survive, societies need some 
level of protection for labour, nature and money, which he labelled ‘fictitious 
commodities’. Here I recall that in Polanyi’s thinking these ‘fictitious 
commodities’ are not created for exchange. In fact, nineteenth century England 
has been the first society to organise these three realities as if they were 
commodities subjected to market exchange. Fred Block addresses the tensions 
between labour and the owners of capital in following terms (Krippner et al., 
2004: 133; emphasis mine): “central to Polanyi’s whole analysis is the 
fundamental understanding about the labour process—the relative power of 
workers and capital, and how the specific forms of political structuring of the 
market effect and shape those relative amounts of power.” Therefore, if we 
pay attention to this (relative) “power perspective”, and the decisive role that 
the state plays in managing the tensions arising in society from the existence 
of ‘fictitious commodities’, it remains useful to see “embeddedness” in 
gradational terms. In doing so, the analytical focus becomes one of 
understanding how society and its institutions interact with the economy, and 
how it (more or less) protects “fictitious commodities” from full 
commodification. 
In the particular case of labour, such protection translates into the question of 
how society gives more or less ‘bargaining power’ to labour. Such ‘protective’ 
dimension, implicit in the institutional interdependency between state and the 
economy, enables us to reconcile Polanyi’s two-fold understanding of 
“embeddedness”: (1) The “methodological” meaning of embeddedness – the 
economy is a sub-system of society and, as such, it is interdependent with the 
other institutions, most importantly the state. In its functioning, the economy 
constitutes other institutions and, at the same time, is constituted by each of 
them and the whole society; (2) The “gradational” meaning of embeddedness – 
These interactions between the economy and the rest of society create 
different types and degrees of power exercise involving the state, which have 
implications on the level of protection of the “fictitious commodities” (see Fig. 
9, Chapter 3).  
Now I turn to money in order to provide another illustration of the analytical 
pertinence of that “gradational” dimension of Polanyi’s “embeddedness”. Here I 
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want to highlight the deep relations between the economy and the state, 
indeed an evolutionary developmental aspect of capitalist society. 
It is known that by the fourteenth century the European bourgeoisie had 
already evaded the economic barriers of feudal territories with recourse to 
financial instruments other than local currencies. After the invention of the 
“double-entry” book keeping, there appeared the “letter of credit” and other 
similar instruments related to long-distance trade. However, as Nitzan and 
Bichler (2009: 292) note: 
the magnitude of private credit paled in comparison to the size of state 
finance. Wars, whose cost soared in tandem with their material scope and 
unit price, were the most financially demanding expenses. … There were 
two ways to raise money – taxes and borrowing – but it was their 
combination that proved the most effective. 
Here lies the beginning of what has come to be the most important financial 
instrument of modern states, the bond: “the first systematic capitalization of 
power, namely, the power of government to tax” (Ibid. 294). Therefore, “over 
the past century, the government bond market has become the heart of 
modern finance. It provides the biggest and most liquid security market; it 
offers a vehicle for both fiscal and monetary policy; and it reflects, through 
its benchmark yield, the universal normal rate of return” (Ibid. 297). In brief, 
we can conclude that the contracts involving the exchange of ‘money’ for 
bonds became institutionalised as a financial instrument of the economy only 
after its adoption by the state, which has been an historical process.  
Another case of deep interconnection between the economy and the state is 
given by the central bank. Because it concerns the creation of money, this 
has been central to Polanyi’s discussion of the “fictitious commodities” 
(Polanyi, 1944: 74-75; emphasis mine): 
Up to the end of the eighteenth century, industrial production in Western 
Europe was a mere accessory to commerce. … It was not the coming of the 
machine as such but the invention of elaborate and therefore specific 
machinery and plant which completely changed the relationship of the 
merchant to production. … Industrial production ceased to be an accessory 
of commerce organized by the merchant as a buying and selling 
proposition; it now involved long-term investment with corresponding 
risks. 
I need not go further in quoting Polanyi to recall that the execution of 
“elaborate and specific” kind of innovative industrial projects required 
“borrowed money”, mostly through banking credit. According to Schumpeter, 
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such involvement of commercial banks in risky projects finally laid down the 
dominance of industrial capitalism over its previous forms (Ebner, 2006b). 
The history of early banking crisis is known and has motivated an acute 
statement by Polanyi (1944: 75) that reminds us of contemporary bailouts of 
banks: “the more complicated industrial production became, the more 
numerous were the elements of industry the supply of which had to be 
safeguarded.”  
As Ingham (2008: 72) recalls: “Greater stability and, consequently, faster 
economic growth were gradually achieved when the private banking networks 
were integrated with public currency and the sovereign debt of the most 
powerful and secure states. This occurred first in the Italian city states during 
the sixteenth century, spread to Holland, and was most successfully 
accomplished in England with the foundation of the Bank of England in 
1694.” And Polanyi states: “The fact that the currencies were managed 
became of prime importance, since it meant that the central banking 
methods were a matter of policy i.e., something the body politic might have 
to decide about” (Polanyi, 1944: 197; emphasis mine). 
What the history of the creation of the central banks also shows, and is 
crucially confirmed by the Great Recession we are living today, is that 
contemporary capitalism can only survive through a close interaction 
between the economy and the state. This includes the protection of the 
banking system from itself in order to avoid the collapse of the economy. A 
brief review of history shows that the control of the state over the financial 
system has been at the same time a mater of degree and, also for that same 
reason, a matter of political contestation (Ford, 2009). After all, each of these 
institutions (economy, state) bears a specific logic, which builds on organised 
interests, powers, ideas, worldviews that make them autonomous (but not 
independent) sub-systems of society (Block and Evans, 2005).150 
Accepting the conceptual framework argued in this thesis has the advantage to 
escape the use of antinomies between markets, state and family in social 
science research of past or contemporary societies. For instance, there is not 
one capitalism but a variety of capitalisms (Whitley, 1999) due to the fact the 
                                                 
150 As Fligstein (1996: 660) insightfully noted, “modern capitalist states have been 
constructed in interaction with the development of their economies, and the governance 
of economies is part of the core of state-building”. 
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institutions that make up a capitalist society mutually constitute themselves, 
and in doing so (within particular historical conditions) provisionally settle 
their tensions through normative arrangements that attribute more or less 
weight to the requirements of the market economy. In my view, such is the 
deep meaning of Polanyi’s (1957: 250) insightful statement: 
The study of the shifting place occupied by the economy in society is 
therefore no other than the study of the manner in which the economic 
process is instituted at different times and places. 
The view of the economy as a macro-institution connects with important 
strands in sociology and political science in researching the institutional make 
up and change of modern varieties of capitalism (Crouch et al., 2005; Deeg 
and Jackson, 2007). In fact, the perspective here argued provides an adequate 
theoretical framework to deal with the issues debated by these authors 
precisely because it builds on a ontology of institutions that this literature 
lacks. Such weakness is well illustrated in the concluding words of (Deeg and 
Jackson, 2007: 173): 
basic insights of institutional analysis – that institutions are collective 
phenomena external to and constraining on individuals, that institutions do 
matter for economic performance and that the states have a central role in 
the enforcement of institutionalized behaviour. 
This formulation is pervaded by the mindset of New-Institutionalism to which 
most of that literature subscribes: rather than being emergent upon 
individuals relations, institutions are external to individuals; rather than seeing 
the economy as an institution in itself, economic activity is seen as impacted 
by surrounding institutions; rather than being directly constituted by, and 
constituting, the state, the economy is pictured as a beneficiary of state 
enforcement of institutionalized behaviour (see Deeg and Jackson, 2007: 158-
161).  
Up to this moment, and Similarly to Parsons and Smelser’s Economy and 
Society (1956), I have been silent about the openness of national societies. 
However, my Naturalist understanding of institutions has no difficulty in 
accounting for transnational phenomena, and thus it is not touched by the 
critiques addressed to Parsons’ framework. This is so in result of the 
semiotic nature of culture which permeates society and its institutions and 
whose operations, because they are based on the symbolic system of 
language, can be extend over a multi-scaled time and space (see subsection 
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3.3.3). Actually, as open systems, institutions and societies constitute 
themselves in the process of interacting with the world environment. This 
idea is well formulated by Sorge (2005: 2; emphasis mine) when he states 
that “internationalization feeds into the build-up of societal specificity”. 
I have acknowledged that the interdependence between the economy and the 
state is strong. The same could be said of the interdependence between the 
economy and the family institution. For instance, the non-paid work that family 
members provide (mostly women) in caring for children, disabled, old or/and 
seek members, and provisioning personal services to the members of the 
family that take part in market operations, is certainly a crucial part of social 
provision, and therefore belongs to the capitalist economy albeit not to its 
market system. In the following I discuss this most relevant distinction.  
4.2.2 Economy: markets and non-markets 
The idea that the economy is a macro-institution of society that goes beyond 
its markets is not easily acknowledged, even in some heterodox quarters. Most 
frequently, non-market provision is subsumed under the broader concept of 
society (see Dolfsma et al., 2005). In fact, this corresponds to the analytical 
occultation of a large part of the activities that make up the provisioning of all 
societies, even in the more developed ones. As Williams (2005: 5-6) states, 
“even in the heartlands of commodification – the advanced ‘market’ economies 
– survey after survey uncovers that non-market work is not some minor 
remnant left over from precapitalist formations and rapidly dwindling as a 
mode of producing and delivering goods and services.” 
In order to fix at the outset a few guidelines for the discussion, I recur to the 
definition proposed by Williams (Ibid, 14): “Commodified work, therefore, is 
composed first of goods and services produced for exchange; second of 
monetized exchange; and finally of monetized exchange for the purpose of 
profit. If any of these constituent components are missing, then the economic 
practice cannot be described as commodified.” 
Also Carvalho and Rodrigues (2008) review the debate about what is 
commodification and recall Hodgson’s (1988) clarifications, namely that in 
markets objects become commodities when their property, or temporal control 
is transferred between individual or collective actors and, their value is 
‘crystallized’ in a price. These authors emphasise the institutional nature of 
144 
 
such process, most importantly the enforcement of the property rights over 
the object that guarantee its “physical and/or moral separation from its owner, 
the seller, on a formally volunteer basis, as when the buyer and the seller 
agree on its monetary value” (Carvalho and Rodrigues, 2008: 268). 
The nature of markets, and the delimitation of their boundaries, has been 
object of an extended debate, not least because sociologists have long 
trespassed on the disciplinary boundaries ‘negotiated’ by Lionel Robbins and 
Talcott Parsons. For years markets have been studied by sociologists, which 
gave rise to the so-called ‘economic sociology’. Two decades ago, in a paper 
discussing the research strategies developed by sociologists in their approach 
to markets, Viviana Zelizer (1988) attempted to summarise crucial points that I 
think are still relevant about the distinction between a market and a non-
market realm. In line with Polanyi’s views, Zelizer states: “In contrast to the 
neoclassical assumption of the market as a universal and exclusive form of 
economic arrangement, market revisionists define the market as one among 
many different possible social arrangements, such as barter or gift exchange, 
that involve economic processes” (Zelizer, 1988: 618). In this paper Zelizer 
addresses the different analytical strategies that have been used in the 
understanding of markets and presents some arguments in favour of her 
preferred alternative, the “multiple markets model”. 
On the one hand, Zelizer (1988: 617) shares the much-known critiques to the 
tenets of the New-Institutionalist understanding of markets, “namely: (1) that 
modern markets are autonomous, self-subsistent institutions, undisturbed by 
extra-economic cultural and social factors; (2) modern markets are not only 
“free” but powerful determinants of social institutions and cultural values; (3) 
noneconomic factors are thus dependent on the market and irrelevant as 
explanatory factors; (4) individual behaviour is best explained by the 
ahistorical rational choice model.”  Nevertheless, Zelizer admits that the 
critiques to the conventional understanding of markets overemphasise either 
the cultural or the social structural factors, and thus place the market in a 
“subordinate” position to the meanings prevailing in the cultural system or to 
non-economic social relations.  
Up to this point I have no difficulty in accepting Zelizer’s point of view and I 
am happy that she sets aside the dichotomy of the “amoral market” versus the 
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“moral society”. However, Zelizer (1985: 112) exposes theoretical difficulties 
when she discusses a particular case: 
The transformation of children’s economic roles during the first half of 
twentieth century illustrates the interaction between economic and non-
economic factors in advanced industrial societies. … As children became 
increasingly defined as exclusively emotional and moral assets, their 
economic roles were not eliminated but transformed; child labor was 
replaced by child work and child wages with a weekly allowance. A child’s 
new job and income were validated more by educational than economic 
criteria. 
The analysis of this historical process shows how Zelizer misses important 
aspects that a multi-level and multi-domain ontology would illuminate,151 
namely the change in ideas about childhood, child education and child-parents 
relations (the new culture) from the status of cultural weapons used in the 
political struggle into the status of new institutional norms of the relevant 
institutions. In the economy, new institutional norms delegitimized child 
labour (with a few exceptions in the beginning of the process), while in the 
institutions of family and education previous norms were reformulated in order 
to enforce a new understanding of the childwhat rights he/she is entitled to, 
what should be the appropriate contribution of work and play to his/her 
personal development. 
In describing the movements, ideas, vested interests, and the exercise of 
powers by the opposing groups, Zelizer fails to make crucial ontological 
distinctions: (1) ideas (culture) on the one hand and interests, social positions, 
organisations (social entities) on the other are different processes that appear 
amalgamated; (2) the work of children, and the activity of legislators, 
pedagogues, parents and industrialists (social realities) are mixed with the 
ideas, values and worldviews object of dispute (cultural entities), all placed at 
the interactive level. 
Therefore, the particular nature and timing of the different levels and domains 
involved in the removing of prevailing norms, and in the institutionalisation of 
new ones, does not receive the identification that could better explain the 
overall process. In fact, with the transition of the economy of industrialised 
societies into mass production, it took six decades to emerge the institutional 
reconfiguration that led to the way developed societies now raise and educate 
their children. 
                                                 
151  For a critique of Zelizer’s understanding of money, see (Ingham, 2001). 
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The discussion of the influential work of Zelizer is useful for different 
theoretical reasons: first, it highlights that a complex interdependence of 
elements of different nature (social, cultural) has been necessary to enable the 
emergence of new institutional norms; second, it highlights the long time it 
takes to deinstitutionalize old norms, which is related to the different 
velocities of change in the institutions involved; third, it highlights the 
existence of a strong interdependence between markets, the family, and the 
state. The different processes that sustain such interdependence should be 
acknowledged when political actors think about reforms in our societies. 
My next step is to take a stand on the present discussion about the moving 
borders between market and non-market forms of provision, the so-called 
“commodification” debate (Rodrigues, 2008; Satz, 2010). In fact, there is a 
feminist literature (Folbre and Nelson, 2000) that makes a distinction between 
“work” and “labour” and emphasises that the former comes associated with 
“complex meanings and motivations” while the latter appears only associated 
to the pay, to the striped act of mercantile exchange, that is, plain 
commodification. This leads these authors to highlight the idea that in ‘labour 
market’ work has cultural dimensions that may be valuable and personally 
enriching. Thus, against the position of Walzer (1983) who argues that for 
moral reasons the commodification of some activities should be blocked, they 
take a nuanced stance: “whether markets inevitably lead to commodification is 
really an empirical matter” (Folbre and Nelson, 2000: 133). Zelizer presents an 
extreme case in this literature because she insists that “markets and money 
mingle endlessly with social life; but the latter is not necessarily endangered 
by the rationalizing power of money, because money is subjected to a broad 
array of new meanings and interpretations provided by the local contexts into 
which it enters” (Steiner, 2009: 107).  
Although this literature rightly calls the attention to the “non-market” 
dimensions of market interactions, in my view it falls again into a flat ontology 
of social reality, one that remains at the interactional-communicational level. It 
does not consider the structural layers of markets (norms making profit the 
viability criterion; organisations structured to obtain profit) and their 
downward causal powers over individuals’ interactions. In fact, we should 
acknowledge that the causation of the structural level does not only constrain 
but also transforms the persons that interact in commodified settings, namely 
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promoting motivations that conform to the profit norm and excluding 
behaviours that fail to produce profit.152 This is the reason why “the normative 
elements are particularly relevant to the research on commodification, since, 
as we have noted, the expansion of markets and of market rhetoric can have 
adverse consequences on the plurality of moral values that structure and give 
meanings to human interactions” (Carvalho and Rodrigues, 2008: 282).153 
The inequalities of power in sociocultural systems are also reminded by 
Carvalho and Rodrigues (2008: 280): 
The issue of power is related to the social relations that form the 
background conditions of individuals who participate in markets, thus 
engendering a potential asymmetric capacity to structure the terms of 
market exchanges, and conditioning the degree of autonomy possessed by 
individuals. 
Because of unequal power in social relations, Walzer (1984: 315) notes that 
even the liberty of the market needs to be carefully preserved because “market 
success override the limits of the (free) market in three closely related ways. 
First of all, radical inequalities of wealth generate their own coerciveness, so 
that many exchanges are only formally free. Second, certain sorts of market 
power, organized, say, in corporate structures, generate patterns of command 
and obedience in which even the formalities of exchange give way to 
something that looks very much like government. And third, vast wealth and 
ownership or control of productive forces convert readily into government in 
the strict sense: capital regularly and successfully calls upon the coercive 
power of the state.”  
At this juncture it is time to take stock of two central ideas discussed in this 
section: first, the economy is a macro-institution that aims the provisioning 
and flourishing of society. The activities involved in this process are of a large 
variety. Certainly, the most studied organised form of provisioning is markets, 
which deal with the monetised production, exchange and distribution of 
goods/services aiming to make a profit. 
                                                 
152 In the words of Bowles (1998: 75), “Markets and other economic institutions do more 
than allocate goods and services: they also influence the evolution of values, tastes, and 
personalities.” 
153 “For example, in education to treat students as ‘consumers’ is to potentially transform 
the nature of the relation of teacher and student in contractual terms” (O'Neill, 2009: 
323). 
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However, I have also highlighted other (much less studied) forms of non-
market provisioning. For instance, Williams (2005) shows the importance of 
subsistence work, non-monetized exchanges, and different categories of not-
for-profit monetized exchange, which include public services, non-for-profit 
organizations, the “cash-in-hand” economy, and goes even to some types of 
markets whenever the participants “are not so much oriented towards profit or 
exchange-value but rather do it ‘for love’” (Williams, 2005: 78).154 In a similar 
vein, Lapavitsas (2003: 42-43) recalls that “the educational and health-related 
activities that produce labour power have an irreducible non-market and non-
capitalist aspect. Consequently, they are permeated by morality, ethical 
concerns, mutual obligation, and a sense of duty and commitment that have 
nothing to do with profit-making.” Bringing to the foreground the existence of 
multiple forms of societal provision, besides markets, helps to countervail the 
belief much engrained in conventional economics that non-market forms of 
provision are either pathological residues of the past, or mere supplements, or 
variants, to modern market organisation (Adaman and Madra, 2002).  
Second, the connection with the debates about the contestability of market 
boundaries is important as it helps to draw a much realistic (even if messy) 
picture of the macro-institution economy, its markets, and their relations with 
other institutions. This is a picture in which economists are called to 
acknowledge and assess different dimensions in societal provision, such as 
effectiveness, efficiency, equity, liberty and morality. As van Staveren (2009a: 
43) recalls, 
this in no way implies that the one sphere should be made instrumental to 
another. To the contrary: the recognition of distinct but not unrelated spheres 
[institutions] in social life, including economic life, helps to see how morality 
is related to agents’ motivations, behaviour and economic results. 
Last but not least, to acknowledge such distinctions makes us more vigilant 
about economists’ (frequently sub-conscious) ideological preferences (see 
Nelson, 2002: 207-208). 
                                                 
154 See Ortiz (2002: 892): “By concentrating on the narrower analytical definition of labour, 
economists have excluded from their analysis, until recently, the impact of other work 
efforts that make the availability of a given quantity of productive labour possible. For 
example, the time spent by the wives and daughters of the wage labourers preparing their 
meals and washing their clothes – effort that allows the labourer to spend more time 
working for wages and that ensures the reproduction of the labour force – is often 
ignored.” 
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4.2.3 What about economic rationality? 
The idea that the economy of a society is equivalent to its markets has grown 
in parallel with the progressive elimination of the strands of economics that 
were dominant in the first half of the twentieth century, the Old 
institutionalism in the USA and the German Historical school in Europe. 
Lionel Robbins at the London School of Economics and Talcott Parsons at 
Harvard were the scholars that played a pivotal role in the ensuing process of 
transformation of economics and sociology (Hodgson, 2001). Hodgson 
(2001: 195-196; emphasis mine) refers to that division of knowledge and the 
disciplinary interests behind it: “Robbins redefined economics as the 
universal ‘science of choice’. Economics was about the rational choice of 
means to serve given ends. … For Parsons, sociology was about the social 
and normative origin of the ends that Robbins has taken as given.” 
In fact, both scholars converged on the understanding that human beings 
display a particular rational behaviour in economic contexts. This common 
view of “economic rationality” is well summarised by Hargreaves Heap (2009: 
416; emphasis mine): “The dominant model of individual rationality in 
economics, sometimes known as the rational choice model, identifies 
individuals with their preferences and casts reason in the role of deciding 
how best to satisfy them. This is a calculative, instrumental sense of reason. 
Its task, much as David Hume suggested when famously averring reason as 
‘slave of the passions’, is to work out the means to given ends.” Also Vernon 
Smith (2008: 40, note 12) sates in a crude formulation that “within 
economics there is essentially only one model to be adapted to every 
application: optimization subject to constraints due to resource limitations, 
institutional rules, and/or the behaviour of others, as in Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium.”155 
With such redefinition in the object of economics and sociology, their 
boundaries became redrawn accordingly: since then, whatever social reality 
under research, economists would look at it from the point of view of the 
individual (atomistic) choice conducted by a principle of “economic 
rationality”, while sociologists would occupy themselves with the study of 
                                                 
155  According to Graafland (2009: 479-480), and pace Vernon Smith, much experimental 
research has shown that reciprocal behaviour represents an important dimension of what 
is usually labelled ‘self-interest’. 
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social structures and the value-laden processes of social integration. It was 
only a question of time to see economists such as Gary Becker applying the 
model of “economic rationality” to the study of the family and the sociologist 
Mark Granovetter to the study of market networks. The fact is that under the 
label of Rational Choice Theory (RCT) “economic rationality” has been 
successfully exported to other sub-disciplines such as sociology or political 
science. Hence, in the last decades the identity of economics became ever 
more defined by the systematic use of RCT, and the mathematical 
formalizations that it fitted so well, rather than by a particular domain of 
social reality, the ‘economy’. 
Building on a multi-level ontology, in the present thesis (section 3.3) I have 
argued that society and its institutions constitute an emergent, new kind of 
reality, which is the obvious object of social science. Thus, my stance calls 
for a single science to address each emergent level of reality, which in the 
case of the social science embraces a plurality of sub-disciplines, or fields of 
study, according to the variety of forms and degrees of complexity and 
organisation that social reality presents itself. Within this framework, a 
question arises: if economics should take the macro-institution ‘economy’ as 
its object of study, is there still a place for an “economic rationality”? 
The formulation of a ‘rational’ link between ends and means or, in other 
words, the efficiency in the allocation of resources, has been inscribed in the 
introductory books of economics as its basic principle.156 The concept of 
efficiency underpins ‘welfare economics’ as it has been promoted by 
economists Pigou and Pareto, who recurred to the principles of utilitarianism 
to measure welfare (van Staveren, 2009b). Mainstream economics is still 
strongly attached to the efficiency-based concept of “Pareto optimality”, that 
is, “if no one’s income goes down, and someone’s income goes up, society 
must be better off” (Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2004: 33).157 With time, 
welfare economics gained an aura of theoretical respectability and provided a 
                                                 
156  In their widely diffused and most influential textbook, Samuelson and Nordhaus (2005: 
4) note that behind their definition of economics are two key ideas that tell the student “to 
think as an economist”: “that goods are scarce and that society must use its resources 
efficiently. Indeed, economics is an important subject because of the fact of scarcity and 
the desire for efficiency.”  
157 In brief: “A decision that makes Bill Gates worse off is, in Pareto’s world, no good, even 
if everyone else is made better off by it” (Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2004: 34). 
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powerful argument against redistribution policies, even if in its own terms it 
has a serious weakness. Irene van Staveren (2009b: 108) explains this point: 
This can be explained with the help of the principle of diminishing 
marginal returns … it may well be that when some resources are shifted 
from those with low marginal utilities (generally the rich) to those with 
high marginal utilities (generally the poor), total utility would increase 
because of a more efficient resource use. The poor would benefit more 
from such redistribution than the rich would lose. But the definition of 
Pareto efficiency does not allow such redistribution. 
Therefore, and perhaps to the surprise of many economists, policy 
recommendations inspired by Pareto-based welfare theory ultimately lead to 
inefficient outcomes and possibly waste. 
For a long time critiques have been concentrated on the viability of the 
“maximisation” of an outcome, the “substantive rationality” in the words of 
Herbert Simon, to which he opposed the cognitive psychology view of 
“procedural rationality” (Simon, 1987).  Problems with the transitivity of 
preferences have been put forward, both at the theoretical and empirical 
level. I will not recapitulate them here and will only refer the reader to the 
meticulous analysis of Herbert Simon in a essay of 1959 where he lists in 
detail five problem areas that justify his preferred approach to “decision-
making economics” (Simon, 1959). To the difficulties plaguing the traditional 
preferences-based formulation, Simon adds the computational difficulties of 
human cognition when “alternatives are not given but sought; and a 
description that takes into account the arduous task of determining what 
consequences will follow on each alternative” (Ibid. 272). Herbert Simon’s 
expectations that “the digital computer would change the situation radically” 
(Ibid. 280) have not been confirmed. It is not that the human mind is 
exceedingly more complex than the best computational devices we can 
produce. Indeed, the crux of the problem lies in the nature of human 
cognition, which is of a kind that cannot be reduced to computational 
capabilities (Damasio, 1999; Latsch, 2003). 
Firstly, it is necessary to acknowledge that Robbins formulation of economic 
rationality presupposes a radical individualism taking account that the 
interdependencies of individuals’ preferences and choices are omitted.158 
Even if we account for the social context to improve the concept of ‘rational’ 
                                                 
158  Besides the already mentioned references in Chapter 2, see also the critiques of 
Rational Choice Theory by (Cruickshank, 2003), (Archer, 2000c) and (Sen, 1977). 
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choice, the fact is that such context would only count as a parameter in the 
choice. 
In reality, human nature is much more complex because human beings are 
individuals who can only live in permanent interaction, thereby making 
sociocultural environments (comprising different local cultures and 
institutional norms) endogenous to their decisions. Both persons and 
sociocultural realities are part of the same emergent, dynamic processes. 
Their “continuity over time means that actions are part of a learning process 
in which today’s actions are affected not only by present needs and desires, 
but also by the results of earlier actions and what the individual has learned 
from them. As a result, the individual of today is a different person from the 
individual yesterday, and will be a still different person tomorrow. … 
Individual choices are part of a process by which people [interactively] create 
themselves” (Fusfeld, 1989: 361-362). 
This dynamic social interdependence led the sociologist Jens Beckert (1996: 
820) to propose a redefinition of disciplinary boundaries: 
Economics deals with the problem by focusing on the transformation of 
situations of uncertainty into situations of risk. Sociology assumes that 
actors cannot base their decisions on a preference order that allows for 
utility optimization, but that intentionally rational actors live in a socially 
structured world that helps them act meaningfully despite the uncertainty 
of the situation. 
Hence, for sociological research, organisations and institutional norms are 
seen as structural entities out there to ‘help’ individuals to live in society. 
How they are created is an issue that Beckert (1996) does not address. In my 
view, notwithstanding the relevance of the above mentioned critical remark 
about RCT, it is time to go deeper in the critique of the concept of human 
rationality as it is traditionally used in most disciplines and streams of social 
science. We need to recall the contribution of Classical Pragmatism to which I 
recurred previously (subsection 2.5.3). On this point John Dewey’s work is of 
most relevance as, similarly to Parsons, he insisted on the importance of 
values. However, Dewey’s understanding of human situations did not require 
“the actor as an automaton acting solely on the basis of norms [usual critique 
of sociological models], or that we reject the “rational” means-ends schema 
[the basic economics model]” (Whitford, 2002: 337). The crucial point is that 
Dewey (as a disciple of Peirce) builds on process metaphysics, which means 
that human situations should be seen as part of a dynamic chain: “and end, 
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or effect, soon becomes a means, or cause, for what follows. Human activity 
is continuous, and “nothing happens which is final in the sense that it is not 
part of any ongoing stream of events” (Ibid. 337). As Beckert (2003: 778-779) 
recalls, “this is most clearly expressed in Dewey’s notion of “ends-in-view”, 
according to which ends are formed and revised in the action process itself 
and become more precise with the better understanding of the problem and 
the means for its solution”. This leads me to the last, but not least, 
dimension of my discussion of human rationality. 
The Pragmatist emphasis on the interdependence and dynamic constitution 
of human ends and means asks a serious question about the nature of 
human motivations. If means and ends are interdependent, how can we 
justify an understanding of rationality that reserves its judgements to the 
efficiency of means while leaving the ends unevaluated? How can we justify 
an understanding of rationality that ignores the legitimacy of the ends? 
Rescher (2004: 50; emphasis mine) answers clearly and convincingly these 
questions: 
For a “rationality” that excludes the critique of harmful affections and 
desires is no rationality at all. On any plausible view of the matter, reason 
cannot simply beg off from considering the validity of ends. Our 
motivating “passions” can surely themselves be rational or otherwise: those 
that impel us towards things that are bad for us or away from things that 
are good for us go against reason, those that impel us away from things 
that are bad for us and towards things that are good for us are altogether 
rational. There is certainly such a thing as evaluative, appraisal-oriented 
reasoning. 
In this thesis, opposing the Hume-inspired conventional economics that 
separates “reason” from “ends”, I adopt the Classic Pragmatist approach for 
which human rationality implies dynamically interrelated means and ends 
(Haack, 2004). Again, Rescher (Rescher, 2004: 50-51) presents a perfect 
formulation: 
The rationality of means is a matter of factual information alone – of what 
sorts of moves and measures lead efficiently to objectives. But the 
rationality of ends is a matter not of information but of legitimation. … the 
rationality of ends inheres in the simple fact that we humans have various 
valid needs … without such varied goods we cannot thrive as fulfilled 
human beings. The person who does not give these manifold desiderata 
their due, who may even set out to frustrate their realization, is clearly not 
being rational. 
In this sense, it is clear that “the rationality of ends is an indispensable 
component of rationality ... Rationally valued ends must be evaluatively 
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appropriate ones: if we adopt inappropriate ends we are not being rational, 
no matter how efficiently and effectively we pursue them” (Ibid. 52, emphasis 
mine). 
Both Parsons and Schumpeter did not adhere to what is now labelled RCT; 
they had a rich understanding of human motivations where institutional 
normativity mixed up with personal liberty and judgment. Nevertheless, both 
authors saw economic rationality as “an instrumental form, as a set of 
procedures for effectively meeting ends that are given” (O'Neill, 2007a: 29). 
And of course they have not extended the concept of ‘rationality’ in order to 
incorporate the Original Institutionalist view of the interdependence of 
means-ends, and the valuation of both means and ends (Samuels, 1997). 
Returning to the opening question of this section (“What about economic 
rationality?”), I should recognise that the above-presented digression leads 
me to accept an encompassing understanding of economic rationality, one in 
which persons always intertwine concerns about efficiency, effectiveness, and 
values both about ends and means, in contexts where the institutional norms 
and the structural powers of the economy (and other institutions) are always 
at work and in a certain way constitute the human beings involved (Bowles, 
1998).159 
Thus, contrary to the conventional separation of positive from normative 
economics, one that we usually find in introductory textbooks of economics, 
I adopt an economic rationality that is all through evaluative. On this I follow 
the pragmatism of Rescher (2004: 51): 
Evaluation thus lies at the very heart and core of rationality. … The 
rationality of our actions hinges critically both on the appropriateness of 
our ends and on the suitability of the means by which we pursue their 
cultivation. Both of these components — the cogently cognitive (‘intelligent 
pursuit’) and the normatively purposive (‘appropriate ends’) — are alike 
essential to full-fledged rationality. 
 
 
 
                                                 
159  About the power of money, and the conventional economic rationality imposed by the 
market, Schumpeter (1987: 123-124) stated: “this type of logic or attitude or method then 
starts upon its conqueror’s  career subjugating – rationalizing – man’s tools and 
philosophies, his medical practice, his picture of the cosmos, his outlook on life, 
everything in fact including his concepts of beauty and justice and his spiritual ambitions.” 
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4.3 Markets as meso-institutions 
4.3.1 Beyond ‘instituted economic processes’ 
Having settled that markets are a part of the macro-institution ‘economy’, in 
this section I make a step further in my thesis. In the present section I argue 
that markets are meso-institutions. Here the term ‘meso’ is used in the sense 
that markets are ‘sub-systems of the economy’, thus above possible 
institutions within large corporations (micro-level) and below the economy 
within society (macro-level). In fact, the different markets are interdependent 
among themselves through inputs-outputs, prices, technologies, distribution 
channels, etc., thus forming a network, the ‘market system’ of that 
economy.160 However, my analytical focus will be the individual market 
viewed in relation to the rest of the economy and society. 
Since the beginning of this chapter I attempted to connect my view of the 
economy to the substantive meaning argued by Karl Polanyi (1957: 243), 
which is based on the idea of “man’s dependence for his living upon the 
nature and his fellows”. In this same work, Polanyi says that “The fount of the 
substantive concept is the empirical economy” (p. 248), the concrete reality, 
thereby taking distance from economics’ ‘formalist’ understanding to which 
he opposed. And finally Polanyi states: “The economy, then, is an instituted 
process.”161 
Although Karl Polanyi remained at the margins of economics for decades, 
recently there have been a resurgence of interest in his work marked by 
conferences, papers and books, sometimes much in relation to his ill-defined 
“embeddedness” concept (Beckert, 2006), other times associated to his views 
of the dynamics of capitalism in terms of a “double movement” (Blyth, 2002). 
The Great Recession we have been living since 2008 shows some of the 
critical aspects to which Polanyi pointed in relation to the Great Depression, 
specifically a huge financial crisis rooted in great disequilibria in the 
international trade and the erosion of the system of international payments, 
then the Gold Standard, now the hegemony of the dollar as the international 
                                                 
160 As I have acknowledged in subsection 3.3.4, ‘networks’ are ‘systems’ bearing low levels 
of organisation and complexity. 
161 I note that the anthropological studies conducted by Gregory (2009) in middle India 
districts identified local, ‘non-instituted’ economic processes, which may be seen as 
interfaces between the ‘family’ and the ‘economy’ institutions. 
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standard. As Harvey (2007b: 163) has nicely put it, “the fact that all of these 
are crisis within capitalist economies and societies, rather than between 
capitalist and non-capitalist alternatives, are amongst some of the principal 
stimuli behind the rush for Polanyian conceptual framing.” 
The importance of the late work of Karl Polanyi resides in his unequivocal 
comparative historical method. Going beyond Karl Marx, Polanyi admitted 
“the possibility of a variety of differently instituted capitalist economic 
causalities, as well as the shifting place of economic processes in different 
societies” (Harvey, 2007b: 165). Polanyi’s statement “The economy, then, is 
an instituted process” gives a formulation that has been read in different 
ways. In this thesis I make my own hermeneutics of Polanyi’s Institutionalist 
approach to the economy. 
I note that Polanyi makes a crucial distinction that is seldom acknowledged: 
on the one hand, there is the “institutional aspect of the economy” (p. 249; 
emphasis mine), and on the other there is “what occurs on the process level 
between man and soil … or … in the conveyor belt in the constructing of an 
automobile” (p. 249; emphasis mine). These are two levels of the same reality 
as he took care to clarify: “The instituting of the economic process vests that 
process with unity and stability; it produces a structure with a definite 
function in society; … Unity and stability, structure and function, history and 
policy spell out operationally the content of our assertion that the human 
economy is an instituted process” (p. 249-250; emphasis mine). 
This passage gives us an explicit formulation of Polanyi’s understanding of 
the economy as an institution “with a definite function in society”, that of 
provisioning society with the necessary goods and services. It should be 
expected to be so after my previous discussion of the systemic nature of the 
economy, which connects with Parsons’ systemic view. However, what seems 
of most relevance is Polanyi’s insistence in the term “process”. Harvey has 
correctly highlighted this point recognizing that “a process analysis is one of 
dynamics.” Polanyi offers here an interesting ‘intellectual window’ to explore 
the understanding of the economy as a dynamic, emergent system, one 
whose systemness can only be maintained by continuous interactive relations 
with its environment (societal and ecological), which was his concern both at 
the theoretical and political level. And although Harvey (2002b: 80) 
acknowledges that such dynamical process occur at different scales, “running 
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through from micro to macro”, the fact is that the self-organising systemic 
perspective has been left aside.162 This leaves opened a path that I deem 
useful to explore at a high-level of abstraction in the remainder of this 
section. 
Indeed, when Polanyi refers to “economic processes” his analysis is focused 
on the interactional level of the economy; his concepts “are often employed 
to denote personal interactions” (Polanyi, 1957: 251). However, he 
immediately reminds that the “integrative effect” of personal interactions 
“was conditioned by the presence of definite institutional arrangements”, 
which would not produce such structures if they were “mere aggregates” (p. 
251). This statement means that Polanyi makes a distinction between the 
‘epiphenomenal’ nature of aggregates and the ‘emergent’ nature of a 
market’s “institutional arrangements”, which then have downward causal 
powers. Polanyi goes on to state that what makes those arrangements more 
than “mere aggregates” are “the vital elements of organization and validation 
[norms]”. Indeed, these are the components of institutions that make up their 
systemness as I have argued in this thesis (see Fig. 9, subsection 3.3.3).163 
Despite his non-systemic reading of Polanyi, Harvey’s (2007b: 170-174) 
expansion of Polanyi’s economic processes (locational, appropriational) into 
four types of “transformation processes”, which involve quality, 
appropriation, place/time and use, is an important contribution to the 
understanding of markets. They bring to the fore the frequently forgotten 
interconnections of production and consumption with distribution and 
exchanges (Fig. 11). Within my framework, they constitute the first emergent 
level of a market. 
 
 
                                                 
162 See also (Harvey, 2007b: 178-179) where the concept of “complex causality” in 
instituted economic processes is explained, and a reference to “immanent and emergent 
causalities” without recurring to the framework of self-organising systems. 
163  An evidence of Polanyi’s view of a macro-micro interdependence of levels is the 
following passage: “In the absence of any indication of societal conditions [the structural 
level] … there would be little, if anything, to sustain the interdependence of the 
movements and their recurrence on which the unity and the stability of the process 
depends” (Polanyi, 1957: 249). 
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Fig. 11 - Transformation processes (source: Harvey, 2007b: 171) 
 
 
The problematic aspect of this representation resides in the fact that, in a 
two-dimensional form, it ‘places’ at the same level (ontological, analytical) 
the four economic processes, their geographical and biological environment, 
the personal interactions that give rise to them, and the relations to other 
institutions of society and culture. The figure may convey a sense of a 
‘flatness’ that in my view is deeply inadequate. As we have seen before, 
Polanyi places the economic processes at the interactional level of the 
‘economy’ only as a first analytical moment. The organizations that put 
these economic processes to work, the norms that fix how to do it, and the 
values that state what is good or bad conduct are absent in the picture. And 
yet, without them, these processes are not really instituted, and thus will not 
be patterned, will not endure, because they require “much more than mere 
routinisation or habituation”; they are also subject to “de-instituting counter-
forces” (Harvey, 2007b: 177). Economic organisations (e.g. firms) and the 
norms of the market should be in the figure, although at a level above the 
four processes, taking account that they belong to the higher structural level 
of the market; they have higher levels of self-organising complexity. 
Therefore, despite sharing the Polanyian approach that inspired (Harvey et 
al., 2007), I will make a step forward and introduce in the next section some 
modifications to the model, and symbolise them in figures, in order to 
convey an emergentist understanding of markets consistent with my concept 
of institution. 
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4.3.2 Emergentist understanding of markets 
4.3.2.1 Market, markets, or both? 
In this section I present the conceptual structure of my Institutionalist 
understanding of markets. A discussion of other views is postponed to the 
next section wherein I will explore the reconstructions here argued and, 
hopefully, the contributions they may bring for a deeper understanding of 
such an under-researched reality, albeit central, of modern societies 
(Hodgson, 2008). 
It is not uncommon to find authors, mainly of the post-modernist streams, 
whose approach to markets could be represented by a statement like this 
one (Bromley, 1997: 1391): 
There is no such thing as the “Market”. Rather, there are infinitely many 
ways of constructing domains of exchange – each one reflecting prior 
collective notions and expressions of who counts, and what is valuable and 
useful. 
This leads me directly to the debated issue of ‘essentialism’ in social science. 
As Sayer (1995: 125; emphasis mine) stated in a discussion about markets, 
“the main objections to markets is that they tend to override non-market 
considerations so that social interaction is dominated by the essential 
requirements of the cash nexus.” Hence, Sayer could be subjected to the 
critique that he admits markets have essential, transcendental, ahistorical 
properties that make them what they are. However, immediately below, Sayer 
rejects such a possible critique and counterattacks: “if things have no 
essences, such that there is nothing to abstract, then we have to assume 
anything can happen to anything, and thus that there is nothing that we can 
expect to achieve through our actions” (Ibid. 125). On this crucial point I am 
inclined to follow Sayer (1997), and also O’Neill (2001); both reject the 
critique of having fallen into essentialism, although they recognise some 
dangers in the incautious use of essentialist expressions. 
The rejection by both Sayer and O’Neill of the post-modernist critique 
(imputation of transcendental, ahistorical properties to ‘the market’), is 
consistent with my metaphysical understanding that reality is ultimately a 
process (Nature) that presents itself in different levels of emergent 
organisation and complexity (multi-level ontology). Markets belong to social 
reality and, as processes, they are continuously changing, although each one 
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at its pace. Nevertheless, markets are not simply permanent social fluxes; 
they are complex organisations of specifically economic processes. They 
frequently display a very organised, slow changing process, so much so that 
a few economists are even interested in making typologies according to the 
more salient aspects of their exchange stage (Jackson, 2007; Rosenbaum, 
2000). In brief, it makes sense to speak about the ‘market’, the set of 
generative properties that make them markets and not (for instance) firms, 
and at the same time to speak about the ‘markets’ with all the diverse forms 
of organisation and norms that we find in the economy. 
At this juncture I need to state that I fully agree with Hodgson’s (2001: 40) 
proposition that “social sciences must thus combine general principles with 
theorising that is aimed at specific domains.” My philosophical assumptions, 
and the ontology of institutions presented in the previous chapter, constitute 
the “general principles” upon which a detailed theorising of markets will 
follow. Accordingly, in this section I discuss what should be understood as 
‘the structures’ of the market, that is, the organisation of the relevant 
sociocultural processes that make markets what they are: a central 
mechanism of coordination of the social division of labour for the 
provisioning of contemporary societies. 
4.3.2.2 Problematic definitions of markets 
It is important to bear in mind that the study of the market is not a popular 
subject in economics. Hodgson (2001: 251) recalls that “economists have 
had little to say about the nature of markets, other than classifying them by 
their degrees of competition and the number of buyers and sellers they 
contain.” Already in Economics and Institutions, Hodgson (1988: 173) had 
stated that “for too long ‘the market’ has been taken for granted.” 
Such lack of interest in the study of markets has been instituted in the 
academia with the hegemony of neoclassical economics, mainly after the 
general equilibrium Arrow-Debreu model has been considered ‘proved’. 
Ackerman and Nadal (2004: 1-2) summarise: 
the model built by Arrow and Debreu shows that there is always a market 
equilibrium at which supply equals demand for every commodity. It is a 
“general” or economy-wide equilibrium since it involves the interactions of 
all prices with the supply and demand for all commodities. 
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However, Loasby (1999: 108; emphasis mine) insightfully notes that “in the 
Arrow-Debreu system all  markets open simultaneously, and once only; when 
a complete set of equilibrium contracts is in place, they all close – forever.” 
Therefore, “there are no active markets in standard market theory; and since 
markets have cleared, there is no need to explain how they clear.” In this 
sense, neoclassical economics became a contradictory strand in economics 
because it is largely built upon the flawed model of Arrow-Debreu and, at the 
same time, originated an important literature about market failures that 
takes as reference that same model (Stiglitz, 1989).164 This should not 
surprise because, as Loasby recalls (Ibid. 109), in neoclassical economics “the 
costs of using markets and the costs of rationality never appear.” 
After decades of marginalisation of the Original Institutionalism, the work of 
Hodgson (1988; 2001) gave an important contribution to the revival of the 
study of markets in economics. He has advanced a definition of markets in 
the following terms:165 
We shall here define the market as a set of social institutions in which a 
large number of commodity exchanges of a specific type regularly take 
place, and to some extent are facilitated and structured by those 
institutions. Exchange, as defined above, involves contractual agreement 
and the exchange of property rights, and the market consists in part of 
mechanisms to structure, organize, and legitimate these activities. 
Markets, in short, are organized and institutionalized exchange. Stress 
is placed on those market institutions which help to both regulate and 
establish a consensus over prices and, more generally, to communicate 
information regarding products, prices, quantities, potential buyers and 
potential sellers (Hodgson, 1988: 174). 
In the first line of this quote we read that the market is a set of social 
institutions in which exchanges are made. This seems to be a formulation of 
the type ‘market as exchanges cum institutions’, which is confirmed by what 
follows: those institutions “facilitate and structure” the exchanges. A few 
lines below, it is also stated that markets “are organized and institutionalized 
exchange”, which is a formulation that maintains the same line of reasoning: 
some entities (‘institutions’) structure/organise the exchanges; they 
“institutionalise” exchanges. However, a few pages later in the same work, 
Hodgson states that “the market is regarded as an institution in its own right” 
                                                 
164 For a critique of the concept of market ‘externalities’, see (Vatn and Bromley, 1997). 
165 Hodgson (2001: Chap. 17) provides an extensive critique of how in the last decades 
mainstream economics ignored or wrongly understood markets. 
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(Ibid, 178; emphasis mine). Here the market is a unit, an ‘institution’ in the 
singular. 
In a later work, when discussing markets Hodgson states (2001: 256; 
emphasis mine): 
A market is an institution in which a significant number of commodities of 
a particular type are regularly exchanged, and in which market rules and 
structures pattern these exchange negotiations and transactions. 
In this formulation the “market is an institution” (in the singular), which 
seems to comprise both “rules and structures” and exchanges. Interestingly, 
here “rules and structures” are not labelled ‘institutions’. 
However, in this same work Hodgson (2001: 295) gives us a definition of 
institution that makes us think twice: “Essentially, institutions are durable 
systems of established and embedded social rules and conventions that 
structure social interactions.” This formulation reminds us of the firstly 
quoted definition of 1988; the “market as a set of social institutions” that 
organise exchanges, where the term ‘institutions’ stands for rules, structures 
and conventions. 
Much recently, Hodgson (2008: 263) addresses markets in these terms: 
In the narrower sense, markets are organized recurrent exchange. 
Where they exist, markets help to structure, organize and legitimize 
numerous exchange transactions. 
Here the ambiguity is augmented: the statement begins with the idea that 
(rather than rules, structures and conventions) markets are recurrent 
exchanges, while in the rest of the paragraph markets “help to structure, 
organize and legitimize”, in other words, markets ‘institutionalise’ 
exchanges. 
So, for Hodgson, what are markets? Are they ‘exchanges’ that need 
‘institutions’ or are they ‘rules and structures’ that ‘institutionalise’ the 
exchanges? Or, could markets be seen as a multi-level, self-organising 
complex system containing both the ‘rules’ and the ‘exchanges’? In fact, a 
few lines below the same page, Hodgson (2008; emphasis mine) tells us that 
“the market is a social institution, governed by sets of rules restricting some 
and legitimizing other behaviours”. 
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In my view, these nuances in Hodgson’s definitions of the market raise 
serious doubts in the reader, and lead me to conclude that, underlying his 
formulations, there is a conceptual tension that remains unresolved. They are 
ramifications of Hodgson’s (2006b) problematic ontology of these rules, 
structures and conventions that I have discussed in Chapter 3 (see 3.3.4).166 
With the above presented review of Hodgson’s definitions of markets I want 
to emphasise the point of departure of this thesis. The review confirms that 
ambiguities about how to understand markets continue to plague 
contemporary Institutional economics, and therefore renders perfectly 
legitimate my own research on this central subject. In the following I build on 
the concept of institution argued in the previous chapter (3.3.4) in order to 
present my own understanding of markets as meso-institutions. 
4.3.2.3 Markets: multi-level socio-cultural systems 
Markets and the broader economy are part of societies, and all of them have 
emerged upon the biosphere, which is why they are now at peril for not 
respecting the sustainability conditions of the latter (Özveren, 2000). This is 
a principle inherent in the Naturalist Institutionalism here argued, which 
inspires Fig. 12. 
 
 
Fig. 12 – Society as a differentiated sociocultural system  
 
                                                 
166 I note Hodgson’s restrictive understanding of markets, which he limits to recurrent 
exchanges, thereby excluding the production, distribution, and use of what is exchanged. 
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In my conceptual framework it is assumed that the economy, and particularly 
its markets, is supposed to work for the wellbeing of society, which is the 
principle of “instrumental valuation” much cherished by Veblen’s followers 
(Samuels, 1997). While acknowledging this, I recognise that the interactions 
of markets with the rest of the economy, the overall society and the world 
have been omitted in Fig. 12. However, they will be extensively addressed in 
Chapter 5. 
The emergentist view of the market here proposed is in line with the ideas 
argued in the section 3.3 about the understanding of institutions, which 
assumed that sociocultural systems are made of different layers, the bottom-
layer being made of persons’ interactions and communications. The crucial 
point we need to understand is that a market, and the structural layers that 
emerge and constitute it, are in fact organised sociocultural processes. As 
Sayer (2002: 55; emphasis mine) puts it, “by persuading others to buy their 
products and setting up the means of regularised exchange for them to do 
so, they [the firms] create something which goes beyond their control.” This is 
a simple but direct formulation that accounts for the emergent nature of a 
market. 
In this understanding of emergence I am not referring exclusively to what 
Aspers (2009: 12) names “spontaneous market making”. The meaning of 
emergence is wide enough to also include the intentional, “organized 
making” of markets. In this latter case we have “actors interacting as 
“political” players, negotiating about the construction of a market” (Ibid. 19), 
and finally arriving at an outcome that is not exactly what each one had in 
mind due to the (non-controllable) events and counter-reactions occurring 
over the political process. In this sense markets are still an emergent 
organisation of a particular kind of provisioning processes. 
As other institutions, the market is a multi-level system.167 The upper level is 
made of two kinds of structures, the social composed of organisations and 
the cultural composed of norms (Fig. 13). The intermediate level is 
constituted by more local, less complex subsystems (networks of social 
relations and meanings), while at the bottom-level occur the interactions and 
communications between the agents, namely the “transactions” (exchanges) 
                                                 
167 My approach to markets is different from the one proposed by the sociologist Neil 
Fligstein for whom, rather than (sociocultural) ‘systems’, markets are ‘fields’. 
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that consummate the “legal transfer of ownership”, to recall John Commons 
words (Kaufman, 2003). In order to overcome the much ingrained dichotomy 
between (rigid) structures and (fluid) processes, I emphasise that the overall 
scheme of the market is based on the metaphysical assumption that reality is 
ultimately a process. This means that I am discussing a set of ‘organised 
flows’ that are connected, and co-evolve, with other institutions and the 
whole society. In the following I attempt to give more details about the multi-
level scheme represented in Fig. 13.168 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 13 – The market as a meso-institution 
 
                                                 
168  My model of the market received inspiration from different and complementary 
sources. See for instance (Fourie, 1991: 46). 
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It is at the bottom level that institutions pulse. This level is made of 
interactions and communications between ‘persons’the triangles whose 
vertices account for body-mind-openness to the worldnot only in making 
negotiations, contractual agreements, and market exchanges but also 
making prospective contacts for future deals and transmitting information of 
different kind (prices, business news, reputation of other agents, etc.). 
Moreover, we should not forget that business agents are intensely engaged 
in contacts with state agents to lobby, obtain public outsourcing, negotiate 
state support to the industry, even engaging in the creation of new markets. 
All these interactions between persons, some of which acting on behalf of 
organisations belonging to other institutions, are the ‘raw material’ of a 
market. The decisions taken by its organisationsfirms, regulatory agencies, 
trade associations, industry training centresnamely about when, how and 
at what price to produce and to sell, are emergent outcomes of interactions 
and communications between persons of different social belonging. Of 
course, this includes state agents that negotiate with firms. These 
negotiations occur between individuals that occupy particular roles in their 
organisations (private and public) and thus act as representatives of the 
interests and projects of the collective entity to which they belong. Hence, we 
need in Fig. 12 arrows that link bottom and top levels. 
At the mid level the model presents a plurality of inter-connected networks 
that arise from the bottom-level and make up the processes of “economic 
transformation” as Harvey (2007b: 171) proposed. According to my ontology, 
the transformations of quality (production), of place and time (distribution), 
of appropriation (exchanges of products and property rights) and of use 
(consumption) are better seen as organised processes, which emerge from 
bottom level interactions and communications.169 Those processes operate 
under the complex structuring of two levels, one below that puts to work the 
sequence of transformations according to a specific order (human 
interactivity and communication), and the higher top level that empowers, 
organises, and legitimates the participation of each organisation and 
individual in those processes (organisations and norms). 
                                                 
169  See Hammond and Sanders (2002: 11; emphasis mine) who state: “the complexity 
paradigm in communication sees the communicative act as a source of both order and 
disorder present in all systems.” 
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Using Harvey’s words, I recall that the transformational processes “are each 
distinct one from the other, and that together, however differently configured 
in relation to one another, they form the basis for economic reproduction 
and/or growth. … the mutual dependence of the four economic  processes 
forms the basis of economic specificity” (Harvey, 2007b: 170). On this, 
Harvey is right in insisting that an Institutionalist view of markets should 
work at a level of abstraction that enables to highlight its specific nature and 
function for society. 
Taking on board Harvey’s (2007b: 171, 174) “transformational processes”, I 
am adopting an inclusive understanding of markets by which, along 
exchanges, the processes of production, distribution and consumption 
become an intrinsic part of the market. This perspective is supported by 
Sayer (1995: 99) who agrees that the analysis should go beyond market 
exchanges: 
For a market or commodity-producing economy it is probably unwise to try 
to draw a boundary between the market, or the sphere of exchange, and 
production and consumption, since the development of markets may only 
be intelligible in the light of developments in production and vice versa. 
As I have said, the scheme should be understood as a provisional model that 
needs to be further specified. An illustration of the direction to take in the 
exploration of the model is given by (Harvey and Randles, 2002: 16-20) who 
concentrate their analysis on the appropriation process (Fig. 14). 
Besides the above-mentioned interdependence between the different 
transformation processes, it is also necessary to recall that each of those 
processes bears relations with other markets, and with non-market and non-
economic processes. The connection to other markets is represented in the 
buyer side of Fig. 14. The horizontal doted line represents a link to firms 
buying intermediate goods/services to be incorporated in the transformation 
process of another market. There are also connections to infrastructures and 
non-market public services (the circle) which are financed by state through 
taxation, and connections to other institutions such as the family (the 
square); adults’ consumption of final goods/services and children’s spending 
pocket money. This buyer side of the market puts in evidence the economic 
connections between markets and other important institutions of society. As 
Harvey and Randles (2002: 19) recall, “the general point is that no one set of 
economic exchanges is economically self-sustaining.” 
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Fig. 14 – Market transformation processes (adaptation of Harvey and Randles, 
2002: 19) 
 
Harvey and Randles also highlight that market exchanges involve agents who 
frequently have unequal powers, although at the same time they are mutually 
dependent. “Thus, manufacturers may exercise power over retailers by virtue 
of their capacity to innovate and produce, or of their brand reputation. 
Retailers may exercise power by virtue of their organisation of end markets 
and control of access to them” (Ibid. 18). 
An important outcome of markets’ transformation processes is the emergence 
of information relevant to the agents’ decisions, namely about the supply and 
the demand of the good/service, the technologies used to produce and make 
it available for exchange, and the prices that have been asked, offered and 
paid in transactions. In this scheme, the words supply, demand, price, 
technology are linguistic representations of the commodities, money and 
information that take part in the transformation processes of the market. In 
other words, they are part of the semiotic processes that occur in 
communications among the agents of the market, and in the interpretation 
that each of them makes of these communications (Shackle, 1972). Hence, the 
need for managers to meet frequently and to participate in different sorts of 
networks aiming to obtain relevant information, for instance about the 
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reputation of business partners, or even engaging in a trust-based network 
where knowledge is shared aiming to solve a technological problem. Markets 
are not of a piece; they are made of, and emerge upon, multiple kinds of 
interdependent networks (Smith-Doerr and Powell, 2005). 
In brief, the market is a sub-system of the institution ‘economy’. More 
specifically, it is a (sociocultural) self-organising, complex, and open system 
endowed with structural levels that have emerged from persons’ interactions-
communications, many of them acting as members of organisations, in the 
transformation processes of production, distribution, appropriation and 
consumption, using matter-energy and symbolic tools in order to maintain and 
enhance the provisioning of society. 
This inclusive understanding of the market sharply contrasts with Hodgson’s 
restrictive definition, which only retains the ‘appropriation’ processes 
(market exchanges), and even leaves out what Hodgson (1988: 177) qualifies 
as “relational contracting”: 
The market includes a generalized mechanism to establish and publicize 
prices, and to promote goods and services. In contrast, there are many 
cases when exchange is established other than through the market, by 
contact obtained in other spheres of activity. A common example of non-
market exchange is the habitually renewed contract to supply a good or a 
service to a regular client. Identical or close substitutes may exist, but the 
buyer chooses to remain with the same supplier without ‘going to the 
market’ to consider an alternative.” 
I do not follow this restrictive understanding of markets, which in my view is 
inspired by the traditional (but erroneous) idea that ‘cooperation’ excludes 
‘competition’ and thus, when cooperation is involved in transactions these 
occur out of the market. In Chapter 5 I will present an understanding of 
markets’ motion that is consistent with the findings of management 
literature, namely that firms frequently choose to cooperate in order to better 
compete (Bengtsson and Powell, 2004). 
Pace most of the New-Austrian school literature, beyond prices, firms need 
information about a variety of relevant issues. They need information about 
material and immaterial inputs (quantities, qualities, schedules of delivery, 
procedures), state policies and the business cycle. Managers meet frequently 
to assess the uncertainty they are currently facing and the cooperation they 
could get from other firms. In consequence, the transformation process of 
“production” is a source of network building that channels information and 
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opens up opportunities for inter-firm cooperation. Frequently, these 
networks have a spatial concentration; they are a form of organisation of the 
‘transformation processes’ of markets usually named (regional) ‘clusters’, or 
“industrial districts” in Marshall’s terms. As Maskell and Lorenzen (2004: 
995) argue, “the resulting freedom of choice of partners facilitates resource 
efficiency under industry uncertainty and is crucial for the competitiveness 
and survival of specially small firms faced with volatile markets and calls for 
perpetual variation.” Moreover, the concentration “enables the building of a 
set of institutions [norms, values, industry recipes] that are helpful in 
conducting certain kinds of economic activity” (Ibid, 1002). 
Further, my understanding of the market acknowledges that ‘supply’ and 
‘demand’ are interdependent. Market suppliers not only scrutinise the 
demographic and cultural trends of society in order to adjust their 
production but they also attempt to mould their potential demand, 
and so a ‘learning’ dialogue shapes the patterns of consumption that 
develop in the system. These patterns emerge, and chance details of the 
process of emergence alter what is finally ‘revealed’. Supply affects 
demand, and vice-versa (Allen, 1994: 595). 
In the model pictured in Fig.13 the ‘price’ is an abstraction. From the 
perspective of my Naturalist Institutionalism, markets are organised 
sociocultural processes, which by their nature cannot be in equilibrium. 
Therefore, there is not a ‘clearing price’ for the market; there are different 
prices at different places and in different moments, and there is no real 
supply and demand schedules that determine such price. Prices are 
information that emerge from the concrete interdependencies that surround 
the appropriation process of a good or service. 
The determination of prices in markets is a rather complex process that 
varies with their organisation. They emerge from a plurality of interacting 
processes that are specific to each market. In markets with large 
repercussions in the whole economy there is a lot of “discretionary acts of 
identifiable persons” (Tool, 1995: 51). In the markets of final goods/services 
the producers are typically ‘price-makers’; prices are determined by a mark-
up rule and publicised. In the financial markets the prices depend on “the 
various rules and procedures that govern market trading, the activities of 
bodies such as regulators, the banking system, and the monetary authorities, 
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and also such things as the operation of physical equipment, computer 
programs, communications media, and so on” (Bibow et al., 2005: 525). 
An important aspect to retain is that the information about supply, demand 
or prices is per se ‘public knowledge’; it belongs to the structural level of the 
market and is used in the decision processes of individuals and 
organisations, be they consumers, small firms, multinational corporations, 
innovation networks, trade associations, unions, etc. 
As for ‘technology’, it should be understood in light of Peirce’s semiotic 
presented in the previous chapter. If we review the triangle of Fig. 7 (see 
3.3.2.3), we can understand the technologies adopted in the different 
processes of transformation going on in the market as sign processes. Take 
for instance the laptop where I am writing now. To state that this machine is 
the technology most used to write in these days is a one-sided statement. 
This only refers to its use, which means a body interaction with this 
particular material that requires some practice; some knowledge that can 
only be acquired in the process of its use. But there is more to it because the 
laptop had to be made and that process required a lot of knowledge about 
computation, about the materials that could be used, and (not least) about 
their mutual compatibility, which certainly took a long time of adjustments 
until it could run effectively. The process of making the laptop is not 
adequately accounted by the commonsense idea that engineers make the 
design and the specialised workers transform the materials according to that 
design. 
In fact, for a technology to emerge, a learning process that requires 
interaction between human beings and materials-energy it is needed (Ingold, 
2010), both from the side of the producers and the side of the users. In the 
technology of the laptop we have a process that relates the material of the 
machine (‘representamen’) to the knowledge/skills needed to its 
manufacturing (‘object’), and to the knowledge/skills needed to use it 
(‘interpretant’). Of course, this is the view proposed by Veblen who “clearly 
believed there was a relationship of complete interdependence in the process 
of technological development” (Lower, 1987: 1155). The same with another 
Classical Pragmatist, John Dewey, who “shattered the traditional notion of 
separate ‘realms’ of knowledge and activity, demonstrating the unity of 
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practical and scientific knowledge as an interaction between the knower and 
the known” (Ibid, 1156). 
Making this Pragmatist connection, I want to argue that in the transformation 
processes of markets – those of production, logistics, exchanges and use of 
goods/services – technologies are better understood as Peircean semiotic 
processes involving interactions between materials-energy, public 
knowledge, and personal knowledge-skills of human beings. With Metcalfe 
(2010: 153), I suggest that “a deeper understanding of technology leads to a 
deeper understanding of the main currents of technological advance and to 
the reasons why the development of technology and its application are so 
uneven over time and place.” 
At the top of the structural level of the market, at its higher level of self-
organising complexity, there are organisations and norms. The latter support 
and legitimise the behaviours of markets’ agents and, with time, even 
changes important aspects of their personality. Among the market norms, we 
find general laws and customs addressing property rights, regulations of 
contracts, informal rights and obligations, quality standards, rules about 
competition, etc. A large part of this group of norms applies to the whole 
market system, and even to society at large, sometimes requiring specific 
modifications to account for the particulars of a market. There are also 
specific norms for the producers of the good/service, and for its distributors 
and retailers when they are specific industries connected to that market. Here 
I think of agreements about wages, time schedules, holidays, training, and 
even general ideas and assumptions about ‘the right way’ to be in the 
business, the so-called ‘industry recipes’ (Spender, 1989). Notwithstanding 
the methodological individualism of Loasby (2000: 302), my understanding 
of market norms is close to his market ‘rules’ and ‘conventions’: “each 
business draws on the institutions [culture] of society within which it 
operates, and then develops, through a mixture of deliberate decisions and 
the consequences of day-to-day interactions, rules and conventions [norms] 
which serve to co-ordinate  its activities and to align them with the activities 
of its suppliers and customers.”170 
                                                 
170  For Loasby, and for a number of heterodox economists inspired by an early work of 
Douglass North, the system of norms that integrates an institution is an “institutional 
arrangement” (Loasby, 1999: 115). 
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As for organisations, the scheme should be read in terms of networks and 
clusters (the left side of the exchanges box in Fig. 14), and certainly not in 
terms of a population of firms. This latter point of view is not even present in 
the seminal work of Marshall (1921), who told us “to treat firms and 
industries as interdependent … Marshall has each firm identified in part 
through its unique set of relations with other entities, including other firms 
as well as organisations such as universities and industrial journalism. … 
Marshall’s firms are both partly constitutive of one another and also of the 
industry” (Bloch and Finch, 2010).171 
At this juncture it is important to recall that markets are not ‘things’ nor 
interacting mechanical ‘forces’. As any complex self-organising system, 
markets are ‘organised processes’ involving interactions and communications 
between persons playing social roles defined by specific rights, duties and 
access to resources, who deal with materials and information, both involved 
in semiotic processes. Therefore, in social science and at least in what 
concerns markets, it makes no sense to talk about ‘equilibrium’ (Metcalfe, 
2004). 
Therefore, being such a kind of system, the causal relations at work in 
markets run up, downwards, horizontally and system-wide. Further, the 
articulations between markets with the rest of society, and with the rest of 
the world through different types of international networks (Perrow, 2009), 
are only possible because they are supported by time and space multi-scale 
communications, themselves created by the powerful symbolic system of 
human language. In this sense, it is only to expect that the borders of 
markets, systems of markets, and the overall economy, are fuzzy. On this 
central aspect, the figures above presented have a shortcoming as they 
present sharp boundaries, instead of the blurred character typical of 
boundaries in sociocultural systems. 
This conceptual framework for the understanding of markets highlights the 
fact that ‘transformation processes’ are not natural givens. Because they have 
a history, they appear differently organised; in and through time, they have 
                                                 
171 At this stage, the use of the term ‘industry’ relates to the focus of the analysis on 
‘production’, a segment of the network of ‘transformation processes’. For a discussion of 
the conditions under which the relations among producers may give rise to “an 
identifiable and invariant network of relations, defining its identity and internal 
coherence”, see (Foray and Garrouste, 1991: 59-61). 
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emerged from human interactions-communications at the cross-roads with 
causal processes emanating from the bio-physical and the societal 
environment. Having identified different levels of emergence and the distinct 
ontological nature of the processes involved (networks, organisations, 
norms, information, communications, material reality, persons), the 
conceptual framework puts in evidence different sources of causal powers, 
each with its own strength and timing. 
Building on the foregoing, I define the market as a meso-institution, that is, 
as sub-system of the macro-institution economy. More precisely, it is a 
sociocultural self-organising, complex, and open system endowed with 
structural levels that have emerged from persons’ interactions-
communications, many of them acting as members of organisations, in the 
transformation processes of production, distribution, appropriation and 
consumption, using matter-energy and symbolic tools in order to maintain 
and enhance the provisioning of society. This is done under the help, 
orientation and legitimation of market norms (rules, laws, theories, values, 
etc.) originated within the market activity itself and from outside by state 
legislation. The large majority of the organisations of modern markets are 
capitalist firms. They operate under conditions of more or less intense 
competition for the opportunity to exchange goods or services with profit, 
although other forms of organisation such as cooperatives have some 
importance. 
In modern societies, markets have become an indispensable form of 
coordination of the extensive social division of labour that today underlies 
the huge variety of goods and services produced by a “restless capitalism” 
(Metcalfe, 2004: 174). 
4.3.2.4 Fictitious markets and marketness 
The inclusive understanding of the market adopted in this thesis has the 
particular advantage of helping to see more clearly why Karl Polanyi 
considered nature, labour and money “fictitious commodities”. In fact, it is 
evident that none of them comes from a productive process in view of future 
exchange with profit and subsequent use by a buyer.  
Nature is presently a global concern taking account of the climate changes 
now widely acknowledged, and the magnitude of the implications of such 
175 
 
changes for human societies, which are interdependent and co-evolve with 
bio-physical ecological systems (Gual and Norgaard, 2010). The neoclassical 
solution to these problems is the extension of markets to environment goods 
and the imputation of prices to environment damages. In other words, for 
neoclassical economics, the solution to environment problems resides in the 
extension of markets to these domains. The fact that nature is not a 
commodity (we inherited it from past generations) causes numerous 
obstacles to the neoclassical project, in particular those related to the limits 
of monetary valuation (Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2004), or the fact that 
“certain kinds of social relations and evaluative commitments are constituted 
by particular kinds of shared understandings which are such that they are 
incompatible with market relations” (O'Neill, 2007a). As O’Neill states, 
neoclassical economists are not able to see that “the solution is the problem”. 
For the sake of brevity, and also because the market solution to Nature’s 
global crisis is now regarded as ineffective by a growing number of 
ecological systems scientists, in the rest of the chapter I will comment more 
extensively the cases of labour and money.172 
First, let us recall that, with capitalism, labour and credit-money have been 
subjected to exchange contracts as if they were commodities.173 However, if 
‘spot exchanges’ are taken as the standard of markets’ operations, as 
neoclassical economics does, we should bear in mind that “in the spot 
market the transaction is negotiated and settled during a single meeting or 
interaction. … There goods are inspected, prices negotiated, and cash 
tendered and accepted – all in the course of single meeting” (Prasch, 2008: 
55). The problem is that with ‘labour’ and ‘credit-money’ nothing is similar to 
the standard market. 
In labour we have an important case of asymmetric power in association with 
mutual dependency, which is manifest in the class division between 
employers, the owners of the firm’s material means of production, and 
employees, the sellers of their work, which is the class division that 
                                                 
172 For a discussion of Karl Polanyi and William Kapp analysis of the environment, see 
Özveren (2007). 
173 Credit-money represents the bulk of a modern economy’s monetary mass and is 
provided by a deposit made by commercial banks at the conclusion of an approved 
demand of credit. 
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constitutes capitalism since nineteenth century.174 Usually, economists refer 
to these relations under the conceptual framework of “labour markets”. In 
line with Polanyi’s thinking, I do not share such approach and elaborate on 
this in the following paragraphs. 
Notwithstanding the role of family and education as non-economic 
institutions that raise and prepare children to later assume the social 
conditions of both consumers and producers, there are at least two crucial 
aspects to consider in the analysis of the so-called ‘labour market’: first, the 
contracted labour cannot be completely specified ex ante because it is to be 
extended in time and, most importantly, because it is necessarily executed 
by the person as a whole. For this reasona person is not a commoditythe 
person has a bearing on the decisions that are taken about the work because 
it involves life, sometimes even the survival. Second, the person has the 
capacity to reflect on her/his situation, which means that “perceived fairness 
and quality of treatment on the job can rival monetary compensation in 
eliciting employee loyalty and effort” (Prasch, 2008: 98). Taking the 
perspective put forward by Bowles, and unlike true commodities, “labor 
market is a prototype of an exchange that is both contested and constitutive. 
The political relationship between boss and worker is instrumental to the 
enforcement of the employer’s claim – that the worker work hard and well – 
and the structure of work life has significant influences on human 
development. … How work is allocated and organized has a well-documented 
bearing on the development of our capacities, norms, and preferences” 
(Bowles, 1991: 15). In brief: (1) the person that works does not come from a 
process of economic production; (2) there is no transaction of labour in the 
form of an ex-ante specified exchange; (3) the labour contract does not 
recognise that the person as a whole cannot be disconnected from the work 
she/he produces; (4) the agents who make the labour contract have highly 
asymmetric powers. On the overall, these reasons are serious enough to lead 
me to state that what is conventionally labelled “labour market” cannot be 
framed within the concept of market argued in this thesis. Under a critical 
realist approach, the so-called ‘labour market’ is currently the subject of a 
research programme that is still making its first steps (Fleetwood, 2006). 
                                                 
174  For a discussion about the need to make the analytical distinction between the social 
division of labour and the class division based on the ownership of capital, see (Sayer, 
1995). 
177 
 
Credit-money is a particular kind of asset that also raises problems regarding 
its conventional treatment as the product of financial markets.175 Here, “the 
crucial point is that the value of assets, by contrast with commodities, is 
determined by market participants’ collective assessment of the likelihood of 
future events. Such understandings are called “expectations” and they are a, 
if not the, critical element in the market for assets” (Prasch, 2008: 65). 
Because money assets are not an end in themselves, the serious issue about 
them is the evolution of their value, which is subject to uncertainties of 
different types including the uncertainty of human behaviour acting in 
crowds (Bibow et al., 2005). Due to positive feedback mechanisms 
speculative bubbles are inevitably formed, and are hugely aggravated by 
credit-provided “leverage” of the money engaged in the speculative process. 
Prasch (2008: 66) correctly places these operations within the broader 
societal context, highlighting its destabilizing effects and “raising the 
question as to how effective these markets are at their socially-sanctioned 
tasks.” More explicitly, Lawson (2009: 775) asks the crucial question: “Should 
the credit institutions of capitalism facilitate social and economic 
development or be mainly concerned, as at present, with advancing funds to 
those concerned merely with making more money?” The Great Recession we 
are living today is only the most recent episode of capitalism’s financial 
instability, and a most revealing one because an extensive regulatory control 
of financial systems was already in place and, nevertheless, did not prevented 
the gestation of a collapse. Therefore, as Karl Polanyi (1944: Chap. 16) long 
ago argued, and a few years ago Ingham (2001) insisted, the particular 
nature of money, and the importance of its articulation to the transformation 
process of production, involves a crucial political dimension that does not fit 
the conceptual framework of the market here argued.176 The current political 
atmosphere in the USA and Europe seems favourable to those who argue, 
and make activism for, the introduction of more legislation that should 
restrict market-like operations using the “fictitious commodity” of credit-
money. 
                                                 
175 For in depth discussions about the nature of money see (Ingham, 2004) and (Schmitz, 
2002). For a note on the much neglected semiotic nature of money, see (Dyer, 1989). For 
a post-Polanyi view of the present financial crisis and the opportunity it opens for the 
emergence of world-level norms, see (Hart, 2009). 
176 About the reform of the legislation of financial trade in the USA, see (Elliott, 2010). 
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In fact, both in the so-called ‘labour market’ and in the ‘credit-money 
market’, the contracts that sustain the exchanges of these “fictitious 
commodities” are permeated by great uncertainty and asymmetric 
information. Further, to bear the nature of a market contract, they would 
require a long-term understanding of the self-interest of those involved, a 
condition that is seldom present. Reality has shown that in such ‘fictitious’ 
market exchanges even a strong control of the state can hardly produce an 
outcome acceptable to the overall society, which makes them contestable, 
and actually strongly contested, ‘institutions’ (Bowles and Gintis, 1990). In 
my view, the ‘market’ is not the adequate concept to deal with the market-
like exchanges that involve nature, labour and money in modern capitalist 
societies. 
Beyond the three Polanyian fictitious commodities, there is a huge variety of 
situations involving imbalances in power of negotiation and asymmetric 
access to information that make the appropriation process (exchanges) much 
different from the standard spot-market model. Such heterogeneity of cases 
led Rosenbaum (2000) to admit a “marketness” scale in order to rank all 
possible situations.177 In my view, this is an analytical effort of dubious 
usefulness and, from the point of view of the actors involved, an issue always 
subject to contestation at the policy level. 
In my view, it seems more useful to both extend the concept of market 
beyond ‘exchanges’, in order to account for other interconnected 
‘transformation processes’, and to acknowledge that markets are variously 
shaped in a interactional process involving firms, the state, other institutions, 
and social movements in society at large (see Chapter 5). This stance is 
supported by the argument put forward by Bowles (1991: 13) who states that 
“markets are political because contracts are [generally] incomplete. And 
where contracts are incomplete, what actually gets transacted cannot be 
enforced by a court of law; rather, the de facto terms of the exchange are 
fought out between the exchanging parties. This is the reason why markets 
are political.” Bowles’ statement is a well argued recognition that power and 
moral dimensions are always present, with more or less visibility, in the 
                                                 
177 I also disagree with Block (1991) about his understanding of markets restricted to 
‘exchanges’, and his idea that the “price mechanism” provides a “marketness” scale that 
could account for the variety of concrete markets, “with spot markets at the high end of 
scale and transactions organized through organizational hierarchies at the low end” (Ibid, 
89). 
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varied shaping and working of markets, a topic that I expand in the next 
section. 
4.4 Comments on other views of markets 
Neoclassical economics is not directly addressed in this thesis. I fully agree 
with Hodgson (1999: 36-37) that “Neoclassical theory is Market-Blind”, by 
which he means that “when attempts are made to discuss exchanges and 
markets in neoclassical economics then the main element of the narrative is 
the increases of utility received by the individuals involved, not the transfer 
of property rights within a framework of legal institutions.” 
In Walrasian economics, markets equate to momentary physical exchanges of 
goods. Not only money is absent but also time and change are not 
considered. Despite much talk about markets, in neoclassical thinking all 
about markets boils down to a simple mechanics by which a fictitious 
omniscient auctioneer makes the right allocations in a manner that “the 
economy ‘gropes’ towards an equilibrium position in all markets and towards 
the determination of a complete final vector of prices” (Ibid., 39). Such kind 
of modelling corresponds to the optimizing dual of a centrally planned 
economy. The problem is that this means the absence of interacting agents 
endowed with specific and uneven competencies and knowledge, attempting 
to collect relevant information about prices, quantities and qualities of 
particular commodities, and looking for an opportunity to make an exchange 
against money and make a profit. 
Against the richness of reality, the vagueness of the concept of market in 
neoclassical economics is well pictured by this formulation: “It is believed 
that when people gather together in the name of self-interest, then, a market 
somehow always emerges in their midst” (Hodgson, 2001: 249). Therefore, in 
the present section I limit my discussion to important differences between 
my view of markets and those of a few contemporary outstanding heterodox 
economists. 
4.4.1 Markets: layers or systems? 
I begin with a discussion of Hodgson’s work, as he is a leading contributor to 
contemporary updating of Original Institutionalism. I have already compared 
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my views with Hodgson’s understanding of institutions in Chapter 3. In the 
present chapter (see 4.3.2.2) I have identified a conceptual tension in his 
definition of markets, and in the following paragraphs I return to his 
definitions to make more explicit the differences between our views about 
“markets as institutions”. 
A first note is that Hodgson’s formulations do not acknowledge that 
economic life is relational; that ‘internal and necessary’ social relations 
(using critical realism vocabulary) are invariants of bonds and networks of 
bonds that ‘tie’ the persons related. Beginning with this base-level, I argue 
that these social networks give rise to self-organising systems such as firms 
and other kinds of organisations; and, that there are networks of 
organisations and meanings, which on the overall make up highly complex 
sociocultural systems. In Hodgson’s formulations we do not find such 
emergentist understanding. 
According to (one of) Hodgson’s (2001: 256) formulations, “the market is an 
institution” in the sense that economic exchanges need “an enforceable set of 
rules of law”, “a system of established property rights, complemented with 
“laws, and procedures to deal with disputes”. For Hodgson, “the key point 
here is to notice that all these frameworks are, in an established sense of the 
word, institutions” (Ibid, 256; emphasis mine). Therefore, when particular 
laws and rules of society are applied to the exchanges of commodities, then 
we have a market. “Markets, in short, are organised and institutionalised 
exchange” (Ibid, 257). In this latter statement it is implicit a unidirectional 
top-down causality. Laws, rules and conventions, which (at least in this 
formulation) Hodgson takes as ‘institutions’, are linked to agents’ exchanges 
by defining restrictions on some behaviours, and helping or legitimating 
others. However, bottom-up and system-wide relational processes are not 
suggested by the definition. 
In fact, contrasting with my framework, Hodgson does not refer to self-
organising complex systems. This should be expected because in his 
formulation market “laws and rules” are not part of a wider whole of inter-
related market processes; they are seen somewhat surrounding, or perhaps 
forming layers above market exchanges but without a definite ontology. Are 
these layers social or cultural realities? 
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Hodgson does refer to culture as an important reason for the diversity of real 
markets. However, the relations between culture and the entities (laws and 
rules) that make some kind of exchanges to have a market nature, to become 
“institutionalised”, are not discussed in a section explicitly addressing 
markets (Hodgson, 2001: 253-257). Here I note that, consistently with my 
understanding of institutions in Chapter 3, the legal and non-legal norms of 
the market are (ontologically speaking) of a cultural nature. It is evident that 
culture is present at the interactive level of markets, for instance in the way 
agents bargain. However, it is necessary to recognise that this only happens 
because culture is at the same time present in the (objectively emergent) 
values, norms, and recipes that are accepted and practiced by the agents of 
that market. What in my framework I label the ‘norms’ of an institution is a 
mix of cultural entities (legal and non-legal), some of them picked up from 
the cultural tissue of society and integrated into the norms of a particular 
institution in order to serve a particular function for society, in this case the 
market with its provisioning function. Of course, some norms are common to 
the majority of markets, namely the legal ones (e.g. property rights law, 
labour laws) while others are particular to each market and have emerged 
within it (e.g. biding rules in the fresh fish market). 
I also want to emphasise that moral values are part of the set of institutional 
norms of markets, whatever the implications they might bear on market 
efficiency, as economic rationality cannot dispense with the rationality of its 
ends.178 Thus, in line with Durkheim in The Division of Labour, I reject that 
markets are morally neutral. Beckert (2005: 5) reminds us that “the moral 
code stops actors from exploiting their exchange partners through 
opportunistic behaviour”. In a similar vein O’Neil (2007b: 263) states: 
in the case of economic relations and roles such as those of employer and 
employee, traders, accountants, bankers and individuals have to have 
some idea of how they should behave towards each other, and what would 
constitute improper or unreasonable behaviour, for the roles to be 
successfully enacted.  
My contribution here is to recall that moral values are cultural entities, which 
have emerged in time within a definite community; they are neither 
subjective preferences of some individuals nor ‘rules’ in the minds of the 
market agents. Every market has moral components to its system of norms, 
                                                 
178 On this point see (Fourcade and Healy, 2007: 300). 
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which means that every market is a moral market (Keat, 2004). In this sense, 
it is inadequate to state that markets are “morally embedded”, thereby 
admitting (at least implicitly) that moral values are ‘external’ to the markets. 
Values may have their origin in the broader cultural system of society, but 
the important aspect to retain is that they are appropriated and integrated in 
the structural level of the market as components of its system of norms. 
At the same time, we need to bear in mind that some norms of the market 
emerge from interactions involving agents and networks endowed with 
asymmetric powers. Such power dimension supports a strong connection 
between market norms and market organisations (see top of the scheme), the 
latter being the domain of hierarchies, resources, interests and powers, while 
the former being the ideational domain of markets, that of worldviews, 
business models, managerial fads, professional and moral rules, etc. Most 
importantly, the interests that actors pursue and invoke for their decisions 
and strive for power can only be seen ‘through the lens’ of the norms 
pertaining to their market. Recalling the work of another sociologist in 
international politics, Blyth (2003: 700) highlights this point: 
The core insight here is that all notions of interest rest upon assumptions about 
motivation that cannot simply be “read off” the structural [social] context. As Wendt 
puts it, “only a small part of what constitutes interests is actually material. … The 
rest is ideational.” As such, we have to pay attention, once again, to “how 
preferences are constituted.” 
Contrasting with Hodgson’s discussion of markets, I think it is important to 
make this distinction between the ‘social’ and the ‘ideational’ domains, and 
acknowledge how they interrelate. My understanding of markets (and the 
broader economy) has thus a systemic, socio-cultural nature, that contrasts 
with the idea of markets as “exchanges conditioned/enabled by institutions”, 
where the latter are understood in most of Institutional economics literature 
as ‘rules’, perhaps analogous to computers’ software. 
However, something is moving in the intellectual panorama and I am glad to 
read a recent statement by two sociologists who reject a trivialised view of 
institutions: “This view of institutions, we argue, tends to take the edge out 
of the concept of institution, which in our opinion should be restricted to 
those areas of society where interests come into play in an important and 
direct manner  such as politics, the economy and the family” (Nee and 
Swedberg, 2005: 797; emphasis mine). Ultimately, this statement gives some 
support to my restrictive use of the concept of Institution (a sub-system of 
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society) and legitimises my choice of the term ‘norms’ for the ideational 
elements of those sub-systems. 
4.4.2 The well behaved institutionalism 
Since the 1970’s there appeared new streams of research, in economics and 
other disciplines, aiming to complement some deficiencies of neoclassical 
economics, namely on what concerns the firm, systematically treated as a 
technical tool, a production function. A distinguishing focus of analysis, 
common to these streams, is the role of institutions in the economy. This 
point has been summarised in a paper by Oliver Williamson (2000: 595; 
emphasis mine), the leading figure of New Institutionalism, where he quotes 
another author: 
the new institutional economics (NIE) turned on two propositions. First, 
“institutions do matter”; and second, the determinants of institutions are 
susceptible to analysis by tools of economic theory” (Matthews 1986, p. 
903). The second of these is what distinguishes the NIE, it being the case 
that institutional economists of all kindsold and neware unanimous in 
the view that institutions matter. 
In the next page, emphasising the dynamics of NIE, Williamson states: “Even 
as institutional economics is being incorporated within orthodoxy, new 
opportunities and challenges await” (Ibid, 596; emphasis mine). 
In this section I am not concerned with the predominant research theme 
explored by NIE, that of the origin and nature of the firm. Although keeping 
it present because firms are the most central actors of markets, the focus of 
this thesis is on markets as such. It is in this perspective that NIE is 
scrutinised below. Therefore, I will not rephrase well known critiques to 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) in relation to the so-called “make or buy” 
problem and NIE’s methodological individualism, as all have been subject of 
detailed analysis in a large number of publications, some of which by 
Hodgson (1988; 1993b; 1999; 2001; 2004d) and with whom I generally 
agree.179 Here, I want to focus on a few aspects that, in my view, have not 
been enough emphasised. 
An Institutionalism that aims to be accepted by the ‘establishment’ certainly 
makes a contribution that does not question the main tenets of economics 
orthodoxy. In order to show that NIE is a complement of economics 
                                                 
179 See also (Ankarloo and Palermo, 2004), (Granovetter, 1985) and (Vira, 1997). 
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mainstream thinking, Williamson recurs to a scheme of levels entitled 
“Economics of Institutions” (Ibid, 597). This is a large universe of 
‘institutions’ insofar it includes: (level 1) informal norms, customs, traditions, 
religion; (level 2) formal rules of the game including property, polity, 
judiciary, bureaucracy; (level 3) play of the game, especially contract; (level 4) 
prices and quantities, including labour incentives. Williamson sees “level 4” 
the field of neoclassical economics, and recognises that “level 1 institutions” 
change very slowly but “have a lasting grip on the way a society conducts 
itself” (Ibid, 597). Therefore, NIE is mainly interested in levels 2 and 3, the 
former labelled “institutional environment” (“the rules of the game”) and the 
latter labelled “governance” (“the play of the game”). Even the “institutional 
environment” moves slowly, although sometimes opening a window of more 
radical reform in higher-order legal institutions such as the constitution or 
the property rights legislation. This is why most of the research of NIE 
concentrates on “the institutions of governance”, that is, “the governance of 
contractual relations” (Ibid, 599). 
From this summary we can see that, according to NIE, ‘institutions’ actually 
are cultural objects that “impose constrains on the level immediately below” 
and, despite signalling the existence of upward feedbacks, Williamson 
explicitly neglects them (Ibid. 596). Thus, NIE does not discuss the 
connections between these cultural entities distributed by levels of 
permanence. Further, the economy is presented as an organisation of 
contracts between individuals. The main concern of NIE is to achieve 
“economizing” in transaction costs, which are used as a tool to assess 
alternative modes of governance (e.g. markets versus firms), and to align 
“transactions” and “governance structures”. Therefore, mainstream 
methodological individualism is respected.180 
An interesting inconsistency appears in the layered scheme proposed 
(Williamson, 2000: Fig. 1, 597). While in the analysis of governance forms, at 
“level 3”, Williamson admits that human beings behave according to rules 
that are provided by ‘institutions’, and to his support invokes Herbert 
Simon’s “procedural rationality”, at “level 4” (the bottom level where 
                                                 
180 What is seldom acknowledged is that the NIE project to apply ‘economising’ analysis to 
the so-called ‘institutions’ “is devoid of any analytical significance, since institutions 
structure human interaction by taking the form of constraints within which individuals 
pursue their interests. The notion of efficiency relative to constraints is meaningless since 
the object of analysis is the set of constraints itself” (Vira, 1997: 763). 
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adjustments are continuous) human beings behave according to neoclassical 
thinking; they maximize their utility function and thereby make neoclassical 
economics “optimality apparatus” adequate for analysis. Clearly, this is a 
defining cleavage, one in which Williamson prefers to pay the price of a 
theoretical inconsistency in order to preserve a bridge to economics 
mainstream. 
“Among the key good ideas” that NIE adopts, and makes it different from the 
neoclassical school (Williamson, 2000: 600), is that humans have cognitive 
limits, which makes contracts “unavoidably incomplete”. Another “good idea” 
is that humans are opportunists, that is, “they will not disclose true 
conditions upon request or self-fulfill all promises” (Ibid. 601), which leads to 
the importance of an adequate structure of incentives to the agents in a 
given form of governance. In the anthropology adopted by NIE, human 
beings are seen as units of economic agency without a relational 
background; they lack a biography. Therefore, inequalities of capabilities and 
skills early acquired (or failed) within the sociocultural environment of the 
family, the belonging to a given social class, and the different opportunities 
in the access to education and jobs are completely ignored. A more 
informed, interdisciplinary understanding of human beings, one that 
acknowledges the interactively-constructed, relational and institutionalised 
up-bringing of human beings could prevent Williamson to adopt the wrong 
idea that human beings are basically opportunistic. This assumption, which 
he shares with public choice theory, is simply an ideological preconception. 
In reality, Williamson is not even consistent in his biased view of human 
nature. As insightfully pointed out by Moschandreas (1997: 49), in 
Williamson’s analysis top managers are an exception. He does not admit the 
idea of “control mechanisms within a hierarchy intended to mitigate 
managerial or employer opportunism against subordinates.”181 Not 
surprisingly, this is consistent with mainstream economics’ lack of 
acknowledgement of asymmetric power in contracts, in firms and in markets; 
a failure that has been widely exposed in the Western financial crash of 2008. 
NIE takes efficiency as the criterion for decision-making about governance 
structures. As Williamson stated “whether a set of transactions ought to be 
                                                 
181 For a similar contradiction about the behaviour of managers in M-form firms, see 
(Pessali and Fernández, 1999: 269-270). 
186 
 
executed across markets or within a firm depends on the relative efficiency 
of each mode” (Williamson, 1975: 8). Despite the opposition of Douglass 
North, another leading author of NIE, Williamson attempts to connect with a 
simplistic evolutionary explanation of firms’ survival on the basis of 
efficiency.182 Vromen (1995: 62) summarises: “in Williamson’s view, selection 
sees to it that firms with less efficient organization forms give way to firms 
with more efficient forms.” Also Knudsen (1993: 283; emphasis mine) notes: 
“Williamson does not explain ‘observed’ governance structures as the result 
of a rational plan, intention or design, but as the final result emerging from 
some unspecified evolutionary process.” In this explanation the ambiguity is 
manifest. There are passages where Williamson refers to a vague selection 
process while the bulk of his work is oriented to the study of governance 
structures in comparative statics terms (see Hodgson, 1993b: 85-86). 
Such direct connection between efficient forms of governance and the 
outcome of a competitive processes in markets, presented as the ‘selection’ 
stage of a Darwinist scheme, has been extensively discussed and rejected by 
Hodgson (1988: 76-78; 1999: Chapter 8). On this point Knudsen (1993: 294; 
emphasis mine) recalls that, long ago, “Sidney Winter (1964, 1975) has 
shown that economic environments change too quickly to eliminate all 
inefficient firms – or firms with inadequate routines. Both efficient and 
inefficient firms can therefore be found living side by side.” 
From my point of view, a direct causal linkage between firms’ level of 
efficiency and some kind of market selection is problematic. Firms are 
autonomous systems, which means that at least some of them have enough 
power to change the environment to their interests (laws, informal rules, 
prices for inputs), and therefore influence to their benefit the competitive 
process, which impinges on other firms of the market and produce 
differential effects on their management. Firms have different capabilities, 
different cost-structures, and different market strategies where costs and 
price play different roles. Such variety in the characteristics of firms is a 
contingent outcome of a co-evolutionary process where firms are proactive in 
making choices about technologies, market positioning, governance or 
lobbying. In brief, Williamson has a naïve understanding of competition, one 
                                                 
182 North “argues vehemently against the view ‘that institutions are created only to reduce 
transaction costs and increase economic efficiency’” (quoted in Richter, 2005: 173). 
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of a rival struggle for profitable exchanges that exclusively builds on 
efficiency. In fact, the latter is determined by a system-wide set of 
intertwined causalities, and only partially and remotely by the “rules of the 
game”. 
NIE not only makes an inappropriate analogy with biological evolution but 
also fails to see what is specifically social in the dynamics of markets, namely 
the differential powers of agents and the emergent market structures 
(networks, organisations, norms) that have causal effects on their own right. 
In fact, the methodological individualism adopted by Williamson and his 
followers impedes an adequate understanding of the process of markets’ 
change, which involves mechanisms of different nature operating within and 
beyond a given society. 
In different moments of his work Williamson (2000: 595) argues that we 
should confront economic theories with reality: “That is accomplished by 
asking each would-be theory to advance refutable implications to which the 
data are applied.” He argues for an operationalization of NIE theories and 
quotes Georgescu-Roegen in arguing that “prediction is nevertheless “the 
touching stone of scientific knowledge” (Ibid. 604). Although Williamson 
recognises the complexity of human beings and the evolutionary origins of 
human mind, he does not follow the path of realism. He wants to be with the 
mainstream, perhaps in its outer ring, and that might be the reason why he 
sticks to the deductivist method. In fact, scientific work about social realities 
must take account that empirical phenomena derive from processes of joint 
causalities, which include those cultural entities that NIE labels institutions. 
However, “action and the choice of governance structure, on Williamson’s 
account, occur separately from, or within the walls of, an institutional 
environment, which, in turn, simply acts as a fixed surrounding context. 
There is no analysis of the interplay between structure and agency, and 
hence the intrinsically dynamic nature of social processes appears to be 
ignored. … this treatment of institutions can best be viewed as 
corresponding to the implicit recognition that the extrinsic condition for 
closure [the standard practice of laboratorial sciences] is not being satisfied” 
(Pratten, 1997: 792). It is clear that Williamson is not aware of the 
methodological problems that his individualistic treatment of markets and 
firms imply, most probably because he does not see markets and firms as 
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social systems. And yet, both are self-organising, complex and open realities 
that are not amenable to the prediction tests that Williamson sees as the 
legitimate means of scientific validation. 
Finally, the exercise of power is a crucial dimension of social life that 
Williamson ignores. According to my understanding, institutions are 
sociocultural sub-systems of society. The norms of that institution are of a 
cultural nature, while its organisations or networks have a social nature and 
sustain the institution’s function. As already explained in Chapter 3, these 
social systems constrain/support the actions of individuals and, which is 
relevant for this discussion, most of the time they comprise a distribution of 
asymmetric decision-making sets. 
In firms, this is a condition of its functioning, which makes them a 
hierarchical structure reproduced by specific mechanisms of authority 
(Ankarloo and Palermo, 2004). It is important to acknowledge that, besides 
the integrative role of institutional norms, the social functioning of markets 
is also dependent on different kinds of power (power to act, associated to a 
‘decision-making set’ attributed to an individual, frequently related to his 
wealth; power over somebody, where the ‘decision-making set’ attributed to 
a given individual conditions another individual’s goals or ‘decision-making 
set’; constraining structures; systems of power). Relevant to the present 
discussion is the fact that a “power over somebody” takes different forms, 
whether in the domain of the firm (“authority”) in organising human work, or 
in the domain of exchanges (processes of appropriation) in the so-called 
imperfect markets where it is labelled ‘market power’.183 Thus, in its neglect 
of power NIE certainly belongs to the economics orthodoxy. 
4.4.3 Markets, knowledge and algorithms 
In this subsection I approach two views of markets that, exploring different 
paths, share important assumptions to which I oppose in this thesis. A brief 
discussion could help to make my understanding clearer. 
To discuss the first approach I begin with a paper by Potts (2001) entitled 
“Knowledge and markets”. Meanwhile, these ideas have been developed in 
other papers such as (Dopfer and Potts, 2004b), (Dopfer et al., 2004), and 
                                                 
183 See (Schutz, 1995) for an analysis of power in markets with an emphasis on the idea 
that people do not meet as equals in exchanges. 
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more recently in the book “The General Theory of Economic Evolution” 
(Dopfer and Potts, 2008). Because, in my view, the authors build on 
problematic assumptions about human beings, knowledge, and social reality, 
my comments will concentrate on epistemic and ontological issues. 
Potts (2001) is able to present an assertive position about knowledge only 
recurring to Hayek’s ideas, which have been formulated for the first time 
before the thirties of last century. Additionally, Potts invokes the respected 
philosopher Karl Popper. This raises serious worries because if we want to 
discuss knowledge today we cannot ignore the advances in the cognitive and 
neurosciences of the last decades (see for instance Freeman, 1999). Further, 
an invocation of Popper as an authority, almost as if philosophical reasoning 
about knowledge stopped there, is scholarly rudimentary. This is not a lateral 
issue because the understanding of knowledge proposed by Potts is no less 
than the foundational concept of a new ‘general theory’ of economic 
evolution (Dopfer and Potts, 2008).184 
Dopfer and Potts’ (2004a) propose of an ontology for economics, which admits 
three levels: the macro and the micro levels are linked to a meso level “made 
up of knowledge in the form of meso rules” (Ibid, 8). The authors define a 
(general) rule as systems of associations of an informational kind between 
empirical entities, features common to the “actualisations” of the rule in the 
individuals. More specifically (Ibid, 10), 
when we conceive of an economy as an ensemble of these rules, we are 
doing macroeconomic analysis. When we focus on the carriers of these 
rules and the processes of adoption and adaptation, we are doing 
microeconomic analysis. And when we focus upon the evolution of a rule 
… then we are principally doing mesoeconomic analysis. 
Such understanding of the human being as “carrier of rules”, or a “rule-making 
and rule-using animal” (Dopfer, 2004) is based on the well-known analogy 
between brains and computers, common to both symbolic (Herbert Simon) and 
connectionist models (John Holland) proposed in Artificial Intelligence 
literature, which have been strongly criticised in the last decade (Bickhard and 
                                                 
184 Potts distinguishes knowledge and information but his reasoning about the issue is so 
disconnected from the literature about the subject (actually no references are provided) 
that I prefer not to comment it. A detailed elaboration may be found in (Bateira, 2006). 
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Terveen, 1995; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). This algorithmic view is consistent 
with the authors’ highly problematic geneticist reductionism: 185 
economic agents are made of biological rules, which govern not only an 
organism’s physical development, but also affect social behaviour and 
preferences (Dopfer and Potts, 2004b: 199) 
A reductionist stance about the human nature is also evident in Dopfer’s 
admission of an epiphenomenal status for the mind, both implicit in his 
extended discussion of brain structures and functions (Dopfer, 2004: 183-185) 
and explicit in the identification of ‘emergence’ with the dubious term 
‘supervenience’: “economic rules supervene on economic agents just as social 
agency supervenes on biological agency” (Dopfer and Potts, 2004b: 211).186 
Further, in a clear case of epistemic fallacy,187 an ontological discussion about 
social realities such as markets is converted into an epistemological issue: 
“what in epistemology is called knowledge, in ontology, computer science, 
mathematics and evolutionary economics is called a ‘rule’ (Dopfer and Potts, 
2004b: 198).188 Indeed, for Dopfer and Potts rules are pervasive; besides 
cognitive rules commanding human mind and behaviour, there are behavioural 
and blueprint rules that make up social realities such as technology, firms or 
markets (Dopfer, 2004: 181). 
Unfortunately, the authors want to account for human behaviour, personal 
knowledge and social reality by recurring to a metaphor already discredited by 
contemporary sciences. Pace Dopfer and Potts, not only human nature is 
wrongly captured by any kind of computational view, be it symbolic or 
connectionist (Latsch, 2003), but also social reality is not adequately captured 
by their “bimodal ontology”.189 The latter is unable to overcome an atomistic 
understanding of human beings and distinguish between an interactional and 
communicational level (micro) and the multi-level realm of social relations-
                                                 
185 See also the following passage: “The beauty of the neo-Darwinian model is that the 
entire process of biological evolution can be expressed on the basis of a single rule-type – 
the gene” (Dopfer, 2004: 180). 
186 How the person could have causal autonomy is not explained. 
187 About the concept of epistemic fallacy see Bhaskar (1975). For a friendly critique of 
critical realists’ epistemological statements see Cruickshank (2004). 
188 See the following statement: “an economic system is made up of knowledge in the form 
of meso rules. Rules are the elements of knowledge in the form of a structure and a 
process. The rule ontology of knowledge extends across many economic concepts” 
(Dopfer and Potts, 2004a: 8). 
189 As put by Dopfer and Potts (2004a: 9-10): “a rule is both an idea and an actualization in 
matter-energy form. Bimodality is between the idea mode (form/information) and its 
physical realization (matter-energy).” 
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structures-systems, plus the cultural entities of the system of norms, all 
emerging from those interactions and communications. 
Actually, the authors turn into social entities whatever they take as properties 
of ‘rules in the minds’ of individuals. They fall into an essentialism completely 
disconnected from the sociological research about the “generative” properties 
of human interactions (Sayer, 1997). According to the Interactionist 
epistemology that I adopt in this thesis, the proposed ‘rules’ cannot be taken 
as instructions conveying information about the appropriate behaviour of 
individuals.190 In a critique that also applies to Dopfer and Potts’s research 
programme, Dupré (2001a) and Cartwright (2001) have convincingly argued 
that the machine metaphor, even if it is a cybernetic one, is not adequate to 
our present knowledge of both human nature and social reality. From an 
‘emergent person’ point of view (see 2.5.2), and a multi-level ontology of the 
social realm, Dopfer and Potts’s ontology (2004a: 10) is clearly undermined by 
a strong interdisciplinary convergence of views.191 
I am conscious that the analysis in terms of “micro-meso-macro” levels could 
be invoked to argue that the idea of emergent levels have been integrated. 
However, the argument lacks credibility because the concept of emergence is 
absent in crucial passages of (Dopfer et al., 2004). 192 For instance, it is stated 
(Ibid, 267, 271): 
The essential point to grasp here is that macro is not a behavioural  aggregation 
of micro, but, rather, it offers a systems perspective on meso viewed as a 
whole.  Similarly, micro is not the reduced essence of an economic system; it is 
a ‘bottom up’ systems perspective on meso when viewed in terms of its 
component parts. The economic system is built upon meso; micro and macro 
are two perspectives …  
Meso change is the core of evolutionary economic processes, and the generic 
meso dynamic is called a meso trajectory.  
In these passages, as in the rest of their works, the word ‘systems’ is used 
with a vague specification of its meaning. It is not always clear if ‘systems’ 
really mean “self-organizing complex systems”, and there is no discussion 
about the problems that the transfer of such a concept into the social realm 
could bring. The absence of any reference to the literature that today 
                                                 
190 Note that “if [social] rules are determinants of actions, the causal distance is very great 
and the underdetermination immense” (Sigmund Koch quoted in Martin, 2005: 213). 
191 For another example of ontological and epistemological misunderstanding in the 
discussion of social rules, and their relation to individuals’ behaviour, see (Lazaric, 2000). 
192 Runde (2009: 374) takes note of, and points to, a contradiction in the assumed “generic 
methodological individualism” proposed by (Dopfer and Potts, 2008). 
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discusses the subject is puzzling (see Byrne, 1998; Eve et al., 1997). 
Moreover, in self-organising complex systems, the articulations between 
levels of reality cannot be treated as an epistemic issue, a question of 
“perspectives”, as it is stated. It is about the ontology of emergent levels and 
the deep nature of sociocultural systems. In my view, Runde’s (2009) review 
of this research-programme is still a charitable one. 
The second approach discussed in this sub-section is a research-programme 
proposed by Mirowski (2007), still in its beginnings. As he put it in a 
previous paper, “we shall maintain that regarding markets as a species of 
computational device would actually foster a viable and rich evolutionary 
economics, one encouraging both mathematical rigor and historical 
relevance, yet simultaneously avoiding the more mechanistic aspects of 
conventional neoclassical theory” (Mirowski and Somefun, 1998: 329). 
Despite the importance of the research about markets provided by economic 
sociology in the last decades (Fligstein and Dauter, 2007), Mirowski preferred 
“the technical engineering literature”, more precisely the “mathematics 
pioneered by John von Neumann, and now taught as basic computational 
theory” (Mirowski, 2007: 211). Building on this literature, Mirowski assumes 
the definition of “a market as a formal automaton”, in brief a “markomata” 
that performs “an integrated set of algorithms” that correspond to market 
functions and run in a computer. 
In fact, the functions addressed by Mirowski’s markomata only refer to the 
distribution and appropriation processes. His understanding of markets 
excludes production and use, even if we know that the characteristics of the 
exchange process crucially depend on the nature of what has been produced 
and the use it will have. In doing so, Mirowski excludes from his “markomata” 
model a crucial source of market change, the innovation that occurs in the 
production and in the use processes. Actually, “markomata” excludes all 
innovation, for to model market operations in terms of algorithms, it must 
leave out crucial aspects of psycho-socio-cultural life: human emotions 
involved in the execution of the work, personal interpretations of the tasks to 
be made, creativity and responsibility to solve unexpected problems, passive 
resistance to fiat, power struggles, strikes, etc. These limitations in 
Mirowski’s work are even noticed by a non-Institutionalist such as Kirman 
(2007: 292) who states: 
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Those who have espoused the institutional economics approach would argue that 
the social structure and history of market features are an essential part of 
understanding the evolution of actual markets. If it is the case that a large part of 
the environment is not susceptible to being represented as a calculating algorithm 
then we are left in difficulty. 
We know that the ultimate sources of society’s change are human beings, 
who are intrinsically relational rather than algorithmic machines, but 
Mirowski cannot integrate in his markomata truly human interactions. The 
crucial problem with his research programme is that markets are 
sociocultural realities; they are part of the economy and, as such, they have 
an institutional nature. Both firms and trade organisations (social systems) 
and the institutional norms (worldviews, business models, values) that make 
up markets bear qualitative dimensions, emerge from, and co-evolve with, 
the social life of human beings. These are historical processes that cannot be 
accounted for by algorithms.193  
Moreover, Mirowski is silent about the particular nature of the “fictitious 
commodities”, for instance labour. As one of his critics commented, “any 
theory of market evolution must account for the unique nature of labour 
power as a commodity. Unlike others commodities (and outside of a society 
based upon slavery), labour power as such, is not produced and sold as a 
commodity by profit-making enterprises” (Juniper, 2007: 273). Therefore, 
having failed to recognise the emergence of a sociocultural reality irreducible 
to human beings’ interactions and communications, in Mirowski’s analytical 
framework “the communicative, semantic, and ethno-emancipatory 
dimensions of social processes are inevitably reduced to those of 
maintenance and improved efficiency of automated processes of encryption, 
transfer, and decoding of information” (Juniper, 2007: 281).194 
To conclude, I notice that the two approaches above discussed share a 
similar understanding of human beings.195 Both have a computational 
                                                 
193 Arguing for the extreme complexity of human nature, Dupré (2001b: 185; emphasis 
mine) states: “Complexity in this context is not just a matter of very difficult sums that we 
do not yet know how to solve, but the concurrence of different kinds of factors, each of 
which may well be complex in this same sense, that we do not know how to fit. Moreover, 
there is no reason to suppose it is even possible to fit them together in the systematic, 
even algorithmic, way that is sometimes assumed.” 
194 As Juniper (2007: 272) acutely notices, “Mirowski falls into the trap of embracing yet 
another form of Laplacian reductionism, albeit through the adoption of an evolutionary 
cybernetics rather than a mechanistic dynamics.” 
195 Note that an integration of both approaches could allow “methodological individualism 
to be upheld without compromising the potential application of established modelling 
techniques” (Potts and Morrison, 2007: 310-311; emphasis mine). 
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understanding of mind and knowledge that I have criticised in detail 
elsewhere (Bateira, 2006) and both run into problems by lack of an 
emergentist understanding of sociocultural systems. Therefore, it is not 
surprising the idea of a possible integration of these streams of research. 
Firstly, as a hypothesis: “So, let us suppose we can make that leap to an 
ontologically robust and empirically rich computational taxonomy of market 
forms that ultimately reduces to the diverse rules of markets rather than the 
preferences or rationality of agents” (Ibid. 308). Finally, while taking some 
distance from Mirowski’s elision of human agency, comes the invitation: 
“Mirowski’s markomata framework is eminently workable as a general 
analytical framework for economics” (Ibid. 312). Obviously if placed within, 
and adapted to, the “micro-meso-macro” General Theory of Dopfer and Potts 
(2008), as the bulk of the comment shows. 
My final word about these two approaches, none of them Institutionalist, is to 
remind that markets are open systems; they cannot be treated as if they 
emerged only through market agents’ exchanges in a “spontaneous” process 
of ‘knowledge discovery’ à la Hayek. States always play a role in markets’ 
emergence and in their maintenance (Fligstein, 1996), which does not make 
them less spontaneous in the sense that, beyond and above the plans of 
entrepreneurs and bureaucrats, there always occur unexpected effects that 
make the emergent result different from the initially intended (Pierson, 
2000). However, both approaches neither acknowledge the importance of the 
power always present in state-market interactions, nor the less visible but no 
less important connection between power and knowledge (Juniper, 2007). 
These two points make a major difference to my thesis in respect not only to 
the emergence and nature of markets per se, but also to the motion of the 
market system and the overall economy, as it will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
195 
 
 
Chapter 5  
Markets and economic evolution 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Thorstein Veblen, the founder of Original Institutionalism, has not discussed 
firms and markets in detail; his concept of ‘institutions’ was enough vague to 
incorporate both. His understanding of economic evolution, strongly inspired 
by the work of Darwin, emphasised the non-teleological nature of 
sociocultural motion against the neoclassical idea of a tendency to 
equilibrium. In some sense this emphasis lead him to overlook the power of 
human agency to change organisations and society. He acknowledges it, but 
his analytical focus was the long term. He paid more attention to the 
destabilising effects of technological change, and to the habits moulded by 
‘institutions’, and the correspondent process of overall selective adaptation 
translated into economic change. 
Differently from Veblen, John Commons emphasised “the human will in 
action” and saw social processes as results “intended or unintended, of 
purposeful action of individuals and collective actors” (Bazzoli, 2000: 67). 
While Veblen’s close connection with Darwin’s thinking has inspired the 
adoption of a ‘population model’ of sociocultural evolution, Commons focus 
on human action and the exercise of power led him to avoid the process of 
‘natural’ selection associated with such model. His evolutionary process was 
one of ‘artificial’ selection. This divide in the first generation of 
Institutionalist economists has resurfaced in the last decade following the 
renaissance of Original Institutionalism since the eighties of the twentieth 
century. 
In the second section of this chapter I discuss the different stances of today’s 
version of the above mentioned debate and argue for a Naturalist perspective 
about economic evolution that, in my view, overcomes and goes beyond the 
dispute. As I understand it, the evolutionary process at the sociocultural level 
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of Nature has specificities that require a shift of concepts and vocabulary; 
rather than ‘evolution’, what is at stake is the ‘history’ of human societies. 
The third section recalls the contributions of Schumpeter and the Austrian 
school, which are more in line with my claim about sociocultural specificity, 
and then I develop an Interactionist model that frames my historical 
understanding of markets’ motion. To prepare the introduction of this model 
I present a multi-dimensional concept of ‘time’ and discuss the limitations of 
the ‘path dependence’ model so much praised in the Institutionalist and 
evolutionary economics literature. 
5.2 What is economic evolution? 
5.2.1 A debate on the good analogy 
As shown in the second chapter of this thesis, Veblen and Hayek’s 
contributions focused on the long-run dynamics of institutions. In vague 
terms, both took Darwin’s framework as a reference in their analysis of 
sociocultural evolution. On the contrary, Polanyi adopted a purposeful-change 
perspective by focusing on political struggles for different projects addressing 
markets and the way they mobilised the state. It seems that this divide bears 
no connection with the situation of present-day Institutional economics and its 
main orientations. 
Besides the stream of New Institutionalism that shares the core tenets of 
neoclassical economics, and thus belongs to the mainstream of the discipline, 
there is a fundamental split in economics heterodoxy on what concerns the 
understanding of economic evolution: (1) a strand composed by a core group 
that invokes the general principles of Neo-Darwinism to use a meta-theoretical 
scheme, and invoke an affiliation to Veblen, and by a number of economists 
that (more or less) diverge on the interpretation and use of that scheme, and 
also draw on different legacies; (2) a second strand argues for a concept of 
evolution mostly inspired by the physics concept of self-organising open 
systems, attribute to Marshall a crucial forerunning intuition, and draw 
inspiration mainly from the non-equilibrium economics of Schumpeter.196 
                                                 
196 Acknowledging the above-mentioned heterogeneity, Foster (2000: 312) regrets that 
“following the lead of Nelson and Winter (1982), many post-Schumpeterian evolutionary 
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Having in mind the disciplinary object of economic phenomena, the two 
strands reject immediate analogies with biological evolution and recognise the 
need to build a conceptual scheme at a sufficient level of abstraction in order 
to frame scientific research in different domains. Accordingly, the first strand 
proposes a conceptual scheme, firstly under the label of Universal Darwinism 
and later ‘generalised Darwinism’ (GD) (Aldrich et al., 2008; Hodgson and 
Knudsen, 2006), which is constituted by a set of general principles (variation, 
replication-inheritance and selection)197 that, “along with essential and auxiliary 
explanations specific to each scientific domain, may apply to a range of 
possible mechanisms” (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004: 284). 
On the other hand, authors of the second stream see GD as “an abstract 
reduction of the Darwinian principles and, as such, still domain specific” (Witt, 
2003: 12).198 Therefore, they argue for a more general definition: “Evolution is 
the self-transformation over time of a system under consideration. In this 
definition, the term ‘transformation’ means a process of change governed by 
regularities. The prefix in ‘self-transformation’ points to the endogenous 
sources and causes of novelty” (Ibid, 13). Obviously, the validity of such 
schemes is dependent on their assumptions about human nature, on the 
ontological stance about sociocultural systems, and on the explanation of the 
micro-macro linkage. From my point of view, these conceptual 
schemes/principles suffer from serious weaknesses and inspire theoretical 
choices that I think are inconsistent with a social science that takes seriously 
the interdisciplinary dialogue.  
In the formulation proposed by Hodgson and Knudsen (2004), the scheme of 
GD seems problematic on various accounts. Despite the invoked higher level 
of abstraction, the scheme used in the analysis of firms and markets has a 
                                                                                                                                     
economists have tended to rely upon the biological analogy of natural selection, either of 
Darwinian or Lamarckian type.” 
197 The Darwinian scheme involves three processes: variation occurs among members of a 
population of organisms (or species); some variation is replicated and inherited by 
organisms’ offspring; organisms (more or less adapted) are differentially successful in 
reproducing, which leads to changes in the distribution of the different ‘types’ of 
organisms in the population (selection). 
198 Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) present an application of GD that attempts to deepen the 
contribution of Nelson and Winter (1982). An evolutionary explanation that highlights the 
selection effects of market competition, and observes the structural change that it 
produces in the market – its evolution – is proposed by Metcalfe (1998). A more 
elaborated model that accounts for the interdependence between the (guided) variation 
among competitors, developmental processes in firms, and market selection is described 
in Foster and Metcalfe (2001b). 
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structure provided by Neo-Darwinism, which is biology’s mainstream 
paradigm.199 In fact, although Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) integrate in their 
framework the idea of inheritance of socially acquired characteristics, usually 
imputed to Lamarck, their analysis of the replication-inheritance process is 
analogous to the geneticist, Neo-Darwinian explanation. Accordingly, in 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004) firms are considered social realities but, at the 
same time, they are treated in ‘anthropomorphised’ terms;200 firms are 
supposed to have “behavioural capacities” (routines) that “involve knowledge 
and memory” (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004: 290) thereby at least implicitly 
accepting the problematic idea of ‘collective knowledge’. Further, routines are 
treated as the organisations’ analogues of genes, that is, as (social) replicators: 
“routines replicate from group to group and from organization to 
organization” (Ibid, 291).  
On this point I note that the term routine has been introduced in the human 
and social sciences by the cybernetics-based thinking of Herbert Simon, and 
popularised in economics by Nelson and Winter (1982). It belongs to the 
dominant school in psychology usually labelled ‘cognitivism’—the brain is like 
a computer, mind its software, and knowledge the outcome of algorithmic 
operations—which has been considered the ‘modern dualism’ version of body-
mind articulation (Cilliers, 1998; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). For this reason, in 
the following discussion I assume that cognitivism is a problematic option in 
what concerns the understanding of mind and cognition. As argued previously, 
only a developmental interactivist understanding of human nature (and hence 
of cognition) is consistent with the results of current research in different 
sciences. Adding to this fundamental inadequacy at the biological and 
psychological level, a Neo-Darwinist understanding of sociocultural evolution 
adds new and important problems that I will discuss in the following. 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2004: 291) recognise some difficulties in the use of 
the GD scheme, namely in replicating routines. Rather than a matter of 
‘knowledge transfer’, as they see the replication of routines, what occurs is a 
                                                 
199 Here I take Hodgson’s (2004b: 53) definition of Neo-Darwinism: “A doctrine denying the 
possibility of the (genotypic) inheritance of acquired (phenotypic) characters by individual 
organisms in evolutionary processes.” For theoretical and empirically supported critiques 
of Neo-Darwinism formulated in the eighties of last century, see Depew and Weber (1989) 
and (Ho, 1988). 
200 “Just as individuals have habits; groups have routines. We regard routines as the 
organizational analogue of habits” (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004: 289; emphasis mine). 
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much different process, one of interactive ‘re-construction’. It must be said 
that “the transfer of technologies, management procedures, corporate 
multidivisional structures, accounting conventions and much else” (Ibid, 291) 
is always a ‘local’ interactive process. This means that persons involved, 
physical infrastructure, organisational setting, and higher-level social 
structures contingently determine firm specific processes. Indeed, as Layder 
(1997: 82) reminds, “in speaking of [social] domains we must be careful not to 
think of them as static things or entities – for they are intrinsically social 
processes whose dynamism derives from the productive and reproductive 
effects of social activities.” 
To see this more clearly, consider the situation of a firm that recruits a 
competitor’s manager (or adopts a strategy proposed by a consultant) that has 
been successful in another firm of the same industry. Anyone that has 
business experience knows that this is no guarantee of success for the host 
firm; the interactions that occur in the latter after the introduction of 
organisational changes will give rise to new ‘routines’; I mean, new social 
relations, not replications of the original ones. What I want to stress is that the 
rules adopted within an organisation are part of a social process in ongoing re-
construction, which means that they are at the same time reproduced and 
transformed. Therefore, rules cannot fulfil the gene-inspired Neo-Darwinian 
criteria of “copying fidelity”; routines do not have essences that could be 
copied, although ‘rules’ when understood as ‘public knowledge’ exist. But 
their ‘downward causation’ will have different outcomes according to the 
social setting where they are used. Ultimately, Witt (1999) converges with my 
argument when he states: “Different people involved in the same routines may 
mean different developments. Subjective and situational factors crop up again 
and determine the decisions actually produced within routines.” Therefore, 
those like Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) who have followed Nelson and Winter 
(1982) made a theoretical choice that rests on a problematic understanding of 
human nature and sociocultural reality, and thus overlook the mechanisms by 
which creativity and emotions are built into human interactions giving rise to 
social relations and their dynamics.201 The idea of routines being copied from 
firm to firm is at odds with the emergentist view of sociocultural reality, which 
                                                 
201 This topic is closely connected with the work of Feldman (2000) about the intrinsic 
dynamic nature of routinised behaviour, which Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) do not refer. 
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is a legacy of the Original Institutionalism also invoked by Hodgson and 
Knudsen. 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2004: 294) discuss the selection of routines within 
firms but it is far from clear how they see different routines competing for 
resources within the same functional department of the firm. Typically, in the 
same moment there is no population of competing routines for the same task 
in a department of a firm, and it is imaginable only in very circumscribed 
domains that a successful routine in a specific department (say accounting) 
could be selected and applied in all departments of the firm.202 In brief, the 
gene-inspired view of market competition as an evolutionary process that 
selects firms differentially adapted, and therefore selects for routines 
(replicators) that are passed on, is in fact an inadequate analogy.203 
The difficulties extend to other aspects of the GD scheme, which takes fitness 
to environmental ‘pressure’ (a situation of scarce resources) as the core 
mechanism of evolution, independently of the processes that explain 
individuals’ ontogeny and their differences, which is usually called ‘blind 
variation’. Certainly, some evolutionary economists (but not the hard-line of 
the stream) have well understood that evolution (at least) in the social realm 
intertwines variation and selection processes through relations of feed-back 
and feed-forward (Foster and Metcalfe, 2001a). The fact that we are dealing 
with individuals guided by meaningful interactions and by projects about their 
environment makes creation of variety largely targeted, future-oriented and 
ecologically constructed (Jablonka, 2000). In fact, Hodgson and Knudsen 
(2004: 283) also recognise this specific character of sociocultural evolution 
and formulate their stance as follows: “even if there were a very different  
system of replication, including one that allowed the ‘Lamarckian’ inheritance 
of acquired characters, a coherent account of the evolutionary process would 
still require key elements of the Darwinian theory. … such Lamarckism 
requires Darwinism to complete its explanations, and is not an alternative to 
it.” More specifically, “insofar as organisms are purposeful, this capacity too 
                                                 
202 Hodgson and Knudsen (2004: 294; emphasis mine) state that “some selection may 
result from internal managerial action, due to perceptions of the relative efficiency of 
different routines … By internal or external mechanisms, some routines are copied more 
than others.” 
203 The use of Neo-Darwinist ‘variation’ and ‘inheritance’ concepts in the study of institutions 
(sociocultural systems such as the economy, the state or science) cannot convince. These 
systems have a long history based on adaptive changes but they never have given rise to 
entities of the same nature (new interactors) conveying mutated routines (new replicators). 
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has evolved through natural selection. … Hence overall, Darwinism is a more 
general and powerful theory than Lamarckism” (Hodgson, 2004b: 54). 
However, the introduction of a Lamarckian component in the GD scheme has 
not cleared the omission of the mechanisms that generate variety in the 
population of firms, nor has it connected in a co-evolutionary way the firm to 
its environment (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). This is confirmed in (Aldrich et 
al., 2008: 590, 591; emphasis mine) where we can read: 
Crucially, Darwinism focuses our attention on the possible mechanisms 
through which variety is preserved and created. … In these cases the new 
environment, and the (relative) isolation of a group from the majority, create 
new opportunities for variation. 
After the initial suggestion that “variety is created” follows the recognition that 
Darwinism only sees “opportunities” for variety; the causal mechanisms that 
create novelty are outside the GD scheme.204 Foster (1997: 433) perceptively 
noticed this fragility when he states that GD “continues to use the selfish gene 
as a biological analogy. The gene has simply become ‘cleverer’ in adapting to 
experience.” Neo-Darwinism, even when GD is complemented with the much 
problematic Evolutionary Psychology (Vromen, 2001),205 leads Institutional 
economics into serious difficulties if we want to explain market processes, 
even more than Neo-Darwinism already faces in the biological and 
psychological realms (see next sub-section).206 
I proceed with the discussion of the second strand in evolutionary economics, 
the ‘self-organisation’ approach mostly argued by Foster (1997; 2005b). This 
author has argued that there is only one process common to all levels of 
reality, the self-organisation of non-equilibrium, thermodynamically open 
systems. These processes, which have been studied in physic-chemical 
                                                 
204 “Darwin (1859) was aware of this. In Chapter 4 of the Origin of Species, he reminded his 
readers that, ‘the term Natural Selection implies only the preservation of such variations 
as arise and are beneficial to the being under its condition of life’” (Ho, 1988: 120; 
emphasis mine). 
205 For Evolutionary Psychology (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994: 328) the mind is a 
manifestation (an epiphenomenon) of brain activity, which is of an algorithmic nature. 
Obviously, everybody accepts that the mind depends on the activity of the brain; but can we 
ontologically reduce the mind to neurophysiological activity? In this respect, it is striking in 
Vromen’s (2001) discussion the absence of any reference to ‘emergence’ as a relevant 
concept to frame the understanding of both human nature and institutions. 
206 For instance, the Darwinian “principle of heredity”, which inspires the analogous 
“doctrine of continuity” (Hodgson, 2004b: 96), admits two types of traits: some “inherited” 
from parents through genes; others “acquired” from the environment. However, 
developmental research rules out such dichotomy because it redefines the nature and role 
of both genes and environment. See (Moore, 2003) and (Bateson, 2001) about this point. 
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systems and gained wide notoriety with the work of Ilya Prigogine (Prigogine 
and Stengers, 1979), are also present in the biological domain in the particular 
case of autopoietic systems studied by Maturana and Varela (1980). According 
to Foster (1997: 440), the Hayekian concept of ‘spontaneous order’ 
corresponds to self-organisation processes at work in social systems. About 
the latter, Foster puts forward that the interactions within the system, and of 
the system with the environment, are made of knowledge: “The deliberate 
acquisition of knowledge … is the hallmark of advanced economic activity. … 
Economic organizations, like their biological counterparts, export entropy in 
structures that embody obsolete knowledge. However, this need not involve 
the sorting processes which tend to come into play in biological self-
organisation” (1997: 443). Therefore, the evolutionary scheme presents two 
core features: economic systems emerge from human interactions based on 
the “skilful acquisition and imaginative use of knowledge” (Ibid, 443); the 
evolution of economic systems is given in their irreversible, non-linear 
trajectory in history, which includes periods of structural change. 
I find a crucial problem in Foster’s evolutionary scheme based on the principle 
of universal self-organisation (US-O). Despite the evolutionary emergence of 
the human cognitive and communicational capabilities, and their centrality to 
sociocultural dynamics, Foster overlooks these roots and goes to state: “once 
we abandon biological analogy in favour of an economic self-organisation 
approach, as outlined, then we are no longer interested in the microscopic 
details of selection mechanisms” (Foster, 1997: 444). So formulated, this is as 
if the macro-level could emerge only out of self-organising processes, while its 
micro-units depend on both self-organising and Darwinian processes. 
Therefore, we are faced with a scheme that makes social systems evolve 
according to processes less complex than those that underlie the evolution of 
the entities that give rise to them. Foster’s contribution ignores that not only 
humans but also other living systems, and possibly physic-chemical systems as 
well, all develop according to self-organising processes that appear intertwined 
with selection of variant resources or paths (Weber and Depew, 2001). 
Moreover, Foster does not see that only allowing for such intertwining are we 
able to understand the emergence and development of human cognitive 
processes and human intelligence upon which human sociality and 
sociocultural systems emerged, as convincingly argued by Christensen and 
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Hooker (1999) in their critical assessment of D. T. Campbell’s model of 
‘variation with selective retention’ (VSR). In these authors’ formulation, “an 
SDAL [self-directed anticipative learning] process has VSR aspects to it, but per 
se this is extremely uninformative. It is precisely the way the generation of 
variation (in the form of anticipative process modulators) and selection (the 
capture constraints—the ability of the system to recognize useful information) 
is modified by the interaction process that is important to its learning 
capacity” (Christensen and Hooker, 1999: S247; emphasis mine). In brief, 
developmental processes based on living systems’ interactions with their 
environment do incorporate variation and selection processes, and it is not 
evident why the sociocultural realm should escape to such pattern. 
Despite avoiding an explicit analogy with the physic-chemical level, Witt (2003: 
13) shares with Foster (1997) the view of evolution as “the self-transformation 
of a system under consideration”. Emergence and dissemination of novelty 
constitute core “domain–unspecific features of evolution” (Ibid, 13).207 After 
having presented his own formulation of the US-O scheme of evolution, Witt 
seems to acknowledge the above mentioned problem of the micro-macro 
disconnection in Foster’s scheme: “there is no doubt that the human species is 
a result of evolution. Yet, the human economy is, at least in its modern forms, 
hardly explicable in terms of the theory of natural selection” (Witt, 2003: 3). 
The solution that Witt proposes— “a central ontological assumption” of his 
work (Ibid, 15)—is as follows: “Somewhere in the history of human kind there 
is, thus, a point where the power of Darwinian evolutionary theory for 
explaining (economic) behaviour ends. But evolutionary change continues 
beyond that point – only with different means and in other forms” (Ibid, 3). 
According to Witt (2003: 15-16) natural selection is historically antecedent to 
man-made, sociocultural evolution and “in this sense  there is, thus, also an 
ontological continuity despite the fact that the mechanisms and regularities of 
cultural evolution differ from those of natural evolution. (Both kinds of 
evolution of course share the few, abstract evolutionary principles [US-O] 
outlined in the previous section.)” 
                                                 
207 In a critical observation about the absence in (Foster, 1997) of emergence internal to 
evolving systems, Witt acknowledges that “self-organization models are also subject to the 
epistemological limitation … they still have to leave open what actually emerges” (Witt, 
2003: 14). 
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In fact, Witt’s (2003) contribution not only does not question the problematic 
assumptions of Foster’s (1997) US-O scheme but also adds a new weakness 
with his particular understanding of cultural change. Witt (2003: chap. 7) 
accepts Neo-Darwinism outside the sociocultural domain and argues that 
human biological evolution stopped in a remote period of history after which 
human beings appear to have acquired the present bodily characteristics 
(which includes genes and brain architecture); since then unfolds the history of 
mankind also named cultural evolution.208 This is based on the ‘double-
inheritance’ view (Boyd and Richerson, 1985) of human nature, which also 
underlies Hodgson’s (2004b: 423) discussion of habits supported by instincts. 
The latter are seen as ‘programmes’ that “have slowly evolved over millions of 
years” and form a biological basis for the acquisition of habits themselves also 
inherited from past generations.209 The problem with this view of human 
beings, understood as the outcome of two major ‘information’ systems 
(genetic, cultural), is that it has been strongly criticised by solid arguments 
coming from scholars of different sciences (Ingold, 2000a; Martin et al., 2003; 
Oyama et al., 2001a). But Witt is not alone (see Hodgson, 2004b; Vromen, 
2004) in his unawareness of the ‘science wars’ that Evolutionary Psychology 
has raised among biologists and philosophers of biology (Segerstråle, 2000).210 
In the rest of this section I will argue that this ‘double inheritance’ dichotomy, 
as well as the analytical separation between human evolution and sociocultural 
history, is ill conceived. But, before that, three central issues in the above 
presented debate should be clarified: 1) the argument that we need a 
‘population thinking’ to account for the emergence of variation;211 2) the 
rejection by the proponents of GD of the critique that they are making a 
biological ‘analogy’; 3) the ontological dichotomy (‘monism versus dualism’) 
                                                 
208 About the evolution of human mind and preferences Witt (2003: Chapter 7) refers to 
the sociobiology literature and implicitly subscribes to the Evolutionary Psychology of 
Cosmides and Tooby (1987). For a convincing critique of Evolutionary Psychology, see 
(Dupré, 1987; 2001b), (Lloyd, 1999), (Panksepp and Panksepp, 2000) and (Lickliter and 
Berry, 1990). 
209 Griffiths (2002: 71; emphasis mine) states: “the concept of innateness conflates a 
number of independent biological properties and is thus a confusing and unhelpful notion 
with which to understand behavioral or cognitive development.” See also (Bateson, 2001). 
210 Vromen (2007) discusses the concept of ‘consilience’ of knowledge in the different 
sciences proposed by the biologist Edward O. Wilson. I agree with his statement that 
“conformity should be sought only with solidly verified knowledge in other disciplines” 
(Ibid, 47); precisely, this is an important cause of Evolutionary Psychology discredit among 
so many biologists. 
211 In Hodgson’s (2004b: 96) words, “the understanding of any item must also consider the 
population of similar entities in which that variation is present or possible.” 
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used by Witt to classify different streams within evolutionary economics. I 
discuss below these items in the reverse order. 
Witt (2008: 550) assumes that there are two modalities of ontology used by 
evolutionary economists: the monist ontology, which he sees as providing 
continuity between the biological domain and the economic domain, as 
suggested by the modern sociobiology; the dualist ontology, which he equals 
to the rejection of that continuity, and associates to the theories of economic 
evolution that seek sociocultural explanations without explicitly assuming the 
above mentioned continuity. The dichotomy is thus generated by the relevance 
of the ‘principle of continuity’, which is based on Evolutionary Psychology 
through its geneticist explanations of brain modularity and their connection to 
important aspects of human behaviour. Unfortunately, this is a much 
problematic theory and institutional economists would better ignore it (see 
references in footnote 72). Instead of overemphasising the biological 
continuity, we should acknowledge both the relative continuity and the very 
specific novelty of human beings as ‘persons’; the sophisticated biological 
nature of persons and their distinct capabilities in multiple domains are most 
visible in their intelligence and linguistic capabilities. To study sociocultural 
evolution we need not to choose between monism and dualism. We have the 
alternative to acknowledge that the emergent levels of Nature are organised, 
and change, according to specific principles that have emerged upon 
evolutionary previous ones. The ecological emergence of human beings as 
persons is alien to the geneticist Evolutionary Psychology. In brief, I state that 
economic processes can only be studied according to principles of 
sociocultural change inspired by a multi-level emergentist ontology, something 
that is beyond the dichotomy provided by Witt (2008: 555). 
Now I turn to Hodgson’s understanding of the analogy. According to Bailer-
Jones (2002), the analogy has an hybrid nature as it bears ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ analogical aspects. The ‘realism’ of the analogy is relative, it 
depends on the weight of the commonalities existent between the relations 
internal to one system (biological system) and the relations internal to a 
system of a different kind (sociocultural system). Therefore, the epistemic 
status of the analogy should be placed between the ‘isomorphism’ and the 
‘metaphor’. Note that both systems and their components are different, and 
yet there is an isomorphism when the relations that structure each system are 
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of the same kind. On the contrary, in the metaphor there is a large semantic 
distance between these relations, which makes the metaphor a rather vague 
comparison, a tool for the imagination of a researcher looking for an insight 
into the reality he is studying. In brief, what is under scrutiny is not the nature 
of the systems (e.g. biological versus sociocultural) or their components; it is 
the relative weight of the commonalities between the relations that constitute 
them. 
Now let us look to (Aldrich et al., 2008) and see how, defending GD, the 
critique of making the analogy between the sociocultural and the biological 
domain is rejected. The generalised Darwinian principles of variation, selection 
and inheritance are argued to apply in the sociocultural level of reality 
because, similarly to the biological level, it also has “complex population 
systems”212: 
In this manner, the common ontological features of all complex population 
systems, including in nature and human society, are established, without 
ignoring the huge differences of detail between them (Ibid, 353). 
… the idea of generalizing Darwinism is not about analogies and does not 
depend on the proposition that the detailed mechanisms of social and 
biological evolution are similar (Ibid, 591-592).  
As we can see, the fundamental reason to reject the critique that GD scheme 
builds on the analogy between the biological and the sociocultural systems is 
that the entities of these systems are hugely different and their evolutionary 
mechanisms are also different in detail. Thus, we can deduce that, 
notwithstanding the differences in the details, the evolutionary mechanisms 
are formally similar. However, these differences are consistent with the above-
given definition of analogy. The proponents of GD are indeed making an 
analogical reasoning, because what counts for the existence of the analogy is 
the formal similarity between the principles (the Darwinian principles) that 
organise the evolutionary process in both levels of reality, hence the idea of “a 
degree of ontological communality at a highly abstract level” (Ibid, 592). On 
this point Witt (2008: 551) is right when he states that “the borrowing of these 
domain-specific abstractions by other disciplines means, of course, that they 
still rely on an analogy construction, albeit an abstract one.”  
                                                 
212 This expression is problematic: ‘populations’ are merely sets of individuals while 
‘complex systems’, when also self-organising, are sets of individuals interacting in 
accordance to relations established between themselves, and relating to the external 
environment, thereby acquiring emergent properties. These terms belong to different 
analytical approaches and thus cannot go together. 
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Finally, I argue that the ‘population perspective’ overlooks the systemic 
organisation of processes, which is pervasive at all levels of Nature. I see 
societies and institutions as complex self-organising, sociocultural systems 
whose structures are made of organisations and norms. Their emergence 
manifests in system-wide properties arising from internal and necessary 
social relations that make up roles/positions and from semiotic 
communications that give meaning to such social relations (Queiroz and El-
Hani, 2006). As discussed in previous chapters, such emergentist 
understanding of sociocultural systems is not only consistent with the 
creativity of individuals but even needs such creativity in order to produce 
continuous change, even at the core of the reproduction of the self-
organising processes that constitute these systems. Novelty is inherent in the 
metaphysics of process adopted in this thesis. 
Contrastingly, a “population” of individuals is a concept that overlooks the 
relations that bond the entities related. To be fair, Hodgson and Knudsen 
(2006: 4) also refer to “entities that interact”. However, interactions (even if 
repeated) are events at the empirical level while social relations emerge from 
these interactions, and thus belong to the structural level; they endure 
beyond the individuals that transitorily occupy the roles or positions that are 
bonded. Therefore, “population” thinking leaves out what is specific to 
sociocultural reality, and in fact carries an unacknowledged reductionism that 
Hodgson otherwise rejects. 
The understanding here argued is supported by Fracchia and Lewontin 
(1999: 69, 70) who charge the analogies inspired by Neo-Darwinism of either 
“dissolving society into a collection of individuals” or making “the reduction 
of differential social power to the status of a subordinate variable, [which] 
precludes the possibility that social systems might have properties unique to 
them as organized systems … This dissolution means, in turn, that social 
hierarchy and inequality are explained as just the consequence of the 
differential cultural fitness of individuals or of the cultural traits they bear, 
rather than, say, as a consequence of antagonistic and exploitative social 
relations.” A parallel critique is also addressed to the theories of cultural 
evolution proposed by different authors (Dawkins, Cavalli-Sforza and 
Feldman, Richerson and Boyd, Durham) who are charged to “pay lip service to 
the complexity of culture” (Ibid, p. 71). 
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To conclude, sociocultural systems are not “populations” of (replicated and 
transmitted) “habits, customs, rules and routines, all of which may carry 
solutions to adaptive problems” (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006: 5). Although 
these authors confidently state that “the type of complex population system 
that we are assuming is highly relevant for evolutionary discourse in the 
social sciences” (Ibid, p. 4, n. 6, emphasis mine), it seems to me that in light 
of the above presented discussion the concept of “complex population 
system” is not only eclectic but also absolutely inadequate for Institutional 
economics research. 
After all, neither the proponents of the GD scheme, nor those of the US-O 
scheme, are aware that they are arguing for the ‘right’ analogy with the 
evolutionary principles of another level of Nature, be it the biological or physic-
chemical. Both have not realised that the emergence of a sociocultural level 
brought with itself new kinds of evolutionary principles, which economics is 
supposed to study in the domain of the institution ‘economy’. Does this mean 
that we should detach evolution at sociocultural level from evolution at the 
other levels of Nature? My answer is no. We only have to engage in a genuine 
interdisciplinary dialogue in order to establish the specificity of the 
sociocultural level of Nature and how, as a new level of reality, it has genuine 
causal powers over the other levels while emerging from them (see Chapter 3). 
In the next sub-section I will show that besides Neo-Darwinism, there is in 
biology another theory with which Institutional economics could establish a 
more productive dialogue. Even so, I will argue that the very abstract 
commonalities that we can identify across different levels of Nature do not 
provide principles that could be productively applied in the study of 
sociocultural evolution. 
5.2.2 Overcoming the debate 
My aim in this subsection is (insofar as I am competent) to connect with the 
state of the art in biology and related sciences in order to dissolve the on 
going debate in evolutionary economics between a strand inspired by Neo-
Darwinism and another inspired by physic-chemical complex self-organising 
systems, even if the latter is presented under the dressings of the 
Schumpeterian formulation of an economic system transforming itself ‘from 
within’. 
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The first point that needs to be settled connects with the more fundamental 
discussion about human nature (see 2.5.2), and refers to the contemporary 
discourse on the role of genes, which are seen to drive human development 
and determine species-typical traits. The idea that we are born with evolved 
innate capacities (that just wait to be activated in a cultural setting) is based on 
the encoding view that the genome carries information from one context of 
development into another. And yet, Ingold (2000b: 382) draws on sound 
research when he states that “taken on its own, however, the DNA ‘specifies’ 
nothing. It is, after all, just a molecule, and a remarkably inert one at that.” 
This statement has the merit to remind evolutionary economists that the DNA 
is only “a reactant, and the particular reactions it sets in train depend upon the 
total organismic context in which it is situated. … it is the cellular machinery 
that ‘reads’ the DNA, and that reading is part and parcel of the very 
development of the organism in its environment” (Ibid, 382). Criticising the 
view of the gene as a ‘source of information’, long ago a biologist (Oyama, 
1988: 261; emphasis mine) stated that “any biologically interesting notion of 
information must be interactively defined … and what is crucial is not 
permanence but availability [of resources, internal and external to the 
organism] at the appropriate time” (Ibid, 261; emphasis mine). 
Because this is a central concept, and one mostly taken for granted by 
evolutionary economics researchers (‘replicator’ is the term mostly used in the 
literature), I think it is useful to quote at length a philosopher and historian of 
biology: 
The principal historical baggage of the gene concept dates back to the view 
of genes as the basic units (the atoms) of life. But what is a gene? The fact 
of the matter is that molecular biologists employ a number of different 
definitions, and they need all of the variations (Keller, 2005: 3) 
(…) 
By contrast to the gene, we do know what DNA is – we can spell out its 
sequence, and we can observe the remarkable stability of that sequence over 
the course of generations. But the most important lesson we have learned is 
that virtually every biologically significant property conventionally attributed 
to the DNA – including its stability – is in fact a relational property, a 
consequence of the dynamic interactions between DNA and the many protein 
processors that converge upon it. The very meaning of any DNA sequence is 
relational – for the purpose of understanding development or disease, the 
patterns of genetic expression are what really matters, and these patterns 
are under the control of a vastly complex regulatory apparatus, and they 
cannot be predicted from knowledge of the sequence alone. (Ibid, 4; 
emphasis mine) 
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Such “relational” view of genes as interactively constructed processes-
resources means that the Neo-Darwinian “replicator-interactor” distinction 
and the associated idea that genes command the ‘development’ of an 
individual while the environment commands the ‘evolution’ of the population 
of individualshas no consensual support among biologists.213 “The 
replicator/interactor distinction is not driven by considerations of evolutionary 
theory. It is the projection into evolution of the dichotomous views of 
development” (Griffiths and Gray, 1994: 298).214 
What is under attack is the idea that the inheritance of the ‘genetic material’ 
(actually an interactive process) is the decisive cause of human development, 
culture being an additional but secondary cause that ultimately does not count 
in terms of biological inheritance. Opposing this view, an important stream of 
biologists claims that “the life cycle of an organism is developmentally 
constructed, not programmed or preformed. It comes into being through 
interactions between the organism and its surroundings as well as interactions 
within the organism” (Oyama et al., 2001b: 4; emphasis mine). 
Building on this radical reformulation of the concept of ontogeny, we can 
extract important differences between what has been called a Developmental 
Systems Theory (DST) and mainstream Neo-Darwinism: a) human beings 
develop through multiple-level, joint determination of multiple causes, and 
thus it is wrong to give causal primacy to genes; b) what we inherit is much 
more than genes, it is a set of resources including physic, biological, human 
and socio-cultural entities; c) the environment is not a static reality to which 
individuals must fit, rather the organism and a number of resources in its 
environment entertain developmental processes that change over time. These 
processes, the developmental resources therein implicated, and the relevant 
environment for the organism make a complex unit labelled ‘developmental 
system’. 
“From a developmental systems perspective, [the relevant unit] is a process—
the life cycle. … Each life cycle is initiated by a period in which the functional 
structures characteristic of the lineage must be reconstructed from relatively 
                                                 
213 For a review of recent research and a clear explanation of why the ‘gene’ is not a 
structural unit, see (El-Hani, 2007). 
214 According to Griffiths (1997: 425), “concepts of information transmission and 
programmed development turn out to be either pseudo-explanatory substitutes for real 
developmental biology, or applicable symmetrically to many different kinds of 
developmental resource.” 
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simple resources. At this point there must be potential for variations in the 
developmental resources to restructure the life cycle in a way that is reflected 
in descendant cycles” (Griffiths and Gray, 1994: 296). That is, variations in 
different types of resources may occur within developmental processes.  
In the DST vision the unit of evolution is thus the life cycle, the developmental 
processes that (varying more or less) in each reconstruction give rise to a 
stable organic form. “A population of individual developmental systems will 
exhibit variation and differential reproduction for a number of reasons. 
Parental life cycles mail fail to generate the full system of resources required 
reconstructing the life cycle. Resources generated by the activities of an entire 
population … may also be scarce, or patchily distributed so that some 
individuals lack an important element of their developmental system. Finally, 
persistent resources … may be scarce or patchy and so some individuals may 
be unable to re-establish the relationship to these resources that is part of 
their life cycle” (Griffiths and Gray, 2001: 207-208; emphasis mine). Not less 
important, as much as failures of development, innovative modifications in the 
developmental system are also causes of variety that carry evolutionary 
advantages. 
Despite the deep conceptual reformulation proposed, DST is still able to 
accommodate the Darwinian notions of inheritance and variety. It also admits 
the possibility of competition for resources whenever “two or more 
developmental processes utilize the same resources, and there is a limit to 
these resources” (Griffiths and Gray, 1994: 301). Further, it also 
accommodates the concept of population, although in this case the individuals 
are the differentially reproductive ‘life cycles’. It also acknowledges a broader 
environment whose changes impinge on the organism through the mediation 
of the “organism-referent environment”, thereby leading to adaptations. 
Rejecting any teleological understanding of fitness, it is acknowledged that 
developmental systems “vary in their success in reconstructing themselves and 
[could] be selected on that basis” (Griffiths and Gray, 2001: 209; emphasis 
mine). 
With this brief outline of DST I have arrived to a picture of natural processes 
that intertwines self-organisation and selection at multiple levels.215 The life 
cycle is at the same time the unit of development and the unit of selection, the 
                                                 
215 See also (Weber and Depew, 2001: 243). 
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former being the focus of analysis in the frame of one or more generations 
and the latter the focus of analysis in broad space-time scales, the evolutionary 
process. Rather than the dichotomised Neo-Darwinian idea of ‘development 
cum natural selection’, in the DST approach evolution “is the result of 
interactions in which outcomes are codetermined, or co-constructed, by 
populations [of life cycles] and environments with their own, often intricately 
related, histories and characteristics” (Oyama et al., 2001b: 6).216 
In brief, at the crossroad of different disciplines (physics and chemistry, 
molecular biology, ecology and psychology) it is emerging in the last two 
decades a new paradigm of evolution that dissolves the traditional antagonism 
between Neo-Darwinism and its critiques who work on self-organising complex 
systems and developmental biology (Griffiths, 1997). For social scientists the 
DST paradigm is important because it proposes an extended concept of 
inheritance that deals with the sociocultural features of the environment as 
developmental resources, in equal footing to biological ones. 
Dissolving the entrenched dichotomies of ‘nature versus nurture’, the 
relational/interactional framework enables us to see that sociocultural 
elements play a central role in the generation-by-generation life cycle 
reconstruction that makes possible the development of an adult person and 
thus to see that, rather than another-reality-to-interact-with, culture has always 
been part of human development. “Culture does not “arise from” nature, nor is 
it “constrained” by it. … culture is part of nature” (Weber and Depew, 2001: 
249). Because cultural resources are indispensable components of each-
generation-reconstructed developmental systems, as much as ‘genes’, Ingold 
(2000a: 63; emphasis mine) rightly claims: “no information is being 
transmitted, genetic or cultural. Rather, the manifold capacities of human 
beings undergo continual formation, re-formation and transformation within 
the contexts of relations between novices and relatively more experienced 
hands, through practice and training within an environment.” 
Under this new perspective the dispute (and attempts of compromise) between 
the ‘evolutionary economics’ traditions is dissolved because ‘genes’ do not 
carry information in any semantic sense; and thus no information is 
                                                 
216 In another formulation: “The theory of evolution is the theory of the change over time 
of the numbers, proportions, and properties of all these things [developmental resources 
and interactions]” (Griffiths and Gray, 1994: 300). 
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‘transmitted’ by organisations’ routines as well. Information is each time re-
constructed through interactional processes specific to each context. Despite 
the dominant view supported by cognitivist psychology and codificationist 
theories of language, we do not ‘internalise’ social rules;217 we develop a 
personal knowledge (an interpretation) about these rules with the help of 
material symbols. Each human being interactively develops his/her own 
knowledge (the ‘I mean’) within a community where systems of ‘public’ 
knowledge have emerged (the ‘what means’ or ‘shared’ understanding) 
(Christensen and Hooker, 1999).218 Hence, social rules do not convey semantic 
information; they ‘scaffold’ a person’s knowledge development, and in the 
process they raise ‘oughtness’ feelings that are attached to community’s 
normative understandings through which individuals have been, and go on 
being, socialised. 
As emergent entities, the so-called (social) ‘rules’ are best seen as cultural 
entities used in particular social settings; and they may be seen as resources 
for the reproduction of life cycles, which involve criss-crossing of causal 
mechanisms between the different levels and domains of systems. Further, 
today’s rules are not patterns of current human interactions; they have 
emerged upon past interactions (Archer, 1995: 143-147), and are every day 
maintained-changed through myriad of current interactions involving 
“institutional structures, power relations, social conflicts, mistaken 
assumptions, betrayals, communicative failures, and so on, of intentional 
agents, not of ‘machines for the replication of practices’ (Benton, 2001a: 216; 
emphasis mine). 
Despite my ‘deleting’ of the evolutionary economics debate, I conclude with a 
note of compromise. We should bear in mind that the purposefulness of 
human action, as emphasised by evolutionary economists more sensitive to 
the Lamarckian tradition, is foundational to the process of emergence-
maintaining-changing of sociocultural systems. However, in the latter “there is 
a place for unintended consequences, contingency and impersonal forces” 
                                                 
217 For an early formulation of the interactivist-constructivist model, which dispenses with 
the idea of knowledge codification and its transmission through language, see Bickhard 
(1980). 
218 In fact, we do not share our understandings, or make them public. Drawing on 
Hooker’s (1995: 73-79) discussion of science, by ‘public’ knowledge I mean an invariant 
space of mental representations that emerges across individuals through the adjustment 
of their different understandings (perspectives) after a period of socially regulated co-
operative interaction. 
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(Benton, 2001a: 216), and this acknowledgement certainly makes happy those 
favouring a generalised Darwinism scheme who emphasise the non-
teleological, cumulative processes. 
5.2.3 For a Naturalist pluralism 
In my view, the above presented evolutionary developmental paradigm 
provides the conceptual bridges that Veblen was looking for in his seminal 
endeavour to make economics consistent with the best of natural sciences of 
his time. Arguing for the specificity of sociocultural emergence, I hope to have 
shown that the understanding of economic phenomena can be consistent with 
an important stream of ‘serious’ biology and psychology (Vromen, 2007).219 Of 
course, as biologists ‘know best’, I had to make an effort to understand the 
relevant contributions and debates in biology, and this leads me to address in 
the following Vromen’s concerns about the trespassing of disciplinary borders 
by evolutionary economists. 
For a long time those who have studied the evolution of the Universe have 
admitted that this process has emergent stages of growing complexity. 
About this difficult issue, Emmeche (2004) underlines that we need to go 
beyond the debate on the measurement of complexity and rather account for 
its qualitative aspects because what we experience among us, and around us, 
is also “information, signification, meaning and processes of sensibility, 
learning, intentionality, experience and consciousness” (Ibid, 43). Further, he 
argues that such qualitative dimension is not limited to the biological world, 
as most evolutionary economists seem to think; it is also present in physic-
chemical reality. This should not be a surprise taking account that 
autocatalytic processes based on “amplification in pattern formation”, which 
are supposed to be at the origin of most elementary forms of life (Kauffman, 
2001), tend to create a centripetal effect upon a set of networked, 
organisationally closed elements on the course of their transactions with the 
environment. Such ‘directional’ effect is per se an emergent quality. 
Ulanowicz (1997: 48) also addresses these qualitative aspects: “We see in 
cetripetality the most primitive hint of entification, selfhood, and id. In the 
                                                 
219 Note that I refer to ‘understanding’ of economic phenomena in the sense of 
establishing meaningful relations between economic explanations and those of other 
sciences. For a discussion of the intertwining of the concepts of ‘understanding’ and 
‘explanation’ see (Faye, 1999). 
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direction toward which the asymmetry of autocatalysis points we see a 
suggestion of a telos, an intimation of final cause.” 
In a similar vein, Deacon (2003a: 292; emphasis mine) emphasizes ‘direction’ 
and ‘self-organized complexity’ as crucial aspects of evolution: “evolutionary 
processes must be described as the successive emergence of new emergent 
phenomena from old. … there is a temporal component to this kind of 
emergence as well as ascent in scale. There is an asymmetry in configuration 
across time—a development.” Therefore, in order to distinguish this kind of 
approach to evolution from Darwinism, it seems appropriate to use 
formulations such as ‘developmental evolution’. 
The crucial point to be underlined here is that the evolutionary process also 
evolved; it has been subject to ‘symmetry breaking’ episodes in the sense 
that 
we can distinguish at least three dominating instances of emergence: the 
emergence of galaxies, the emergence of life, and the emergence of 
linguistic culture. Each of these changed the rules of the evolutionary game 
to such an extent that no evolutionary theory can be taken as satisfactory 
without dealing with them. More specifically, in each case the historical 
nature of our universe acquired qualitatively more powerful ways of 
expressing itself (Hoffmeyer, 1998: 283-284; emphasis mine). 
The first instance of emergence is the precipitation of energy into matter, 
which is the most basic emergence of a ‘difference’. A second instance occurs 
when differences give rise to ‘distinctions’, which is inherent to autocatalytic 
processes in chemical systems that, after a long evolutionary time, acquired a 
boundary and a particular type of molecule we call DNA. Such symmetry 
break corresponds to the emergence of living systems. The third instance of 
emergence arrives with self-conscious human life. This is a different type of 
emergence, which enables human beings to take distance from reality; 
human beings make distinctions not only about the world but also about 
themselves. They interactively construct forward-looking internal 
representations of those differences using sophisticated cognitive processes 
(Bickhard, 2005),220 which turned them into intelligent beings capable of 
linguistic semiosis (Christensen and Hooker, 2000; Deacon, 2003b). 
According to Tattersall (1998), the symbolising capacity is the very 
                                                 
220 As Hoffmeyer (1998: 289) put it, “the human brain would not function without the 
historically developed patterns of communication between some hundred billion highly 
organized nerve cells.”  
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foundation of the human imagination and creativity, which underlies the 
production of artistic objects and the burial rituals that are signs of the 
emergence of Homo Sapiens. 
The existence of these ‘symmetry breakings’ (emergent levels) in the 
evolutionary process of Nature enables us to see that, with life, differences in 
the realm of matter and energy became “a difference for” a living system. 
This is a new kind of emergence; it “constitutes the origination of 
information, semiosis, and teleological relationships on earth. It is the 
creation of an “epistemic cut” … the point where physical causality acquires 
(or rather constitutes) significance” (Deacon, 2003a: 300). 
Much later, with humans’ use of language, semiotic processes provide the 
highest level of “semiotic freedom”. Due to the material basis that supports 
linguistic symbols, “today we can – in principle – think everything which has 
ever been thought. But thousands of years ago much of what we think today 
would have been simply impossible to think” (Hoffmeyer, 1998: 289).  In this 
way, social and cultural entities can be represented across time and space 
thereby taking part in the causal net responsible for the emergence of each 
particular person, a process that in turn sustains the emergent process of 
present day institutions (Lemke, 2000a). Therefore, we can say that since the 
Big-Bang semiotic processes of rising complexity are at work in the 
evolutionary process;221 they are “both rationally understandable and just part 
of nature as mass, energy and force, yet demanding an alternative 
metaphysics, inspired by Charles S. Peirce, in order for them to be seen in 
continuity with the rest of Nature” (Emmeche, 2004: 46; emphasis mine). 
Under the above presented view, abstract principles common to all levels of 
reality are unable to support a project of unification of all scientific 
knowledge (Wilson, 1999). Different emergent levels of Nature have different 
ontologies, which call for different kinds of meta-theories and theories. 
Therefore, as I see it, we need a multi-level ontology and its necessary 
implication, pluralism among sciences. Additionally, we should accept 
pluralism within each science in order to account for the epistemic 
limitations of scientists in their endeavour to explain reality in its full 
complexity. 
                                                 
221 In a similar vein, see (Salthe, 1998: 16). 
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This stance has been convincingly argued by, among others, Cartwright 
(1999), Dupré (1993), Giere (1999) and Mitchell (2003). On this much 
discussed issue I side with Midgley (1999: 901; emphasis mine) and her 
illuminating words: 
Ecology, ethology, and developmental biology ask their own distinctive 
kinds of question, often large ones. It is not sensible to treat these 
questions as somehow less scientific than those of genetics or neurology 
and to try to reduce them to those sciences. If, however, we accept this 
plurality of questions, with the variety of methods for answering that it 
demands, we see that biology as a whole – indeed science as a whole – 
could never be, and is not meant to be, the kind of single, vast, elegant, 
infallible, monistic calculation that unifying rationalists have visualised. It 
must always be a fallible co-operative enterprise, an ongoing, fluid, 
pragmatic compromise between many points of view. 
In Midgley’s company, I assume that sociocultural realities can only be 
explained by theories addressing their specificities, albeit theories that 
dialogue, articulate, and (hopefully) are consistent with warranted theories of 
other sciences. In fact, emergent processes preclude both causal reduction and 
causal isolation of levels of Nature.222 Therefore, pace Mäki (2001), the ideal of 
unification of science is not desirable, even in its ‘ontological’ version. We 
need to understand social and cultural entities in their emergent specificity as 
part of Nature’s process, that is, “embedded in the natural world and arising 
naturally within it” (Hooker, 1995: 37). Nevertheless, I also bear in mind that 
ontological statements are not immune to epistemological riddles, which is 
why, in my view, Peircean pragmatism is of most relevance for those who aim 
to overcome both empiricism and relativism (Rescher, 2005).223. 
With my Naturalist approach I acknowledge that physic-chemical and 
biological systems participate in the emergence of human beings and their 
societies, which is the reason why there are basic organisational features 
common to all levels of reality (e.g. evolutionary developmental processes 
involving some kind of variation, selection, inheritance). However, it is no 
less true that human beings are a very special kind of living being; humans 
vitally depend on a community, which they intelligently maintain and change 
                                                 
222 For a discussion of the current reductionist thinking that threatens psychology, see 
(Bandura, 2001). 
223 Pragmatism also underlies the following statement by Giere (1999: 241): “Rather than 
thinking of science as producing sets of statements that are true or false in the standard 
objectivist fashion, we should think of it as a practice that produces models of the world 
that may fit the world more or less well in something like the way maps fit the world more 
or less well.” 
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by language-coordinated interaction. In order to develop, humans need an 
intertwined process of biological and sociocultural re-construction in and 
through time. This process is deeply different from what occurs at other 
levels of reality, particularly in the following aspects: (1) human relations, 
cooperative and competitive, always imply mutual constrains and 
management of power under different forms and degrees; (2) the exercise of 
power, redundancy of institutional norms, and normativity of culture provide 
on the overall indispensable social stability; (3) the radical openness of a 
human being, that is, her/his imperative need to express identity and 
difference, introduces in social relations an inexhaustible source of change, 
even when stability seems to prevail.224 
Sociocultural reality has its own properties consistent with, but different from, 
properties of psychological, living, and physic-chemical reality. Thus it calls for 
theories that consistently connect with, and build on, theories addressing 
other levels of reality. This Naturalist stance (1) frames social and cultural 
realities within metaphysics of process, in the sense that institutions are 
organised processes that maintain themselves and serve societies’ stability 
through continuous change; (2) keeps a thread of continuity linking matter, 
life, human beings and society; (3) overcomes unhelpful dichotomies such as 
informal/formal, agent-sensitive/insensitive institutions. Further, it leaves an 
instrumental place for analogies and metaphors whenever they present a 
heuristic potential for theory construction. On this point I side with those who 
argue that metaphoric use of language is not only inescapable (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1999) but plays a central role in the production of new scientific 
concepts in social theory (Lopez, 2003). Therefore, I will recur to concepts 
from natural sciences insofar they are helpful in understanding the specifics of 
social systems.225 
In my view, the specificity (not independence) of the sociocultural realm has a 
solid foundation that justifies the rejection of a conceptual scheme common 
                                                 
224 Discussing human organisations, Stacey et al. (2000: 112) qualify the concept of 
dynamics ‘at the edge of chaos’ proposed by Kauffman as a paradoxical state that 
combines systems’ stability and instability: “the dynamic has a fractal quality in that no 
matter what the detail in which the attractor is examined, it displays intertwined stability 
and instability. So if one selects what looks like a stable part of a spatial or temporal 
pattern at the edge of chaos, it always contains chaos, or instability, and vice versa.” 
225 I use the term ‘understanding’ in the pragmatist sense of ‘intelligibility’: neither 
objectivism (there is no direct relation between reality and scientific theories ‘clean’ of 
human judgments) nor subjectivism (scientific understanding is not reducible to a 
subjective state or feeling). About this see (De-Regt, 2004). 
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to other sciences. Consequently, evolutionary economics would better build 
on theories available in the different sub-disciplines or fields of research in 
the social science, explore connections and consistency with theories 
pertaining to other levels of Nature and, in the spirit of Peirce’s Pragmatism, 
maintain systematic confrontation with the reality to be explained. This 
seems to me a more promising path for Institutional economics. 
5.2.4 Do sociocultural systems evolve? 
So far I have argued that evolutionary processes have themselves evolved and 
that this impedes the use of a generalised explanatory scheme. I have also 
shown how an important stream of evolutionary biology rejects Neo-
Darwinism and proposes an integration of bio-physical and sociocultural 
realities in the explanation of human development and evolution. 
On this point it is convenient to recall the stance assumed by Witt (2003: 28) 
in the above mentioned debate: 
evolution extends from nature (where it is explained by the neo-Darwinian 
theory) into the historical process of long-term economic change. In that 
process, the forces of natural selection have increasingly left room for man-
made influences. 
However, a sequential view that pictures hominids without culture, and 
current human beings free from natural selection, deeply contradicts what we 
know today about the life of different species. We should accept that life 
cycle reconstruction with recourse to both natural and cultural resources is 
not exclusive of human beings; rather, what is unique to humans is their 
extraordinary capacity for symbolic communication (Donald, 2001; Laland et 
al., 2000). 
Further, like basic natural resources, human sociocultural resources are 
shared by many life cycles in a generation. They are handed over by past 
generations, and maintained or changed by the present one as part of 
current developmental processes, which shape developmental conditions for 
the next generation. Usually this change across time is called history, which 
in fact is “a specific instance of a process that is going on throughout the 
organic world. In fact, we do not need one theory to explain how apes became 
human, and another to explain how (some) humans became scientists” 
(Ingold, 1998: 96; emphasis mine). 
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To put things clearer, the DST approach integrates within a new conceptual 
framework two historical meanings for evolution, the Lamarckian genealogical 
perspective—the species-specific on going process of life cycle reconstruction 
at each generation—and the Darwinian population perspective (Young, 
1992).226 Of course, it may be adequate to use population models in particular 
populations of unrelated individuals in a state of absolute incapacity to react to 
environmental pressures. However, such mathematical-statistical analysis 
corresponds to what has been named “predictive fitness” (Matthen and Ariew, 
2002), and as such they are agnostic about the causal processes at work in 
self-organising systems defensively responding to the pressure of scarce 
resources, while in the same interactive process actively attempting to change 
or stop that pressure.227 The models that account for the varying distribution 
of individuals in a population omit the organisational process internal to the 
individual and the organisational process among the individuals and with the 
environment in complex systems that are not decomposable. Of course, human 
beings and sociocultural systems are emergent systems of this systemic, self-
organising complex kind. 
In my view, the alternative to Neo-Darwinism presented in the previous 
subsection clears the way for Institutional economics to accept the 
breakdown of two conceptual divides that so far have been an obstacle to its 
progress: the divide between “development” and “evolution” and the divide 
between “history” and “evolution”. 
Taking account of the foregone, my answer to the question “Do sociocultural 
systems evolve?” is: sociocultural systems evolve, and by this I mean that 
sociocultural systems change in and through time according to interactive 
processes entertained by persons, who continuously change themselves, the 
organisation of their societies, their culture, and the bio-physic ecology of 
their communities. Such processes involve a tangle of causal mechanisms 
that cut across heterogeneous scales of space and time due to the unique 
and powerful symbolising capacities of human beings. 
                                                 
226 As Oyama (2000: 62) puts it, “if evolution is construed as change in the constitution 
and distribution of developmental systems, the study of ontogeny is no longer a poor 
relative, to be lent evolutionary legitimacy by genetic hook or crook. Rather, it becomes 
the very heart of evolutionary biology.” 
227 For a critique of the concept of ‘natural selection’, see (Salthe, 2008). 
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If Institutional sociologists and political scientists take my understanding of 
economic processes as an historical Institutionalist approach, I can only 
agree. In fact, I hope to have shown that, as an institution of society, the 
‘economy’ is a sociocultural reality. Thus, the study of economic processes 
requires intrinsically historical theories (Calhoun, 1998), that is, theories that 
both integrate the historical dimension of economic processes and the 
awareness that theories, as cultural entities, are themselves historical. In this 
sense, ‘history’ is the developmental evolutionary process that occurs at the 
sociocultural level of Nature. Of course, this understanding applies to the 
study of particular markets and the market system of an economy. 
5.3 Markets as historically organised processes 
5.3.1 Schumpeter and the Austrian school 
In this section I attempt to focus on important contributions to the 
understanding of markets made by eminent economists of the twentieth 
century who had a focus on their historical nature. For the sake of brevity, in 
the following cursory discussion I will give particular attention to the ideas of 
Kirzner and Lachmann, central figures of New Austrian thinking, and to the 
singular contribution of Schumpeter, who in the first half of last century 
unsuccessfully attempted to make an original synthesis of different streams 
of economic theory.228 
5.3.1.1 Schumpeter 
I begin the discussion with Schumpeter (1934). It is widely recognized that 
his book The Theory of Economic Development, written in the beginning of 
the twentieth century and published in Germany in 1912, exposes 
Schumpeter’s comprehensive vision of the dynamics of capitalism at the 
beginning of his academic life. On the other hand, his book Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (1942), written at a later stage, presents a 
somewhat revised vision of the dynamics of capitalist economies, which gave 
                                                 
228 About this originality, Reinert (2002: 23) states that “Schumpeter’s academic 
schizophrenia was caused by his attempt at unifying two fundamentally incompatible 
world-views”, while Graça Moura (2002: 819) writes that “it is possible to detect, albeit in 
fragmentary form, two irreconcilable models that appear mixed up in Schumpeter’s 
Theory.” 
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rise to an interesting literature about the extent of the changes in his 
understanding of the entrepreneurial endeavour and his vision of the future 
of capitalism.229 In the remainder I will only use The Theory of Economic 
Development (henceforth The Theory) because such debate bears no decisive 
implications for the purposes of the present section.  
In The Theory Schumpeter firstly presents the scheme of a circular flow in a 
stationary economy where no element is endowed with the power of 
disrupting the established order, although he admits continuous incremental 
changes (p. 63, note 2). He states by the end of the first chapter: “With this 
we have closed the description of the circular flow. For an exchange economy 
as a whole there is the same continuity, and under the same assumptions, 
the same changelessness as for a non-exchange economy  continuity and 
constancy not only of the process but also of the values” (p. 55). Departing 
from this mechanistic picture of the economy, evoking Walras’ thinking who 
he mostly admired, Schumpeter presents a vision of economic development 
that he embeds in the wider social development of a nation. However, 
because Schumpeter rejects the evolutionary rhetoric coming from biology, 
which he viewed as inadequate for economic theory (“metaphysical 
preconception”, p.57-58), he assumed the conceptual framework of historical 
change “whereby social conditions become historical “individuals” in 
historical time. … neither a circular process nor pendulum movements about 
a centre.” (p.58). 
Actually, in the second edition of The Theory Schumpeter states that his 
understanding of development is not well accounted by the term “dynamics” 
because development is much more than change in time, it is “that kind of 
change arising from within the system which so displaces its equilibrium 
point that the new one cannot be reached from the old one by infinitesimal 
steps” (p. 64, note 1, emphasis in the original). Certainly, as a social process, 
the economy is never in equilibrium, neither before the innovations 
introduced by the entrepreneurs nor after its major effects have settled, but 
this is where resides the paradox of whole Schumpeter’s intellectual edifice. 
One is tempted to admit that, in the quotation above, he wanted to refer to a 
stationary flow, in which case the term equilibrium as meaning ‘no change’ 
does not apply. However, the problem is deeper than this issue of 
                                                 
229 See for instance (Langlois, 2003) and (Witt, 2002). 
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terminology. “Clearly, Schumpeter’s crucial insightson variable levels of 
consciousness in human action, on the interdependence of individual 
creativity and institutional arrangements, on the essential nature of money 
and the specifically capitalist role of the banking systemcannot have their 
source in this equilibrium framework. This suggest that this framework is not 
so much a product of ontological reflection as of a priori methodological 
preferences: that it is the product of a preconception of how what is must be 
fashioned so as to qualify as science” (Graça Moura, 2002: 819; emphasis 
mine).230 
In fact, despite his developmental understanding of economic change being a 
major tribute to the German Historical School (Ebner, 2000; Michaelides and 
Milios, 2009), the fact is that Schumpeter has been reluctant to identify “his 
own intellectual affiliations and sources” (Reinert, 2002: 23) and only in the 
last years of his carrier left the neoclassical environment of the department 
of economics at Harvard and moved to the Harvard Business School where 
“he encountered the verstehende meso-level economics that was an 
important part of his intellectual upbringing” (Ibid, 36). 
Such ambiguity is also patent in his formulations about the nature of both 
the economy and society just as Schumpeter closes his explanation of the 
circular flow in The Theory (p. 55-56): “The values with which we have to do 
carry meaning not with reference to the point of view of the whole economic 
system but only to that of the individual. … individual values are interrelated 
and are not independent of ach other. The totality of economic relations 
constitutes the economic system, just as the totality of social relations 
constitutes society. … They operate upon one another through the exchange 
relation so that they influence and are influenced by all the values of other 
individuals.” And here is inserted a short note: “There is general 
interdependence between them.” 
This quote makes evident that Schumpeter’s “methodological individualism” 
is of a particular nature, certainly not an atomistic vision of human beings, 
because he also admits that in a society there is more to it than individuals; 
there are also the social interdependencies generated by human interaction. 
                                                 
230 Making a different exegesis of Schumpeter’s writings, Freeman and Louçã state (2001: 
53, note 13): “for Schumpeter, the circular flow was a real process, simultaneous with 
development, and a complete theory should integrate both dimensions in the same 
framework.” 
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Nevertheless, it remains unclear if this “general interdependence” gives rise 
to a new ontological reality with causal powers of its own. In the second 
edition of The Theory (p. 61, note 1) Schumpeter replies to the critiques of 
his individualist emphasis on the entrepreneur as promoter of change. He 
argues that they misunderstood his stance and goes to state: “… it would 
obvious be nonsense. … The “entrepreneur” is merely the bearer of the 
mechanism of change.” 
Now, Schumpeter turns to the opposite pole and defines the entrepreneur as 
an oversocialised human being deprived of autonomy, he “merely bears” the 
causal action of social structures. Here Schumpeter emphasises the causal 
powers of socio-cultural structures. What is not clear is the consistency of the 
overall causal framework. Festré and Garrouste (2008) have attempted to 
better define the specific character of this “methodological individualism” 
but, by lack of the adequate concept (emergence in self-organizing complex 
systems), are only able to maintain without a clear reasoning that 
Schumpeter’s “holism and individualism do not contradict” (p. 379). 
Actually, these authors tend to consider a ‘soft’ understanding of systems’ 
causation (“They act in the sense that they define a set of constraints”, note 
30, p. 388), which may be understood as ‘soft emergence’ or, in 
philosophers’ terms, an ‘epiphenomenon’. The problem is that persons, not 
simply individuals, are much more than “constrained” by socio-cultural 
phenomena. Indeed, they could not even exist without them as they are 
interactively constructed all over their lives in a process that involves these 
same structures (Bickhard, 2008a). What Schumpeter (and most of his 
readers) lack is an emergentist ontology of sociocultural systems of the kind I 
have presented in chapter 3 (section 3.2). Only in the light of such ontology 
we gain the understanding of the methodological tension that we find in 
Schumpeter’s work, the tension between his (socialised) entrepreneur 
promoting radical changes and his complicated acknowledgement of the 
“historical factors of change” (socio-cultural structures), which reveals his 
fears of falling into an individual-independent holism. Hence the use of the 
term “individualism”. Nevertheless, as Graça Moura (2002: 820) has rightly 
asked, “is it really surprising that Schumpeter should have rather uncritically 
imported the conception of science of his time?”. 
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At this juncture, notwithstanding the ambiguities and tensions (even 
contradictions) in his work, I take stock of some of Schumpeter’s intuitions 
that I see relevant for a later discussion: a) an Institutionalist view of markets, 
economy, and the overall society as processes involving individuals and 
socio-cultural structures; b) being processes, markets and the economy are 
seen as flows that reveal variable velocity, that is, periods of smooth change 
and periods of high turbulence; c) periods of “small disturbances” may “in 
time add up to great amounts”, that is, give rise to transformational, 
developmental change; d) the openness of the economic system to the wider 
society, and their interdependent (historical) change, although with a biased 
understanding of the source of economic development, which predominantly 
comes “from within” the system through entrepreneurial innovations (The 
Theory, p. 63); e) a theory of market competition through innovation, 
presented as the motor of socioeconomic development, which necessarily 
implies consecutive periods of expansion and recession, the “normal” 
business cycle (The Theory, Chapter 6). 
To conclude, I assume that Schumpeter’s contribution to the understanding 
of economic development may be labelled a theory of economic evolution, 
the latter understood without biological connotations, rather as a process of 
historical, structural change of capitalism.231 As Schumpeter himself 
recognised, his vision of the evolution of Capitalism “is more nearly parallel 
to that of Marx” (The Theory, p. 60). 
5.3.1.2 The Austrians, Old and New 
Today it is evident that Carl Menger, the founder of the Austrian school of 
economics in the 19th century, has been an eclectic scholar that while 
contributing to the establishment of marginalism in economics also agreed 
with important aspects of the German Historical School (GHS). As Reinert 
(2005: 269) states, “like Schumpeter later, he insisted that history was an 
‘indispensable’ tool for the profession.” Despite the aggressive dispute he 
had with the GHS (the Methodenstreit  of 1883-1908), represented by Gustav 
Schmoller, “they shared the same critical attitude towards the mechanical and 
barter-based English theory” (Ibid, 265). Their debate was mostly about 
                                                 
231 Schumpeter rejected biological analogies when presenting is vision of economic 
development. On the other hand, Hodgson (1997: 138) notes that Lamarck’s evolution 
was also based on development “from within” (the organism), meaning that those who 
‘read into’ Schumpeter’s work a Darwinist scheme are going too far. 
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human cognition and the role of historical facts in economics’ explanations. 
However, the next generation of Austrian economists, much like Marshall’s 
neo-classical followers, lost the original relationship between theoretical 
reasoning and historical reality and turned to a mechanistic view of the 
economy, one that tends to an ‘equilibrium’ state and is made of a network 
of ‘perfect competition’ markets. In this sense, “Schumpeter was surely the 
most ‘Austrian’ of both the second and third-generation Austrians” (Reinert, 
2005: 292). 
In the twentieth century, Ludwig von Mises abandoned Menger’s concept of 
contextualised human rationality in which “the rational agent is one who 
works at the understanding both his needs and the means of satisfying them” 
(Langlois, 1991: 123) and argued for a subjectivist concept of rationality 
where needs are ‘a given’, in the sense that needs are subjectively defined by 
each individual. In this way needs are seen as detached from the objective 
situation of time and space where the individual lives. Thus, as psychological 
phenomena, needs are out of reach to economics research. The latter should 
only focus on the observable (‘rational’) action of an individual’s attempt to 
economize on the means under his control. Within a particular interpretation 
of methodological individualism, Mises’s version of human rationality 
becomes “the fundamental source of cohesion in the economic system (which 
is, of course, the social “whole” in question) (Langlois, 1991: 129),  Actually, 
his late work in the fifties accentuated the negation of systemic wholes and, 
under the political climate of the Cold War, gave rise to a discourse “very 
close to being McCarthyst political propaganda” (Reinert, 2005: 284). In brief, 
while the founder of the Austrian school was concerned with time and 
uncertainty, with Mises (and part of Hayek’s work) “Austrian economics came 
to seem like neoclassical economics in words rather than in mathematics” 
(Ibid, 276). 
Hayek, who has been a student of Mises, found his teacher’s restricted 
rationality unable to deal with his own understanding of market competition 
as a process of knowledge ‘discovery’ and ‘diffusion’, which for Hayek makes 
market coordination possible. Langlois (1991: 131) notes that “if “rational 
action” is to mean only the Pure Logic of Choice (as Hayek here agrees) then 
learning – the acquisition, as it were, of premises not previously “given” to 
the agent – cannot be a “rational” activity.” Hayek ultimately solves the 
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problem with an expanded concept of rationality understood as ‘reasoned’ 
behaviour within an institutional context.232 He emphasises the importance of 
rule-based behaviour, thereby going beyond Mises’s reduction of human 
rationality to a calculatory procedure. Moreover, Hayek understands social 
rules as a socio-cultural evolutionary outcome (in a vague sense), which 
enables a reading of the late Hayek (Hayek III) close to Original 
Institutionalism in what concerns the understanding of economic change. 
Even so, a concise summary of Hayek’s view of markets as an economic 
process, as extracted from most of his work, could be the following: “In an 
inefficient configuration, market prices act as signposts for agents, providing 
new knowledge about the direction in which plans have to be modified. In 
that perspective, competition is by assumption an efficient device of 
knowledge discovery and entails the convergence of plans. The occurrence of 
unexpected change prevents the economy from reaching a long-term 
equilibrium. Competition permits the adaptation to the new configuration via 
its capacity to diffuse the new relevant knowledge” (Gloria-Palermo, 2002: 67; 
references to picture omitted ). 
Following Hayek, Israel Kirzner engaged in the contemporary revival of the 
Austrian school of economics and took the lead of the New Austrians, which 
is far from being a uniform stream of thinking. For instance, “the status of 
equilibrium among Austrian economists seems currently a matter of dispute” 
(Loasby, 1989: 160). For instance, while Kirzner argues for a (more or less 
strong) process of market “equilibration” Ludwig Lachmann emphasises the 
open-endedness of the market process and “clearly believes in the possibility 
of serious discoordination” (Ibid, 160). 
Kirzner, similarly to Schumpeter and unlike Mises, gives a central place to the 
entrepreneur. However, much differently from Schumpeter, his entrepreneur 
has not a disruptive behaviour, rather he is alert to price differences within 
the market process and looks for opportunities of arbitrage. In profiting from 
these opportunities he not only follows the established rules but also makes 
the market converge to the proximity of a stationary state; he plays an 
equilibrating role. 
                                                 
232 Here I recall the heterogeneity of Hayek’s work and his late stage, identified in Chapter 
2 as ‘Hayek III’. 
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Describing Kirzner’s market understanding, Gloria-Palermo (2002: 63-64) 
states: “in a disequilibrium world, discoordination is the consequence of 
imperfect knowledge, and imperfect knowledge is precisely the source of 
profit opportunities. … The role of the entrepreneur is to reduce the initial 
ignorance of the economy through the discovery and diffusion of new 
knowledge that is revealed by the exploitation of profit opportunities.” 
Therefore, and at least unlike the late Hayek for whom the rhetoric of 
equilibrium makes no sense, “Kirzner insists that all these activities promote 
coordination” (Loasby, 1989: 161). He assumes that market competition “is 
by assumption an efficient device of knowledge discovery and entails the 
convergence of [firms’] plans” (Gloria-Palermo, 2002: 67). In fact, Kirzner 
expands Mises’s ‘logical choice’ rationality in order to include the ‘alertness’ 
of his entrepreneur. However, by bringing in entrepreneurs’ alertness, “he 
does not broaden the strict conception of rationality to destroy or supplant 
that conception; rather, he broadens it precisely to defend it from attack” 
(Langlois, 1991: 133). 
In the attempt to answer Schumpeterian critiques of his smooth capitalist 
motion, Kirzner came up with a nuanced formulation that makes room for 
both equilibrating and disruptive periods. He argues for a view of “the inside 
workings of the capitalist system (its ability to offer pure profit incentives 
that can evoke entrepreneurial perception of available opportunitiessome 
(but not all!) of which opportunities may consist in the potential for 
technological revolution (implementation of which calls for the 
“Schumpeterian” qualities of boldness, initiative, and creativity)) (Kirzner, 
1999: 16). 
This formulation opens the possibility of an integration of Schumpeterian 
periods emerging from continuous gradual changes occurring over the 
‘equilibrating’ periods. While being an interesting step towards a synthesis, 
this move still does not account for socio-cultural sources of change coming 
from the interactions between markets and the wide society, which inspire 
new projects and make valuable new entrepreneurial competencies. In fact, 
Kirzner sticks to the (structural) opportunity for making profits, which still 
leaves outside the picture both the non-economic motivations of 
entrepreneurs and their capacity of creating and/or lobbying for new 
arrangements in markets’ structures. 
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Ludwig Lachmann, another New Austrian outstanding scholar, has been 
qualified as a ‘radical subjectivist’ (Langlois, 1991: 135). In fact he extended 
and deepened the traditional subjectivism of the Austrians’ approach that 
takes markets as knowledge processes – entrepreneurs making, executing 
and revising “plans” – insofar he explicitly considered the entrepreneur’s 
expectations about the future of his business. Most importantly, he made a 
distinction between the market process in itself and the entrepreneur’s 
interpretation of its events and environment. In Lachmann’s (1986: 4) words: 
what men adjust their plans to are not observable events as such, but their 
own interpretations of them and their changing expectations about them. 
… market processes do not reflect the effect of a sequence of events on 
successive individual actions, but that of a sequence of interpretations of 
past and future upon them. 
Therefore, Lachmann’s perspective goes far away from a teleological 
understanding of markets and forcefully rejected the idea of a built-in 
tendency to an end-state equilibrium. “In a competitive game there are 
winners and losers. By the same token, competitive market forces will cause 
discoordination as well as coordination of agents’ plans.” And he reminds us 
that, even if there is some kind of strong coordination in the supply side (e.g. 
state planning or cartel agreement), producers are still dependent on 
consumers’ autonomous decisions; “They remain unable to assure one 
another that these [productive capacities] will actually be utilized” (Ibid, 11). 
On the other hand, Lachmann emphasises that markets are at the same time 
interlinked and heterogeneous, at least in what concerns the horizon of 
business plans. This latter aspect suggests that new knowledge makes more 
vulnerable “those [markets] in which plans necessarily extend over a 
substantial period of time. … in such conditions, coordination will rarely be 
achieved by price alone” (Loasby, 1989: 162). 
It is obvious that Lachmann goes largely beyond Mises’s framework and is an 
embarrassment to the New Austrians who stick to the more traditional views 
of Hayek and Kirzner. As Gloria-Palermo (2002: 67-68) perceptively notes, 
“the splitting point concerns precisely the definition of individual plans” 
because Lachmann accepts Hayek’s interpretative view of past experience 
and adds a second interpretative moment, “expectations, that is, an 
interpretation of the future situation, understood as imagination.” Therefore, 
Lachmann’s entrepreneur is not only alert to opportunities but also creates 
them. “Creativity means the break in continuity towards a disequilibrium 
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dynamic” (Ibid, 70), which connects Lachmann to Schumpeter’s formulation 
of “creative destruction”. 
For those who think that Lachmann has gone too far with his subjectivism, it 
is important to situate his entrepreneur within the Institutionalist perspective 
that he kept in the background. Just in the Preface of (Lachmann, 1986: xi; 
emphasis mine) he states: “Markets are institutions. Changes in the functions 
of different classes of agents … have to be seen and explained as 
institutional changes.” Note that, rather than the much used formulation of a 
“market cum institutions”, Lachmann states that markets are themselves 
institutions. In this sense they must comprise the individual actors, the firms, 
and the instituted norms that help, constrain and even constitute the 
actors.233 Indeed such understanding is at the core of the present thesis. 
Taking markets as institutions, Lachmann avoids falling into the absolute 
discoordination that a subjective arbitrary action could bring about. 
Institutional norms help and guide entrepreneurs’ actions; they are 
“interpersonal orientation tables”, as he puts it in the following statement 
(Lachmann, 1977: 62): 
there are certain super-individual schemes of thought, namely institutions, 
to which the schemes of thought of the first order, the plans, must be 
oriented, and which serve therefore, to some extent, the coordination of 
plans. They constitute, we may say, ‘interpersonal orientation tables’, 
schemes of thought of the second order. To them, praxeology, for which 
until now the plan and its structure have understandably occupied the 
foreground of interest, will increasingly have to turn in time to come. 
This passage is explored by Foss and Garzarelli (2007: 801) who argue that 
“at some level expectations are, and must be, coordinated (this is the 
institutional level) [the structural level] in order that at another level they can 
beand indeed must be for a dynamic economydisparate (this is the 
individual plan level) [the interactional-communicational level].” 
I take this quote of Lachmann as an excellent opportunity to enter into a 
conceptual territory that Foss and Garzarelli have excluded from sight. I 
                                                 
233 Here I acknowledge that Lachmann’s formulations in early works seem closer to the 
usual formulation of ‘markets cum institutions’. To keep a thread of continuity in 
Lachmann’s thinking we should interpret the dichotomy internal/external institutions in 
the sense of ‘norms’ ‘internal to a particular market’ versus norms generated outside that 
market and pertaining to other institutions and the culture of that society (external 
norms). This is not the path followed by Foss and Garzarelli (2007) who rather 
reinterpreted Lachmann’s vision by recurring to the New Institutionalist formulation of 
‘markets cum institutions’. 
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argue that Lachmann here should be read through the concept of emergence, 
and such reading enables us to see that Lachmann’s ‘radical subjectivism’ 
gives us a realist ontology of institutional norms. Indeed, “the schemes of 
thought of second order” are invariants of those of first order, that is to say, 
they emerge as a new level of intangible, objective reality. They are objects 
that we re-present by material symbols, which call for different, subjective 
interpretations of individuals. In this way I present a Peircean reading of 
Lachmann’s Institutionalism, one that highlights the cultural nature of 
institutional norms in line with my discussion of institutions presented in 
Chapter 3. 
Now we can see why Langlois (1991: 135) states that Lachmann’s radical 
subjectivism “does violence to much of Mises’s program”. In fact, he 
managed to connect his “interpretative” turn with the normative structures of 
the meso-institution ‘market’ and those of the broader society, which (to the 
annoyance of some New Austrians) not only cuts him from mainstream 
economics but also moves him closer to the emergentist view espoused by 
critical realists in social science. A movement that leaves Austrian economics 
even more exposed to conceptual tensions and paradoxes, a subject that I 
have no room to explore now (Lewis and Runde, 2007; Martin, 2009). 
5.3.1.3 Legacies of order and change 
The cursory review above presented shows that the Austrian school of 
economics, including its Schumpeterian derivation, has not produced a 
theory of institutions or a theory of institutional change. Nevertheless, it is 
also clear that both Schumpeter and the Austrian school were able to 
formulate a crucial intuition that I deem relevant for the present research, 
namely: the system of markets is an instituted process within society that is 
open to interchanges with the societal environment. 
This intuition puts an emphasis on sequences of decisions made by 
individuals and firms participating in the market process, which has no 
precise beginning and no pre-given end. As processes, markets are 
inherently dynamic, as much as are societies, a view much in line with 
Veblen’s sequences of “cumulative causation”. Moreover, and 
notwithstanding the ambiguity and vagueness of some formulations, it may 
be said that both Schumpeter and the Austrians recognised that market 
processes comprise an interactional level of individuals and another realm 
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made of institutional norms, which has been labelled with different terms 
according to the authors (“rules”, “institutions”). However, the way both levels 
relate to each other remained obscure in their analysis, even in the work of 
Lachmann, the most sophisticated of the Austrians.234 
It is also true that most of the explanatory potential of institutional norms 
remained largely unexploited when both authors entered into detailed 
discussions about particular economic mechanisms, namely of market prices 
or economic cycles. This placement of institutional norms in the background 
of individual action might explain why Lachmann has been subject to the 
criticism of theoretical nihilism (Foss and Garzarelli, 2007; Gloria-Palermo, 
2002). 
It is important to acknowledge that both Schumpeter and Lachmann made an 
important rupture with the neoclassical school when rejecting the teleological 
vision of a market process that has an in-built tendency to equilibrium. 
Embracing a genuine understanding of markets as processes, one that 
integrates the creative initiative of those who defy established rules and face 
uncertain outcomes, both authors admitted that the velocity of economic and 
societal change is variable, comprising periods of small-scale change and 
periods of great turbulence. 
However, this ‘legacy of change’ that contemporary heterodox economics has 
rediscovered is still underdeveloped. It is not clear how Schumpeter and 
Lachmann related their ‘process’ view with the existence of market order that 
both recognized. In others words, they did not explicitly address the 
mechanisms that enabled the generation of order (and not disruption) in 
markets despite their continuous change. Nor did they speculate about 
possible relations between what occurs in periods of smooth change and the 
dramatic periods of turbulence. In the case of Schumpeter, disruptive change 
comes from within the economic system by entrepreneurial action but, at the 
same time, this action is originated in individual creativity and boldness, 
which are outside the production and exchange processes of markets. 
Further, although both authors made references to the relations between 
markets and the wider society, only Schumpeter theoretically discussed the 
connections between the state and the economy, both in terms of the 
                                                 
234 In this literature firms have not been directly under analysis and it remained implicit 
that they were represented by the individual actions of their managers and entrepreneurs. 
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economic impact of the fiscal system and in policies that promote 
entrepreneurial behaviour (Ebner, 2006a). His view of economic development 
was more balanced than Lachmann’s who focused exclusively on the 
entrepreneurial source of change and did not discuss the role of society’s 
culture and other institutions in moulding entrepreneurs’ character and 
determining the norms of the particular markets where they operated. 
Even if both authors assumed the historical dimension of economic 
phenomena, the fact remains they mostly emphasised the auto-
transformational power of markets and their impact on society at large. 
Notwithstanding the more nuanced view of Schumpeter, their emphasis on, 
and understanding of, radical change is biased to markets’ internal 
dynamics, and thus contrasts with Polanyi’s vision of a “double movement” 
involving interactive tensions between the logics of capitalist markets and the 
interests of the wider society. If we see the state as the “arena in which … 
different rules of legitimate order converge, collide, and fold back on one 
another” (Skowronek, 1995: 95) it becomes clear why Polanyi saw in political 
struggles around and within the state a crucial (“exogenous”) source of 
change in markets’ processes in order to prevent markets’ appropriation of 
nature, labour and money. Logically, Schumpeter’s perspective has been 
driven by change from ‘within’ as his thinking had no room for such a 
concept of “fictitious commodity”, and much less for Karl Marx’s concept of 
class struggle. 
With all their limitations, the contributions of the Austrian school and those 
of Schumpeter contained the seeds of a new kind of economics that quickly 
was seen to be incompatible with the equilibrium-based neoclassical school 
triumphant in the second half of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the 
discussion of their contributions to the understanding of markets’ processes 
enables us to acknowledge not only their limitations but also to gain an 
awareness of the scale of the work that contemporary Institutional economics 
still faces in order to become a credible alternative to the mainstream of the 
discipline. 
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5.3.2 Markets: an Interactionist approach 
In presenting my own formulations about the market understood as an 
organisation of processes I will take the lead of Bates’s (2006) discussion of 
‘agency-structure’, which he sees as realms “related in and through time by a 
constantly fluid interpenetration” (Ibid, 157). In fact, the term 
“interpenetration” has already been used in chapter three in the discussion of 
the emergent nature of sociocultural systems; it comes from Luhmann’s 
(1995) systemic understanding of societies. Ultimately, ‘interpenetration’ 
means that persons and the sociocultural systems in which they participate 
are mutually constitutive to the point that when we focus the analysis on the 
change of sociocultural systems we are taking on board (even if implicitly) 
the changes occurring at the interactional-communicational level of persons. 
Here we have to distinguish between the ‘time’ of persons’ experiences and 
the ‘time’ of the sociocultural systems in which they take part. While the time 
of the latter is related to the time of the former they are not the same. 
Human beings go on living ‘in’ and ‘through’ different kinds of ‘time’ (Adam, 
1990) and this reality should be accounted for in a conceptual framework of 
sociocultural change that assumes its emergence in Nature’s evolutionary 
process. The present section intends to be a preliminary step in that 
direction in discussing the ‘time’ of markets, the historical time of a 
particular kind of sociocultural systems. 
5.3.2.1 Change in time and through time 
At the outset I acknowledge that we share with the rest of Nature non-linear 
‘times’. This is explained in the work of Adam (1990: 154) and is well 
synthesised in the following passage: 
Organisational aspects of time, for example, are found at the inorganic, 
organic, and the human social level, as well as in the design aspects of 
human artefacts. The organisational principles of time, in terms of 
sequence, duration, periodicity, rates of change, and synchronisation may 
be the same for all, but their meaning and expressive form change with 
context. … All beings, it has further become apparent, are their own past, 
present, and future. The difference lies in the degree to which they are 
aware of this fact and the way they relate to it. 
Accordingly, we need to identify what is specific in the time of human 
sociocultural systems. Here Adam (1990) is helpful in showing that only 
human beings have been able to develop an abstract, quantifiable time, a 
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common reference (an emergent ‘cultural invariant’) that enables the 
coordination of their life in community. Over the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, with the Industrial Revolution, this abstract understanding of time 
turns into a powerful resource and gains a value and a price. Recurring to a 
pool of philosophical and  historical works, Adam (Ibid, 117) shows that time 
as a resource 
forms part of societies where the social interactions and exchanges have 
generally become independent of context and content, and where the time 
structuring is based on standardised, invariable units. Time in such 
societies has become stratified and separated into family, work, leisure, 
production, and market time, to name just a few. Chronological calendar 
and clock time, related to as being time per se, in terms of an independent, 
objective reality, forms the central link between all these aspects. 
However, such a sociocultural time can only emerge upon the particular 
biological time of human beings, and the time of the solar system and the 
wider universe. This is an understanding deeply inspired by the thinking of 
George Mead, one of the founding fathers the American Pragmatism at the 
beginnings of twentieth century, who followed Peirce in seeing human’s 
interactive construction of a ‘symbolic time’ as an outcome of Nature, the 
latter also understood as an interactive (‘social’) process incorporating 
successive symmetry-breakings. In the words of Adam (1990: 156), 
“contemporary natural scientists have provided the substantive evidence for 
Mead’s theory that natural and social time are therefore not mutually 
exclusive but implicating.” 
Following Peirce’s Pragmatism, my view of markets as emergent sociocultural 
systems cannot be captured by the traditional dichotomy of ‘structure versus 
change’ or ‘diachronic versus synchronic’ perspective. Once and for all, we 
need to accept that time is intrinsic to nature, which means that my analysis 
of markets has to take on board the biological ‘timescapes’ of human beings, 
the ‘timescapes’ of organisations, culture and society at large, and their 
internal and necessary interpenetration as well.235 
In line with the above presented stance, I acknowledge that biological ‘time’ 
is non-linear and cyclical (body temperature, blood pressure, hormonal 
                                                 
235 At this juncture we should bear in mind the interdisciplinary implications of Prigogine’s 
research: “‘How can we relate these various meanings of time’, he asks, ‘time as motion, 
as in dynamics; time related to irreversibility, as in thermodynamics; time as history as in 
biology and psychology? It is evident that this is not an easy matter. Yet, we are living in a 
single universe. To reach a coherent view of the world of which we are part, we must find 
some ways to pass from one description to another’” (Quoted by Adam, 1990: 67). 
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cycles, etc.). At the same time, it presents a directionality revealed in the 
aging process going from birth to death. As Adam (1990: 87; emphasis mine) 
highlights, “this cyclicality must not, however, be conceptualised as 
reversible recurrence but as change. Whilst the degree of change is context 
dependent, it is in the very nature of these rhythmic processes to differ on 
their recurrence.” This “rhythmicity” of human nature, intimately tied to the 
‘time’ of the universe from which we have evolved, challenges us to 
understand the ‘time’ of sociocultural systems through an analytical 
framework that goes beyond the dualism of a successive switching between 
‘morphostatic’ and ‘morphogenetic’ stages as proposed by Archer (1995). In 
brief, there is a circadian time in human social life that has emerged from the 
circadian time of nature; it appears as interactive change through 
repetition.236 I will take account of this connection in the discussion that 
follows. 
5.3.2.2 Markets and path-dependent processes 
In a much cited paper, Paul David (1994: 208) states: “the more strongly one 
wishes to assert that the slowly evolving institutional matrix of markets 
constitutes a fundamental historical constraint on the performance of market 
economies, the more essential it seems to try to understand why ‘history 
matters’ in the evolution of organizations and institutions, themselves.” 
In order to offer such understanding David draws on his previous work about 
“phenomena of ‘path dependence’ in stochastic dynamical systems” 
manifested in ‘non-ergodic’ systems, those that “are unable to shake off the 
effects of past events and do not have a limiting, invariant probability 
distribution that is continuous over the entire state space. …they are drawn 
into the neighbourhoods of one or another of several possible ‘attractors’, 
selections among the latter being made, typically, by the persisting 
consequences of some aleatory and transient conditions that prevailed early 
in the history of the process” (Ibid, 208). 
This path dependence approach to sociocultural phenomena has been widely 
diffused in economic history, mostly through the late work of Douglass North 
(2005: 62) who recently summarised his stance in the following terms: 
                                                 
236 “The concept of circadian means circa one day. It indicates an openness to variation 
rather than sameness, invariant repetition, and fixed accuracy” (Adam, 1990: 74). 
237 
 
Institutional change is typically incremental and is path dependent. … It is 
incremental because large-scale change will create too many opponents 
among existing organizations that will be harmed and therefore oppose 
such change. Revolutionary change will only occur in the case of gridlock 
among competing organizations which thwarts the ability of organizations 
to capture gains from trade. Path dependence will occur because the 
direction of the incremental institutional change will be broadly consistent 
with the existing institutional matrix (for the reasons described above) and 
will be governed by the kinds of knowledge and skills that the 
entrepreneurs and members of organizations have invested in. 
In the discussion below I will take the terms “conventions”, “institutions”, 
“institutional change” and “institutional matrix” used by David, North and 
other social scientists as amenable to my encompassing concept of 
‘institutional norms’ presented in chapter 3. Most of the time they refer to 
cultural entities, although in some contexts the authors also seem to include 
organisations in institutions. Basically, I intend to show that the concept of 
path-dependence is in itself problematic and, above all, cannot be given 
primacy if we want to understand markets’ change. 
Actually, underlying path dependence explanations there are two different 
models that appear intertwined in the literature and thus make difficult the 
identification of which one the author is using, if he is not intertwining both 
at the same time. These models have been summarised by Ebbinghaus 
(2009: 191) in the following terms:237 
One common image is the unplanned ‘trodden trail’ that emerges through 
the subsequent repeated use by others of a path spontaneously chosen by 
an individual. A different illustration is the ‘road juncture’, the branching 
point at which a person needs to choose one of the available pathways in 
order to continue the journey. … The first model stresses the spontaneous 
evolution of an institution [institutional norm] and its subsequent long-term 
entrenchment; the second view looks at the interdependent sequence of 
events that structure the alternatives for future institutional changes. 
The ‘trodden trail’ model has a serious limitation that stems from the 
assumption that the competing elements facing some “initial conditions” are 
in equal footing, which for instance means that (at that moment) the 
competing actors had equal resources. This is why the process is not 
launched by the strategic move of a ‘stronger’ actor but rather by “some 
aleatory and transient conditions” to use the words of David. In fact, because 
it is inspired by the ‘Polya urn’ model, the ‘trodden trail’ model explains the 
‘lock-in’ of a closed system endowed with an internal, positive feedback 
                                                 
237 In a similar manner, (Håkansson and Lundgren, 1997) summarise Paul David’s two 
models of path dependence. 
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mechanism. “An end to the ‘lock-in’ would only be possible through 
exogenous intervening factors, which are certainly outside the theoretical 
model” (Ebbinghaus, 2009: 196). This is a problematic shortcoming, which 
makes the model inadequate when we are attempting to understand changes 
in sociocultural systems made of creative actors that participate in different 
institutions. 
As for the second meaning of path dependence, the ‘road juncture’ model, 
we leave behind a population of institutional norms one of which will be ‘the 
winner’, and the analytical focus becomes “the long-term developmental 
pathway of an institution, or complex institutional arrangement [norms or 
system of norms], shaped by and then further adapted by collective actors” 
(Ebbinghaus, 2009: 199; emphasis mine). 
Here we have what Ebbinghaus sees as a “more open path-dependence 
concept [useful] to describe institutional development … in the sense of the 
sequence of contingent decisions. Earlier decisions, once institutionalized, 
‘structure the alternatives (Rokkan, 1999) of later ones.” (Ibid, 200; emphasis 
mine). Comparing with the ‘trodden trail’ model (Ibid, 202), the ‘road 
juncture’ model acknowledges change coming ‘from within’ the sociocultural 
system in the triple sense of: a) path stabilization, which involves adaptations 
to external changes that preserve the ‘architecture’ of the system; b) path 
departure, which require adaptations that include a partial modification of 
system’s core structures; c) path cessation or switching, which means the 
end of the system or its replacement by another one, possibly through the 
intervention of ‘political entrepreneurs’. 
This developmental perspective of path-dependence, ‘road juncture’ version 
(see Fig. 15), presents the enormous advantage of putting aside the 
deterministic aspect of the path-dependence/lock-in rhetoric, which has been 
inspired by the studies of technological innovation and its focus on the 
constrains to technological change (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985).238 In between 
the more extreme cases of ‘inertia’ and ‘radical change’, it allows for a 
                                                 
238 It is true that a number of economists, for instance Castaldi and Dosi (2006: 117), 
acknowledge that “lock-ins seldom have an absolute nature: the unfolding of history … is 
also a source of new ‘windows of ‘opportunities – using again Paul David’s terminology – 
which allow de-locking and escaping from the past.” However, exceptions 
notwithstanding, it is also true that the analytical weakness pointed out by Crouch and 
Farrell (2004: 12) applies to most of economics path dependence literature: “[The more 
sophisticated versions of path dependence] … fail to advance arguments about what such 
wide-ranging change involves, and how actors will respond to it”. 
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variety of intermediate ‘departures’ in line with the conclusions of some 
management studies about how firms and industries change (Huy and 
Mintzberg, 2003; McGahan, 2000). 
 
 
 
Fig. 15 –  Illustration of a developmental path dependence (source: Ebbinghaus, 
2009: 204) 
 
 
 
Despite the merits of the developmental perspective of path-dependence 
phenomena, this variant of the model still sees most of the path as a minor-
change ‘time’ obscurely connected to the changes that occur at ‘critical 
junctures’, the latter being recognised as the important ‘times’ of change. An 
example of such emphasis is Stråth (2009: 37; emphasis mine) who “argues 
for the analysis of social processes in terms of path-breaking responses to 
crisis rather than in terms of path-dependence” and proposes a focus on 
cultural entities such as interpretations, narratives, discourses (“cultural 
idioms”) that “are or were activated in specific historical and institutional 
settings”, even if such cultural resources have been created over the path 
that led to the crisis. 
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The relevant literature about path-dependence in economics typically puts an 
emphasis on the non-ergodicity of economic systems’ path and its 
irreversibility, albeit sometimes with the important qualification that 
‘irreversibility’ “is not only a constraint on the freedom to choose [in the 
future] but also a continuous source of opportunities” (Dosi and Metcalfe, 
1991: 147). Nevertheless it appears that the constraints and the 
opportunities are quite different processes analytically unrelated. While some 
authors place industries’ path dependence within an explanatory scheme 
similar to ‘generalised Darwinism’ (Langlois and Robertson, 1995) others 
explore some kind of analogy between market processes and those of 
biological evolution described by the ‘punctuated change’ model (Antonelli, 
2007).239 
As Schneiberg (2007: 50) perceptively notes, a ‘generalised Darwinism’ 
scheme is “typically incremental and evolutionary rather than fundamental. 
Thus … overplaying continuities with the past, and downplaying or even 
denying the existence of fundamental change, off-path behaviour and the 
creation of new forms.” On the other hand, the economic analysis inspired by 
‘punctuated change’ stresses “a discontinuous succession of divides and 
qualitatively different institutional regimes, rather than an incremental 
accumulation of evolutionary changes. But to get to these ruptures, scholars 
typically invoke exogenous shocks to the system. … [This strategy] denies 
institutional [stabilising] effects at critical junctures in order to preserve the 
recognition of fundamental change” (Ibid, 50-51). 
A crucial problem of these approaches is that, either assuming paths of 
incremental change or of strong inertia punctuated by temporally 
concentrated major change, they do not reconcile processes of stability with 
processes of radical change within a single explanatory model. In a review of 
research in political phenomena, Thelen (1999: 399) addresses this crucial 
point when she states that “understanding moments in which fundamental 
political change is possible requires an analysis of the particular mechanisms 
through which the previous patterns were sustained and reproduced.” 
Observing the conclusions of detailed empirical research in comparative 
                                                 
239 Djelic and Quack (2007: 181; emphasis mine) argue that in their research “punctuated 
equilibrium, i.e., a single radical and abrupt jump from one stage to another, was not 
observed. Instead, multidirectional struggles, an aggregation of decision points, and 
multiple critical junctures charted a posteriori a series of crooked paths.” 
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business systems, I am convinced that the norms of markets do change in 
multiple ways that go largely beyond the dichotomy of ‘minor adaptive’ 
versus ‘major radical’ types of change. “Instead of separating institutional 
development into periods in which agency matters more than structure or the 
other way around,” it would be more productive to pay attention to “broad 
modes of gradual but nevertheless transformative change” such as 
“displacement, layering, drift, conversion, and exhaustion” (Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005: 19; emphasis mine) in the norms and organisations of 
markets.  
The fact is that both ‘incremental’ and ‘punctuated change’ models prevail in 
evolutionary economics and they typically require an ‘evolutionary time’ of a 
varying population of individuals (rules, firms, technologies). As already 
discussed, the evolutionary approach implies the uneasy choice of a 
sociocultural entity that could ‘play the role’ of the gene. Notwithstanding 
the misunderstanding of the role of the gene in biology, this is an obligatory 
(but wanting) analogy in order to build upon it a mechanism of replication 
that could explain the continuity of the overall evolutionary process. 
The ‘stability’-bias of the path dependence approaches has been pointed out 
by Schneiberg (2007: 50) in the following terms: 
It is hard to explain fundamental change and the rise of new paths using 
arguments about path dependence and the constraining power of context 
that were originally crafted to explain stability withinvariation 
acrossfields, systems or nation states. 
In a similar vein, Djelic and Quack (2007: 162) also stated: 
On the whole, and whatever the version considered, path de\pendency 
arguments tend to focus on mechanisms that anchor and stabilize 
trajectories while paying less attention to the sources and mechanisms of 
change. In the strongest versions of path dependency, path transformation 
is presumed to be highly unlikely except through rare radical ruptures or 
reorientations, which are often associated with violent external shocks. 
Despite such serious limitation, path dependence explanations have been 
used in heterodox economics at least since the eighties of last century 
(Freeman and Perez, 1988). I am not denying the existence of such 
phenomena, at least in the history of technologies. The problem is that social 
scientists who rely exclusively on the path dependence model are not aware 
of the need of an analytical framework that could account at the same time 
for stability and change in a specific kind of systems: in multi-level, 
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sociocultural systems with fuzzy boundaries, as it is the case of markets. 
This requires an understanding of processes where time is “multiple in its 
forms and levels of expressions” (Adam, 1990: 169); a plurality of ‘timings’ 
that we need to integrate in our models of sociocultural change. In 
sociocultural reality we need to work with different and related timescapes 
because while inter-persons interactions are mostly organised in a short-
horizon clock/calendar time, markets may be better understood in historical 
time (Harriss, 2006), and societal change certainly needs a long-horizon, 
‘evolutionary’ time (Eisenstadt, 2006). 
In brief, using the words of Kössler (2006: 297-298), “we are challenged to 
interlink these different time-scales or timescapes in our account if we wish 
to arrive at a picture of the overall process as well as its concrete local and 
regional variations.”  
5.3.2.3 Markets have a history 
The above presented discussion of path dependence models should be 
placed in the context of a broader enquiry about causal processes and 
outcome processes in sociocultural change. This is provided by Pierson 
(2003) who not only makes a useful distinction between ‘short’ and ‘long’ 
horizons of both causes and outcomes, but also explains how path 
dependence processes (its initial historical event and the ensuing reinforcing 
feedback loops) are only one among various types of historical processes in 
the sociocultural realm. Therefore, economists should be aware that path 
dependence models, although relevant, have not the monopoly of historical 
explanations of economic processes. Further, they should acknowledge that 
“as feedback loops become central to the process that follows a critical 
juncture, it becomes impossible to delineate clear causes and effects; 
instead, a set of factors mutually reinforce each other” (Pierson, 2003: 195, 
note 193). This is already proposed in Chapter 3 as a general methodological 
principle for the study of sociocultural phenomena. 
Path dependence explanations have been imported from the study of physics 
and chemistry (Prigogine and Stengers, 1979). However, besides my critique 
in section 5.2 of the analytical procedure of abstracting a ‘generalised 
scheme’ from theories pertaining to other levels of reality, there is an 
additional and quite simple point that should convince us to embrace a 
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specific understanding of sociocultural processes. The point is (almost 
perfectly) stated by Thelen (2003: 231; emphasis mine) in the following: 
Increasing returns arguments focus mostly on the winners and on 
adaptation effects (after an institution has been “selected”) that reinforce a 
particular trajectory. But this emphasis obscures ongoing political 
contestation over the form and functions of institutions forged at (often 
distant and receding) critical junctures. Increasing returns cannot tell the 
whole story because, in politics, losers do not necessarily disappear and 
their “adaptation” to prevailing institutions can mean something different 
from “embracing and reproducing” those institutions, as in the worlds of 
technologies and markets. 
Thelen’s point fully applies to the study of markets. For instance, the recent 
strikes of British Airways airline staff remind us that the routine work in 
producing a daily service for market exchange is based on front office and 
back office human interactions and communications, which implies 
(frequently unnoticed, but at times largely mediatised) conflict, contestation, 
negotiation, and certainly continuous change. 
Economists working in the tradition of Original Institutionalism, but also Neo-
Schumpeterians and New Austrians, should acknowledge the research made 
available by Historical Institutionalism in sociology and political science. An 
important outcome of this research is an enriched insight about the 
processes of sociocultural change that enables to see “there often is 
considerable continuity through and in spite of historical break points, as 
well as dramatic institutional reconfiguration beneath the surface of 
apparent stability or adaptive self-reproduction, as a result of an 
accumulation over longer periods of time of subtle incremental changes” 
(Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 8). This research tradition provides an important 
building block for the construction of the encompassing framework we need 
in order to understand the richness of markets’ history beyond the 
conventional dichotomies of ‘incremental’ versus ‘radical’ processes of 
change and ‘continuity’ versus ‘discontinuity’ in their outcomes. Its 
contribution helps to eliminate an ingrained shortcoming in heterodox 
economics, that of “separating institutional development into periods in 
which agency matters more than structure or the other way around” and to 
see “the way actors cultivate change from within the context of existing 
opportunities and constraintsworking around elements they cannot change 
while attempting to harness and utilize others in novel ways” (Ibid, 19). Such 
understanding is enhanced, and better framed by the concept of 
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sociocultural emergence when it is connected with the acceptance of 
different timings for bottom-level interactions and upper-level structures of 
the system. To this synthesis I turn in the following. 
The point of departure in the building of a new conceptual framework for the 
understanding of markets’ change is the acceptance that markets are 
sociocultural units, that is, markets are meso-institutions of 
contemporaneous capitalist societies, and as such markets have a history. 
Markets undergo historical change in different ways: transformation 
processes of production, distribution, appropriation and consumption 
change in/through historical time; the firms (and other organisations) that 
operate in the markets, and the norms that make markets organised 
processes, change as well.240 Recalling previous arguments, and much in 
agreement with Schumpeter (although not exactly for the same reasons), I 
will dispense the analogy with evolutionary processes in biology, or any other 
realm for that matter, in order to build a theoretically based, historical 
understanding of markets ‘timing’.241 
1.  The first assumption of my historical perspective enables to overcome the 
traditional divide between causal processes operating ‘from within’ the 
market and causal processes coming ‘from outside’ the market. This 
dichotomy is still present in the above mentioned literature of Historical 
Institutionalism in sociology and political science. As Schneiberg (2007: 51) 
summarises, there are researchers who “look outwards from the path, and 
begin with the recognition that institutional systems or fields coexist, 
interact or even overlap with other systems organized according to different 
logics”, while other researchers’ approach “looks inwards and backwards at 
the paths themselves, at what actors can do on or with existing institutional 
arrangements, and how the histories of path creation themselves generate 
resources for transformation or the creation of new forms.” 
According to my interactive understanding of self-organising systems, we 
need to work with a combination of both perspectives (from within and from 
outside) because no self-organising complex and open system could survive 
                                                 
240 In line with my stance in section 5.2, here I share the point made by Snooks (2007: 140; 
emphasis mine) that “to understand the real ‘global state’ of human society, we need to 
adopt a realist general dynamic theory from within the social sciences, not a statistical 
theory from the physical sciences.”  
241 Actually, “human [biological] evolution and human history turn out to be two 
inseparable aspects of the same overall process” (Berry, 1999: 137). 
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without a continuous interaction with its environment, which is a joint-
“within/outside” process. It is through such interactive mode of being – which 
is a unique process – that a market emerges and, in so doing, exerts an 
influence on the environment. It is understood that the latter is composed by 
the market system, the economy and the broader national society, the other 
societies in the world to which the market is related and, last but not least, 
the bio-physical ecology.242 Therefore, a market’s process is a joint outcome 
of interacting events, internal and external, which means that while internal 
sources of change need resources from the outside in order to emerge and to 
operate, external sources of change would produce no effect on the system 
without adequate linkages internal to the system. Hence, Neo-
Schumpeterians’ emphasis on the ‘from within’ entrepreneurial process are 
reminded that successful, pervasive technologies could not transform 
markets (and feed back into transformative processes in wider society) 
without the scientific knowledge produced outside market processes by 
creative individuals belonging to other institutions, and the new state 
regulations and unperceived cultural changes that enable and sustain the 
transformative power of new ‘constellations’ of technologies (Freeman and 
Louçã, 2001). Therefore, a first critical juncture in the history of markets 
resides in the productive relationship between creators (scientists, artists) 
and entrepreneurs.243 
2.  The second assumption relates to the non-teleological nature of markets’ 
history. Firms have strategies, either formalised in planning exercises or 
simply implicit in their operational management. Nevertheless, as their future 
cannot be controlled, firms’ actual strategies will emerge “as time goes by”, 
and thus can only be known a posteriori (Mintzberg et al., 1998). In the 
process, firms (as autonomous systems; see 3.3.2) attempt to change their 
environment through a variety of networks in which their managers and 
owners participate (Granovetter, 1985).244 These networks, legislated or 
                                                 
242 The natural environment disasters produced by the extraction and transport of oil, and 
by its transformation and consumption, are there to remind economists of this basic, 
though frequently glossed over, interdependence. 
243 Another critical point in the road from invention to innovation is found at a later stage 
in the test of the market. As Metcalfe (2004: 165) states, “The entrepreneur must bring 
the conjecture to fruition in a working business organization for it to be tested by the 
market, and thoughts must be turned to profitable action if the conjecture is to be of 
consequence.” 
244 The same could be said for other types of non-for profit organisations operating in the 
same market like trade/labour unions or industry training centres. 
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informal, reach the social group of policy-makers, their law and economics 
advisers, and the media, thereby channelling a lobbying activity for 
favourable changes in legislation about diverse domains such as market 
competition, taxes, labour or environment standards. In this sense, a market 
has a history, which is a process; and, by definition, processes have no pre-
existent end to be attained, be it an ‘equilibrium state’ or a dynamic systems 
‘attractor’. Whatever the history of the market within a chosen time-frame 
(stability, renewal, radical change, disappearance) it will emerge from 
individual and collective actors’ interactions with a multi-level environment 
providing scarce resources. 
Recurring to the evolutionary economics conceptual framework (mostly 
focused on firms), in metaphorical terms we could say that markets “may be 
always ‘on their way’ to something, but never arrive, because their external 
environment [the economy and the wider society] and their internal 
components adapt and change as history unfolds.” (Allen, 2001: 346). 
Making a bridge to the evolutionary economics literature, the history of a 
particular market corresponds to an interactive developmental process while 
the history of the ‘market system’, if (reductively) seen as a ‘population of 
markets’, could be statistically described as an evolutionary process (for the 
relations between 'development' and 'evolution' in biology, see Oyama, 
2000). In any case, there would be variation, inheritance and selection 
processes of a sociocultural kind operating at different levels. In my view, 
however, the crucial point to retain is that markets and societies are co-
implicated in their histories, and if social scientists have forgotten this crucial 
dimension of capitalism the financial-economic-social (and possibly political) 
crisis that began in 2007 is with us to recall that such co-constitution is a 
“matter of fact”, to use Veblen’s terms. 
If markets and societies have a non-teleological history, could we say that 
they have at least a directionality? In what sense can we speak of 
sociocultural development? 245 Here we need to make a distinction between a 
directionality of history assessed in terms of moral values, and a 
directionality assessed in terms of a set of sociocultural indicators. The 
former case seems much problematic, as there will always be scholars 
                                                 
245 A formulation that is neutral with respect to the problem of directionality in economic 
development is given by Metcalfe and Ramlogan (2005: 220): “all economies are 
developing economies, in the fundamental sense of continuous self-transformation”. 
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inclined to look back to history as progressive betterment while others would 
see no trend at all, if not one of decadence. As for the second option, the 
idea of directionality in socio-economic processes is widely accepted under 
the concept of ‘development’. This has been argued for instance by Brinkman 
(1995) who, adopting a Schumpeterian approach, recalls the succession of 
technological revolutions that structurally transformed not only the 
economies but whole societies. Brinkman brings to the fore the work of the 
Institutional economist Gunnar Myrdal “who defined development as “… the 
movement upward of the entire social system” (Ibid, 1182; emphasis mine). 
In the last decades the Human Development Indicator published by the World 
Bank, inspired among others by Myrdal’s understanding of development and 
the philosophical work of Amartia Sen, has been widely accepted as a useful 
tool for assessment of the ‘progress’ of each country, one that involves both 
economic growth and an ‘up-lifting’ structural change both in the economy 
and in other domains of society. 
However, it seems to me that the evidence of directionality defined in terms 
of sociocultural ‘development’ is weak. Many societies have not consistently 
followed such developmental path. Evidence of this exists at least in Africa. 
Further, the idea that development implies continuous economic growth, at 
least in terms of the past Western style, is increasingly seen by environmental 
experts as unsustainable (Kallis and Norgaard, 2010). For the good and the 
bad, it seems there are reasons to doubt that the history of human societies 
has some sort of directionality that could be taken as an historical ‘law’.246 If 
a developmental directionality could be discerned at all, one would need to 
leave the sociocultural realm and adopt an encompassing perspective about 
the whole universe to look at the different emergent levels of Nature, whose 
complexity (however it is measured) some biologists see as continuously 
growing (Hoffmeyer, 1998; Ulanowicz, 1997). Notwithstanding the validity of 
this vantage point, I note that the evolutionary timescape to which it refers is 
largely beyond the historical time of markets, which I measure in decades of 
‘calendar time’. 
                                                 
246 This topic of historical patterns is (so far) an unresolved issue. On the one hand, some 
argue that “an historical approach to economic growth is unlikely to be acceptable, unless 
it … is also capable of identifying and explaining recurrent phenomena, as well as special 
cases” (Freeman and Louçã, 2001: 130). But, on the other hand, Seabrooke (2007b: 395-
396) warns against the trap of seeing history as cyclical by mapping onto the past 
(through a selective reading of data) a particular model of the present, and then proposing 
a rationale (the ‘cycle’ or ‘wave’) that enables to predict a trend for the future. 
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3.  The timescape of markets’ history leads me to a third assumption. So far I 
have taken for granted the intuitive idea of sociocultural change observed in 
reference to either “a parameter of retrospectively fixed points” (change ‘in 
time’) or to “the process of change” per se of a system (change ‘through 
time’) (Adam, 1990: 101). However, we could consider another possibility, 
that of the ‘organising time’ of the clock and the calendar, which is a socially 
instituted tool that emerged with Western industrialisation and enables to 
“co-ordinate, synchronise, and sequence specific actions; when these are to 
take place; how long they are to take; how often and within what length of 
time span they are to happen; and in what order of priority they are to be 
selected” (Ibid, 101). In this sense, the ‘abstract time’ becomes contextually 
dependent and endowed with a normative character, one that enriches my 
concept of ‘institutional norms’ of the market. 
The abstract nature of this ‘organising time’ is objectified as a conceptual 
tool that establishes the public meaning of a quantifiable time (minutes, 
months, years), “a resource that may be budgeted, wasted, allocated, sold, or 
controlled” (Ibid, 104). This man-made time is well described by Adam (1990: 
109) in the following statement: 
I suggest that it is only with our relating to the human creation of calendar 
and clock time as time, that time became a receptacle to be filled, a 
resource to be allocated, and a commodity to be sold and exchanged on 
the labour market. 
This ‘organising time’ bears another important connection to my institutional 
understanding of markets, although this time the connection is not with the 
norms that regulate markets; it is a connection with the powers embedded in, 
and among, the ‘organisations of the market’. Therefore, “once we ask who 
structures whose life, what rules are being adhered to, and how these 
processes occur, then timed social life becomes fundamentally embedded in 
an understanding of the structural relations of power, normative structures, 
and the negotiated interactions of social life” (Adam, 1990: 109). Here ‘time’ 
becomes an organising principle of powers and resources; of our social life in 
the market. 
Time as a resource around which there emerge struggles of power is at the 
core of the capitalist firm where “labour is exchanged for money in a 
mediated form and time is the medium through which labour is translated 
into its abstract exchange value” (Ibid, 111). Indeed, “the time of some 
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members of such a society may be deemed more important or costly than of 
others. … This in turn relates to its use and the extent to which the control 
over such usage is discretionary or imposed” (Ibid, 113).247 “What emerges as 
significant here is the need to recognise industrial time as a resource with 
both a use and an exchange value” (Ibid, 117), a “reified time … externalised 
and imposed” (Ibid, 120) on the circadian time of human biological life. 
This new understanding of time brings into the analysis of markets’ history 
an important source of change, albeit a much neglected one in the heterodox 
traditions inspired by Schumpeter and the Austrian school. While the former 
directs his attention to the applications of radically innovative knowledge that 
could lead to profits of a large scale, and the latter emphasises the 
distributed source of all kinds of knowledge about the market as the main (if 
not the only) source of endogenous-driven change, both neglect power 
struggles as a source of change of organisations, particular markets, and the 
wider market system. Therefore, a model of markets’ history needs to 
incorporate the interdependence of different ‘timings’ in the 
knowledge/culture domain (the processes of emergent institutional norms) 
and in the power relations/social domain (the processes of emergent 
organisations). In both kinds of processes, their different ‘timing’ involve 
interactions with the societal environment, which is by nature emergent, 
complex, and thus also multi-‘timing’. 
4.  A fourth and final assumption. If we accept that ‘market time’ is revealed 
through sociocultural emergent processes, then we should assume that the 
rhythmicity of the interactional-communicational level of sociocultural life 
should be present in the history of markets under some kind of rhythmic 
path such as expansion followed by decline, or boom followed by burst. This 
is a point so far unexplored, but one that intuitively appears fundamental 
and parallel to a point made in this thesis (see 3.3.3): culture, as a system, 
has a sign-based nature because it emerges from the persons’ 
communications through semiotic processes which are at the core of their 
learning processes. For instance, I suggest that the ‘circadian hypothesis’ 
should be explored in the study of expectations in market processes, which 
Keynes related to the uncertainty lived by economic agents when assessing 
                                                 
247 This ‘organising time’ is well illustrated in Lazonick’s (1991: 119) discussion of Karl 
Marx’s analysis of industrial work. 
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the future outcomes of markets, which he causally linked to economic 
fluctuations. This is a line of research waiting to be explored in an 
interdisciplinary style by the social scientists who share an historical 
understanding of the economy. 
5.3.2.4 Interactionist model of markets 
In what follows, the elaborations previously presented (see Chapter 4) about 
the systemic nature of markets are implicit. This understanding enables me 
to treat markets as sociocultural units/systems without running the risk of 
being criticised of ‘holism’, of ignoring the structure, relations and 
interactions involving individuals, firms and other organisations (e.g. 
regulatory bodies) of markets. I also recall that I have defined firms as 
sociocultural autonomous systems, where the term ‘autonomous’ refers to 
their strategic capacity to plan their future and to undertake actions intended 
to change the business environment into their benefit, which are properties 
that markets lack. 
Therefore, it should be clear that by using the terms systems/sub-systems I 
am neither incurring into a functionalist explanation nor am I ignoring the 
autonomy of the persons that sustain (by continuously changing) these 
systems. In my emergentist understanding, I intrinsically assume that 
sociocultural systems such as firms and markets have emerged upon 
persons’ social interactions and communications, and have differentiated 
into intermediate levels that are made of networks of social relations and 
meanings that define the roles that persons enact. Hence, the model that I 
am proposing acknowledges that the processes relating firms within a 
particular market and to other institutions of society are made by persons 
enacting their specific roles and behaving according to an institutionalised 
rationality (see 4.2.3). 
The model described below is represented in Fig. 16248, which symbolises the 
interactions that make up the being ‘in and through’ time of a particular 
market (market A), an element of the market-system, itself a sub-system of 
the economy.249 The former is a meso-institution of society while the latter is 
a macro-institution. It takes account of three relevant institutions: Market A 
                                                 
248 The term model is to be understood in the wide sense of a mediating instrument, as 
discussed in (Morrison and Morgan, 1999). 
249 I recall that the economy also comprises non-market provisioning (see 4.2.2). 
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plus the institutions of science and state/polity, beyond others that are kept 
in the background of the analysis. To these selected three institutions (one 
meso and two macro) I add culture – the ‘ideational background’ of all 
institutions of society.250 They have been chosen after a review of some 
contributions in organisation management (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; 
Spender, 1989), evolutionary economics (Metcalfe and Ramlogan, 2005; 
Metcalfe and Warde, 2002b), economic sociology (Beckert, 2009; Dobbin, 
2004; Harvey, 2002b; Harvey and Metcalfe, 2005) and comparative political 
economy (Hall and Thelen, 2009; Streeck and Thelen, 2005).  
 
 
 
Fig. 16 – Markets’ interaction processes 
                                                 
250 For a brief discussion of the integrative role of culture across society’s institutions, 
albeit under a different terminology, see (Sorge, 2005b: 116-117). 
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The discussion is exclusively centred on the interactions involving the actors 
of a particular market (‘market A’) among themselves, with the actors of 
other markets, the actors of other institutions, and the actors of other 
societies. The interdependence among institutions, and their connections 
with the wider world, have been assumed in Chapter 3 and thus will not be 
addressed here in order to keep the discussion manageable. 
Simplifications are inevitable in any scientific endeavour. However, although I 
have no room to expand on all relevant connections (for instance with the 
education/training institution), when going over the discussion of the model I 
want the reader to keep in mind the international connections or extensions 
of markets, in some cases their very supra-national nature. I am aware of the 
rising flows of international trade, of the multinational production, 
distribution, and exchange networks of large corporations, and their 
sometimes deep connections with local clusters of small and medium firms 
in different countries. Of course, the electronic technologies used in the final 
markets have transformed these in extreme examples of international 
markets endowed with supra-national norms (e.g. Basel III).  
The important point that should be present about the international scale of 
markets relates to the Interactionist nature of the model proposed. I accept 
that national markets are, in large part, an interactive construction of the 
internationalisation process. Precisely because the process is interactive 
(between ‘within’ and ‘outside’), there is not on the one side the national 
market and on the other side the forces of the international markets that 
impinge on it. On this point I agree with a strong argument made by Sorge 
(2005a) and with Campbell’s (2007: 181-182) reading of it: “International 
pressures … are mediated by already existing domestic practices. New 
practices originating outside a country are translated, layered or otherwise 
recombined with nationally specific metatraditions [culture] that have been 
inherited from the past. … internationalization is a simultaneous move to 
universalism (convergence) and particularism (divergence).” 
Now I move to the details of the model. The arrows in Fig. 16 stand for inter-
institutional networks or organisations (e.g. professional training centres, 
networks for innovation, networks for legislation lobbying), and for 
processes (causes/effects) relating market A to the institutions, culture and 
other economies and societies in the world. It could be argued that, for 
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analytical reasons, two kinds of interactions should be separated: (a) the 
interactions within market A and between market A and the rest of the 
market system, and (b) interactions relating market A to culture, state/polity 
and science. However, in doing this separation, even only for analytical 
purposes, I would be inconsistent with my methodology as I argue that 
market processes appear as a joint operation of different sorts of interactions 
(causes or effects); they present themselves as ‘constellations of 
interactions’, which is proper to the nature of complex self-organising 
systems. Therefore, in the following discussion I assume there is an 
intertwining of different kinds of interactions at each moment of the analysis. 
Below I follow the contribution of Beckert (2009), which gives a valuable 
explanation of markets’ processes, but I also diverge in what I see as 
shortcomings of his analysis in light of my social ontology. This author 
highlights the contingent nature of interpersonal relations in the market and 
the inherent uncertainty that individual and collective actors face. In Beckert’s 
(2009: 249) words: 
Only when it is possible to integrate the individual behaviour of market 
actors in such a way that they develop enough confidence to accept the 
risks of market exchange can the market operate as a mechanism for the 
fulfilment of adaptive functions in society. But how can we explain this 
integration of action and thus the order of markets?  
Actually, the question put forward by Beckert is about markets’ emergence as 
an organisation of different emergent processes, the latter being (by nature) 
a continuously organised change in particular segments of sociocultural 
reality. In Beckert’s words: “I argue that one can distinguish between three 
fundamental coordination problems which represent at the same time the 
central sources of uncertainty for market actors. … I call these issues the 
value problem, the problem of competition, and the cooperation problem” 
(Ibid, 253; emphasis mine). In the following I discuss each of these 
coordination problems from my vantage point. 
a) Competition and market interactions 
Metcalfe and Ramlogan (2005: 220) bring to the discussion of market 
competition some neglected contributions of heterodox economics that see 
the competitive process much differently from the price-based understanding 
of neo-classical economics: “What all of these writers are pointing to is 
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competition as a process of rivalry and for rivalry to be meaningful the 
competitors need to be different. It is this that connects us immediately to 
the evolutionary foundations of competition and development.” 
The idea “that markets are open to the rival behaviours of producers and 
consumers” (Metcalfe and Warde, 2002a: 194) leads me to emphasise a 
fundamental idea about market competition: it is a process of rivalry that 
cuts across both sides of the appropriation process, supply and demand. 
Most of the literature, either in evolutionary economics or in economic 
sociology, focus only on the supply side, and some extreme formulations 
seem to adopt a selectionist rhetoric as if there existed an independent 
demand that ‘selects’ for the fittest firms.251 The current poor understanding 
of the demand side is acknowledged by Nelson and Consoli (2010) for whom 
“Evolutionary economics badly needs a behavioural theory of household 
consumption behaviour, but to date only limited progress has been made on 
that front.”252 For instance, the knowledge of the demand-side will be 
improved with more work on the understanding of how new products are 
accepted and diffused among consumers (Kalkan, 2010), and (most 
importantly) how these processes are influenced by the strategies of rival 
producers. I think that the behaviourist psychology is not the best available 
partner for economics research in the field of consumer behaviour.  
Nevertheless, our understanding of the full process of market competition 
certainly needs interdisciplinary research and still has some way to go. 
This encompassing picture of market competition leads us to acknowledge 
that supply and demand are indeed interactively constructed, which is a 
vision that is seldom adopted, even in evolutionary economics literature. One 
exception is Allen (1994: 595) who places this crucial feature at the core of 
the competitive process: 
Potential ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ are not given independently of each other. 
People cannot experience what is not made available, but can only be 
affected by what is produced. Their lifestyle, demands and preferences are 
shaped by the supply that really occurs, and so a ‘learning’ dialogue shapes 
the patterns of consumption that develops the system. These patterns 
                                                 
251 The canonical formulation of the evolutionary model is given by Metcalfe (1998: 33; 
emphasis mine): “It is the variant properties of the units of selection which play the causal 
role and the critical factors [of the environment] which translate the variant properties into 
the differential fitness of the units of selection. Fitness itself is not a variant property of 
anything.” 
252 For a review of theoretical approaches to consumption that dissent from neoclassical 
economics, see (Ackerman, 1997). 
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emerge, and the chance details of the process of emergence alter what is 
finally ‘revealed’. Supply affects demand, and vice versa, and cultural 
structures are formed by the effects of positive and negative 
feedbacksimitation, economies of scale, learning by doing etc, are 
positive, and competition for attention, for market and for resources are 
negative. 
This quote is a good support to my Interactionist approach to market 
competition and is much helpful in highlighting the existence of important 
relations between markets and the culture of a society when we look at its 
demand side. Of course these relations are also at work in the production 
processes on the supply side taking account that the beliefs prevalent within 
the firms are actively promoted by managers and entrepreneurs (Witt, 2000) 
who carry into their firms the ideas and values of their communities and 
society at large. In fact, and most importantly, the network of market 
producers (the industry) tacitly accepts a system of norms about how to 
compete in their market, which bear important linkages to society’s culture. 
In line with Marshall’s understanding of industries, Spender (1989: 68) 
argued that uncertainty “is resolved by the manager using his judgment to 
supplement the description of the decision situation”; managers “draw their 
judgements from a shared pool [of ideas and values], the “industry recipe.” 
This industry-specific identity highlights a crucial linkage between the 
broader culture of society and one important set of non-legal norms, the 
‘business model’ that informally regulates the supply side of the market and 
seldom is identified in economics literature as a source of organisation in the 
competitive process.253 It corresponds to a negative feedback expressed in 
“the idea that people interpret their environments and the forces operating 
within them through a set of taken-for-granted cognitive and normative 
templates (metatraditions)” (Campbell, 2007: 183).  In some cases, the 
‘business model’ gains a powerful normativity that ‘blinds’ the firms to the 
strategies they would need to survive competitive challenges (Porac et al., 
1995). This means that, as a cultural entity, ‘business models’ are analogous 
to ‘worldviews’; they “embody fixed presuppositions which determine how 
“facts” are interpreted, even, and perhaps particularly, facts that may appear 
to undermine an underlying worldview!” (Reynolds, 2004: 546). 
                                                 
253 On the close concepts of ‘business model’ and ‘market framing’ see respectively (Porac 
et al., 1989) and (Fiss and Kennedy, 2007). 
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Markets’ history is also made by entrepreneurial firms willing to shake the 
prevailing norms and undertake competition through more or less radical 
innovations. This dimension of rivalry in market processes has been explored 
extensively by evolutionary economics literature, mostly by the Neo-
Schumpeterian strand, with theoretical and empirical study of technological 
innovation across industries (Metcalfe, 2003) and in specific industries 
(Malerba, 2006) occupying a prominent place. In broad terms, over the 
twentieth century there has been an acceleration of innovations of a 
technological kind, which came largely from the interaction between science 
(public and private) and industry, through the market of R&D patents and 
through the activity of cross-border networks. 
These inter-institutional, cross-border interactions connect the strategies of 
entrepreneurial firms with the ideas of inventive actors working in the 
science institution in order to build innovative solutions to problems created 
by the competition process (Metcalfe, 2010; Metcalfe et al., 2005) (see Fig. 
17). This is a central source of positive feedbacks into markets’ history and 
into economic growth through technological innovation (Nelson, 2001), 
although its importance should be tempered by the acknowledgement that 
the effects of interactions with science intertwine with interactions with other 
institutions, namely with the state through its economic policies. For 
instance, a high interest rate induces short-run profitable investments that 
tend to displace expensive and time-demanding R&D projects (Ramazzotti, 
2001: 75). After all, the technological dimension of the competitive process 
is only a piece in the big puzzle of markets and society interactions (Perez, 
2004). 
Market competition is always regulated by the state.254 Beckert (2009: 258) 
notes that “the state is involved through its legislation, for instance in 
antitrust law, labor law, or intellectual property law as well as through the 
introduction of subsidies, duties, and consumer protection measures.” But, 
besides its regulatory role, the state can also be entrepreneurial “in the sense 
of providing the ‘vision’ for the future and building new institutions and the 
‘managing of conflicts’ which inevitably arise during the process of structural 
change” (Chang, 1994: 293). 
                                                 
254 For a broader discussion of the relations between the state and markets, see (Block and 
Evans, 2005: 505). 
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Fig. 17 – Model of a network for innovation 
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In a more focused study, Harvey  (2007a) discusses three mechanisms 
relating markets and state in a co-constitutive way: law, welfare regulation 
and fiscal rules. His contribution highlights the economic, but non-market, 
nature of important causal processes in markets’ functioning. “So legally or 
welfare regulatory instituted economic processes are immanent in the 
economic environment, shaping it in significant ways” (Ibid, 31). Further, “the 
interaction between different regulatory modes [law, welfare regulation, fiscal 
rules], as much as with the economy, is a critical aspect in understanding the 
process of historical transformation” (Ibid, 33). Therefore, he concludes: 
“because the dynamic involved in the model is multipolar, it may be that the 
language of complex, open-systems causality is more appropriate that one 
that implies a bi-polar dynamic or any straightforward opposition or 
dichotomy between variation and selection processes” (Ibid, 36). This 
statement fully applies to the Interactionist perspective of market processes 
here argued. 
Another important dimension of markets interactive change relates to the 
exercise of power (Schutz, 1995).255 While mainstream economics tend to 
admit that “people meet as equals in markets”, in fact “some must work, 
while others need not, and the latter dominate the former in the strictest 
senses of the term, albeit perhaps by indirect and inconspicuous means” 
(Ibid, 1165). Beyond this historical class divide, other forms of power occur 
under the heading of ‘market imperfection’, namely the existence of “a 
business hierarchy defined by firms’ possession or lack of monopoly power 
and by their sizes and positions in financial markets” (Ibid, 1166). Using a 
different conceptualisation, Harvey (2002b: 82; emphasis mine) states that 
“the exchange relation is characterised by mutual dependence (owners of 
capital need labour; people are, in varying ways obliged to sell their labour) 
and asymmetrical power relations”, a social relation that is different from 
‘competition’. The latter “takes place within the same class of economic 
agent, but not between classes of economic agent” (Ibid, 82), for instance 
among firms in the situations of ‘market imperfection’ discussed by Schutz. 
Differently from competition, and falling under the category of ‘mutual 
dependence with asymmetrical power’, are the relations between vertically 
                                                 
255 It is important to note that Max Weber defined ‘economic action’ as “peaceful exercise 
of power”, according to the translation provided by Parsons (Baecker, 2007: 28). For a 
Peircean view of power, see (Garnar, 2006). 
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integrated businesses such as between food retailers and food 
manufacturers, which Harvey (2002b) discusses in detail. 
Discussing the so-called ‘labour markets’, Beckert (2009: 259) understands 
that “they demonstrate very obviously how the institutional [state] regulation 
of competition not only reduces uncertainty by creating stable expectations 
but establishes economic inequalities and allocates market risks between 
market actors. … Only if the resulting inequalities are accepted will the 
organization of economic activities through markets gain the social 
legitimacy that is itself a precondition for the functioning of markets”. When 
there is a loss of legitimacy power struggles may ensue and take different 
forms and outcomes (Seabrooke, 2007a), which are in themselves a source of 
change in markets’ norms and organisations. 
Therefore, and despite ignored not only by the mainstream but also in 
important streams of heterodox economics (New Austrians, Neo-
Schumpeterians), power should be present in the analysis of markets. As Hall 
and Thelen (2009: 13) put it, “achieving and maintaining coordination usually 
also involves the exercise of power, because forging and maintaining 
particular institutional arrangements creates winners and losers, notably in 
both sides of the class divide”. In brief, “markets are as much political arenas 
as they are economic realms” (Beckert, 2009: 259). 
Finally, I want to stress that the initiative of the interactions between firms 
and the state belongs to both sides. The state elaborates legal norms for the 
market, and firms exercise their power through collective action in the 
multiple forms aiming to promote favourable changes in markets’ norms, 
namely those that regulate competition. Galbraith, a notable Institutional 
economist who studied the power of corporations in modern industrial 
capitalism gave us an illuminating formulation with which I conclude this 
discussion:  
When the modern corporation acquires power over markets, power in the 
community, power over the state, power over belief, it is a political 
instrument, different in form and degree but not in kind from the state 
itself. To hold otherwiseto deny the political character of modern 
corporationis not merely to avoid the reality. It is to disguise the reality 
(Galbraith, 1973: 6).  
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b) Cooperation and market interactions  
The burst of the speculative bubble in the housing markets that produced an 
international crisis, and forced the states and central banks to intervene in 
the financial markets in 2008, is a conspicuous illustration that without trust 
markets collapse. Such massive intervention prevented (in extremis) a 
dramatic generalised rush to banks by depositors in fear of losing their 
savings. Facing important limitations in the knowledge about the quality of 
the products and the ultimate intentions and future behaviour of other actors 
in the market, and also the future outcomes of the market itself, the solution 
to such uncertainty has to come from generalised trust. Inspired by 
Luhmann’s sociology, Bachmann (2001: 342) presents ‘trust’ as a 
foundational mechanism of social coordination: 
at the origin of the social world lies the constitution of successful 
generalised forms of social practices induced by individuals’ repeated 
decisions to co-operate with each other rather than remaining in 
isolation. In any case, such mechanisms are essential in regard to the 
constitution of differentiated social systems. 
This basic mechanism involves someone’s assumption that a trustee will not 
behave opportunistically without guarantees or enforceable promises of 
exchange. It is a necessary but risky engagement that calls for continued 
search of good reasons to be judged acceptable. In this perspective, ‘trust’ is 
neither a kind of strategy that rational actors use to maximise their interests, 
as Coleman puts it, nor it comes out of the need to reduce costs of 
opportunistic behaviour, as viewed by Transaction Cost Economics. Although 
both Coleman and Luhmann argue that ‘institutions’ (institutional norms) 
help social actors to assess the risk of trust investments, there are important 
differences between both authors: 
Luhmann, who rejects the concept of solipsistic and solely calculation 
oriented actors, suggests that institutions are to be understood as 
reducing risk by providing patterns of social behaviour which in a 
nondeterministic manner orient social actors’ expectations and decisions 
(Bachmann, 2001: 345). 
This means that the interplay between markets’ norms and individual 
behaviour is of a recursive nature, which preserves individual’s freedom to 
break the rules; both legal and non-legal norms “do their job in a latent 
manner”. 
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The emergence of an institutionalised culture of trust, as part of markets’ 
norms, is the adequate theoretical basis to the understanding that market 
processes are not only about competition but also about cooperation. And it 
is a better alternative to the approaches summarised by Beckert (2009: 260) 
such as the individualistic explanations of game theory in economics, the 
power oriented explanations unilaterally emphasising the enforcement of 
norms, and the sociological explanations based on a ‘flat’ ontology of social 
networks. 
There is no doubt that cooperation is complementary and supportive of 
market competition. An important example of this complementarity has been 
theorised by Alfred Marshall (1919) in his analysis of industrial districts. 
Today, the literature about these synergies, either theoretical or policy 
oriented, is voluminous and constitutes a field of fertile research (Becattini et 
al., 2009; Belussi and Caldari, 2009; Uyarra, 2010). In fact, the surge of 
studies on cooperation for competition have begun earlier under the label of 
‘National Systems of Innovation’ (Freeman, 1995; Lündvall, 1992; Nelson, 
1993). Paying attention to culturally specific instituted processes, these 
studies addressed inter-firm cooperation and inter-institutional networks at a 
national level aiming at building innovation-based competitive capabilities. 
The above mentioned literature provides compelling evidence that 
cooperation is not a phenomenon internal to the firm, as suggested by 
Transaction Cost Economics; rather, cooperation is indispensable to the 
functioning of modern capitalism and to the success of firms’ competitive 
strategies (Richardson, 1972). This has been historically documented by 
Lazonick’s (1991) detailed study of the decline of Britain’s industrial power 
and the rise of those of the USA and Japan. And I conclude this discussion of 
market cooperation with a Lazonick’s incisive remark: 
A theory of economic activity that assumes from the outset that the 
absence of market coordination represents a failure in the economic system 
cannot grasp the growing importance of planned coordination for 
generating economic growth (Ibid, 9). 
c) Value and market interactions 
Value is seldom discussed in the analysis of markets, either in heterodox  
economics or in economic sociology, and this is strange given the fact that 
“one crucial source of uncertainty confronting market actors derives from the 
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difficulties of assessing the value of commodities” (Beckert, 2009: 253). 
Beckert discusses the issue of value from the point of view of market 
demand, actually the point of view of the consumers who strive to form a 
judgement about the value of what they want to buy, and below I will draw 
on his contribution. 
Contra the idea of an exogenously given set of preferences assumed by 
neoclassical economics, Beckert rightly recalls the critique of Talcott Parsons 
and his view of a socialised determination of consumers’ valuation process. 
Hence, Beckert discusses different ways of attributing value according to the 
particular type of the goods/services exchanged. Some goods may be ranked 
according to a technical standard, which is a social construct that gives the 
customer an idea of their qualities and adequacy for a purpose in view. Other 
goods are valued according to theoretical, social or political conventions. For 
instance, in the financial markets neoclassical models of finance ‘informs’ the 
software used by the traders, and thus coordinates their action “providing a 
cognitive basis from which to judge the relative value of heterogeneous 
products within the market” (Beckert, 2009: 254). In other markets (e.g. art, 
wine) it is the informed opinion of an expert that guides the buyer in his 
judgement about the value of the product. His assessment “relies on socially 
constructed judgments that reduce uncertainty and thereby stabilize 
expectations in a market field” (Ibid, 254-255). 
Another source of judgement lies in religion, which has been an obstacle, in 
the nineteenth century in the USA, to the creation of a market for life 
insurance, and still is today important in what concerns the consumption of 
some foods. It is also clear that the value of a large number of goods 
depends on their recognition as signs of status in social ranking, which is the 
essence of the fashion markets and justifies large investments of 
corporations to build and maintain a successful ‘brand’. On the other hand, 
cultural changes in society at large may turn obsolete, and in time lead to the 
disappearance of, a number of goods/services and their markets.  These are 
not evident processes and much of the rhetoric about the ‘knowledge 
economy’ conceals the multi-dimensionality of what is being changed in the 
last decades and will continue to change (Slater, 2002): the materiality of 
products or infrastructures of services provided; the productive processes, 
the logistics of distribution and exchange interfaces; consumers’ capabilities 
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to use new products; symbolisation of social status. In much, if not all, of 
these aspects the market’s supply and demand are actively constituting each 
other. 
So far I have followed Beckert (2009: 257) in his argument that “it is through 
processes of standardization, cognitive anchoring, normative legitimation, 
and social positioning that the subjective value attributions arise with which 
market actors assign value to goods.” Nevertheless, products and services 
must have some material basis to support the valuation of consumers. 
Indeed, this was the perspective of the classical political economists for 
whom, namely Ricardo and Marx, the value of goods was exclusively 
originated by the labour used in their production; the good (in itself) 
incorporates the value. Whatever the merits of the labour-value theory, we 
will not understand the creation of value in the market if we ignore the 
process of production. At least because it is there that is made the 
distribution of the revenue, which is sustained by the final validation in the 
quantities sold at a given price taking place in the appropriation stage of the 
market.256 And the problem of revenue distribution makes a full circle in our 
story as it connects with the problem of the competitiveness of the firm, 
which may be seen in two close but different perspectives: “the 
Schumpeterian because the enterprise organizes the innovation process that 
permits the development of productive resources [and thus higher profits 
and higher wages] and the Marxian because the enterprise has incentives to 
invest in new technologies and ensure their fullest possible utilization [with 
less employees, better paid and more stressed]” (Lazonick, 1991: 290). 
The above presented discussion gives some detail to what I have named an 
Interactionist model of markets’ (Fig. 16), an understanding of the key forces 
that jointly create the history of each market, and of the whole market 
system of modern capitalist economies. Underlying this discussion is the 
systemic, sociocultural view of the market presented in chapter 4 where, in 
line with my particular understanding of institutions, I make a central 
distinction between the market’s organisations and the market’s norms. The 
latter have an ontology of a cultural kind (which includes technologies) and 
therefore bear meaning connections with the common pool of society’s 
                                                 
256 In modern markets the price is usually fixed by the supplier within a procedure of cost 
accounting and a (flexible) policy of mark-up (see Tool, 1995). 
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culture, as do the other institutions. The multiple interactions in which the 
market’s actors are engaged as members of different institutions of society, 
and therein hold particular interests, have a bearing on the norms that 
regulate market activity, and thus are causal sources of its history. These 
interactions involve market actors’ judgements about what are their personal 
interests, those of their firms, and those of society at large. This is the social 
dimension of markets – as distinct from, but interdependent with, the 
cultural dimension – that accounts for actors’ interactions in mobilising 
power and resources of different kind to change norms (Dimitrakopoulos, 
2005). Of course, these multiple inter-institutional interactions have a 
bearing not only in markets’ norms but also in market’s organisations 
(networks, firms, unions, etc.), and therefore are important causal sources of 
market’s history. 
To close the chapter I would like to emphasise the particular role of the state 
in the model. It would be a mistake to understand the state either as one 
institution of society on equal footing with the others, or as the ‘pilot’ that 
commands society. Modern societies have differentiated into highly complex 
sociocultural systems (institutions) that cannot be guided in a hierarchical 
command-and-control mode (Amin and Hausner, 1997). In the Interactionist 
model the state (and the polity that turns around it) is not simply one among 
other institutions; it has a specific status. The state not only produces 
normative meanings and guidance for the whole society but also is the 
enforcer of last resort through police, courts, jails, and in some states death 
penalty; in fact, the state is a meta-institution that interacts with the other 
institutions. 
Therefore, the political projects that strive for society’s legitimation in 
contemporary democracies, and aim to control the state, are in a large part 
projects that address the architecture and the consequences of a capitalist 
organisation of the economy.257 Political struggles are thus a source of 
markets’ change, which is central to the argument of Hall and Thelen (2009: 
26): “the kind of coalitional analysis that has been so important for 
explaining the origins of many institutions [norms or organisations] in 
coordinated market economies also provides the basis for a dynamic account 
                                                 
257 For a systematic discussion of these consequences see (Metcalfe and Warde, 2002a: 
199-204). 
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of how shifting alignments of interests bring about the reconfiguration of 
institutions and forms of coordination in both liberal and coordinated market 
economies.” 
Markets, when understood with the restrictive meaning of ‘exchanges’, have 
been part of human societies long before capitalism. However, as Karl Polanyi 
forcefully argued, with capitalism markets have been extended to new 
domains (labour, money, nature) thereby introducing a source of both 
dynamism and violence in industrialised societies. The state, understood as a 
meta-institution, is the instance from where modern societies attempt to 
moderate that violence inscribed at the core of the capitalist economy. As 
Baecker (2007: 29) put it,  
Without the society intervening, that kind of economy – envisioning an 
uncertain future and making provisions with respect to it – would socially, 
evolutionarily, and materially not be possible. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
In the concluding chapter of this thesis I present the answers that the thesis 
provides to the research questions advanced in Chapter 1 and highlight the 
main results of the research that lend support to them (6.1). Then I show 
how these results make a contribution to contemporary Institutional 
economics (6.2). I finish with a provisional account of the limitations of the 
research outcome and the possible directions in which to explore the 
potential of the Naturalist Institutionalism argued in the thesis (6.3).    
6.1 Research questions: the answers 
The thesis aimed to discuss the nature of markets and, as it has been argued 
in the Introduction, this required a deeper understanding of the core concept 
of ‘institution’. To achieve such aim, research questions have been 
formulated; some of a broader scope and others more circumscribed. In the 
present section I return to four main research questions (RQ) and give them 
straightforward answers, which are followed by a summary of their 
theoretical underpinnings. 
RQ1 – What is the main legacy of Institutional economics? 
The main intellectual legacy of Institutional economics is of an ontological 
nature; it is a proto-emergentist understanding of economic phenomena. 
The review of the work of Veblen, Polanyi and Hayek provided in Chapter 2 
opened a new intellectual window: the three authors make a distinction 
between a micro level of human sociality, namely transactions in markets, 
and a macro level that Veblen names ‘institutions’, Hayek names ‘rules’ and 
Polanyi terms either as ‘institutional set up’ or ‘structures’. Whatever the 
terms used, the three authors tentatively approached an original idea: the 
micro and the macro levels of sociocultural reality are interdependent and 
mutually constitutive. This is an emergentist perspective that overcomes 
‘monist’ approaches (either the micro or the macro) that are unable to 
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understand that we are dealing with a new ontological reality (sociocultural 
systems) that emerges upon these mutually constituting levels. 
This core legacy has been neglected in the revival of Original Institutional 
economics of the last decades, and when today the term ‘emergence’ is used 
it is softened into a “non-reductive physicalism” in order to preserve the 
monist ontology of materialism. This manoeuvre is mostly evident in the 
absence of the concept of ‘person’ in Institutional economics literature, 
which is typically reduced to an epiphenomenon, the mind “supervenient” on 
the human brain. Inspired by Polanyi’s legacy, section 2.5 connects with 
converging contributions of different disciplines to argue that persons 
emerge through linguistic, social and material interactions and, as such, 
persons have causal powers on their own right. 
The concept of person is the point of departure for an ontology of 
sociocultural systems. It is recognised that interactions and communications 
make the life-experience of persons through cognitive, emotional and 
material processes, which give rise to inter-personal bonds. Social relations 
are emergent invariants of these bonds, some of which are internally and 
necessarily related (e.g. teacher-student), and thus constitute roles and 
positions that exist beyond the persons that occupy them. Persons’ social life 
and the systems of ‘social relations’ and ‘public meanings’ that emerge from 
that life should be analytically distinguished. Using a spatial metaphor, while 
the structural level feeds-downwards to persons that occupy roles-positions, 
the outcome of their relations also feeds-upwards to maintain and change 
that structural level. 
In brief, this chapter describes in detail the interplay between human agency 
and the structural levels of sociocultural systems and shows how they make 
systemic wholes, that is, self-organising complex and open systems of a 
sociocultural kind. 
RQ2 – What is an institution? 
An institution is a sociocultural system emergent from inter-related 
organisations, networks, norms and material reality, which structure 
individuals and organisations thereby serving with reliability a societal 
function. 
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This definition of institutions has the advantage of providing a conceptual 
clarification that was for a long time needed in Original Institutional 
economics. This literature gives us definitions of institutions such as “habits of 
thought” (Veblen), “ways of thought or action” (Walton Hamilton) or “patterned 
behaviour and the ideas and values associated” (Neale). However, if institutions 
are to be understood as sociocultural reality they should not be reduced to 
persons’ propensities for habitual behaviour, patterns of behaviour, or a mix of 
both. 
The above presented definition places institutions within sociocultural reality, 
the latter seen as the latest stage of the evolutionary process of Nature. Such 
view means that the properties of sociocultural systems build upon, and are 
consistent with, those of previous levels. 
Chapter 3 provides some inter-disciplinary findings that are helpful to 
understand why social scientists should not accept ‘methodological 
individualism’. For instance: underlying empirical reality there are contingent 
configurations of causal processes criss-crossing different structural levels; 
biological, physical and social systems have irreducible emergent properties, 
and thus take part in causal processes involving both their components and 
other systems, at the same or other levels; rather than ‘things’, systems are 
multi-level ‘organised processes’ interacting with other processes in the 
environment of the system. 
The chapter also shows that sociocultural systems have properties that make 
them specific. In fact, human sociality requires each person to play different 
meaningful roles, which gives rise to cross-border networks that connect the 
various sociocultural systems of society. Further, and differently from the 
biological systems, sociocultural systems interact in a multiplicity of scales, 
both in time and space, due to the use of language. This configuration takes 
sociocultural reality to the highest levels of self-organisation and complexity in 
the evolutionary process of Nature. 
In the definition of institutions, cultural components (‘norms’), endowed with 
different kinds of normativity, are combined with social components 
(networks, organisations), and meaningful material reality. The reference to 
the specific symbolising nature of human beings and their societies points to a 
crucial link: material reality is involved in the semiotic processes that give rise 
to institutional norms. Therefore, if we want to understand what are 
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institutions we need to draw on the philosophical roots of Original 
Institutionalism, which means that Institutional norms are better understood in 
the context of Peirce’s triadic semiotic. 
This thesis elaborates a Peircean ontology of culture and treats culture as 
society’s ‘pool’ of meanings that supports the huge diversity of institutional 
‘norms’. Here resides the basis for the distinction between the social and the 
cultural components of institutions; although interdependent, they are 
ontologically distinct. 
Summing up: 
 - social and cultural entities have distinct roles in institutions. The cultural 
components (norms) provide normativity while social systems (organisations, 
networks) provide functionality; 
- on the overall, four analytical levels are assumed: interactional-
communicational, institutions, society, world, each relatively autonomous to 
the others; 
- different combinations between social and cultural elements account for a 
large range of institutions and for the existence of tensions between social and 
cultural domains, and between institutions themselves and the whole societal 
system. 
RQ3 – Is the market an institution? 
The market is a meso-institution of society, a sub-system of the institution 
‘economy’. More specifically, it is a (sociocultural) self-organising, complex and 
open system endowed with structural levels that have emerged from persons’ 
interactions-communications, many of them acting as members of 
organisations, in the transformation processes of production, distribution, 
appropriation and consumption, using matter-energy and symbolic tools in 
order to maintain and enhance the provisioning of society. 
The thesis connects Karl Polanyi’s thinking with Talcott Parsons systemic 
sociology through the idea that the ‘economy’ is a macro-institution of society. 
Differently from most Institutionalist literature, it also establishes a distinction 
within the economy between the ‘market system’ and the non-market activities 
of provision. 
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The traditional ‘division of knowledge’ between economics and sociology is 
also blurred with the proposal of a new concept of human rationality: human 
rationality is multi-dimensional and socially situated; it always intertwines 
concerns about efficiency, effectiveness, and values about interdependent ends 
and means, in contexts where institutional norms and structural powers of the 
economy (and other institutions) constitute, and are constituted by, the 
persons involved. 
In line with the understanding of institutions presented in the previous 
chapter, the market is seen as a multi-level self-organising, complex, and open 
system. The upper level is made of two kinds of structures: the ‘social’, 
composed of organisations and networks; the ‘cultural’, composed of norms, 
some of which may constitute ideational systems (e.g. business models, 
management theories, ideologies). The intermediate level is constituted by 
networks of both social relations and meanings that make up the 
‘transformation processes’. At the bottom-level of markets are persons’ 
interactions and communications and the “transactions” that consummate the 
legal transfer of ownership and use of goods and services. This is an inclusive 
understanding that nevertheless excludes from the scope of the concept the 
transactions involving land, labour and money, the “fictitious commodities” of 
Karl Polanyi, which are only (market-like) exchanged but not subjected to the 
other transformation processes that are indispensable to the existence of a 
market. 
The reader might wonder why neoclassical economics understanding of 
markets is not addressed in this thesis. The reason is well explained by 
Geoffrey Hodgson (1999: 36-37) in the statement that that “Neoclassical 
theory is Market-Blind”, “the main element of the narrative is the increases of 
utility received by the individuals involved, not the transfer of property rights 
within a framework of legal institutions.” In neoclassical economics, markets 
equate to momentary physical exchanges of goods, money is absent and 
processes (continuous change) are ruled out. Its ‘representative agent’ is 
alien to ‘real world’ persons, which have different competencies and 
knowledge. In brief, neoclassical economics is not relevant for a discussion 
of markets because it is based on erroneous assumptions such as the 
concept of ‘representative’ agent, the absolute dominance of negative feed 
back effects leading to market equilibrium, the ignorance of the systemic 
271 
 
nature of markets and the consequent adoption of methodological 
individualism. 
For these reasons Chapter 4 overlooks neoclassical economics and closes 
with a discussion of the most important differences between my emergentist 
view of markets and those of a few contemporary outstanding heterodox 
economists. 
RQ4 – Do markets evolve? If so, how? 
Yes, markets evolve but this evolutionary process has a specific sociocultural 
nature that goes by the name of ‘history’. The history of a market depends, 
among others, on its interactions with science, the state and culture, aiming 
to manage uncertainty and coordination in three crucial domains, 
competition, cooperation and value. 
In Chapter 5, the thesis takes a stand about the current debate between 
those Institutional economists who argue for a generalised explanatory 
scheme inspired in biological evolution and those who prefer the inspiration 
of physic-chemical systems. Whatever the level of abstraction adopted, both 
stances actually build on foundational analogies. They argue for the ‘right’ 
analogy with another level of Nature, and do not realise that the emergence 
of a sociocultural level brought with itself a new kind of evolutionary 
principles. From the point of view of Naturalist Institutionalism, the debate is 
off the point for the analytical focus of economics should be on what is the 
specific nature of markets, rather than on analogies with other levels of 
Nature. 
The thesis summarises a critique of Neo-Darwinism made by non-mainstream 
biologists, which strengthens the idea that autonomous systems, while 
interacting with their environment, co-constitute the overall evolutionary 
process. This perspective, amazingly glossed over in ‘evolutionary’ economics 
literature, undermines its typical reasoning in terms of ‘population thinking’. 
Further, not only population thinking does not address the causal processes 
through which biological evolution occurs but it is also inadequate for 
understanding the history of sociocultural systems. In the case of markets, 
their components (e.g. firms, clients) establish stable bonds among themselves 
and with other systems of the societal environment (e.g. state, science, family) 
that cut across heterogeneous scales of time and space. These are features 
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that invalidate evolutionary population models, at least in the study of 
markets. 
Chapter 5 specifies how the history of markets unfolds. It presents a model of 
markets’ motion that combines an ontology of time with the structural analysis 
of market processes. Market interactions addressing the problems of 
competition, cooperation and value are addressed in detail. The emphasis on 
interactions is inspired by the Classical Pragmatist vision of relational 
processes. The model highlights key inter-institutional interactions that jointly 
create the history of each market, and the history of the whole market system 
in modern capitalist economies. In this sense it provides a bridge to the 
Varieties of Capitalism literature. 
With science and culture, the state plays a central role in the model. It would 
be a mistake to see the state either as one institution of society on equal 
footing with the others, or as the ‘pilot’ that commands society. Modern 
societies have differentiated into highly complex sociocultural systems 
(institutions) that cannot be guided in a hierarchical command-and-control 
mode. In the Interactionist model the state has the specific status of a ‘meta-
institution’. It is seen as the instance from where modern societies, and the 
political projects that compete for state power, attempt to moderate the 
tensions inscribed in the nature of markets, the powerful core of modern 
capitalist economies. 
6.2 Novelty of the thesis 
Attempting to update Original Institutional economics, the present thesis 
turned out as an outcome of cross-disciplinary research. Its point of 
departure is the proto-emergentism hinted by Veblen, Hayek and Polanyi, 
which has been fleshed out with relevant work in different disciplines. The 
outcome is a reconstruction of Institutional economics that, in my view, could 
avoid intellectual pitfalls, conceptual dichotomies and sterile debates that 
impede the building of a consistent alternative to mainstream economics. Of 
course this reconstruction opposes received ideas and certainly creates 
intellectual tension with other approaches in the field. I see this outcome in a 
positive perspective; it could provoke discussions, lead to further research 
and give rise to new ideas. This is the constructive spirit in which the thesis 
has been written.   
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 There is a fundamental originality in this thesis. It presents at the outset its 
methodological foundations, which enables those who so far have been 
working in the Original Institutionalist tradition to compare their own with 
my methodological choices and trace at least some of our theoretical 
differences to those fundamental choices. In this sense the thesis is radical; it 
goes down to the roots of the theoretical problems that Institutional 
economics presently faces. 
A metaphysics of process is in itself a radical novelty. Taking reality as 
organised processes, the social scientist is comfortable when discussing 
sociocultural change and the existence of order and stability, which contrasts 
with the Institutional economics traditional bias to emphasise permanence. 
Highlighting that sociocultural processes are ‘organised’, that is, stably 
related among themselves, the thesis shows how we can articulate the 
‘structural’ and the ‘flow’ views of sociocultural phenomena that usually are 
seen as incompatible. 
This same methodology provides a ground to overcome the present debate 
between those who invoke basic concepts of Darwinism and those who see it 
inadequate for Institutional economics. Notwithstanding the careful use of 
metaphors and analogies, Institutional economics has to be built on what is 
specific to sociocultural reality. Human reflexivity, human semiotic processes 
of thinking and communicating, and the enormous learning capabilities and 
creativity of human beings are central properties of a new emergent level in 
the evolutionary process, which call for a conceptual framework distinct from 
those that are abstracted from processes at other levels of Nature. This is the 
bedrock of Naturalised Institutionalism.    
The proposed understanding of institutions enables Original Institutional 
economics to deal with the great complexity of markets in an inclusive, rich 
and non-reductionist way. Inclusive, because the systemic view enables to 
nest firms within markets rather than oppose them to markets; also inclusive 
because it embraces the diverse processes of market transformation rather 
than limit the analysis to market exchanges. Rich, insofar it makes an 
ontological distinction between norms on the one hand, and firms and 
networks on the other hand, which enables to trace different processes 
endowed with different velocities and rhythms. Non-reductive, because it 
provides the description of the processes that give rise to the structural level 
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of markets, above and beyond the transactions involved, thereby accounting 
for system-wide causal relations that escape ‘mechanismic’ explanations. It 
rescues the economic sociology of Talcott Parsons and, without incurring in a 
functionalist shortcoming, combines it with the emergentist intuition of 
Veblen. At last both streams are reconciled. 
Further, the emergent systems perspective helps to see the functional 
differentiation of society into institutions and the place of culture in relation 
to them. It enables an Interactionist understanding between markets and 
culture that acknowledges sources of change working both ways; markets 
change culture (values and life styles; see Sennett, 1998), and culture 
changes markets (labour capacities, theories about the economy and 
management, demand shifts). The connection between markets and culture 
also becomes enriched with the contribution of Peirce’s semiotic, which 
accounts for the material dimension of culture and shows why technological 
innovations are in fact one aspect of culture-markets interactions. In brief, 
Naturalist Institutionalism provides an encompassing conceptual framework 
that can be useful to frame the empirical study of markets and market 
systems in contemporary capitalist economies. 
Consistently with a multi-level ontology, the thesis argues that different 
levels of Nature require different ontologies, and hence different kinds of 
meta-theories and theories. This stance implies, on the one hand pluralism 
among sciences, and on the other hand invites economics to a friendly 
dialogue with the other sub-disciplines of social science. I surmise that my 
emergentist, multi-level ontology provides a helpful grounding for: (1) intra-
disciplinary dialogue, namely with political scientists, economic sociologists 
and the Varieties of Capitalism literature; (2) inter-disciplinary dialogue, 
namely with researchers working in developmental psychology. The thesis 
suggests that there are opportunities for synergistic gains in ‘inter’ and 
‘trans’-disciplinary research projects, which could transform the study of 
markets and the broader economy in “an everyman’s land”, to use 
Schumpeter’s words (Swedberg, 1999 [1989]). That day, whatever the scholar 
background and the research methods used, all those engaged in the study 
of the economy would rightly name themselves ‘economists’. 
Another innovative contribution of Naturalist Institutionalism is related to the 
concept of institutional ‘norms’. Rather than ‘rules’, a word with a 
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computational connotation, the thesis proposes the term ‘norms’, which is 
encompassing enough to integrate different cultural entities such as laws, 
customs, theories and values. The latter are of most importance because it 
brings into the analysis of markets something that long ago has been 
abandoned in favour of (only apparently) amoral terms such as ‘efficiency’, 
‘utility’ and ‘self-interest’. In this sense, Naturalist Institutionalism reconnects 
with the Classical roots of economics; it is Political Economy. 
Further, the thesis argues for what Schumpeter understood as a reasoned 
history of capitalism. For instance, the model of markets proposed in Chapter 
5 (notwithstanding the differences in scope and merit) has characteristics 
similar to Schumpeter’s Theory of Development. The model describes the 
market as systemically organised processes of social and cultural nature that 
emerge from interactions and communications between persons. It is an 
intellectual tool to be used in the study of empirical data recurring to 
different kinds of research methods, both quantitative and qualitative, in 
order to understand the history of particular markets and the market system 
of a society. In this sense, Naturalist Institutional economics is also 
theoretically informed history of the economy. 
Finally, the Interactionist model highlights the interdependence of the 
different institutions of society and shows how they are connected by 
networks of agents acting on behalf of organisations pertaining to these 
institutions. This is illustrated with innovation processes (Fig. 17), which are 
organised in more or less formal networks involving persons with different 
institutional belongings, that is, different interests, powers, competencies, 
ideas and values. They are historically specific institutional articulations of a 
particular society, which is a view that differs from the concept of Systems of 
Innovation adopted in ‘evolutionary economics’ literature. On this point, the 
originality of the thesis comes from the acknowledgement that innovation is 
at the core of developmental change, which involves changes in the 
community’s culture, in the norms of its institutions (values, ideas, 
worldviews) and in the balance of power between different groups at 
different spatial scales. It suggests the need to build multi-level coalitions for 
change. 
Because the Interactionist model places norms of different kind (legal and non-
legal) at the core of institutions, it highlights the risks of voluntarism in 
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policymaking. In fact, change in legislation is only one move in the overall 
process of institutional change, which also depends on other norms such as 
ideologies and business models, and on the ‘social’ components of institutions 
where power and interests are of prime importance. The awareness that the 
social and the cultural domains do not change at the same pace is of most 
importance for sensible policy decisions. A policymaking going down to local 
partnerships and experimental projects could reveal unintended and 
undesirable effects of centrally designed policies. Only such participatory style 
is able to engage public services in a collective learning process that creates 
opportunities and capabilities for new developmental paths. The model 
suggests an Interactionist policymaking. 
6.3 Limitations and research prospects 
The thesis provides what should be understood as the first step of a new 
research programme in heterodox Institutional economics. While such a 
programme should cover the study of other institutions and their interplay 
within the nation-society, and beyond its borders, the thesis has a limited 
focus, the study of markets. The in-depth discussion of the ontology of 
institutions came from the need to overcome the ambiguities that pervade 
the existent definitions of markets. The proposed concept of institution 
certainly needs to be improved with contributions from other bodies of 
knowledge in social science.  
The model of markets presented in Chapter 4 and 5 incorporates time as an 
intrinsic dimension of interacting processes of transformation of matter-
energy and meanings. It is only a sketch of a research project that needs 
cooperative work in an extended horizon. For instance, the institution 
‘family’ has not been discussed in the model. It has been included in ‘other 
institutions’, and yet an explicit account of the interactions between markets 
and the ‘family’ would explicit crucial links between the market and the non-
market domain of the economy. The same could be said of the interactions 
with the institution ‘education’. 
Another aspect of the model that needs further work is the definition of a 
theoretical criterion to help empirical research to define a particular market. 
For instance, do the utilitarian and the luxury cars belong to the same 
market, the market of ‘cars’? How should we make explicit the international 
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scale of transformation processes involving multi-national corporations with 
a model that is anchored on nation-state institutions and culture while 
international norms are still absent or in a early process of emergence? 
The completeness of the Interactional model of markets was not sought from 
the beginning, to which add limitations such as the above mentioned. Of 
course it does not provide a set of equations, which nowadays is the 
standard of ‘elegance’ in mainstream economics modelling, although it is 
certainly more in tune with the reality that it seeks to understand than such 
formalisations. On the whole, the model is a sketch that needs to be 
developed and matured through critical debate. It explores new directions in 
theoretical research and provides some conceptual novelty, which hopefully 
will stimulate discussions that could further the achievement of a broad 
consensus in Original Institutional economics. 
The thesis presents unfinished work. It provides an ontology of markets that 
should be followed by two kinds of research streams. One, at the theoretical 
level, should aim to identify complementary contributions from other 
literatures that could help to make a more robust connection between 
Institutional economics and the sociology of markets. Here, beyond Weber 
and Parsons, I am thinking of classical sociologists such as Tönnies and 
Simmel whose rich work I have not explored (for instance, see Zafirovski, 
2007). 
Another stream of research that could follow is the empirical work, without 
which any theoretical contribution remains at best an interesting hypothesis. 
In the spirit of Classical Pragmatism, I assume that it is not enough to engage 
in debate with peers about theoretical contributions. In the case of markets, 
to do rigorous empirical work means, in a trivial sense, to do historical work; 
any empirical data about markets is about what has already happened. The 
theoretical framework proposed in this thesis could inform historical studies 
of markets of different kinds of goods-services at different geographical 
scales. For instance, there is a lack of studies in services despite the fact that 
the economy of contemporary developed societies is mainly a ‘services 
economy’. 
The study of a given market, when informed by a theoretical framework such 
as the one proposed here, enables to ask pertinent questions, organise the 
data, and clarify what is historical and contextual in light of the general 
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features of the model. At the same time, empirical work raises questions 
about the relevance of the theoretical framework, which may lead to 
adjustments or even a change in fundamental assumptions. For studies 
involving an extensive timescape, ‘historical narrative’ might be a useful 
method of research if structured by the theoretical model (Büthe, 2002). Case 
studies and historical studies of markets could provide a fruitful test to the 
usefulness of Naturalist Institutionalism. 
And I finish with that Pragmatist idea that usefulness of economic theories 
should be a central concern to Institutional economics, a concern brilliantly 
expressed by a great Institutional economist of the twentieth century: 
And since we will be in touch with real issues, and since issues that are real 
inspire passion, our life will, again, be pleasantly contentious, perhaps even 
usefully dangerous (Galbraith, 1973: 10). 
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